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PREFACE.
The theory of international law on which this study is
based, may be briefly summarized in a few statements. With the
present system of world organization, effective enforcement of law is
only possible through action by state administrative and. judicial or-
gans. International law, therefore, can not be effectively enforced
exce t over persons subject to the jurisdiction of the state. We
may therefore conclude that international law can be effectively en-
forced only in so far as it prescribes conduct for persons and sub-
ordinate agencies of government.
The essential feature of international law is not that it
lays down rules of conduct for states, but that it holds states re-
sponsible for the conduct of persons. International law, therefore
should be regarded as the law binding the members, both persons and
states, of a "supra-national" state or a "community of nations", the
enforcement of which is delegated to the organs of the states com-
posing it. The German Constitution, with its system of imperial law,
binding on individuals but enforced largely through the adrninis tra tiv
officers and courts of the component states, furnishes an illustra-
tion of such a system.
The recognition of this fact, that international law reaches
down to individuals is therefore, important. International law can
become effective, through state enforcement, in proportion as it
lays down obligations for persons, rather than for states. Much
of it now consists of rules prescribed for persons and officers of
government and the greater part of it can be described in terms of
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such rules because the state can only act through human agencies.
When we say that a state is obliged to do or abstain from doing cer-
tain acts, we can only mean that its chief executive officer, or its
legislature, or its courts are bound to observe certain rules, which
by proper constitutional checks, it is possible for municipal law to
enforce
.
With this conception, that international law prescribes rules
of conduct for persons and public officers and imposes obligations
upon states, to enforce them, we shall consider the rules of munici-
pal law enforced in the United States in pursuance of this internatioi;
al obligation.
The distinction between a legal and a political method of
enforcement has been kept in mind. Where action is left to the
discretion of military, naval or executive officers or legislative
bodies as cases arise, the rule is not considered on of municipal
law. The term is only applied to the rules laid down as permanent
and enforceable by governmental authority according to an established
procedure, either judicial or administrative.
The title to be given this study, caused the author much
perplexity, and doubtless the one finally decided upon is open to
criticism. Mr. A. V.Dicey entitled his book on "private internationa:
law", "A Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict
of Law." Ferhaps this thesis could be entitled "A Digest of the
Law of the United States with reference to International Law." Such
a title ,however
,
would imply a mere or less exhaustive treatment of
the subject. The present work does not pretend to digest the whole
of the law of the United States relating to the enforcement of inter-
national obligations. It is intended merely to suggest a field
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which the writer believes will bear further exploration. The title
first considered was "The Extent to which International Law is Ih-
corporated into the Law of the United States." Such a title would
have excluded consideration of the rules which we have designated
laws supplementary to international law. They are municipal law
enforcing international obligations but are not rules of internation-
al law incorporated into municipal law. The title finally settled
upon is certainly inclusive enough and indicates that discussion is
limited to the rules of international law enforced as law in the
United States, excluding those enforced by executive authorities as
"political questions."
The general subject of the relationship of international to
municipal law, has not been extensively considered in any English
treatise. Holland's excellent article on "international Law and
Acts of Parliament" published in his "Studies on International Law"
is a brief but valuable contribution. Professors J.B.Scott and W.W.
Willoughby in articles in the American Journal of International Law,
Westlake in an article Entitled, "is International Law a part of
the Law of England" published in the Law Quarterly Review, and Law-
rence in his "Essays on some disputed Questions of International Law"
have discussed the nature of international law and its relation to
municipal law, especially to the judiciary. Walker in his "Science
of International Law", Westlake in his "Principles" as well as his
more recent work on International Law and A. H. Snow in several
articles in the American Journal of International Law have emphasized
the idea that international law is law governing individuals regar-
ded as members of a society of nations, rather than law, simply be-
tween nations, as the name suggests. The last writer in fact sug-
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gests the term "supra or super national" as a more appropriate term.
Writers on jurisprudence have sometimes considered the sub-
fleet but usually very briefly. With Austin's example before them,
they have excluded international law from the scope of their subject.
Gray's "Nature and Sources of the Law" and Stephen's "History of the
Criminal Law of England" contain particularly lucid expositions of
this standpoint.
The most important contributions to the subject are in Ger-
man. H. Triepjjfcel in his "Volkerrecht und Landesrecht" considers the
nature, sources and relationships of international and municipal law.
W. Kauf#man7j, in "Die Rechtskraft des Internationalen Rechtes und das
Verhaltnisse des Staats Organs zu demselben covers somewhat the same
ground but emphasizes particularly the legal authority of internation-
al law and tr ;aties as immediate sources of municipal law.
In the present work, the writer has attempted to discover
the actual situation in the Unitsd States, with only incidental re-
ference to the theoretical relationship of the two branches of juris-
prudence. Frimary reference has therefore been madd to the treaties
statutes, executive orders and court decisions of the United States.
Had it not been for the orderly arrangement of much of this material
in Moore's "Digest of International Law", a monumental contribution t<
the science, the work would have been practically impossible. Moore's
International Arbitrations, have also been used as have the collections
of cases by Freeman Snow, J.B.Scott, Pitt Cobbett, and Norman Bent-
wich. Much use has also been made of the annual publications of the
Naval War College, in which numerous points of prize law have been
exhaustively discussed with especial reference to the practice of
the United States. Professor C. G.Fenwick's recent work on the
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Neutrality laws of the United States has been constantly referred
to in dealing with that subject. Tucker and Blood's edition of the
Penal Code of 1910, Davis's edition of the Military Laws and Howland'
Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General, all exhaustively
annotated, have also been of assistance. The standard treatises
on international law, of which those by Professors G.G.Wilson and
Amos S.Hershey are particularly rich in references illustrative of
American practice, have, of course, been referred to.
The work has been carried through under the guidance of
Professors J. W. Garner and Walter Farleigh Dodd, to both of whom the
author wishes to made grateful acknowledgement for many suggestions
and much helpful criticism.
Champaign, Illinois,
May 15, 1915.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Possibility of Enforcing International by Municipal Law.
It is the purpose of this thesis to discover how and to what
extent international law is enforced by municipal law in the United
States. For an adequate treatment of the subject a more or less
definite meaning must be attached to the terms municipal law and in-
ternational law. This is all the more necessary because with a com-
mon view of these two branches of jurisprudence, our inquiry would
be not only fruitless but impossible. Thus there is a common opinion
which limits the connotation of international law to relationships
between states regarded as independent political communities, exclu-
sively. 1 With this view the state is regarded as a unit, an organism
whose control is concentrated in a single will designated by the term
sovereignty. It is with sovereigns alone that international law has
to do
.
Municipal law on the other hand is held to be law within the
state. The sovereign enforces it but can not be bound by it. As
well say that a dynamo can drive the engine which moves it, as to say
the sovereign power can be controlled by the municipal law it makes
1-See Bentham, "With regard to the political equality of the per-
sons whose conduct is the object of the law. They may, on any given
occasion be considered either as members of the same state, or mem-
bers of different states, in the first case the law may be referred
to the head of internal; in the second case to that of international
jurisprudence. Now as to any transactions which may take place be-
tween individuals who are subjects of different states, these are
regulated by the internal laws and decided upon by the internal tri-
bunals of the one or the other of those states, the case is the same
where the sovereign of the one has any immediate transaction with a
private member of the other. * » * There remains then, the mutual
transactions between sovereigns as such, for the subject of that
branch of jurisprudence which may be properly and exclusively termed
international law." Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legis-
lation, Works, Bowring Ed., 3; 149. See also Travers Twiss, Law of
Nations considered as independent political communities, Oxford, 1884
p. 2; T.E. Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, 11th, ed., N.Y.
1910, pp 385-389, 402.
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and enforces. ^ How then can municipal law enforce international law?
Clearly with this conception of international law, it can not.
Although this theory of international law is often enunciated,
it is never adhered to in discussions of the subject with the mean-
ing just outlined. All writers on international law discuss rights
and duties of ambassadors and consuls, of armed forces, of aliens,
of neutral vessel in time of naval war, etc. International law as
well as municipal law contains rules relating to the conduct of per-
sons. Were such rules omitted from the subject, international law
would be reduced to a few precepts telling when a state might make
war, how far it may exercise jurisdiction, how and when it may ac-
quire territory, some of which on investigation would be found to be
rules of policy rather than of law.
International law is not to be distinguished from municipal law
by the assertion that the former relates to the conduct of states,
the latter to the conduct of individuals within the state. Not state
conduct, but state responsibility is the criterion of international
law. International law prescribes rules of conduct which individuals
must observe, but if they fail to observe them it pays no attention
to the individual but declares that the state of which he is a mem-
ber is responsible and liable. All rules, for the breach of which
states will be held liable, are rules of international law.
1-See Justice Holmes, MA sovereign is exempt from suit not because
of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends," Kawananako
vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,353, (1907), citing Hobbes, Leviathan,
c26, 2; Bodin, Republique, 1, c8, ed. 1629. p 132; Sir John Eliot,
De Jure Maiestrate, c3; Baldwin, De Leg. et Const, Digna Vox, 2nd ed.
1496, fol. 51b, ed • 1539, fol. 61. See also American Banana Co. vs.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347; John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudent
,
5th ed., London, 1911, 2 vols., 1;263, 278 J.C. Grey, The Nature and
Sources of the Law, N.Y., 1909, p 77-81; T.E. Holland, The Elements
of Jurisprudence, 11th ed.. N . Yj 1910 . p 53. 3651 J«W. Salmond. Juris-
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Thus international law and municipal law are not mutually ex-
clusive. The same rules may be prescribed by both. Both interna-
tional law and the municipal law of the United States say that in-
habitants of the United States shall not "set on foot military ex-
peditions" when the country is neutral, and that naval forces shall
not interfere with neutral commerce in time of war except for breach
of blockade, carriage of contraband or similar cause. Municipal law
however, holds the individual criminally liable for setting on foot
;
a military expedition1 and the naval officer liable in damages for
o
making a seizure without probable cause, while international law in
both cases requires the United States to make reparation to the in-
jured state if these acts occur. 3 We believe therefore that it is
possible for municipal law to enforce at least a part of Internationa]
law so far as the obligations of that state are concerned.
2. Relationship of International and Municipal Law.
International law consists of rules prescribing the conduct of
persons, agencies of government and states, for breaches of which
4
states are held liable. This definition is undoubtedly exceedingly
vague. It is often difficult to tell whether a state will be held
prudence, 2nd. Ed., London, 1907, p. 110, 475-481; J.C. Calhoun, Dis-
quisition on government, Works, 6 vol., Columbus, 1851, 1;146; J.W.
Burgess, Political Science and Comparative constitutional law, Boston,
1902, 2 vol., 1;53.
1-Act Apr. 20, 1818, Rev. Stat. sec. 5286.
2-Little vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 176,(1804); The Thompson, 3 Wall.,
155; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170. See Moore's Digest, 7; 593-598.
3-Hague Conventions, 1907, v;art.4: Declaration of London, 1909,
art. 64.
4-A number of different points of emphasis are made in definitions
of international law. All agree that they are "rules of conduct
regulating the intercourse of states" (Halleck, Int. Law, 3rd., ed.
1;46). Many however enlarge this definition in its most limited sense,
by emphasizing the fact that international law may prescribe conduct
for persons, (Hershey, Int. Law, pi; Westlake, Int. Law 1;1: Prln-
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liable for the infraction of a particular rule or not. Often if weak
it will, if strong it will not. There is no authoritative tribunal
for defining rules of international law and saying for this act of a
person or of an officer the state is responsible, for this it is not.
ciples pi j Bonfils, Droit Int, pp 2,79). Walker, (Science, p. 44)
emphasizing this idea says, "International laws are rules of conduct
observed by men toward each other as members of different states
through members of the same international circle." Most writers, how-
ever, even those enlarging the denotation of the term, restrict its
connotation by requiring that the rules conform to some standard of
objectivity. "Actual observance " is frequently considered enough,
(Bonfils, pi; Walker, Science, p. 44). Lawrence (p.l) and Bonfils
(p. 2) require that the rules " determine conduct " , Westlake (Prin.pl)
that they " govern the relations of states", Hershey , (p.l) that they
be "binding upon the members of the international community". Exactly
how any of these standards can distinguish international law from in-
ternational morality, it is difficult to see. They are so vague as
to be almost meaningless. Hall's insistence that nations must "have
consented to be bound" (p.5) is more definite, while Holland (Studies,
pi. 94) is even more concrete when he says, "the law of nations * * is
the public opinion of the governments of the civilized world with
reference to the rights which any state would be justified in vindi-
cating for itself by a resort to arms
.
" Some writers emphasize the
idea that international law is not real law. Holland calls it "pub-
lic opinion", (Studies, p. 194), Austin, "International Public Moral-
ity (1;173,226) Stephen, (History of Crim. Law. 2; 35) and Gray (Na-
ture and sources of the law p. 125) convey a similar idea. It seems
to us that such assertions are inappropriate in a definition of in-
ternational law. Usage has applied the term so consistently that it
would seem more proper to enlarge the definition of law so as to in-
clude international "law". However, such definitions may serve the
useful purpose of indicating that the sanction of international law
is different from that of municipal law, which is the significance
given by these writers to the term "law." Our definition is doubt-
less as open to the criticism of vagueness as any. We make no im-
mediate limitation according to the character of the parties obligated*
Any rule of conduct is a rule of international law, if states are
held liable . This connotative limitation under present conditions
implies an exclusion of rules relating to parties of a certain char-
acter, for instance those defining relationships between persons of
the same state or persons and their own government, because such
matters being entirely internal, other states have no interest in
exacting a liability. There have, however, been attempts to include
res interna in international law, for example the principle of le-
gitimacy by the Quadruple Alliance of 1815. If state liability were
actually recognized, in such matters, they would become rules of in-
ternational law. By the phrase "are held liable" we mean to assume
an inductive and objective standard, requiring actual practice for
the proof of this condition, and also a subjective standard similar
to Holland's that opinion must recognize a resort to force as justi-
fiable. In enforcing this liability, a condition which is of courseincapable of more than very indefinite verification.
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The only test is that of actual practice. Where responsibility is
habitually acknowledged or in other words, where the concensus of
opinion among nations recognizes that responsibility exists, the
rule is one of international law.
Even more vague than the scope of international law is its
sanction. The enforcement of the liability of states is not insured
by any legal procedure. Such pressure as the inertia of habit, pub-
lic opinion, commercial or military reprisal, threats of war, etc., 1
alone compel states to observe international law, to enforce its ob-
servance among their subjects and within their territory, to acknowl-
edge their liability and to make adequate reparation for infractions
of its precepts.
But although it is difficult to tell what rules are within the
field of international law and what sanctions enforce the liability
of states, it is easy to state definitely many of the rules them-
selves and to show how they are actually enforced. This statement
appears self-contradictory, yet there are many rules relating to
diplomatic intercourse, condemnation of prizes, which are capable of
being stated in definite terms and are enforced by definite legal
methods. They are also rules of international law, at least states
have habitually acknowledged responsibility for their infraction*
For the definite statement and legal enforcement of internation-
al law we look to the municipal law, of states. Municipal law con-
2
sists of all general rules which the state enforces. The most com-
mon agents of enforcement are judicial tribunals but a rule enforced
"V- See Elihu Root, "The sanctions of International Law", Am. Jour.
Int. Law, 2;451, (1908)
2- Writers on general jurisprudence commonly give a similar defini-
tion to the term "law". Gray, (Nature and Sources of the Law, p. 82)
says "the law of the state -- is composed of the rules which the
courts -» lay down for the determination of legal rights and duties,"
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by an authoritative executive or administrative proceedure is no less
municipal law. The rules of international law, so far as they lay
down rights and duties of persons and officers may be enforced by
municipal law either directly through the application of internation-
al law by the court and executive officials or indirectly through the
coercion of persons and officers in a manner not immediately pre-
scribed by international law but calculated to cause an observance
of the international duty*
It is true that they may not be. A state has entire control of
its own municipal law and whether or not it chooses to enforce rules
of international law, depends upon the force of the international
sanctions pressing upon it. 1 But if it does enforce them, it there-
by enforces its own duties under international law and in so far as
Salmond
,
(Jurisprudence p. 9) says, "The law is the body of principles
recognized and applied by the state in the administration of justice".
Both of these definitions recognize state enforceability as the most
important feature of municipal law. Austin* s conception (Lectures
on Jurisprudence, 1;79,88) was essentially the same although he em-
phasized the fact that the state "commanded" law rather than that
it enforces it, thus being forced to the awkward explanation that
"what the sovereign permits he commands" (2;510) to explain judg-
made law. Maine's criticism (Early Hist, of Inst., p. 377- 387) that
customary law is neither commanded or enforced by the sovereign and
can not be altered by him, seems to confuse the titular with the real
sovereign. If customary law is applied in village tribunals it is
being enforced by the "sovereign" in the sense of political science
even though Runjeet Singh, the titular sovereign does not enforce it
and can not alter it. Walker, (Science of Int. Law, p. 44) attempts
to parallel his definition of municipal with that of international
law and says "municipal laws are rules of conduct observed by men or
by men recognized as binding toward each other as members of the
same state" . He does not recognize positive state enforceability as
necessary and he also limits the connotation of the term to rules
between members of the same state. We disagree with him in both of
these points. We intend to include as municipal law all rules of
conduct binding either citizens or aliens enforced by the state,
either through a central or local authority, so long as tMs author-
ity is recognized as legitimate.
1- See W.W. Willoughby, The legal Mature of Int. Law, Am. Jour. Int
law, 2,357, in answer to article of same title by J.B. Scott, Am. Jour
Int. Law, 1;831. Also, Westlake, Is Int. Law part of the Law of Eng-
land, Law Quar. Rev., 22; 14-26; Holland, Studies in Int. Law, p»195»
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this enforcement is effective and complete it escapes liability un-
der international law. It also gives legal definition and sanction
to these rules.
It is thus an obligation, imposed by international law itself
upon states to enforce that part of international law relating to
the conduct of persons within their jurisdiction through their muni-
cipal jurisprudence. It is for states, to supply the lack of a
world administration for the execution of international law. As
state courts of the United States enforce the federal constitution,
laws and treaties, so it is the duty of independent governments to
see that their courts enforce international law and that their ex-
ecutive authorities execute it.
It must not be overlooked that there are rules of international
law which a.re incapable of enforcement in municipal law. Those which
prescribe rules of conduct which the state considered as a unit must
do or refrain from are directed solely to the sovereign power in the
government. The commencement of war, the recognition of foreign
states and governments, the submission of questions to arbitration,
the acquisition of territory, the extension of jurisdiction are of
this character. They are political questions and beyond the power
1- See judicial decisions on this subject, Res Publica vs. DeLong-
champs, 1 Dall.lll; Talbot vs. Seamens, 1 Cranch 1,37,(1801); Thirty
Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170,
Scott 17; Hilton vs. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113; The Paqueta Habanna, 175
U.S. 677, Scott, 19. In Murray vs. the Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64,
the court said that municipal law ought to be interpreted in harmony
with international law if possible. English cases--Triquet vs. Bath,
3 Burr. 1478, Scott, 6; Heathfield vs. Chilton, 4 Burr 2015, Scott
189; Le Louis, 2 Dodd 239, Scott 352; Emperor of Austria vs. Day,
2 Giff. 628; In the Recovery, 6 Rob. 348, the court even went so far
as to assert that prize courts must apply international law in oppo-
sition to municipal statutes. This view was not maintained in West
Rand Central Gold Mining Co. vs. Rex, L.R. 1903, 2 K.B. 391, Bentwich
1, which held that an act of state prevented the application of con-
flicting rules of international law. Regina vs. Keyne, L.R. 2 Ex. 63,
Bentwicn, 6, held that international law could not operate to in-
1 crease jurisdiction, and Mort-anHon
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of municipal law to control. The observance of such rules is in the
hands of discretionary officers. In the United States congress and
the president are responsible for the observance of such rules by
the United States and they can not be coerced by municipal regula-
tions. It is true that in these matters the political organs of the
government act according to legal precedents as well as dictates of
pure policy. But their action in either case is beyond the scope of
municipal law and of our subject*
We are concerned with the rules of international law enforced
directly as law in the United States and those enforced indirectly
by the enforcement of laws supplementary to international law, The
precedents and proceedure followed by political organs of government
in settling these political questions will not, therefore, be con-
sidered.
3. Classification.
The doctrine of responsibility of states «hich is the essence of
international law, presents two possible methods of viewing the mat-
ter. We may consider the rule itself of primary importance and thus
private persons, ambassadors, consuls, military forces, naval forces
etc., as well as states would be subjects of international law for
whom different rights and obligations are prescribed. On the other
hand we may consider the liability or enforcement of the rule as of
primary importance; and states, which are alone responsible, as the
only subjects of international law. We should then describe the
rights and duties of states, with reference to these various classes
of officers and persons, considering them as objects of international
law.
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The latter is the course commonly pursued. States are said to
be the only subjects of international law. Persons, public officers
1
as well as territory and other kinds of property are its objects.
In our own opinion there is much to be said for the first view,
'There is a tendency for international law to impose a direct respon-
sibility upon persons and officers2 and if it is ever to be law in
the Austinian sense of the term, this view will have to be recognized
The possibility of an effective law binding states was exhaustively
discussed in the federal convention of 1787, 3 and settled by the
civil war. Even corporations when of considerable magnitude have
proved surprisingly difficult things to control by law. A corpora-
tion or a state can neither be brought to court, nor put in jail.
Law can never act upon it more than imperfectly.
Peters, 14 Scott. L.T.R. 227,(1906), Bentwich 12, applied a statute
extending jurisdiction beyond the limits permitted by international
law. See discussion of prize cases on this point, Holland, Studies,
p. 193-199.
1- See Lawrence, Int. Law, p,73, "Probably it is best to say with
Oppenheira (Int. Law, 1;344) that persons, like territory are objects
of International law, and reserve the term subjects for those arti-
ficial persons who are either sovereign states or communities closely
akin to them through the possession of some of the distinguishing
marks of statehood."
2- See, for instance, Hague Conventions 1907, in which occur such
expressions as "Every prisoner of war is bound to give etc." (IV,
Art. 9) "a belligerent war ship may not prolong its stay, etc.",
(XIII, Arts. 14,16,18,19,20).
3- See James Madi-son, The journal of the debates in the convention
which framed the constitution of the United States, Gaillard Hunt,
ed., N.Y., 1908, 2 vol., also in Madison, Works, Hunt, ed., vol. 3;
Elliot, Debates, vol. 5; Farrand, The records of the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787, New Haven, 1911, Remarks by Madison, May 31, Wilson,
June 25, King, July 14. Strong, July 14, saying, "The practicability
of making laws with coercive sanction for the states as political
bodies had been exploded in all hands. See also Madison letter to
Jefferson, Works, 1;344: The Federalist, Nos. 15,16,21, P.L. Ford,ed.
pp 87,90,91,97,123. A.C. McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Con-
stitution, Am. Nation Ser. , vol. 10, pp 242,245. The constitution of
the German Empire, does provide for the legal coercion of states
through a process known as "Federal Execution", but the law of the
empire acts directly on individuals.
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As it is however, the responsibility of states is the predomi-
nant feature of international law, and we will adhere to the usual
custom of classifying the branches of that subject according to the
rights and duties of states.
It is possible to discuss any body of law in terms of either
rights or duties; either privileges or obligations; either liberties
or restrictions. Every right implies a duty on the part of others
not to infringe it. Every duty implies a right on the part of others
i to expect its observance. Treatises on international law, as on all
other departments of law, commonly treat parts of the subject by de-
scribing duties, other parts by describing rights. In fields where
liberty of action is the rule and restriction the exception, con-
venience dictates a treatment from the standpoint 6f duties, while
when the reverse is true, when restriction is the rule and liberty
of action the exception, a treatment from the standpoint of rights
is most conservative of space.
For our purposes however, a classification based exclusively
on duties is necessary. Our purpose is to discover what obligations
of international law are enforced by municipal law. We will there-
fore attempt to cover the whole field of international law from the
standpoint of duties. We will not consider the rights of the United
States, as such, but only in so far as they imply a duty not to ex-
ceed them.
Looking at international law as imposing obligations upon states,
some of these obligations require action or abstention on the part of
the
.
government , while others require the state to enforce action or
abstention on the part of its citizens or public officers. Duties
of the first character are considered under the four heads: abstention
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acquiescence, vindication and reparation, those of the second under
the head prevention.
The international obligations of a state differ somewhat accord-
ing to differences in status caused by the advent of wars. Four gen-
eral divisions are thus suggested. Obligations in time of peace, ob-
ligations as a neutral, obligations as a belligerent toward neutrals
and obligations as a belligerent toward enemies.
The questions relating to the transition from war to peace,
peace to neutrality, etc., as well as the advent of new states, in-
volve the subject of recognition. This is a political question.
Municipal law does not lay down rules saying when new states shall
be recognized, when belligerency and insurgency exist, and when they
cease. In these matters the municipal law of the United States fol-
lows the political departments of the government as has been repeat-
edly affirmed by the courts.^" It adjusts itself to the new status
and recognizes the new condition.
These matters are therefore beyond the scope of our subject.
We will take the conditions of peace, war and neutrality for granted
and discuss the municipal measures for enforcing national duties in
each of these conditions, classifying such duties under the five heads
abstention, acquiescence, prevention, vindication and reparation.
1- Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 241,(1808); Consul of Spain vs. the
Conception, Fed. Cas. 3137,(1819); Gelston vs. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246,324
(1818); U.S. vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610,(1818); The Bivina Pastora, 4
Wheat. 52; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253,307; Keene vs. McDonough, 8
Pet. 308; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet. 511; Williams vs. Suffolk Ins. Co.,
13 Pet. 415,(1839); Kennett vs. Chambers, 14 How. 38, ( 1852) ; The Prize
Cases, 2 Black 635; U.S. vs. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412; U.S. vs. Lynde, 11
Wall. 632; The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408, (1885) ; Jones vs. U.S.
137 U.S. 202,(1890); The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1,(1896); Underhill
vs. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250; Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938,
(1913). English cases—The Pelican, Edw. Adm. Appdx. D.
,
Taylor vs.
Barkley, 2 Sim. 213; Emperor of Austria vs. Day, 3 Giff 628; Republic
of Peru vs. Peruvian Guano Co., 36 Ch D. 489,497; Republic of Peru
vs. Dreyfus, 38 Ch. D. 343,356,359.
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FART I. OBLIGATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE.
Introductory.
The obligations imposed upon states in time of peace are in
general derived from one fundamental conception, which may be sum-
marized as the principle of territorial independence or territorial
Indspondeiioo or territorial sovereignty*
Modern international law was impossible until the idea, that
government and jurisdiction are inseparable from territory, had re-
!
ceived recognition. It is true that these propositions are not uni-
versally held now. The principle that jurisdiction extends by race
or nationality and by the nature of the act rather than by territory
is still asserted, and acted upon in claims of jurisdiction over
citizens abroad and over any one committing offenses against the
state or its citizens. It is, however, believed that these claims
are to be regarded as exceptions to the general rule of territorial
jurisdiction. The triumph of the theory of territoriality in juris-
diction and government is assured by the fact that power of coercion,
physical force, is the foundation of both of them and effective coer-
cion is by the nature of t hings exclusive within one territory. We
will therefore regard the following propositions as the norms of the
law of peace: (1) a state occupies a definite portion of territory.
(2) Within that territory it may organize itself, dispose of its land
:
resources and wealth, and control the conduct of the inhabitants with
perfect freedom. This may be stated by saying that within its terri-
tory it has unlimited powers of government, property and jurisdic-
tion. (3) Outside of that territory its power ceases. 1
1- On the theory and necessity of territorial sovereignty see J.W.
Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law, Boston
1898, 1;52; Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 8th
Ed^joston 1883^jpp 8-9, 21-24; J. W. Salmond, Jurisprudence; 2nd Ed.
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These conditions are in fact imaginary. They could, in complete-
ness, be realized only if all states were as isolated as the planets*
This not being true they are subject to numerous exceptions, necessi-
tated by the inevitable peaceful intercourse of states and their sub-
jects, and the necessary concurrent extension of authority by all
states over the high seas which are within the territory of no state,
and which by physical facts can not be so appropriated. States bet-
ter than human individuals accord with Herbert Spencer's theory of
liberty \ but even in their case we must modify this absolute right of
liberty by the proviso that a like liberty be accorded to others.
It is the determination of these exceptions to the ideal condi-
tion of absolute territorial independence which forms the body of the
law of peace. Were there no exceptions, obviously there would be no
more need for law regulating relations between states than there is
for law regulating relations between the inhabitants of the earth
and the inhabitants of Mars. Consisting of rules governing excep-
tions to the general rule the law is ordinarily expressed in terms
of rights. Thus we speak of the states right to a limited juris-
diction over its subjects abroad, and over its merchant vessels on
the high seas, and its exclusive right of jurisdiction over its am-
bassadors, public vessels and armed forces abroad. We propose, how-
ever, to look at the matter rrom the reverse side of duties. We are
not interested in the laws of the United States providing for the
exercise of rights as such; but as they indicate the limits of these
London, 1907; p. 99; Justice 0. W. Holmes, in American Bandana Co. vs.
United Fruit Co., 213 U. W. 347, (1909); W. E. Hall, International
Law, 4th Ed. London, 1895, p. 20-21^ 45-46 J.E. Ferarwd-Giraud , Etats
et Souverains devant les tribunaux etrangers, Paris, 1S95, 1; 31-36
discusses necessary exemption of states from foreign jurisdiction.
1- Herbert Spencer, Social Statics together with Man versus the
State
, N.Y.
,
1910, p36.
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rights, and imply an obligation of the United States not to exceed
them.
The obligations of states under international law may be classi-
fied under the five heads: (l) abstention, (2) acquiescence, (3) pre-
vention, (4) vindication, (5) reparation, A state is under the ob-
ligation to abstain, with a few exceptions, from the exercise of
authority outside of its territory, to acquiesce in the exercise
within its territory, of authority by foreign states in a few cases,
to prevent its citizens and public officers from doing acts injurious
to foreign states and their subjects, to vindicate its sovereignty
and position in the family of nations by treating violations of in-
ternational law by foreign persons or officers in manner prescribed
by international law and to make reparation for breaches of inter-
national law by its citizens or public officers.
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Chapter I . Obligations of Abstention .
Introductory,
The obligations of abstention are derived from the fundamental
principles of international law. The state is bound to abstain from
the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction over acts or persons in
any but its own territory, with a few exceptions. These duties re-
late primarily to the conduct of the government. If the government
chooses to ignore them by sovereign acts such as intervention or con-
quest, municipal law can have no restraining effect. Statutes, trea-
ties, and court decisions, have, however, expressed legal limitations
upon the extension of power outside of the territory and until changec
by a sovereign act, are laws enforcing the duty of abstention as
against the government. By their mere statement as law, these limi-
tations tend to be observed by the sovereign power and, of course,
may be enforced by coercive measures as against inferior officers of
government.
The obligations of abstention may be considered under the three
heads, (1) acquisition of territory, (2) use of force against foreign
states or their subjects, (3) exercise of jurisdiction outside of the
territorial limits.
1. Acquisition of Territory.
(1) The right to acquire unoccupied territory or territory occu-
pied only by savages is generally recognized by international law and
has been affirmed by the law of the United States. In the Declara-
tion of the Berlin congress of 1885 it was provided that territory in
Africa should only be acquired with effective title after notifica-
tion and actual occupation. The United States signed this declara-
tion but as it was not submitted to the senate for ratification it
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is not a binding treaty. 1 The c laims of the Indians to territory
has been held to be no bar to the rights of acquisition by civilized
o
nations through discovery and occupation, in a number of cases.
The acquisition of unoccupied Guano Islands by action of citizens of
the United States was provided for by statute in 1856, under condi-
tions, designed to prevent such acquisition of Islands already under
the sovereignty of foreign states, but the fact that another govern-
ment had formerly occupied an island and subsequently abandoned it,
was held no bar to its acquisition under this act, 4
(2) The acquisition of land by accretion, or the gradual and im-
perceptible building up of territory by rivers or ocean tides has
been upheld as conferring legitimate title, by United States courts
in the case of private owners and states of the union,^ a view which
implies an acquisition of sovereignty over such accretions by the
United States. This method of acquisition was supported in an Eng-
lish case which acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States
over mud islands formed near the mouth of the Mississippi.^
1- See Moore's Digest 1;267.
2- Johnson vs. Mcintosh, 8 Wheat. 543, (1823); Martin vs. Waddell
,
16 Pet. 367; Mortimer vs. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 6 N.Y.S. 898,
(1889); Ketchura vs. Buckley, 99 U.S. 188.
3- Act. Aug. 5, 1856, Rev. Stat. 5570-5578.
4- Jones vs. U.S. 137 U.S. 202, 220, (1890). See Moore's Digest,
1;299, 556-580.
5- Ocean City Association vs. Schwer, 46 Atl. Rep. 690, (N.Y. 1900);
Mulry vs. Norton, 100 N.Y. 424; Wallace vs. Driver, 61 Ark. 429;
Jeffries vs, East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 191, (1890); St.Louis
vs. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226, (1891); Nebraska vs. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 368,
(1892)
6- The Anna , 5 Rob. 373. (1805). See Moore's Digest, l;269-273.
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(.3) Prescription has been held to confer good title to terri-
tory claimed by states, 1 and by individuals as against the govern-
p
raent. It has also been impliedly recognized as founding good title
in various boundary treaties of the United States,
(4) The acquisition of land by conquest was denounced in reso-
lutions proposed at the International American congress in Washing-
ton, 1889-1890, which stated, "That the principle of conquest shall
not, during the continuance of this treaty of arbitration be recog-
A
nized as admissable under American Public Law". The United States
acceded to the resolution but as the plan of arbitration upon which
it was contingent did not become effective the resolution did not
become law. The courts have held that under the constitution con-
gress has no power to declare wars for conquest and the president to
wage them for that purpose, hence the United States can not acquire
new territory by conquest. Territory under military government or
occupation is, therefore, not territory of the United States for
purposes of internal administration. This interpretation of consti-
tutional law, is however, no guarantee against the seizure of foreign
territory by conquest, for the courts will recognize a forced cession
or sale of territory concluded by treaty and they have specifically
1- Rhode Island, vs. Mass., 4 How. 591,639,(1846); Handly's Lessee
vs. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 378, (1820); Indiana vs. Ky. , 136 U.S. 479,
(1890); 159 U.S. 275, (1895); 163 U.S. 520, (1897), 167 U.S. 270.
2- U.S. vs. Chavez, 175 U.S. 509, 522, (1899); Peabody vs. U.S.
175 U.S. 546; Chavez vs. U.S. 175 U.S. 552.
3- Treaty with Great Britain, 1818, art. 3, Malloy p. 632; 1827,
art. 1, p. 644. See also treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela,
1897, adopted as a basis of the bondary arbitration demanded by the
United States, art. 4, affirmed that fifty years prescription gave
good title. See Moore's Digest, 1;293.
4- See Moore's Digest, 1;292: 7;318.
5- Flemming vs. Page, 9 How. 603, (1849). Contra see Am. Ins. Co.,
vs. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, (1828). See Self-Denying Ordinance in refer-
ence to Cuba. Apr. 20, 1898. 30 stat. 739 sec. 4.
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held that acquisition by conquest is proper by international law,
even though prohibited by the law of the United States. 1
(5) Acquisition of territory by treaty, whether from forced
cession, desire of the population, or purchase has been upheld as in-
2
herent in the treaty making power of the government, and has been
the usual means by which the United States has acquired territory.^
The law of the United States thus, permits of acquisitions of
territory by occupation, accretion, prescription, and treaty while
it requires the government to abstain from acquiring land by conquest
The question is, however, a political rather than a legal question,
and so the courts have held. 4 If the political department of govern-
ment indicates by suitable evidence that it regards new territory as
acquired the courts will follow it. The duty to abstain from ac-
quiring land occupied by other states, is therefore one left to the
discretion of the political department of the government and is be-
yond the power of municipal law to control*
2. Use of Force against Foreign States or their Subjects*
The use of force may be resorted to (1) against a foreign state
itself, as in intervention, war or general reprisals, (2) against
1- On this subject see Fleraming vs. Page 9, How. 603, (1849); U.S.
vs. Hayward, 2 Gall. 485; U.S. vs. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246; Moore's Digest,
1;290: 7;257-265, 315. Neely vs.Henkel 180 U.S. 109, 119-170 (1900)
Moore's Digest 1; 535.
2- See Chief Justice Marshall, in Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet.
511, (1828).
3- Treaties with France 1803, Malloy p. 508, ceding La.; Spain 1819,
p. 1651, ceding Fla; Mexico, 1848, p. 1107, 1853, p. 1121, ceding southjf
western territory; Russia, 1867, p. 1521, ceding Alaska, Spain 1898,.
p. 1690, ceding Philippines and Porto Rico, Panama, 1903, p. 1351,
granting Canal Zone. See also Joint Resolutions of congress, Mch. 1,
1845, 5 stat. 797; Dec. 29, 1845, 9 stat. 108, admitting Texas to the
Union, and July 7, 1898, incorporating Hawaii.
4- Jones vs. U.S., 137 U.S. 202, (1890); Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet
253.
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subjects of a foreign state by way of special reprisals, or (3)
against foreigners for breaches of municipal law. The use of force
against aliens within the territorial jurisdiction, in the usual pro-
cess of enforcing municipal law may unquestionably be exercised, and
gives rise to no duty of abstention. The law of peace, however, re-
quires a government to abstain from using force against foreign
states or their subjects outside of its territory.
Such a use of force against the foreign state itself or within
its territory is known as intervention. In treaties with Cuba and
Panama the United States has been specifically given the right to
intervene.*
(1) The Hague convention relating to the Pacific Settlement of
international disputes which recommends mediation, commissions of
inquiry and arbitration in cases of disagreement;^ as well as numer-
ous individual arbitration treaties, recognizes the duty to abstain
from the use of force against foreign states. Another of the Hague
4
conventions requires the United States to abstain from the use of
armed force for the collection of contract debts. These treaties
have been ratified and are law in the United States, but they are
addressed to the political department of the government. The courts
1- Treaty with Cuba, 1903, Malloy, p. 362, permits intervention to
preserve independence, and with Panama, 1903, art. 23, p. 1356, to
protect the canal.
2- Hague conventions, 1899, Ij 1907, I.
3- There are two kinds of individual arbitration treaties; special,
relating to the arbitration of specified claims alone, as the treaty
of Washington with Great Britain, of 1871; and general, requiring
arbitration, of all questions of a certain class. Conventions of
the latter class were concluded with a large number of powers in 1906
to last for five years, recourse to the Hague court being provided for
,
4- Hague conventions, 1907, II.
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in applying the law will recognize sovereign acts of force even when
prohibited by treaty. No power of municipal law can compel resort
to arbitration or prohibit intervention or a resort to arms, but the
definite statement in treaties of an obligation to abstain from the
use of armed force, undoubtedly, in itself, offers a sanction to the
observance of this duty by the political authorities of government.
The constitutional provision giving congress alone power to declare
war appears also to prevent a hasty resort to arms. Experience has,
however, demonstrated, that the executive can create a situation
from which congress can not recede. 1 The use of force in cases not
amounting to war, such as naval demonstrations, or the employment of
armed forces to protect embassies in time of insurrection have gen-
erally been authorized by congress. Such action is not, however,
required by law. A number of cases have occurred, notably during the
Boxer uprising in China, when armed force was used without express
authorization, and its use subsequently ratified by congress2 .
The use of force on foreign territory to suppress marauders,
and pirates and prevent maltreatment of citizens has been justified
on the grounds of self defense. Thus Jackson's invasion of Florida
in 1819, and various invasions of Mexican territory in pursuit of
marauding Indians; the occupation of Amelia Island by United States
forces in 1817 to suppress a nest of pirates; the landing of troops
in Vera Cruz Mexico, 1914 and Peking ,' China
,
1899; and the Bombard-
ment of Greytown, Nicaragua in 1854 to protect American citizens were
justified by the political department of the United States government
on this basis. Great Britain in the same manner attempted to justify
1- As in the Mexican war.
2- See Moore's Digest, 7;109-118, Navy regulations, 1913, sec. 1647
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the seizure in American waters and destruction of the Caroline, in
1837, against the vigorous protest of the United States."
1"
The determination of circumstances warranting intervention in
self defense is in any case a political question and forms an ex-
ception to the general rule of international law that the state must
abstain from the use of force on foreign territory. This general
rule of abstention is recognized and enforced by United States law.
In the Navy Regulations, the use of force in territorial waters and
landing of armed troops, without express permission of the local
authorities, is forbidden. Military law also requires strict respect
for foreign territory. 2 Instructions of the Department of State fur-
ther aid in the performance of this duty. In 1887 instructions to
a Charge d 'affaire in Peru said, "It is always expected that the
agents of the department abroad will exercise extreme caution in
summoning war vessels to their aid at critical junctures, especially
if there be no practical purpose to be subserved by their presence". 3
The courts have affirmed this view in dicta. Where a seizure under
the non-intercourse act was made in foreign territorial waters the
court said "it is certainly an offense against the power which must
be adjudicated between the two governments,"^ and where a naval of-
ficer entered foreign territory to recover piratically seized proper-
5ty of American citizens it held that he acted beyond his right, but
1- For discussion of these and other cases relating to self defense
as a justification for the violation of foreign territory, see Moore'S
Digest, 2;400-425.
2- Navy Regulations, 1913, Sec. 1645-1648. Army Regulations, 1913,
Sec. 89, ch. 3, Dig. op. judge Ad. Sen. 1912, p. 90. Moore's Digest,
2;364. For similar duties in time of war toward neutrals, see infra,
p. 212. et .seq
.
3- Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State to Mr. Neal, Charge, Nov. 16, 1887;
see Moore's Digest 7;109. See also Consulor Regulations, 1896, Sec.113
4- Ship Richmond vs. U.S., 9 Cranch 102,104,(1815) See also the Itats
1892, Moore, Int. Arb. p. 3067-3071.
5- Daviggon VSt SealSKiUS^ 2 Paine 324. See also Nelson. Att.Gen..
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in both of these cases the foreign governments claim was held to be
subject to diplomatic settlement only. Municipal law could offer no
relief. Where special permission to pursue marauders on foreign
territory or to preserve order is given by treaty as is the case in
several Mexican agreements and treaties with Cuba and Panama, no duty
of abstention is involved. 1
In the present state of the law the enforcement of the duty to
abstain from intervention and the use of force on foreign territory,
belongs primarily to the executive through its control of military
of
and naval forces and diplomatic officers as well as/the general con-
duct of foreign relations. Judicial authorities may add their sanc-
tion by the enforcement of the usual principles of administrative and
military law. Violations of the international obligation, specifi-
cally authorized by the political departments of government, are
however, beyond the power of municipal law to control.
(2) Reprisals may be divided into four classes: Public and pri-
vate general reprisals, public and private special reprisals. General
reprisal is the right to seize any property of a foreign state or its
citizens on the sea, and is equivalent to a state of war, although in
the trouble with France in 1798-1799 general reprisals were author-
p
ized by congress without an express declaration of war. The courts,
3however, held that war actually existed. By the abolition of pri-
4 op. 265(1843) ; Black, Att. Gen. 9 op. 286, (1859) ; Moore's Digest,
1; 362-365.
1- Protocols with Mexice, 1882,1883,1884,1885,1890,}892,1896, Mallo; •
pp 1144-1177. Most of them were to be in force one year, but that of
1896 specified that it should last until Kid's band of Indians be ex-
terminated or pacified. See also treaty with Cuba, 1903, p. 362;
Panama, 1903, art. 23, p. 1356; Nicaragua, 1867, art. 15-17, p. 1285.
2- May 28, 1798, 1 stat. 361; July 9,1798, 1 stat. 578; Mch. 3,1799
1 stat. 743.
3- Bas vs. Tingey, 4 Dall.37, (1800); Talbot vs. Seaman, 1 Cranch
1,282, (1801); Moore's Digest, 7;155-153.
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vateering, private general reprisals are no longer permitted. Public
general reprisals are still resorted to but are considered in the
chapters devoted to obligations in time of war.
By private special reprisals, persons wronged by a foreign state
were i ormerly permitted by commission of their sovereign to indemnify
themselves by seizing property belonging to any subject of that state
on the high seas in time of peace. This practice would amount to an
aggravated form of privateering and would now be regarded as little
short of piracy. The legitimacy of the practice seems to be admitted
by the constitutional provision giving congress power to grant letters
of marque and reprisal though it was denied by Attorney General Ran-
dolph in an opinion of 1793. At present the practice is undoubtedly
obsolete. 1 The only question therefore which concerns us here, is
that of public special reprisals. Under this right the seizure of
vessels on the high seas or in the jurisdiction of their own state
through such institutions as pacific blockade is generally considered
legitimate by writers » on international law. As the United States
has not resorted to reprisals in time of peace, except in the case of
France in 1799 which the courts regarded as war, the courts have had
no opportunity to pass upon the legitimacy of seizures by way of re-
prisal, but they would undoubtedly be bound by any act of the politi-
cal department of the government in this respect. The power to make
war would probably be held to include a power to resort to lesser
acts of violence.
(3) The duty to abstain from the use of force outside of the
territory of the United States, against foreign vessels, guilty of
infractions of local law, has not been universally maintained by the
1- Randolph, Att. Gen. 1 op. 30, see Moore's Digest, 7;119.
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law of the United States. An act of 1797
1
still in force author-
izes revenue officers to board foreign vessels four leagues from the
g
coast and in Church vs. Hubbart, Chief Justice Marshall upheld the
right to make seizures on the high sea for breaches of municipal
regulations in a case involving such a seizure by Brazil, but a few
years later in Rose vs. Himely, changed his mind, and denied the
validity of such seizures. The embargo and non-intercourse acts of
the early nineteenth century, did not permit the seizure of foreign
vessels outside of territorial jurisdiction. The rule laid down by
4
Lord Stowell in Le Louis that visit, search and seizure of foreign
vessels beyond territorial jurisdiction is not permitted in time of
peace, was followed by Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, and
appears to be the usual law of the United States. Exceptions to this
statement are found in the provisions of treaty authorizing the seiz-
ure in restricted zones of slave traders flying foreign flags and the
universally acknowledged right of seizing pirate vessels. These sub-
jects will be discussed in considering the exercise of jurisdiction
ouer the high seas. Cases have affirmed that unequivocal acts of the
sovereign authorizing seizures beyond the three mile limit would be
obligatory, though such acts should if possible be interpreted to
accord with international law. 6 Nevertheless in the Alaskan seal
1- Act. Mch. 2, 1797, Sec. 27, rev. stat. 2760; Moore's digest,
1;725.
2- Church vs. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187; Scott, 343,
3- Rose vs. Hiraeley, 4 Cranch 241, (1808), see also Hudson vs.
Guiestier, 6 Cranch 281, (1810); The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, (1824).
In the Itata, 1892, Moore's Int. Arb.
,
p. 3067-3071, the U.S. was held
liable in damages for a seizure in Chilean waters, see Scott, cases
note p. 344. similar view was held by the U.S. supreme court in the
Ship Richmond ta.U.S. 9. Cranch 102, 104 (1815). Moore's Digest, 2;364.
4- Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, (1817).
5- The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, (1825).
6- Murray vs. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64,(1804), which held
that the non-intercourse actshould not be interpreted as authorizing
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fishery dispute of 18S6 British sealing vessels were seized sixty
miles from shore and their seizure justified by the courts under a
statute
^
USX/which by no means unequivocally authorized such acts. The atti-
tude taken by the courts however, was that the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States extended one hundred Italian miles from
the shore, the question will therefore be adverted to in considering
the extent of jurisdiction.
While the duty to abstain from the use of force against foreign
; vessels on the high seas in time of peace, is primarily to be con-
trolled by executive authority, yet by the rule requiring legal ad-
judication of all seizures courts may add their sanction to the en-
forcement of this duty.
3, Exercise of Extra-territorial Jurisdiction,
vThe final duty of abstention required a state to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction beyond its territory, with a few exceptions.
For convenience we may consider the matter under the four heads:
(1) Sxtent of territory, (2) Jurisdiction over the high seas, (3)
Jurisdiction over acts committed in foreign countries and (4) Juris-
diction over suits against foreign states.
(1) Where the territory of the United States is adjacent to that
of foreign states, the boundary has in most cases been defined by
treaties which are binding upon the courts in assuming jurisdiction
2
of cases. In the absence of treaty stipulations river boundaries
the seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas or prohibiting the
sale of national vessels to foreign countries.
1- See Moore's Digest, 1;895.
2- Curtis Att. Gen., 8 op. 175; U.S. vs. Texas, 162 U.S. 1, (1896)
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have been held to exist in the middle of the main current
1
. In the
case of international rivers, however, a number of treaties have
provided that the jurisdiction is subject to the right of free navi-
2
gation by vessels of all nations, and the courts have maintained
this position, holding that a foreign vessel could not be seized for
violation of local laws while passing through American waters of an
international river, en route to a foreign port. The same freedom
of navigation is permitted upon the Great Lakes by treaties with
4
Great Britain,
The extent of territorial jurisdiction on the sea for exclusive
fishing privileges was fixed at the three mile limit in the treaty
of 1818 with Great Britain. In treaties with Mexico, however, the
boundary between the two countries was stated to begin, three marine
6
leagues or nine miles from land in the Gulf of Mexico, and an act
7
of 1797 still in force authorizes revenue officers to board foreign
vessels four leagues from shore. The whole of bays with headlands
1- Handly vs. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374; Ala, vs. Ga. , 25 How. 505;
Iowa vs. 111., 147 U.S. 1, (1893). Moore's Digest, 1; 615-621.
2- See Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, Art. 8. p. 589. Art. 3,
Malloy, p. 643; 1846, Art. 2, p. 657; 1854-1866, Art. 4, p. 671, Art. 26,
p. 711 decreeing free navigation in the Mississippi, St. Lawrence,
St. John, Yukon, Stikine, and Porcupine. With Mexico, 1848, Art. 6,7,
;
p. 1111; 1853, Art. 4, p. 1123, decreeing free navigation in the Colo-
rado, Gila, and Bravo. In a treaty with Bolivia of 1850, Art. 26,
I
p. 122, it is stated that "in accordance with fixed principles of in-
ternational law, Bolivia regards the rivers Amazon and La Plata * *
opened by nature for the commerce of all nations" and in that with
Argentine Republic of 1853, Art. 6, p. 19, the Parana and Parana and
Uruguay, are declared free to commerce even in time of war with the
exception of contraband.
3- The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, (1824).
4- Treaty with Great Britain, 1871, art. 28, 30, Malloy, p. 711;
1842, art. 2, p. 652; 1854-1866, art. 4, p. 671.
5- Treaty with Great Britain, 1818, art. 1, Malloy, p. 631.
6- Treaty with Mexico, 1848, art. 5, Malloy p. 1109; 1853, art. 1,
p. 1122.
7- Act. Mch. 2, 1797, sec. 27; rev. stat. 2760, See Moore's Digest,
1:725, 1
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two leagues apart or even more have been held by statute, official
opinions and judicial decisions to be entirely within territorial
jurisdiction, 1
By an act of 18682 the killing of fur seal "within the limits
of Alaskan Territory or in the waters thereof" was prohibited. Vessel i
engaged in such business were declared forfeitable and their officers
and crew liable to criminal punishment. In 1886 the United States
3
District court of Alaska held a number of seizures of British ves-
sels by revenue cutters, sixty miles from shore, valid under this
statute. It reached this decision by applying the meaning of Alaskan
territorial waters given in a Russian Ukase of 1821, which it held
was the meaning adopted by the political department of the United
States government. This Ukase had declared the territorial jurisdic-
tion of Russia to extend one hundred Italian miles from the shore,
and the United States claimed to have purchased this jurisdiction
with the territory in 1867, The vessels were condemned and the of-
ficers held liable to criminal punishment. Upon Great Britain's pro-
test the vessels and men were released and orders sent to Alaska to
discontinue pending proceedings. Nevertheless in 1887 and 1889 other
vessels were condemned by the same court. The act of 1868 was amendec
A
in 1889, the countries jurisdiction being extended "to all the do-
minions of the United States in Behring Sea". In an arbitration of
1- For Delaware Bay, see Randolph, Att. Gen,, 1 op. 321, Moore's
Digest, 1;735; Chesapeake Bay, Stetson vs. U.S., Moore, Int. Arb,,
4; 4337-4341; Moores Digest, 1;741; Buzzard's Bay, Public Acts Mass.,
ch. 1, sec. 12, (1890); Commonwealth vs. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230,
(1890), affirmed Manchester vs. Mass., 139 U.S. 240.
2- Act June 27, 1868, Rev. Stat. 1956.
3- See U.S. vs. La Ninfa, 49 Fed. Rep. 575, (1891); U.S. vs. the
James G. Swan, 20 Fed. Rep. 108; U.S. vs. The Alexander, 60 Fed. Rep.
914.
4- Act. Mch. 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 1009.
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the question in 1892 the United States' claim of jurisdiction was
denied, thus "the dominions of the United States in Bering Sea" were
held in subsequent cases to extend only to the three mile limit.
1
It is evident that the attitude taken by the United States on
the limits of territorial jurisdiction has been by no means uniform.
The courts have held that the determination of the matter either as
and
to boundary or jurisdiction over 'the sea is a political question /that
they are bound to follow the view of the political department of the
2
government . Nevertheless the interpretation of political acts bear-
ing on these points often involves questions of legal definition, and
the courts undoubtedly may exercise an effective authority in enforc-
ing the country's duty of abstaining from the exercise of jurisdictior
outside of its territory, by refusing to take cognizance of cases,
where according to international law, or national acts interpreted
according to international law, the national jurisdiction does not
extend. In such cases, therefore the courts may apply rules of in-
ternational law directly as rules of decision.
(2) The exercise of jurisdiction over vessels of foreign nations
seized on the high seas in time of war, by way of reprisals or when
1- On the arbitration see Moore's Digest, l;913-922. As a result of
the arbitration the United States paid Great Britain |473,151,26 as
indemnity for the seizures. Judicial discussions subsequent to the
arbitration, see The Alexander, 75 Fed. Rep. 519, Pacific Trading Co.
vs. U.S., 75 Fed. Rep. 519; La Ninfa, 75 Fed. Rep. 513, reversing 49
Fed. Rep. 575; Whitelaw vs. U.S. 75 Fed. Rep. 513. The Bering Sea
controversy is discussed at length in Moore's Digest, l;890-929, and
Freeman Snow, Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy, Boston, 1894
p. 471-509.
2- Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet. 511;U.S.
vs. Reynes, 9 How. 127; Williams vs. Suffolk Ins. Co., 13 Pet. 415;
In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502-505, (1892); Jones vs. U.S. 137 U.S.
202,212,(1690); U.S. vs. Texas, 143, U.S. 621, 629, (1892). See Brit-
ish case Rogina vs. Keyne L.R. Ex. D. 63, (1876) Scott 154, in which
criminal jurisdiction on vessels within three mile limit was refused
In the absence of specific authorization by the political dept. of
govt. Soon after this decision, the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction,
Act 1878 41-2 Vict. 7J5 gave such jurisdiction. In Mortensen vs.
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crdered by municipal law have been considered. The general principle
appears to be recognized that in time of peace no jurisdiction may be
exercised over vessels of foreign states on the high seas. The law
of the United States does, however, provide for the assumption of
jurisdiction over pirate vessels, slave traders, and national vessels
upon the high seas.
(a) Jurisdiction over pirates was given by the crimes act of
1790^ enacted under the constitutional authority of congress to "de-
fine and punish piracies and offences against the law of nations."
Besides, persons "piratically running away with vessels or goods
worth over fifty dollars on the high seas, the act declared all per-
sons guilty of acts punishable by death if committed in the United
States, or of other specified offenses, pirates and punishable by
death* The courts distinguished two classes of offenses in this act:
(l) piracy by international law and (2) piracy by national law. It
was only for the former offense that the courts could assume juris-
pdiction of acts committed on foreign vessels. In the latter class
of offenses, jurisdiction was only assumed where the offense was com-
3
mitted on a United States vessel or by a United States citizen.
4 tiAn act of 1819 , amended this act, so as to make piracy as de-
fined by the law of nations" punishable by death and piratical vessels
5
subject to forfeiture. The act was practically repeated in 1820, and
appears in the Revised statutes as section 5368. It was repeated in
Peters. 14 Scot . L.T.R. 227(1906). Bentwich 12, the court held that
it was bound to accept the jurisdiction given it by statute over of-
fenses committed beyond the three mile limit by foreign vessels.
1- Act. Apr, 3, 1790, 1 stat. 113.
2- U.S. vs. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, (1820); U.S. vs. Pirates, 5
Wheat. 184.
3- U.S. vs. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, (1818); U.S. vs. Holmes, 5 Wheat.
412, (1820;
4- Act. Mch. 3, 1819, 3 stat. 513.
5- May 15, 1820. 3 stat. 600; Rev. Stat. 5368.
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the penal code of 1911, the death penalty having been changed to life
imprisonment by an act of 18971 . The definition of piracy dependent
upon the meaning of that term by the law of nations was held suffi-
2
ciently definite to give criminal jurisdiction.
Persons holding commissions from recognized belligerents even
though not recognized as independent states, can not be considered
' pirates3 and although opinions have differed the weight of authority
holds that the vessels of unrecognized insurgents may not be treated
as pirates, 4 Foreign vessels have been held forfeitable for piratical
aggressions though the voyage was not primarily one of piracyw and
seizure of innocent vessels on probable suspicion of piracy, exempts
the captor from liability for damages. 6
Property seized by pirates has been restored on payment of sal-
vage in the same manner, as in the case of the recapture of prizes
during war, though there is no limit to the time during which restora*
tion is possible as seizure by pirates never devests the original
7
owner of his title. A number of treaties have required such
restoration,^
1- Penal Code 1911, sec. 290, Act. Jan 15, 1897, 29 Stat. 487.
2- U.S. vs. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, (1820).
3- The Nuestra Senora de la Caridad, 4 Wheat. 497; The Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283; The Estrella, 4 Wheat 298; Ford vs. Surget,
97 U.S. 618; U.S. vs. Baker, 5 Blatch, 11,13,
4- The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63, (1897), U.S. vs. the Itata,
56 Fed. Rep. 505; U.S. vs. The Weed, 5 Wall. 62; The Watchful, 6
Wall. 91. Contra see The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408, (1885),
Navy Regulations, 1885, ch. 20, par. 18. See Moore's Digest, 2;1097.
5- U.S. vs. The Malek Adhel , 2 How. 210.
6- The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1; The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1,
7- Wirt, Att. Gen., 1 op. 584, (1822).
8- See treaty with Spain 1795, art. 9, p. 1643; U.S. vs. The
Amistad, 15 Pet. 518.
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Treaties have provided that American citizens, accepting com-
missions against the other contracting party, should be treated as
pirates. There has been doubt whether such treaty provisions are val-
id because of the impliedly exclusive power given by the constitution
to congress to "define piracies".
1
There have been no criminal pro-
secutions under such treaties. The act is not one of piracy by in-
ternational law and therefore applies only to United States citizens.
(b) Slave trading by United States citizens, was made a crime
by an act of 1807, 2 and denounced as piracy by a statute of 1820; 3
in this case, however, the crime was not one of piracy by interna-
tional law. In the early half of the nineteenth century, the United
States strenuously opposed Great Britain's claims to visit and search
foreign vessels suspected of slave trading and to punish them as pi-
4
rates. The practice was continued during the Napoleonic wars but
5Lord Stowell by a decision in 1817 refused to recognize these claims
as valid in time of peace, and his view was followed by Chief Justice
Marshall in 1825, consequently the "pirates" from slave trading were
only subject to United States jurisdiction when in her vessels.
The treaty of Ghent with Great Britain in 18147 expressed the
hope that both countries would endeavor to suppress the slave trade,
D
and in the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842 the United States agreed
1- The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152; Letter by Sec. of State Marcy,
referring to a proposed treaty with Venezuela of this character,
Moore's Digest, 2; 978.
2- Act. Mch. 2, 1807, 2 stat. 420, sec. 7.
3- Act. May 15, 1820, 3 stat. 600, Rev. stat. 5375.
4- The Amedie, 1 Act. 240, (1810); The Fortuna, 1 Dods. 81, (1811);
The Diana, 1 Dods. 95, (1813). The view was held in these cases that
foreign vessels seized during war, would not be restored if engaged
in slave trading.
5- Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, (1817).
6- The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, (1825)
7- Treaty with Great Britain, 1814, art. 10, Malloy, p. 618.
S- Treaty with Great Britain. 1842. art. 8. Malloy, p.655«
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to maintain a squadron on the West African coast to act in coopera-
tion with a like English squadron, each of them, however, to seize
only vessels of its own flag.
Great Britain definitely renounced her claim to visit and search
foreign suspected vessels in 1858 and at the same time the United
States senate by a resolution denounced the "visit, molestation, and
detention" of United States vessels by force by foreign powers "as
a derogation of the sovereignty of the United States"1 A treaty with
2
Great Britain of 1862 provided tor the mutual patrol of a convention-
al zone extending two hundred miles from the African coast and the
seizure of slave traders, to be tried in three mixed courts at Sierre
Leone, Cape of Good Hope, and New York. In 1870, the mixed court
was abolished by treaty, the same provisions applying to national
courts of the two countries. By the general act for the repression
of African Slave Trade4 of 1890, which is a treaty ratified by the
United States and sixteen other powers, the visit, search and seizure
of vessels of signatory powers under five hundred tons burden, by war
vessels of any of the signatory powers is permitted in a prescribed
zone about Africa. Suspected vessels are to be sequestrated and
their officers and crew turned over to the country under whose flag
they sailed. Slave trading by this convention has been put on a foot
ing resembling that of piracy, though not exactly the same. Visit
and search may only be exercised against foreign vessels in the limit"
ed zone and trial is always by the country of the suspected parties.
1- Moore's Digest, 2; 946.
2- Treaty with Great Britain, 1862, Malloy, p. 674.
3- Treaty with Great Britain, 1870, Malloy, p. 693.
4- General act for the Repression of African Slave Trade, 1890,
Malloy, p. 1964.
5- On the Slave Trade see Moore's Digest, 2; 914-951*
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(c) Jurisdiction over civil cases involving merchant vessels on
the high seas is inherent in the admiralty jurisdiction given to
federal courts by the uonsti tution and by the judiciary act of 1789.
Cognizance of crimes committed on board national vessels, is not,
however, inherent in the admiralty jurisdiction, 1 but by statute
courts of admiralty are given jurisdiction over offenses on United
States vessels at sea, even when committed by foreigners. The acts
specified as piracy by national law come under this head. The crimi-
nal jurisdiction over vessels is not co-extensive with the civil ad-
miralty jurisdiction. The latter has been held to extend over the
high seas to tide water mark and in rivers so far as the ebb and flow
of the tide, in the United States, having been extended over the
3Great Lakes and all navigable streams. The criminal jurisdiction
however, extends only over United States vessels on the high seas
beyond territorial limits. Crimes on board vessels within terri-
4 5torial waters of the United States or foreign countries are not
within the statutory grant of jurisdiction to courts of admiralty
jurisdiction, but are within the cognizance of the state or foreign
country where committed. Statutes have given consular courts
1- U.S. vs. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 366; U.S. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76,
(1820); U.S. vs. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412, (1820).
2- Act Apr. 30, 1790, 1 stat. 113; Rev. stat. 5346,5576, Penal Code,
1911, sec. 272. The jurisdiction extends also to offenses committed
on Guano Islands. Trial is held in the district court of the dis-
trict where the offender is found or into which he is first brought,
(Rev. Stat. 730).
3- The Genessee Chief, 12 How. 443; The Hine vs. Trevor, 4 Wheat.
555, (1366); The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 44, (1866); Packer vs. Bird,
137 U.S. 661, (1891).
4- U.S. vs. Bevans, 3 Wheat 336.
5- U.S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 74, (1820), U.S. vs. McGill, 4
Dall. 426, (1806). U.S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, (1393), seems
to be contra. In Reg. vs. Anderson, 11 Cox C. C. 193, (1868), a
British case, the court took jurisdiction of a jr*ime by a United State i
citizen on a British vessel forty-five miles up the Garonne of France.
Monro's nipr ft gt.
f
s
-p937. See Infra p. 39.
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jurisdiction over crimes committed by seamen upon United States ves-
sels. 1 The jurisdiction extends where the vessel is in the port of
2
the country where the court is located.
The national jurisdiction over public vessels is complete and
exists even when the vessel is within foreign territorial waters.
This jurisdiction is exercised through the courts martial and execu-
tive authority. In the case of public vessels not of the navy, the
laws giving courts of admiralty, jurisdiction of crimes appear to ap-
ply as in the case of merchant vessels*
(3) The United States has in general recognized its duty to ab-
stain from the assumption of jurisdiction over acts committed in
foreign countries, but certain exceptions to this general rule have
been recognized by law. For convenience we may consider the subject,
under the four heads, (a) acts committed by agencies of government,
(b) by citizens, (c) by foreigners, and (d) laws of extraterritorial
effect.
(a) The general exemption of foreign public vessels, armed
forces, and diplomatic representatives from local jurisdiction is
recognized by international law. The law of the United States pro-
vides for the exercise of jurisdiction over acts by its agencies of
this character even in foreign countries. Naval forces of the United
States in foreign jurisdiction continue subject to the articles for
the government of the navy, navy regulations and naval instructions.
Crimes committed on board such vessels in foreign ports are subject
to trial by court martial in the same manner as if the vessel were on
the high seas or in a home port. Seamen of the navy are also subject
1- Rev. Stat. 4084,4088.
2- In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, (1891).
3- See Navy Regulations, 1913; Articles for the government of the
Navy, Rev. Stat. 1624.
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to consular jurisdiction for acts committed abroad. 1
Armed forces may only enter foreign territory in time of peace
p
by special license but wherever they are they remain subject to the
articles of war, the army regulations, and the general orders of the
3
war department. As with naval forces crimes committed by members
of such forces in foreign territory are subject to court martial
trial* Military law is personal, and nan- territorial in effect.
The exemption from local jurisdiction of diplomatic representa-
tives is recognized by international law and specified in the in-
4
structions to Diplomatic officers issued by the president in 1897 .
By these instructions they are forbidden to submit to local criminal
or civil jurisdiction, or to testify in foreign courts without the
5
express consent of the United States. They remain subject to the
instructions of the department of state and the president, by whom
they may be recalled at pleasure, and to the law of the United State i.
Consuls do not enjoy the exemptions of diplomatic officers from
local jurisdiction except in non-Christian countries. They are, how-
ever, declared by the Consular regulations of 1896 to be exempt from
jury and militia duties and their archives are not subject to local
7jurisdiction. Consuls abroad are subject to consular regulations
and the authority of the department of state and the president. They
Q
may u e punished in the United States for crimes committed abroad.
1- Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 630, p. 268. Moore's Digest,
2; 611. See Navy Regulation Nov. 2, 1875.
2- See Dig. op. Judge Ad. Gen. 1912, p. 90.
3- See Articles of War, Rev. Stat. 1342-1343; Dig. op. Judge. Ad.
Gen. 1912, pp 511,1071.
4- Instructions to Diplomatic officers of the United States, (1897)
Sec. 46, p. 18; Rev. Stat. 4063-4064.
5- Diplomatic Instructions, 1897, Sec. 46,48,53,56.
6- Diplomatic Instructions, 1897, Sec. 272-280, Rev. Stat. 202.
7- Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 71-75.
8- Moore' a Digest . 2;267.
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The Consular regulations declare United States consular officers to
be immune from local criminal and civil jurisdiction, and subject £o
diplomatic privileges in non-Christian countries.
1
In such cases
their acts are subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts as
in the case of ministers.
(b) Acts committed by United States citizens abroad are not in
general subject to the jurisdiction of United States law. This ap-
plies to acts committed on national merchant vessels in foreign ports.
Thus the United States courts have held that statutes conferring
jurisdiction over crimes committed within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the United States do not apply to crimes committed on vessels in
p
foreign ports . Crimes take place where they take effect, conse-
quently the court refused jurisdiction in a case where an American
citizen fired a shot from an American vessel, billing a man in for-
3
eign jurisdiction.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Statutes have pro-
vided for the punishment of crimes against the sovereignty of the
United States, committed by citizens abroad, such as the unauthorized
4
carrying on of diplomatic correspondence with foreign governments.
Another exception occurs in the case of countries where consular
jurisdiction has been established by treaty. Such treaties have been
concluded with most non-Christian countries, although that with Japan
been
has/ abrogated, in 1894, as have those of countries which have since
1- Consular Regulations, 1896, Sec. 75.
2- U.S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 74, (1820); U.S. vs. McGill, 4 Dai: .
426, (1806); contra, U.S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, (1893). See in-
fra p. 39.
3- U.S. vs. Davis, 2 Sumner C.C. 482, (1637).
4- Act. 1799, Rev. Stat. 5335. See Moore's Digest, 2;264.
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become colonies of European states.
1
The treaties usually specify
the limits of this jurisdiction, which has been further defined by
2
act of congress. According to this statute such consuls have juris-
diction over crimes committed by United States citizens in that coun-
try, or by sailors in United States vessels even when the man is a
3foreigner. A similar jurisdiction extends to consuls and commercial
agents in places "not inhabited by any civilized people or recognized
by any treaty with the United States."4 Besides this criminal juris-
diction consular courts exercise civil jurisdiction in cases where
5
American citizens are defendents.
(c) The United States has of all countries been the most con-
sistent in its opposition to the doctrine of extra-territorial juris-
diction, over foreigners. As has been observed, the jurisdiction
over citizens for acts committed abroad, a jurisdiction which is
1- Treaties now in force with Bornea, China, Corea, Morocco, Tripo-
li, Turkey, Persia, Siara, Tonga. Treaties have been concluded but
since abrogated or superseded by annexation with Algiers, Muscat,
Zanzibar, Japan, Madagascar, Samoa, Tunis.
2- Act Aug. 11, 1848, 9 Stat. 276, as amended in Rev. Stat. Sec.
4083-4130. Applies to China, Japan, Siam, Egypt, Madagascar, Turkey,
Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morrocco, Muscat, Samoa, and other countries
with which appropriate treaties may be concluded. Rev. Stat. 4129.
Japan, Madagascar, Tunis, Muscat, and Samoa have since been excluded
by treaty.
3- Consular regulations, 1896, Sec. 629. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453,
(1891).
4- Rev. Stat. Sec. 4088. This was held to permit the assumption of
jurisdiction by a special agent sent over for that purpose in a coun-
try where no regular consul or commercial agent resided by Att. Gen.
Garland. (18 op. 219, 1885)
5- In exercising jurisdiction consular courts apply the law of the
United States, the common law, the law of equity and admiralty, and
"decrees and regulations" which ministers may make to "supply defects
and deficiencies" in the other bodies of law mentioned. Rev. Stat.
4986; Cushing Att. Gen., 7 op. 503; Moore's Digest, 2;614-617.
6- See the Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362; U.S. vs. Davis, 2 Sumner C. C.
482, (1837).
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permissable by international law and extensively exercised by many
countries, has been but sparingly provided for in the law of the
United States. In an exhaustive discussion of extra-territorial
crime,
1
written by John Bassett Moore, in connection with the Cutting
case, in which Mexico attempted to assert jurisdiction over an Ameri-
can citizen for acts committed against a Mexican citizen in the
United States, only one instance is mentioned in which, aside from
treaty agreements, jurisdiction is asserted over foreigners for acts
p
in foreign territory. This case occurs in a statute of 1856 which
authorizes consular officers and secretaries of legation to adminis-
ter oaths and perform notorial acts, which shall be valid in the
United States. The act also provides that persons committing per-
jury in such oaths shall be liable to criminal punishment as if the
act was committed in the United States, and may be indicted in any
district where arrested. This statute was justified by Attorney
3
General Williams on the ground that the domicile of the consul or
diplomatic agent where the act was committed is to be regarded as a
portion of United States territory. Moore thinks a more satisfactory
justification can be found in the implied consent given by the for-
eign government, to submit its citizen to United States law, when he
does these acts before an officer recognized by international law
and by the foreign states own law, as competent to perform such
functions. 4
To this example may be added that already mentioned of the juris 1
diction exercised by consular courts over seamen of foreign nation-
1- J . B. Moore, Report on extraterritorial Crime, For. Rel., 1887,
p. 770. A large portion of this report is printed in Moore's Digest,
2; 243-269.
2- Act. Aug. 18, 1856; Rev. Stat. 1750.
3- Williams Att. Gen., 14 op. 285.
4- Moore's Digest, 2;267.

ality serving on American vessels in foreign ports. The consular
regulations very specifically extend this jurisdiction, and in the
case of In re Ross
1 its exercise was upheld by the United States
supreme court in the case of a British subject, serving on an Ameri-
can vessel and found guilty of murder by the consular court for an
act done on the vessel while in the harbor of Yokahama. The usual
principle of jurisdiction over acts done on national vessels coupled
with the extraterritorial jurisdiction over such vessels, granted to
consuls by treaty in this case, furnish sufficient justification for
this exercise of jurisdiction over aliens for acts committed abroad.
Not so easily justified is the jurisdiction given by statute over
every person committing assaults with a dangerous weapon on vessels
wholly or partly owned by United Citizens, on the "high seas, or in
any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay,
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of
the jurisdiction of any particular state". Under this statute juris-
diction was upheld of a crime committed on an American vessel in the
Detroit River within the territorial limits of Canada, thus limiting
the term "particular state" to states of the union.
In general however, the law of the United States gives adequate
recognition to the duty of abstaining from the exercise of juris-
diction over extraterritorial crime by aliens.
(d) United States courts have in general refused to give an
extraterritorial effect to laws, even when no limitation was expressed
in terms. Thus the supreme court refused to apply the Sherman anti-
trust law to prevent a monopoly in Costa Rica. Justice Holmes,
1- See Consular regulations, 1896, sec. 629; In re Ross, 140 U.S.
453, (1891).
2- Rev. State. 5346. See U.S. vs. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, (1893).
In U.S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat 76, the court refused jurisdiction of
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speaking for the court said, "All legislation is prima facie terri-
torial, words having universal scope, such as every contract in re-
straint of trade, # * will be taken as a matter of course to mean
only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legisla-
tor may subsequently be able to catch."
In 1908 judge advocate general Davis expressed an opinion that
o
declarations of war were laws of extraterritorial effect.' Conse-
quently the president could call out the militia for service in for-
eign countries, under the constitutional and statutory authority to
3
call them out "to execute the laws." A statute of 1908 based on
this opinion recognized such extraterritorial laws but the validity
of this provision was denied in an opinion of the attorney general in
19124 .
Though this view applies to ordinary laws," there are undoubtedly
laws of extraterritorial effect. Such for instance, are the articles
of war, the articles for the government of the navy, and official in-
structions to army, navy, consular and diplomatic officers. These
are laws of non-territorial character, applying to particular persons
wherever they may happen to be. Such laws however, have been applied
only to citizens of the United States, with the minor exceptions men-
tioned in the last section, and consequently are not inconsistent
a crime by an American citizen in an American vessel in the river
Tigress of China. The statute under which indictment was made in
this case was, however, sec. 12, of the crimes act of 1790, (see Rev.
Stat. 5576) which extended jurisdiction only over the high seas. See
also, Thomas vs. Lane, 2 Sumn. 1, U.S. vs. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72 ;
Moore's Digest, l;937-938.
1- American Banana Co. vs. United Fruit Co. . 213 U.S. 347, (1909)
2- See Cong. Record, 60th Cong., 1st. Sess., 1908, vol. 42, p. 6940,
6661; 63rd. Cond., 2nd. Sess., p. 7778.
3- Act May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. 399, Sec. 5 p. 400.
4- Att. Gen. Wickersham, 29 op. 322, (1912). But see Act Feb. 16,
1914, Sec. 4, in which the power to summon the naval militia for ser-
vice "within or without" the territory is given.

-41-
with the obligation to abstain from extending laws, or assuming juris-
diction over aliens abroad.
(4) The courts have affirmed on numerous occasions that they can
not assume jurisdiction over suits against foreign states, or sover-
eigns, or their official representatives, such as ministers and am-
bassadors.^" The commonwealths of the union have also been considered
sovereign in this respect and no suits against them entertained un-
less jurisdiction has been specifically granted by the constitution.^
The government of the United States is itself in this class and can
3
not be sued unless specific provision is found in statute.
The courts have however, held that a nominal suit to discover
facts may be within their jurisdiction. 4 They may also assume juris-
diction of suits brought by sovereigns. As in such suits the sover-
eign has voluntarily submitted to their jurisdiction, setoffs may be
allowed against him to the amount of his claim but no more. 5 The whole
proceeding can never result in an actual judgment against a sovereign,
1- Underhill vs. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250; Hassard vs. United States
of Mexico, 173 N.Y. 645, 61 N.Y.S. 939; Ros Publica vs. De Longchamps,
1 Dall. 111,116, (Pa.); Hatch vs. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, (N.Y. 1876);
Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 137.
2- People vs. Dennison, 84 N.Y. 272; Beers vs. Arkansas, 201 How.
527. The immunity of states from jurisdiction in federal courts in
cases covered by the constitution was denied in Chisholm vs. Ga.,
2 Dall. 419, (1793), as a result of which the immunity was specific-
ally granted from suits by subjects of another state or a foreign
state, in the eleventh amendment.
3- Stanley vs. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255; Kawananako vs. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349,353.
4- Manning vs. Nicaragua, 14 How. Prac. 517, (N.Y. 1857)
5- People vs. Dennison, 84 N.Y. 272; King of Spain vs. Oliver, Fed.
Gas. 7813; U.S. vs. ECkford, 6 Wall. 490; The Siren 7 Wall. 152.
See also Von Hellfeld vs. Russian Govt., a German Case, Am. J. Int.
Law, 1911, 5;490.
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In a number of these cases the courts have specifically invoked
the principle that courts apply international law and have found the
non-liability of sovereigns to suit, among its rules. 1 In other
cases, the fact that jurisdiction implies power to enforce, a condi-
tion impossible as against sovereigns, was considered sufficient to
p
warrant a refusal of judgment. While in cases where the plaintiff
sought relief for infractions of right by his own sovereign the prin-
ciple that the power which may alter the law can never be bound by
it, was held to render such a jurisdiction out of the question. Thus
3
in Kawanahako vs. Polyblank, Justice Holmes, speaking for the court
said, "A sovereign is exempt from su&t, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends."
The duties of abstention are in the main of a political nature
and beyond the power of municipal law to control. There have, how-
ever, been treaties and statutes defining methods of acquiring terri-
tory, the limits of the use of force against foreign countries, and
the extent of the national jurisdiction. The courts also, although
generally holding such questions political, and following the politi-
cal department of government in any determination it may give regard-
ing the international duties of abstention, have laid down rules,
especially on the question of jurisdiction. As in laying down these
1- Hatch vs. Baez, 7 Hun. 596, (N.Y.1S76); Res Publica vs. DeLong-
Champs, 1 Dall. 111,116.
2- American Banana Co. vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, (1909).
3- KawanaHako vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353.
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principles upon which they and other public officers will act, they
find the rules in the law of nations, and apply them according to
the principle that courts of the United States apply international
law in appropriate cases, judgemade law furnishes an effective mu-
nicipal sanction to the fulfillment of the states duties of absten-
tion.
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• Chapter II . Obligations of Acquiescence,
Introductory ,
As a state is in general bound to abstain from the exercise of
sovereignty outside of its territory, so in general it may resent
any obstructions to the free exercise of its sovereign rights within
its territory. As has been noted there are exceptions to the general
rule of abstention from the exercise of extraterritorial sovereignty.
In like manner there are exceptions to the rule of complete internal
authority. International law specifies cases in which sovereign
rights may not be exercised even within the territory and thereby
imposes a duty to acquiesce in these exemptions. There is, however,
great difference of opinion as to what these exemptions are.
It seems that in common law countries the principle of absolute
territorial sovereignty is adhered to in theory with great emphasis,
but in practice numerous concessions are made. 1 In Roman law coun-
tries on the other hand, many limitations of strict territorial
sovereignty are recognized as law, but in practice, few more con-
cessions are allowed than under the common law. It is possible that
the difference in theory can be traced to the territorial isolation
of England in the days when the common law originated; as distin-
guished from the uisintjlgul Ij i und it situation of continental European
contiguity and a
states where/common descent from the Roman Empire, was enhanced by
the medieval conception still lingering in the Roman Law of a world
state, to which all territorial states are subject, However, for our
purposes the origin of the difference in theory is unimportant. We
do not care whether the exemptions from territorial sovereignty
1- See Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon
7 Cranch 116 (1812)
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actually practiced, were originally justified by a theory of comity
or of legal obligation. It remains certain that many of them are
now so habitually observed in practice, as to be distinctly obliga-
tions of international law. Others are observed with varying fre-
quency so should be classed as obligations of comity and good will
rather than law. A third class of such concessions consist of ob-
ligations sometimes enunciated by theorists but seldom made effect-
ive or maintained by practical diplomatists.
In the first class are the complete or partial exemptions from
territorial jurisdiction of certain foreign agencies of government,
such as executive heads, diplomatic officers, armed forces, public
vessels, consuls and sometimes of other foreign subjects, to which
may be added the exemptions from complete control, of certain por-
tions of territory, such as international rivers and canals, ports
and territorial waters of the ocean, and recently acquired territory.
In the second class are exceptions from the usual rule that
courts apply the law of the land. Such exemptions occur in cases in-
volving foreign persons, foreign judgments, foreign contracts, etc.
Here exists the most marked difference between the Anglo-American and
Continental theories. Writers of the latter school usually consider
it a duty of the state to assume jurisdiction of cases and apply
foreign law according to the rules of private international law. 1
Common law writers on the other hand, generally consider the matter
1- See H. Bonfils, Manuel de Droit International Public. 3rd. ed.,
Paris, 1901, p. 3: F. DeMartens, Traite de Droit International, 3 vols
Paris, 1883, 2; 391-400: See also Annuaire de l'institut de Droit
International, 1902, 1904, 1906, 1908 and compare attitude of repre-
sentatives of Continental and Common Law countries in discussions of
private international law.
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i
entirely one of comity and policy. They deny that a state is under
an international duty to apply foreign law according to any rules
other than those its own jurisprudence may direct. Consequently they
sometimes object to the term "private international law" but consider
the rules governing "conflict of laws" as a branch of the common law.
Which theory is best adapted to promote the welfare of men and na-
tions we shall not attempt to decide but it is certain that no system
for the application of law has been universally consented to at pres-
ent. Although American courts have occasionally applied rules on the
subject because they deemed them established by , international law,^
their general tendency has been to regard precedents of the common
law alone. We will therefore exclude the rules of private interna-
tional law from consideration. At present international law imposes
no duty upon states to apply foreign law in certain cases.
In the third class are duties connected with the control of pri-
vate persons and commerce. It is sometimes asserted that states are
bound to acquiesce in the immigration of foreigners and the emigra-
tion of inhabitants; the naturalization of aliens and the expatriation
1- See T.E. Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, 11th ed.
,
N.Y.,1910
pp 410-419: J.Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law, 3rd
ed., London, 1890, pp 1-7: Joseph Story, Commentaries on The Conflict
of Laws, 8th ed., Boston, 1883, pp 8-9,24; F. Wharton, A Treatise on
the Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., 2 vols., N.Y., 1905, pp 2-4: A.V. Dicey
A Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Law,
2nd ed., London, 1908, pp 3-16: F. Pollock, First Book of Jurispru-
dence, 2nd ed., London, 1904, p. 99: T.J.Lawrence, Principles of In-
ternational Law, 4th ed., N.Y. 1910, pp 5-6: A.S. Hershey, The Essen-
tials of International Public Law, N.Y. 1912, pp 4-5, Bibliography^!
3
2- See Hilton vs. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,(1894), in which Justice Gray,
speaking for the court decided that international law, public and pri-
vate, is part of the law of the United States and requires adherence
to the principle of reciprocity in applying foreign judgments. He
therefore refused to apply a French judgment, as French courts did
not apply foreign judgments, but in Ritchie vs. McMullen, 159 U.S.
235, at the same time, he applied an English judgment on the same
principle. Justices Fuller, Harlan. Brewer, and Jackson dissented in
Hilton vs. Guyot on the ground that the commonlaw was decisive and it
applied the principle of res judicata to foreign as well as domestic
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cf citizens; and the importation and exportation of goods, * If the
state were really under an international obligation to acquiesce in
these matters, if it had no legal right to say who should enter or
leave its territory, who should form its citizenship and what com-
mercial policy should be pursued the regime of territorial state
sovereignty would be at an end. The United States has certainly not
acted upon this theory in its entirety. It has passed laws prohibit-
ing immigration not only of vicious classes but of whole races, and
laws expelling aliens after they have arrived. In its diplomatic
correspondence instead of maintaining acquiescence in emigration as
a duty under international law, it has considered it a duty of states
g
to prohibit the emigration of vicious classes. Even less hae un-
limited admission to citizenship been permitted by law. Large classes
and whole races are permanently excluded grom this privilege. Laws
permitting naturalization have been framed with reference to national
policy not international duty. By admitting the right to restrict
emigration, the right to prevent the loss of its citizens by expa-
triation is admitted. Whether the citizens who have emigrated and
reside abroad, may expatriate themselves, acquire citizenship in
another country and claim the privileges of the new citizenship on
returning is a different question. The United States has maintained
that the recognition of the right of expatriation is a duty of inters
3
national law, but all nations have not given assent to this doctrine.
The opinion which considers a state bound to acquiesce in the free-
dom of commerce, has certainly received no countenance from American
1- See Bonfils, op.cit., sec. 412-414; Hershey, op.cit. p. 257, and
note, also bibliography, p. 273.
2- See Moore's Digest, 2;427.
3- The "inherent right of expatriation" was enunciated by congress
in 1864, Rev. Stat., 1999-2000.
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practice. The United States has completely prohibited exportation,
by embargo acts. It has prohibited trade with specified countries
by non-intercourse acts and has habitually placed serious limitations
upon importation by protective tarriffs. No duty of acquiescence in
these fields, is required by international law, and the subject need
no longer detain us.
Limiting consideration to the first class, we may discuss the
national measures enforcing the duty to acquiesce in exemption from
the complete exercise of authority within the territory, under three
heads: (1) privileges of foreign agencies of government and persons,
(2)liabilities attached to newly acquired territory, (3) exemptions
of certain portions of territory from complete control, or servitudes
As in the case of the duty of abstention this duty is one direct
6d immediately to the sovereign power of the state. If the sovereign
refuses to acquiesce in the immunity of ambassadors and orders his
courts to assume jurisdiction over them, the courts must obey. If
by an act of state he refuses to recognize the right of inhabitants
of acquired territory to their vested rights under the former sover-
1
eign the courts must obey. Or if he refuses to permit vessels in
distress to enter his ports, and commerce to pass upon his boundary
rivers, his interoceanic canals and his territorial waters, the obli-
2gation can not be enforced by municipal law. In all of these cases,
however, in the absence of express statute the courts may enforce the
1-See West Rand Central Gold Mining Co., vs. Rex., L.R. 2 K.B. 391,
(1905), which held that "an act of state" barred recovery from the
British government of a claim due from the Transvaal government be-
fore acquisition. Discussion of this case by J.Westlake, "Is Int.
Law part of the Law of England", Law Quar. Rev., 22;14.
2- The fortification of the Panama Canal amounts to an announcement
! that the United States will not acquiesce in its freedom to commerce
under all circumstances.
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duty by adhering to the rule that international law is to be applied
that
in appropriate cases, and/statutes are to be interpreted so far as
possible in accord with that law. And where the rules of interna-
tional law are expressly declared by treaty, statute or executive
order, the power of municipal law to enforce is clear.
1. Privileges of foreign agencies of government and persons.
(l) Foreign public vessels are granted the right of asylum
coupled with immunity from local jurisdiction in several treaties, 1
and in a large number of treaties the United States has agreed to
accord the most favored nation treatment to the diplomatic representa-
tives of the contracting power, ^and special privileges have frequent-
ly been thus accorded to foreign consuls. These privileges do not
in general extend beyond the immunity of the consular archives from
seizure, the inviolability of the consulate, and the privilege of
adjusting disputes between sailors on national vessels and performing
functions connected with commerce. Most treaties specify that the
consul shall be subject to local jurisdiction in the same manner as
3
citizens and to most favored nation treatment. . By a few treaties
4
consuls are exempt from giving testimony and in non-Christian coun-
tries where extraterritorial privileges are granted consuls usually
1- See Treaties, France, 1788-1798, art. 17, Malloy p. 474; 1800-
1809, art. 24, p. 504; Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. 25, p. 604; Prus-
sia, 1785-1796, art. 19, p. 1483; 1799-1610, revived 1828, art. 19,
p. 1493; Sweden, 1783-1799, revived 1816, 1827, art. 19, p. 1732;
Netherlands, 1782-1795, art. 5, p. 1245.
2- Such treaties have been concluded with twenty-one countries, most
ly South and Central American. The Spanish treaty of 1902, however,
contained this stipulation. (art. 12, Malloy, p. 1204)
3- In 104 treaties with 51 countries provision for consular officers
is made. 20 special consular conventions with 15 countries have been
concluded. Consular conventions with practically all countries are
now in force. Russia, however, since the termination of the treaty of
1832, by joint resolution of congress in 1911, is an exception to
this rule.
4- For axjaiBPle see treaty with France. 1853. art. 2. Mallov . n.529.
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enjoy diplomatic immunities by treaty, such privileges, however, are
1
not reciprocal.
The consular regulations and diplomatic instructions outline the
2
privileges of such officers. These executive orders are not of im-
portance in enforcing the country's duty of acquiescing in the im-
munities of foreign resident officers, but they illustrate the view
of the law taken by the United States.
In several treaties private citizens of the contracting parties
3
are granted immunity from military service.
(2) Courts have enforced the duty to acquiesce in the immunities
granted by treaty and statute as well as others recognized by inter-
national law. They have held that jurisdiction may not be assumed of
4
suits against foreign sovereigns, and former officers of foreign gover-
5
rcents for political acts, even when they are within the territory.
The same exemption has been held to apply to public vessels and
1- See Moore's Digest, 5,37-40. Supra, p.
2- Consular Regulations, 1896, sec. 71-75, 82. Diplomatic instruc-
tions, 1897, sec. 18, 46-49.
3- Such treaties have been concluded with sixteen countries. Those
with Argentina, 1853, art. 10, Malloy, p. 23; Congo, 1891, art. 3,
p. 329; Costa Rico, 1851, art. 9, p. 344; Honduras, 1864, art. 9, p. 955;
Italy, 1871, art. 3, p. 970; Japan, 1894, art. 1, p. 1029; Paraguay,
1659, art. 11, p. 1367; Servia, 1681, art. 4, p. 1615; Spain, 1902,
art. 5, p. 1703, are now in force.
4- See Dicta by Chief Justice Marshall, in Schooner Exchange vs.
McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, (1812). British case, Mighell vs. Sultan of
Johore, L.R., 1894, Q.B.D. , 1;149.
5- Underhill vs. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250.
B- U.S. Peters, 3 Dall . 121; Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7
Cranch 116,137, (1812); Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, (1902)
See British case, The Parlement Beige, L.R. , 5 P.D. 197,217, (1900),
Bentwich, p. 123; Scott, 220.
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1
other personal property of a foreign state or sovereign. Public
armed troops and soldiers have also generally been held exempt when
2
acting under orders of their sovereign but in the celebrated case of
3
People vs. McLeod, in which a court of the state of New York refused
to recognize such immunities a reverse attitude was taken. In this
case the authorities at Washington favored the release of McLeod in
accordance with international duty, but were unable to release him
from state authority. The case illustrates the obstacle which the
division of power between state and national government may offer to
the performance of international duties. Soon after this case by an
4
act of 1842 congress provided for the release of such persons from
state courts by habeas corpus issued by federal courts.
The exceptions to the general rule of exemption in cases where
it becomes necessary for the state to vindicate a violation of its
5
neutrality are considered under that subject.
(3) By statute courts are forbidden taking jurisdiction of cases
against diplomatic ministers and members of their households upon
Q
either xzivil or criminal charges. This has been held to apply to
such officers accredited to third countries in transit through the
7
United States as well as those accredited to the United States, but
the person claiming immunity must be an actual diplomatic officer.
1- Hazzard vs. U.S. of Mexico, 61 N.Y.S. 939, (1899). British case,
Vavasseur vs. Krupp, L.R. 9,Ch. D. 351,(1878); Moore's Digest, 2,
558-593.
2- Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, (1902); Dicta Schooner
Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, (1812).
3- People vs. McLeod, 25 Wend, 253; 26 Wend. 663; See Moore's Diges
2; 24-25. McLeod was tried and finally acquitted on an alibi.
4- Act Aug. 29, 1842, Rev. Stat. sec. 753; Moore's Digest, 2;30.
5- Infra, p. 154 et seq.
6- Act. Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 117, Rev. Stat. sec. 4063-4064.
7- Wilson vs. Blanco, 56 N.Y. Superior Court 582; 4 N.Y.S. 714;
Scott, 206.
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A consul general performing diplomatic functions was held not to be
1
within the immunity. Few cases have come before United States
courts involving directly, jurisdiction over diplomatic officers.
Generally a release has been effected by executive authority before
the process has gone so far.. In a number of cases dealing with the
punishment of persons violating diplomatic immunities the question
2
has been discussed. The courts have also held that a diplomatic
3
officer may not be compelled to give testimony.
For the better enforcement of these duties the constitution has
conferred jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors and public
ministers upon the federal courts and has also given the supreme
4 5
court original jurisdiction in such cases. Statutes have made
over all suits
jurisdiction/against ouch officers or their household exclusive in
the federal courts, thus prohibiting the exercise of any such author-
ity by state courts and preventing an occurrence in reference to pub-
lic ministers similar to that of the McLeod case, in reference to
foreign armed forces. Statutes have also provided that the supreme
court "shall have exclusively, all such jurisdiction of suits or pro-
ceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers or their do-
mestics or servants as a court of law can have consistently with the
6
law of nations."
1- In re E.a iz, 135 U.S. 403. See British case, Heathfield vs. Chil-
ton, 4 Burr. 2015, Scott, 189. On diplomatic immunities generally see
Ex Parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C.C. 232; Cushing Att. Gen., 7 op. 367, 18551;
Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, and other English cases, cited Scott,
191, note.
2- U.S. vs. Liddle, 2 Wash. C.C. 205,(1808); Res Publica vs. De
Long-champs, 1 Dall . Ill ,( Pa. 1784) ; U.S. vs. Ortega, 4 Wash. C.C. 531,
(1825); U.S. vs. Brewer, Baldwin 234.
3- Guiteau's Trial, 1;136; Moore's Digest, 4;645.
4- Constitution, Art. iii.
5- Judiciary Act, Sept. 24, 1789, sec. 9,11,13, 1 Stat. 76, Rev.
Stat. Sec. 687, 711, Judicial Code 1911 ,36 Stat. 1087, sec. 256, cl. 8.
6- Rev. Stat. 687; Judicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087. sec. 233.
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The courts have held that consuls are not entitled to the im-
munities of ambassadors but are subject to criminal and civil juris-
diction.
1
Consuls are generally held exempt from military and jury
service but United States citizens holding foreign consular positions
2
may not claim this exemption and trading consuls are subject to the
3liabilities of native merchants in all that concerns their business.
Treaty privileges of consuls are protected by the constitutional
principle that treaties are law to be applied by the courts. In a
case in which a consul claimed immunity from sub poena under treaty,
the court held that even the constitutional provision giving a person
;
under criminal indictment the right "to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor" would not permit of serving process
4
on such a consul.
The constitution confers jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls
upon federal courts and original jurisdiction 4n such cases upon the
5
supreme court. By the judiciary Art. of 1789, jurisdiction of courts
against cobsuIs was given exclusively to federal courts. By an act of
1- Commonwealth vs. Kosloff, 5 Serg. and Rawle, 545, (Pa. 1816);
Coppell vs. Hall, 7 Wall. 542,(1868); Gittings vs. Crawford, Taney's
Decisions, 1; In Re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403; Bradford, Att. Gen. 2 op. 378,
(1830); Butler Att. Gen., 2 op. 725, (1835); Cushing Att. Gen. 2 op.
18, 367, (1854-1855). In U.S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall.297, (1793), a con-
sul was subjected to criminal jurisdiction. British cases, see, Bar-
buit's case, Cas. Temp. Talbot, 231(1737); Clark vs. Cretico, 1 Taunt
106,(1808); Viveash vs. Beckers 3 M.& S. 284, (1814)
2- Cushing Att. Gen., 8 op. 169, (1856).
3- Coppell vs. Hall, 7 Wall. 342, (1869).
4« In Re Dillon, Fed. Cas. 710; Moore's Digest 5;78. The court held
that the constitutional provisions only insure equal privileges in ob
taining witnesses to the accused and the government, not an absolute
right in either case. The French government maintained that rights of
its consul under International law as well as under treaty had been
violated by the serving of process which gave rise to this case.
5- Judiciary Act. 1789, Rev. Stat. sec. 711, CI. 8.,
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1875 this provision was repealed, giving state courts a concurrent
jurisdiction but in the Judicial code of 1911 the jurisdiction of
federal courts was again made exclusive. The supreme court exercises
original, but not exclusive jurisdiction in such cases. 1
(4) A more extensive limitation upon territorial sovereignty
than the mere immunity of consuls in these respects, are jurisdic-
tional privilegos accorded by some treaties. The United States has
never concluded treaties by which foreign consuls or diplomatic of-
ficers exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in its territory to
the extent that such jurisdiction is commonly exercised in non-
Christian countries, but certain privileges have been accorded. These
privileges which have always been reciprocal, generally permit for-
eign consuls to "sit as judges or arbitrators in such differences as
may arise between the captain and crew of the vessels belonging to
the nations whose interests are intrusted to their charge, without
the interference of the local authorities" and to require the assist-
ance of local authorities "to cause their decision to be carried in-
to effect or supported." These treaties undoubtedly impose a duty
upon the United States to acquiesce in the consular jurisdiction pro-
vided for. It has been held that the authority is ministerial and
3
not judicial and in an early opinion the court expressed the view
1-Act. 1875, 18 Stat. 318. See Wilcox vs. Luco, 18 Cal. 639,(1898).
The court below held that the constitutional provision alone gave ex-
clusive jurisdiction to federal courts, but this was reversed in the
state supreme court. See Moore's Digest, 5;72-77, Scott, 205-206,
note. Judicial code 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 256, CI. 8: sec. 233.
2- See Treaties with Prussia, 1828, art. 10, Malloy, p. 1499; France,
1853, art. 8, p. 531; Italy, 1878-1881, art. 11. p. 980; 1881, art. 1,
p. 983; Sweden and Norway, 1827, art. 13, p. 1753; Austria-Hungary, 1870,
art. 11. p. 42; Belgium, 1880, art. 11, p. 97; Germany, 1871, art. 13,
p. 554. See also Consular Regulations, 1896, and Moore's Digest, 2;298,
The treaty with France 1788-1798, art. 12, Malloy, p. 495 gave consulai
courts jurisdiction "of all differences and suits between subjects" o:
the respective countries. See Moore's Digest 2;83-85.
_
3- Cushing Att. Gen.. 8 op. 580. (1857).
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that the treaties were not self executing and local officers could
not lend assistance without statutory authority.
1
This view is not
2
generally maintained but to avoid difficulties a statute of 1864 re-
quired United States courts and officers to issue process on applica-
tion of consuls, in fulfillment of treaty obligations when that coun-
try accorded reciprocal privileges as attested by proclamation of the
president. The president has proclaimed this situation with refer-
6nce to most of the treaties in force. The courts have enforced
these provisions by refusing jurisdiction of cases coming within the
4
consular privileges but it has been held that where disturbances
affect the tranquility of the port, the national courts may always
5
exercise jurisdiction.
(5) An exemption from territorial jurisdiction which if carried
that
to excess might become a source of public danger, is/ granted to per-
sons within diplomatic residences, consulates or public vessels.
This is known as the right of asylum. It should be noted that the
1- See Moore's Digest, 2; 298.
2- Act June 11, 1864, 13 Stat. 12, Judicial code, 1911,36 Stat.
1087, sec. 271.
3- Proclamations Feb. 10, 1870, May 11, 1872; See Moore's Digest,
2;299.
4- Telefrees vs. Fee, 46 N.E. 562, (Mass.); The Elwine Kreplin,
9 Blatch. 438; Williams vs. Wellhaven, 55 Fed. Rep. 80.
5- This exception to the consular provilege is specified in all of
the treaties menti oned
,
( note 2 on preceding page) except that with
France, 1853, art. 8, p. 531. See Wildenhus' case, 120 U.S. 1; Com.
vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. 363, (Pa.); Taft Att. Gen., 15 op. 178, (1878
6- Cn the right of Asylum see Moore's Digest, 2; 755. In early times
the privilege of giving Asylum was recognized and often abused. Moore
says, "In some instances ambassadors of a thrifty tuna realized enor-
mous profits by hiring and granting their protection to houses which
they then sublet to malefactors", Moore's Digest, 2; 759.
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and
immunity of public vessels J diplomatic and consular residences does
not necessarily imply a right of giving asylum. Thus a great many
treaties declare that consular residences shall be inviolable but
"in no case shall their offices and dwellings be used as places of
asylum". Although this distinction may exist in reference to the
duty of the foreign privileged authority, it can not with reference
to the duty of the state upon whose territory this authority is lo-
cated. If the state must acquiesce in the immunity from entry of a
diplomatic residence or a public vessel, it must also acquiesce in
its use as an asylum, so far as immediate assertion of its authority
is concerned. It can of course protest and recover the fugitive by
diplomatic means.
In its diplomatic instructions, consular regulations and naval
instructions, the United States forbids the granting of asylum except
2
in unusual cases. This is the practice generally required by trea-
ties and may be said to be the law although in a number of cases
American officials have given asylum, especially to political refugees
3
in South American countries.
On the other hand the United States has generally recognized the
immunity of diplomatic residences and foreign vessels of war from
4
entry and service of legal process, although in an opinion of 1794
attorney general Bradford held that a writ of Habeas Corpus could be
5
served on a foreign public vessel while in 1799 attorney general L§e
1- See Treaties with Netherlands, 1878; Salvador, 1870; France, 1853;
Belgium, 1868; 1880; Italy, 1868; 1878; Roumania, 1881; Servia, 1881;
The German treaty of 1871, art. 5, Malloy p. 552, declares that con-
sulates shall be inviolable "except in the case of pursuit of crime".
See Moore's Digest, 2;755-757.
2- See Diplomatic instructions, 1897, sec. 49-51; Consular Regula-
tions, 1896, sec. 80; Navy Regulations, 1813, sec. 1649.
3- See Moore's Digest, 2;781-883.
4- Bradford Att. Gen., 1 op. 47. (179a).
5- Lfte At.t.. PTRn., 1 np. 87-&Q. nfrQQ),
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th ought civil or criminal process might be served in a British man
of war. In an opinion of 1855
1
attorney general Cushing emphatic-
ally maintained the doctrine of exemption, going even to the extent
of extraterritoriality. In several treaties the right of asylum to
slaves on public vessels is affirmed^ and in the Brussels act of
3
1890 slaves fleeing to war vessels of the signatories are declared
to become free. Consulates do not enjoy immunities, by international
law, and consequently could under no circumstances give asylum, un-
less immunity is granted by treaty, as is done in a number of cases.
Acquiescence in the right of asylum so far as it is necessitated
through
/the immunity of diplomatic residences, consulates and naval vessels
4
from territorial jurisdiction is enforced by the same means; but
there is really no duty of acquiescence, for the state may, within
its international right, protest the matter diplomatically.
Resident subjects of foreign states are permitted no special
privileges or exemptions from territorial jurisdiction except those
specifically accorded by treaty, such as military exemptions. In
these cases the courts by directly enforcing treaty provisions as
law may enforce the states duty of acquiescence.
1- Cushing Att. Gen., 7 op. 112; 8 op. 73, (1655,1856).
2- Ey the treaty with Algiers of 1795-1815, art. 11, Malloy p. 3,
the return of slaves fleeing to public vessels was required, by that
of 1816-1830, art. 14, p. 14, Christian captives fleeing to United
States Public vessels, might be asylumed. By the treaty with Tunis
1797-1824, art. 6, p»1795, the return of slaves was demanded but as
amended in 1824-1904, art. 6, p. 1801, slaves gaining asylum were free,
The treaty with Madagascar, 1881-1896, art. 7, p. 1071 forbade the
giving of asylum to slaves.
3- General act for the Repression of the Slave Trade, Brusselis
Convention, 1890, art. 28, Malloy, p. 1975.
4- See U.S. vs. Jeffers, 4 Cranch C.C. 704, Sctott, 256, (1836), in
which a constable was removed from office for arresting a fugitive
slave in the house of a British Secretary of Legation. See British
case, Forbes vs. Cockburn, 2 Barn. & Cress, 448, (K.B. 1824), Scott,
258, where it was held that slaves reaching a British Warship became
free, hence Forbes the owner of a plantation in Florida, had no action
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2. Liabilities attached to newly acquired territory.
The second duty of acquioscence relates to the rights of the in-
habitants of newly acquired territory and the liabilities attached to
the land. The rules governing these matters are ordinarily spoken of
as the law of succession. According to the strict principle of terri-
torial sovereignty, as soon as new territory is acquired, any rela-
tions between its inhabitants and the new government would become
matters of municipal law. No obligations of international law could
exist. The actual law however, recognizes this case as an exception
to the usual rule of complete territorial sovereignty. The land must
be taken subject to a kind of servitude. The acquiring state must
acquiesce in preexisting rights of the inhabitants and preexisting
rights of third parties hypothecated upon the territory. These ob-
ligations may be classified under three heads. (l) Treaties imposing
obligations upon the former sovereign, (2) liabilities attached to
the territory, (3) rights of the inhabitants derived from the former
sovereign.
(1) International law requires the new sovereign to recognize
the obligations of treaties concluded by the old sovereign only in
against Cockburn, commander of a public vessel, for asyluming and
carrying off such fugitive slaves. For extended discussion of rights
of asylum on Public vessels and limits of local jurisdiction over
such vessels in port according to English law, see Report of Royal
Commission on Fugitive Slaves, 1876, Great Britain forbade public ves-
sels to give asylum to slaves by an order of 1875, (Br. and For. St.
Papers, 66;892). The Royal commission appointed to consider this order
held as follows; For right of Asylum and extraterritoriality, Philli-
rnore, 3ernard, Maine., Contra, Cockburn, Archbald, Thesiger, H.T. Hol-
land, FitzJames Stephen, Rothery, but they held that asylum might be
given as a matter of humanity and in any case the local authorities
could not recover the fugitives by entry of the vessel. It is inter-
esting to note that the line of cleavage is between publicists on in-
ternational law and common law, lawyers and judges. See in reference
to the work of this commission, Maine, Int. Law, p. 88; Stephen, Hist,
of the Criminal Law, 2;57; Jour, of Jurisprudence, 20,1888; Moore's
Digest, 2;848.
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case of universal succession. There have been two cases of this
character in the history of the United States, those of Texas and
Hawaii. Both states had concluded treaties with third parties before
annexation. 1 In both cases, in the resolution of annexation the
United States declared all treaties of the forme r states abrogated.
Japan offered some protest to the abrogation of her treaty with Hawaii
but the United States disavowed any intention of violating vested
rights of Japanese subjects under this treaty, and no specific case
2
seems to have arisen.
(2) The second case has arisen in connection with the annexation
of Texas and Hawaii and the cessions of Spain following the war of
3
1898. The United States assumed by statute liabilities hypothecated
4
upon the revenues to a specified amount in the first two cases.
1- See Treaties of Texas with France, 1839, Marten's N.R., 16;987:
with Great Britain, 1840, Marten's N.R.G., 4;1506: 1841, Ibid, 4;609:
with Netherlands, 1840, Ibid. 1;375: See Moore's Digest, 1;456. Texas
had also concluded treaties with the United States, see Malloy, p.
1778-9, which were of course, abrogated by annexation. See treaty of
Hawaii with Japan, 1886, Br. And For. St. Pap., 77;941.
8- Joint Resolution, Mch. 1, 1845, 5 Stat. 797; July 7, 1898, Sec.
4
Germany claimed that she retained special rights in the Sulu Archi-
peligo under protocol with Spain of Mch. 11, 1877, after cessions of
the Philippines to the United States, a contention denied by the
United States. See Moore's Digest 5; 346-352.
3- The Act o¥§l7§0, sponsored by Hamilton, whereby the national
government, as succeeding to much of the sovereignty of the states by
the constitution of 1769 assumed their revolutionary debts to the
amount of $21,500,000 may also be citfed as a recognition of the duty
of the successor to sovereignty., 1 Stat. 142, Sec. 13.
4- By 'the joint resolution of Mch. 1, 1845, 5 stat. 797, consenting
to the admission of Texas to the Union, it was specified that Texas
should retain public funds, debts, taxes and dues owed the Republic
and vacant lands, to be applied to the payment of debts which were
in "no event to become a charge upon the United States". By an act,
of Sept. 9,1650, 9 Stat. 446, on consideration of a boundary modifi-
cation and relinquishment by Texas of "all claims upon the United
States for liability of the debts of Texas" the United States agreed
to pay $10,000,000 to the state, half of which was to be retained
until "the creditors of the state holding bonds and other certificate*
of the state of Texas for which duties on imports were specially
pledged shall first file at the Treasury~of the United States, re-
leases of all claims against the United States." As few of the Texan
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In the case of the Spanish cessions the United States refused to in-
clude in the treaty of peace a provision, presented by the Spanish
plenipotentiaries by which the United States was to assume "all
charges and obligations of every kind in existence at the time of the
ratification of the treaty of peace, which the crown of Spain * * may
have contracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty hereby
relinquished and transferred, and which as such constitute an integral
part thereof."
1
It also rejected a provision requiring that "grants
and contracts for public works and services" in Cuba, Porto Rico, and
the Phillippines be "maintained in force until their expiration, in
accordance with the terms thereof, the new government assuming all
the rights and obligations thereby attaching up to the present time
to the Spanish Government." It, however, disavowed any purpose "to
disregard the obligations of international law in respect to such con*
2
tracts." A number of claims based on Spanish concessions were pre-
sented to the government and were variously settled in accordance wit!
bonds were specifically pledged upon imports, the act gave rise to
question, but was held to require payment of all bonds. (See Cushing
Att. Gen. 6 op. 130, (1853), Corwin, Sec. of Treas. , Sen. Ex. Doc,
103, (34th Cong. 1st Sess, p. 406-7) . In the British claims arbitra-
tion of 1853, claims for Texan bonds were presented and the commis-
sion held that the United States was not liable, hence these claims
were not within the competence of the arbitral court. The matter was
concluded by an act of Feb. 28, 1855, 10 stat. 617, by which the
United States agreed to pay Texan debts for which the revenues of the
state were pledged to the amount of $7,750,000, to be apportioned pro
rata among the creditors. See Moore's Digest, l;343-347. In the Joint
Resolution of July 7, 1898, annexing Hawaii, "the public debt of the
Republic of Hawaii" was assumed by the United States to an amount not
to exceed .$4,000,000. See Moore's Digest, 1;351.
1- This applied to Cuba and Porto Rico. See Moore's Digest, 1;352.
The United States delegation held that these obligations were incurrec
in a fruitless effort to pacify the Island extending over a long
period of years. The expenditure did not benefit the islands and
should be considered liabilities of the Spanish nation, not of the
Islands. See Moore's Digest, l;351-385.
2- Moore's Digest, l;389-390.
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opinions of Attorney's general and law officers of the War Department
which was then administering the Islands.
1 As an example may be men-
tioned the case of the Manilla Railway Co., a corporation subsidized
by the Spanish government which claimed a continuance of the periodic
subsidies by the new government. The law officer of the Division of
p
Insular affairs of the War Department advised the non-allowance of
the claim holding it to be a personal obligation of the Spanish sover-
3
eign but the attorney-general took a contrary view and in an official
opinion, held that the United States was liable for this obligation
under international law.
To summarize, the United States has generally acknowledged its
obligation to pay debts pledged on the revenue, and contracts for the
improvement of territory to which it has succeeded. It however, de-
nied such an obligation with reference to the general public debt of
the dismembered state, in cases of partial succession.
(3) Certain rights of the inhabitants have generally been speci-
fied in treaties ceding territory to the United States. Freedom to
leave the country and retain their former allegiance without loss of
property; and in case of election to remain in the territory, guaran-
tees of civil rights, religious liberty and some tiroes admission to
4
American citizenship have generally been so stipulated. Similar pro-
visions have been contained in resolutions, statutes and executive
1- Griggs Att. Gen., 22 op. 310,408,514,520,546; 23 op. 181; Knox,
Att. Gen., 23 op. 451.
2- Magoon's Reports, 177.
3- Griggs, Att. Gen., 23 op. 181; Knox Att. Gen. 23 op. 1.451. See
Moore's Digest, 1;369-410.
4- Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, art. 4,5,6, Malloy, p. 586;
1840, art. 3, p. 656; France, 1803, art. 3,6, p. 508; Mexico, 1848,
art, 8,9,11. p. 1111; 1853, art. 2,5, p. 1121; Russia, 1867, art. 3,
p. 1523; Spain, 1819, art. 5,6,8, p. 1653; 1898, art. 9,-12, p. 1690.
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orders relating to the annexation, government and administration of
new territory.
1
By enforcing these provisions the courts have en-
forced the governments obligations under international law.
The enforcement of constitutional guarantees also acts to pro-
tect the rights of inhabitants of such territory but the courts have
drawn distinctions as to the applicability of these guarantees to
different kinds of acquisitions. All of the constitutional guaran-
2
tees apply to incorporated territory such as Alaska, and territory
contiguous to the original colonies but those conferring privileges
not "natural rights" but of a technical nature relating peculiarly
to the common law, such as trial by jury; or of a political nature
such as citizenship, do not apply to inhabitants of unincorporated
territory, such as the Phi lippines, Hawaii, and Porto Rico.' None
of the constitutional guarantees appear to apply to territory tem-
4
porarily occupied and under military government or to consular juris -
5
diction . It appears, however, that the confiscation of property or
the deprivation of life or liberty of persons without "due process
of law" in actually acquired territory, would be prevented by con-
stitutional guarantees.
1-See Northwest Ordinance, July 13,1787; Act Aug. 7,1789; in refer-
ence to Louisiana. Act. Oct. 2, 1803, 2 Stat. 245; Mch. 19,1804, 2 Stat.
272; in reference to Texas, Joint Resolution, Mch. 1, 1845, 5 Stat.
797; Act Sept. 9, 1850, 9 Stat. 446, Feb. 28, 1855, 10 Stat. 617; in
reference to New Mexico, Act. Mch. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 854; in reference
to Hawaii , Joint Resolution, July 7,1898, Act. Apr. 30, 1900; in refer-
ence to Porto Rico, Act Apr. 12,1900, May 1,1900; in reference to
Philippines, Act July 1, 1902, Mch. 9, 1902; in reference to Guano
Islands, Act 1856, Rev. Stat. 5570-5578.
2- Rasmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S. 510.
3- For this distinction and reference to "natural rights" see
Justice Brown, in Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,282. For its ap-
plication to Hawaii, Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197; to the Philip
pines, Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S. 138; and to Porto Rico, Gonzales vs.
Williams, 192 U.S. 1.
4- Neeley vs. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122.
5- In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464.
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The United States courts have held that all public law, relat-
ing to forms of government, revenue systems, and administration are
abrogated by change of sovereignty, 1 but in a number of cases the
executive has by order continued the former administrative authori-
2
ties, in which case their acts are valid. The system of private law
in force has, however, been held to continue until specifically al-
tered by statute. It is upon this principle that the courts of all
of the states, originally British colonies or settled from them- have
continued to apply the common law while those of Louisiana, and
Texas, have applied the French and Spanish systems of law respectively
1- Karcourt vs. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523; New Orleans vs. U.S. 10
Pet. 602; Davis vs. Concordia, 9 How. 280; U.S. vs. Vaca, 18 How. 556
Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 pet. 542; Pollard vs. Hagan, 31 How. 212
225; U.S. vs. Reynes, 9 How. 127; U.S. vs. D' Auterine, 10 How. 609;
Montoult vs. U.S. 12 How. 47; U.S. vs. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412; Stearnes vs
,
U.S. 6 Wall. 589; U.S. vs. Pico, 23 How, 321; Moore vs. Steinbach, 12'
U.S. 70; Alexander vs. Roulet, 13 Wall. 386; Mumford, vs. Wardwell
,
6 Wall. 423. See Moore's Digest, 1; 304-311. For effect of succession
on Revenue Laws see, Flemming vs. Page, 9 How. 603; Wirt, Att. Gen.,
1 op. 483, (1821); Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. 164; Presidents Proc-
lamation, July 25, 1901, and Insular Cases, DeLima vs. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244; Dooley vs. U.S. 182 U.S.
222; Armstrong vs. U.S. 182 U.S. 243; Huus vs. N.Y. & Porto Rico,
Steamship Co. 182 U.S. 392; Goetz vs. U.S. 182 U.S. 221; Crossman vs.
U.S. 182 U.S. 221; Fourteen Diamond Rings, 103 U.S. 176; Dooley vs.
U.S. 183 U.S. 151. See Moore's Digest, l;311-332.
2- Joint Resolution, July 7, 1898, in reference to Hawaii; War Dept.
Circular, Feb. 1899, in reference to territory under military govern-
ment; act May 1, 1900, in reference to Porto Rico. See Ely's Adm. vs.
U.S. 171 U.S. 220,230,(1898). Moore's Digest, l;306-308.
3- In Mortiner vs. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co., 6 N.Y.S. 89,(1889), Scot"
,
111, a claim that Dutch law rather than English should apply in refer*
ence to the portion of New York City originally occupied by the Dutch
was denied. The British claim based on Cabot's discover prior to Dutcl:
occupancy, established in the view of the court, the common law. The
court admitted that modern publicists hold that discovery not followec
by occupation is insufficient to give title to new territory but
thoioght that by the international law of that time, Cabot's claim was
valid. As an additional reason for its opinion the court seemed to
cast some doubt on the principle that succession does not alter the
private law. Thus it held that even if Cabot's claim was not suffi-
cient to establish a prior British title, the Dutch law would have
been abrogated by the British conquest and acquisition in 1664. The
court however suggested that the chatter of Charles II, of 1664 spe-
cifically established the common law. The intervention of such an
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Th e application of the English law of admiralty in federal courts
has been based on a like principle.
1
The courts have applied the
same principle to other acquisitions of territory such as Florida,
2
New Mexico, and the Spanish cessions of 1898,
The inviolability of existing contracts and property rights of
inhabitants of acquired territory has been generally upheld in refer-
ence to obligations owed by the former state itself to such inhabi-
tants. Inhabitants as well as persons of foreign states benefit by
the acquiescence of the new sovereign in its duty to assume the pub-
lie burdens attached to the territory. If a definite act of the
political department of government repudiates such liability, there
4is no recourse for inhabitants, although foreigners entitled to
similar credits can still resort to diplomatic protest.
Where the obligation is one between private parties, treaties
generally have required inviolability and the courts have emphatic-
ally maintained that the same doctrine in the absence of treaty.
act of state would clearly bind municipal courts, even if contrary
to international law. It would seem that prescription might have
furnished sufficient basis for maintaining the predominance of Eng-
lish law in this case but it does not seem to have been relied upon.
1- Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, (1815).
2- Louisiana, see Keene vs. McDonough, 8 Pet. 308; U.S. vs. Turner,
11 How. 663; Florida, see Am. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet. 542; New
Mexico, U.S. vs. Power's Heirs, 11 How. 570, U.S. vs. Heirs of Ril-
lieux, 14 Hew. 189; Lei tsendorfer vs. Webb, 20 How. 176. In Chicago
Pac. R.R. Co., vs. McGlenn, 114 U.S. 542, the state law was held to
apply in territory donated by the state of Kansas to the Federal
Government for a penitentiary. See Mortimer vs. N.Y. Elevated R.R. Co
6 N.Y.S. 89, (1889), Scott, 111, note 3 above. See also U.S. vs.
Chaves, 159 U.S. 452,(1895); Strother vs. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410.
3- Supra, p. 59.
4- West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. vs. Rex. L.R. 2 K.B. 301, 401-
2, (1905), and article on by J.Westlake, Law Quar. Rev., 22;14-26.
In this case it was held that an "act of state" barred the right of
an inhabitant of the Boer Republic to recover debts owed him by that
republic, from Great Britain, after succession.
5- Wilcox vs. Henry, 1 Dall . 69, (Pa, 1782); U.S. vs. Soulard, 4 Pet
511, (1830); U.S. vs. Percheman, 7 Pet .31 ,( 1833) ; U.S. vs. Arredondo,
6 Pet. 691; U.S. vs. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436; U.S. vs. Clarke, 16 PeA.231;
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Thus Chief Justice Marshall in upholding a real estate right in
Florida based on a grant by Spain, said "It is very unusual even in
cases of conquest for the conqueror to do more than to displace the
sovereign and assume domain over the country. The modern usage of
nations, which has become law, would be violated, that sense of jus-
tice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civil-
ized world would be outraged if private property should be generally
confiscated and private rights annulled. The people change allegiance
their relations to their ancient sovereign is dissolved, but their
4
relations to each other and their right of property remain undisturbed,
This same principle has been applied in cases of succession to
insurrectionary and military governments. Private rights and obliga-
tions, valid under the law of the previous defacto government have
2been enforced. Neither public nor private obligations will, however,
U.S. vs. Repentigny, 5 Wall. 212, (1866); U.S. vs. Hanson, 16 Pet.
196, Delassus vs. U.S. 6 Pet. 117, 133. (1835); Mitchell vs. U.S. 9
Pet. 711, (1835); U.S. vs. Yorba, 1 Wall. 412; Townsend vs. Greeley,
5 Wall. 326; U.S. vs. Anguisola, 1 Wall. 352; Airhart, vs. Massieu,
98 U.S. 491; Coffee vs. Grover, 123 U.S. 1, 9, (1887); Ely's Adm. vs.
U.S. 171 U.S. 220, 223, (1898); See Moore's Digest 1; 414-427. FDr
citation of further cases see Sctott, cases, 97 note. By statute of
1860 congress authorized the courts to settle land claims near the
Ste. St. Marie based on a grant of the King of France in 1750, accord-
ing to international law, the law of the country from which the claim
was derived, principles of justice and stipulations of treaties. Un-
der this act the court held that a grant of land on certain conditions
of occupancy, was lost upon the grantees failure to fulfil these con-
ditions after leaving the country because of Great Britain's suc-
cession in 1760. The opinion of both the original grantee and his son
that the claim was lost and the failure to advance a claim until sever
ty-five years after the grant, confirmed the court's opinion that the
claim was without merit. See U.S. vs. Repentigny, 3 Wall. 211,(1866),
Scott. 98.
1- U.S. vs. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51, 86, (1833).
2- Succession to British Military Govt, of Castine, Me., 1814, U.S.
vs. Rice, 4 Wheat. 256, (1819); to confederate De Facto Govt, of
Southern states, 1861-1865, Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. 1,9-11,
(1868); Tbc Venice 2 Wall. 258; Hanauer vs. Woodruff, 15 Wall. 448;
Bissell vs. Heyward, 96 U.S. 580; Delmar vs. Insurance Co., 14 Wall. 6
661; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570,580; Baldy vs. Hunter, 171 U.S.
388,392, '(1890) ; Sprott vs. U.S., 20 Wall. 459, (1874). See Moore's
DJ.gest f l;45-60.
c
, —
L
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be held as valid If they were contracted in support of armed resis-
tance to the United States, or in rebellion. Thus the courts have
held that all acts of the Confederate government of 1861 to 1865 were
void. No rights could be derived from its laws because its very ex-
istence was rebellion against the United States. Acts of the states
in rebellion however, might be valid if not in direct aid of the in-
surrection. 1 Acts of the Confederate congress accepted by them and
enforced by their law, such for instance as acts requiring the ac-
ceptance of confederate paper currency, were valid. Thus the United
'
States courts after the war, enforced contracts for the payment of
confederate paper for an equivalent value at the time the contract
o
was made, in United States money.
To summarize, the United States has generally by treaty obligated
I
itself to permit the inhabitants of acquired territory to retain their
old allegiance if they wish. Treaties, statutes and constitutional
guarantees have insured them the usual immunities of citizens. Treaty
guarantees and the doctrine that courts apply international law have
insured the retention of the existing system of private law until
changed by express act of the legislature and the inviolability of
(private property rights unless they were directly involved in the pro-
motion of hostilities or rebellion. Statutes and executive orders
have occasionally retained portions of the previous system of public
law and administration but the courts have affirmed that public law
'is abrogated by succession unless express act of the sovereign inter-
venes.
1- Cn the distinction between acts of the confederate government
; and of the states in rebellion, see Sprott vs. U.S. 20 Wall. 459,
i(1874); Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 191-2, (1877); Dewing vs.
;Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193, (1877); Ford vs. Surget, 97 U.S. 594,604,
(1878). See Moore's Digest, l;54-60.
2- Thorlngton vs. Smith. 8 Wall. 1. (iftflftl.
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3. Servitudes.
There have been at different times claims that certain portions
of territory are subject to servitudes or rights of use by foreign
powers and persons, which are beyond the authority of the territorial
sovereign to abridge. Thus it has been said that international
rivers and canals, are owned by adjacent states subject to the rights
of free commerce of all; that marginal seas and straits are free to
• the innocent passage of foreign vessels, that the territorial sover-
eign's control of ports is subject to the right of asylum of vessels
in case of imminent danger from stress of weather or other cause;
that certain portions of territory are subject to the right of inno-
cent passage of foreign troops, and even that all foreign territory,
especially frontiers, is held by the territorial sovereign subject
to the right of foreign states to enter the same for the purpose of
enforcing order when self defense demands.^ The United States for a
long time maintained that British territorial waters about New Found-
land were subject to prescriptive fishing rights of United States
f i shermen.
If there are any such inalienable servitudes, they clearly put
the territorial sovereign under a duty of acquiescence. By the award
of the Hague arbitration of 1910 between Great Britain and the United
States it was held that servitudes were contrary to the doctrine of
sovereignty maintained by international law and could be recognized
"only on the express evidence of international contracfhence the
American claim that prescriptive fishing rights on Newfoundland
1- Pleas of self defense were used to justify violations of Span-
ish and Mexican Territory in pursuing Indian Manauders and the land-
ing of troops in foreign ports to protect United States citizens as
in the recent (1914) case of Vera Cruz. See Moore's Digest, 2;400-425,
ffi
servi^ycji^s generally see Hall, Int. law, 4th ed., p. 106; Moore's
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territorial waters constituted a legal servitude in which Great
1
Britain must acquiesce, was of no avail.
(1) It seems that possibly an exception to this broad statement
should be made in the case of boundary rivers. In that case the
right of free commerce could scarcely be unilaterally restricted and
is universally recognized. United States courts have recognized the
principle by holding that vessels traversing American waters of in-
ternational rivers can not be seized for violation of municipal stat-
p
| utes when bound for a foreign port.
(2) The right of asylum for vessels in distress has also been
affirmed in United States law. The courts have refused to condemn
vessels forced by stress of weather, into ports closed by statute or
4blockaded by right of war. The right of asylum, however, is subject
to the provision that the vessel, unless a public one, shall be sub-
ject to the local jurisdiction. It can therefore scarcely be said
that the privilege constitutes a servitude upon the port waters.
Most of these so called servitudes are not maintainable by
modern international law. The United States has diplomatically and
judicially affirmed its absolute right to sovereignty over its entire
5territory.
(3) Servitudes conceded by treaty are however, clearly recognized
1- See text of this decision, Am. Jour. Int. Law, -4 ;948, 958, ( 1910)
,
Editorial Comment, Ibid 8;859 (1914); also article CP. Anderson, The
Final Outcome of the Fisheries Arbitration, Ibid. 7;1,9 (1913).
2- The Appollon, 9 Wheat. 362, (1824).
3- Cushing, Att. Gen. 7 op. 122, (1855); The Santissima Trinidad,
7 Wheat. 283; Moore's Digest, 7;982-985. Great Britain treated Jef-
ferson's proclamation, prohibiting hospitality to British warships
in 1807, after the Leopard and Chesapeake affair as a breach of in-
ternational law. See Moore's Digest, 6; 1035.
4- The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 17 Wall. 30; Moore's Digest, 2; 339
et seq.
5- Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116,136, (1812). See
Moore's Digest, 2;4-16.
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and certainly impose a duty of acquiescence upon the country. The
United States has specifically accorded by treaty the right to cer-
tain countries of free commerce in international rivers1 and in the
2
Panama canal, the right of asylum in ports to either private or pub-
lic vessels in case of "stress of weather or pursuit of pirates or
3
enemies" the right of using troops on its territory in pursuit of
4
marauding Indians and the right to establish submarine cabal termi-
5
nals. The usual principle that treaties are enforceable law, tends
to enforce these duties but acts of congress may always over ride
such treaty privileges so far as municipal law and the controlling
power of municipal courts is concerned.
1- Treaties with Great Britain, 1783, art. 8, Malloy p. 589; 1842,
art. 3, p. 643; 1846, art. 2, p. 657; 1854-1866, art. 4, p. 671; 1871,
art. 26, p. 711, decreeing fsee navigation in the Mississippi, St. Law-
rence, St. John, Yukon, Stikine, and Porcupine. With Mexico, 1848,
art. 4, 7, p. 1111; 1853, art. 4, p. 1123 decreeing free navigation in
the Colorado, Gila, and Bravo.
2- Treaty with Great Britain, 1901, art. 3, Malloy, p. 783.
3- The United States has concluded thirty-one treaties with twenty-
five countries in which this privilege is specified. Only two appear
to be in force, Bolivia, 1858, art. 9, Malloy, p. 117; Prussia, 1799-
1810, revived 1828, art. 18, p. 1492. The privilege of free entry to
ports is now so universally acknowledged that treaty stipulations are
not necessary.
4-Protocols with Mexico, 1882 to 1896 by which Mexico was permitted
to pursue marauding Indians in United States territory. Malloy, p.
1144-1177.
5- Special permits with rules have generally been issued by the
president to companies desiring to land cables. On power of the
president to give such permits see Richards, Acting Att. Gen., 22 op.
13, (1697); Griggs, Att. Gen., 22 op. 408, (1899). See Moore's Digest
2;452-466.
6- For a recent discussion or treaty servitudes or international
contracts, see Aix-la-Chappelle Maestricht R.R. Co. vs. Thewis, Dutch
Govt, intervener, Apr. 21, 1914, a German case, reported Am. Jour.
Int. Law., 1914, 8; 858, 907. In this case a portion of Prussian
territory was held to be subject to a servitude by which a Dutch
Railway Co., had the right to operate under Dutch law. Germany
claimed that a protocol of Mch. 11, 1877 with Spain created a servi-
tude for her benefit upon the Sulu Archipelago, which remained after
cession of the Archipelago to the United States. The United States
refused to recognize this claim. See Moore's Digest, 5;351.
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Chapter III . Obligations of Prevention *
Introductory
The municipal laws designed to insure the abstention of the
government from illegal acts outside of its territory; and its acqui-
escence in recognized exemptions from its complete control of its
own territory have been considered. But its duties under internation-
al law do not stop here. The government is responsible for the acts
of its officers and its civil population. It is therefore under
duty to take positive measures to prevent contraventions of inter-
national law by such persons
.
The duties of prevention bear a relation to duties of abstention
!
and acquiescence. The responsibility of the government for its sub-
jects extends no further than its own duties. It need prevent no-
thing which it is not itself bound to abstain from authorizing. In
fact it does not extend so far. There are many acts of its subjects
which the government is not responsible for and which it need not
; prevent, but which it must itself abstain from. This is especially
evident in the law of neutrality. A neutral government need not
prevent the export of arms by its subjects to belligerents but it
must itself abstain from such commerce. In the law of peace the same
I principle applies. The government must abstain from authorizing the
use of force outside of its territory or intervening in the affairs
of foreign governments but it is not responsible, if its subjects do
such ac$s abroad, without authorization.^" For acts within its terri-
1- See Moore's Digest, 6; 787. The United States does recognize a
certain responsibility for acts of its citizens promoting insurrec-
' tion against states in which it has consular jurisdiction, even when
|
committed abroad. The immunity of United States citizens from local
jurisdiction in such cases is accountable for this exception to the
general rule. See Rev. Stat. sec. 4090. 4102. Infra p. 79.
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tory the responsibility is much greater and hence also is the duty of
prevention. For acts of public officers either in its territory or
abroad the responsibility of the government is much greater than in
the case of private persons and hence the duty of prevention is more
ardutfous. We may therefore conveniently consider the subject in
reference (1) to agencies of government, and (2) to the civil popula-
tion. Although the international duties imposed by treaties are con-
sidered in connection with corresponding duties of international law,
the general duty of (3) preventing infractions of treaty provisions
may conveniently be considered here.
1. Acts by Agencies of Government.
(1) The agencies of government which come in contact with for-
eign nations in time of peace are the navy, the diplomatic service
and the consular service. International law requires that naval
|
vessels obey local regulations on entering foreign jurisdiction, ab-
stain from prohibited acts and exchange salutes on meeting foreign
public vessels. Special duties, when enjoying the hospitality of
ports, such as refusing asylum to criminals, slaves and political re-
i fugees are sometimes required by treaty. These duties are specified
in the permanent navy regulations and naval instructions 1 issued
under authority of the president and are enforced by the executive
control exercised over the navy at all times by the president as
j
commander-in-chief, through the navy department, and the authority of
courts martial in enforcing the statutory articles for the government
• of the navy. 2
t~ Navy Regulations, 1913 sec. 1502, 1633-1634, 1641-1651 under
authority Rev. Stat. sec. 1547.
2- Rev. Stat. sec. 1624.
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A case involving the enforcement of navy regulations arose in
1893. During the naval revolt in Brazil, Commodore Stanton, an
American Naval Commander on entering the port of Rio Janeiro, ex-
changed visits and fired salutes in honor of the naval insurgents.
The Brazilian government protested and the navy department on inves-
tigation found that Commodore Stanton had violated article 115 of the
Navy Regulations of 1893, providing that "no salute shall be fired in
honor of any nation * * not formally recognized by the government of
the United States." As the offense was due to mistake rather than
intent the department although holding that Commodore Stanton had
committed "a grave error of judgment" restored him to his command. 1
Armed forces are forbidden, passing into foreign territory with-
out license, and on such occasions continue subject to military com-
missions, and army officers are required to observe certain formali-
p
ties in dealing with representatives of foreign governments.
(2) Diplomatic officers are likewise subjected to duties while
in foreign countries. International law requires Diplomatic officers
to observe diplomatic etiquette, in making visits, being admitted to
audiences and in matters of precedence. It requires abstention from
public addresses or expressions of opinion likely to be offensive to
the state to which the minister is accredited and it seems that mod-
ern international law requires the minister to prevent his residence
being used as a place of asylum by fugitives from justice. This duty
is also specified in a number of treaties. In exchange for his im-
munity from local jurisdiction tne diplomatic officer is also requir-
1- See Moore's Digest, 1;240-241.
2- Dig. op. Judge. Ad. Gen. 1912, C. R. Howland ed. pp. 90, 106
Army Regulations, 1913, sec. 398; 407; 889, ch.3.
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ed to be especially strict in his observance of local laws. These
duties are specified with considerable definiteness in the Instruc-
tions to Diplomatic officers^- issued by the president under authority
of statute2 and a number of them are specified in the statutes them-
selves. Thus statutes specifically forbid ministers to correspond
or give information relating to the affairs of the foreign government
to which they are accredited to any but the proper United States
officials, and specify a number of matters relating to costume, ab-
4.
sention from post, correspondence, etc.
The permanent instructions, and statutes as well as special in-
structions issued by the president or secretary of state^ are enforc-
ed by executive control of the ministers tenure of office, require-
ments of bonds on acceptance of mission, and criminal liability for
misconduct in office.
By the constitution the president with the advice and consent of
the senate has the power of appointing diplomatic officers6 although
;
special agents have been appointed by the president alone.''' By
statute such appointments (or rather salaries for appointees) are
limited to citizens of the United States^ and provision has been
made to prevent the performance of diplomatic functions by unofficial
representatives by making such acts criminal
1- Instructions to Diplomatic Officers, 1897, sec. 1-136.
2- Rev. Stat. sec. 1752.
3- Act Aug. 18, 1850. Rev. Stat. 1751.
4t Rev. Stat. sec. 1674-1688.
5- See Moore's Digest, 5; 565.
6- Constitution, Art. 2 sec. 2, CI. 2.
7- See Moore's Digest, 4;412.
8- Rev. Stat. 1744; Moore's Digest, 4;457.
9- Act Jan. 30, 1794; Rev. Stat. 5335. This act resulted from the
efforts of Dr. Geo. Logan, who attempted on his own responsibility a
mission of conciliation in France in 1798. It is known as the "Logan
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Ministers are required by statute to give bond for the faithful
performance of their duties and it has been held that the appointment
is not complete until execution of this bond* 1 Diplomatic officers
are subject to special orders of the president generally transmitted
through the department of state and the president may recall such
officers at discretion. By statute diplomatic officers have been
made responsible for negligence and misconduct in office.2 Criminal
prosecution in United States courts for violation of statutory duties
would therefore seem possible.
(3) International law imposes duties upon consuls while in ser-
: vice in foreign territory. They may not enter upon their functions
until they have received an exequatur from the government to which
they are consigned and they are bound by its terms. They must ob-
serve the local law3 although by treaty they are generally exempted
from military, jury service, etc. Consulates are frequently declared
immune from local jurisdiction by treaty, but it is also a rule of
most of these treaties that the consul must refuse to give asylum to
persons sought by local authorities. 4
These duties of consuls are specified in detail in the Consular
regulations issued by the president under authority of statute, 5 and
Act". There have been no prosecutions under it. See Moore's Digest,
4;448-450. Reference is made to the act in U.S. vs. Craig, 28 Fed.
Rep. 795, 801; American Banana Co., vs. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 356.
1- Williams vs. U.S. 23 Ct. CI. 46; Moore's Digest, 4;457. On
Liability of bondsman, see U.S. Vs. Bee, 4 C. C. A. 219.
2- Act. June 27, 1860, rev. Stat. 4110; See also Rev. Stat. sec.
1734; act Dec. 21, 1898, 30 Stat. 771.
3- See Moore's Digest, 5;698^
4- Supra . p . 55
.
5- See Consular Regulations, 1896. Duties under International
law, sec. 71-76; under treaties, 77-93; under authority of Rev. Stat,
sec. 1752.
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a number of them are specified in the statutes themselves These
regulations and statutes are enforced through the executive control
exercised over consuls by the president through the department of
state, by requirements of bonds and by amenability to criminal pros-
ecution in the United States for acts done abroad.
Consuls are appointed by the president with the advice and con-
sent of the senate2 and it appears that inferior consular officers
may be appointed by the president alone or even by diplomatic or
superior consular officers. 3 According to a statute of 19064 only
American citizens may be appointed to positions with a salary of
$1000 a year or more. A limited application of the civil service
principle in making appointments has been put into operation by ex-
5
ecutive order. Consuls are subject to special instructions of the
department of state and the president, and may be removed at the
I
president's discretion.
Consuls are required by statute to give bond for the faithful
performance of their duties and they are subject to criminal pros-
ecution in the United States courts for specified acts committed
I
abroad such as accepting appointments as administrator without giving
bond or account of money, exacting excessive fees, making false oath,
neglecting duty toward seamen, making false certification of proper-
1- Rev. Stat. sec. 1751-1752; 1716-1737; Act June 30, 1902, 32
Stat. 547.
2- Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2; CI. 2.
3- Act Apr. 5, 1906, sec. 2, 3; Consular Regulations, 1888, sec.
! 8, 7; 1896; sec. 21. See U.S. ys . Eaton, 169 U.S. 331. Moore's
Digest, 5; 8-9.
4- Act Apr. 5, 1906, sec. 5; Moore's Digest, 5;12.
5- Ex. Ord. June 27, 1906; Dec. 12, 1906; Apr. 20, 1907; Dec. 23,
1910. under authority Rev. Stat. sec. 1753, Act Apr. 5, 1906, and
May 11, 1908. See Information Regarding appointments and promotions
in the Consular Service of the United States, Govt. Printing Office.
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ty, 1 etc., as well as for general misconduct in office. 2
The international duties of these governmental agents are en-
forced largely through methods of executive control. The executive
orders and instructions, prescribing the conduct of such officers,
are specifically authorized by statute and are to be regarded as law3
which may be effectively enforced through the appointment and re-
moval power of the executive. The requirements of bonds, the amena-
to
bility of naval officers /courts martial, and of consular and
diplomatic officials to the criminal jurisdiction of American courts
for specified statutory offenses, add further sanction to the en-
forcement of these duties.
2. Acts by the Civil Population.
x
Governments are not generally responsible for acts by private
citizens committed abroad or on the high seas.4 Private individuals
in such cases are amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
foreign government or if they commit piracy on the high seas to those
of any government catching them. They may be punished, but their
government can not be held responsible for their acts and no repara-
tion may be demanded. This principle does not apply in countries
where citizens are exempt from local jurisidjstion by treaty, and con-
sequently in such places the responsibility of the government of
nationality continues, to a limited extent.
There has been some difference of opinion as to whether a state
1- Rev. Stat. sec. 1716, 1728, 1734-1737; act Dec. 21, 1898, 30 st
!
stat. 771; act June 30, 1902, 32 stat. 547.
2- Act June 22, 1860, rev. stat. sec. 4110; Moore's Digest, 2;267,
note •
3- See Rev. Stat. sec. 1752. On legal status of executive orders
and regulations, see J. A. Fairlie, The National Administration of
j
the United States fo America, N. Y. 1905, p 27.
4- See Moore's Digest, 6;787»
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ls responsible for the acts of private citizens even within its terri-
tory, but the doctrine of responsibility appears to be established. 1
A state is supposed to maintain order and protect life and property
within its territory. It therefore is liable to make reparation for
failure to do so, if such failure results in an injury to a foreign
state or its citizens.
This principle is subject, to exceptions. Where insurrections
, are of considerable magnitude or where the country is invaded by hos-
! tile forces, incidental injury to aliens is beyond the power of the
government to prevent and the government is therefore not responsible,
!
The general principle ,however , is as stated, and clearly implies a
|
duty on the part of the state to prevent acts, injurious to foreign
states or persons being committed by its civil population.
The subject may be considered under the three heads, (l) injury
to foreign states, (2) injury to resident foreign public officers,
(3) injury to alien private persons.
(1) International law requires a government to prevent persons
within its jurisdiction doing acts directly injurious to foreign
2
states. The supreme court of the United States has held that the
relations are exclusively in the hands of the national
!
measure of this duty is "due diligence" and that as foreign /govern-
|
ment, legislation punishing acts directed against foreign governments
is warranted under the constitutional authority to "define and punish
I * * offences against the law of nations i* By treaty the United States
has recognized its obligation to prevent injury to adjacent states by
1- S^e article by Julius Goebel, Jr>The International Respopsibili •
ty of states for injuries sustained by aliens on account of mob vio-
lence, insurrection and civil war. Am. Jour, of Int. Law. 8;802, Nov.
1914.
2- U.S. vs. Anj-ona, 120 U.S. 479, (1887), Moore's Digest, Ij61.
3- Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 10.
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hostile bands of Indians and forcible measures have been taken to
suppress such marauding bandsl The manufacture or uttering of coun-
terfeit foreign money or bank notes is made a crime by national stat-
2
utes, and the courts have declared that such acts are prohibited by
3international law. Transporting dynamite and other explosives from
the United States in vessels bound to foreign countries except in the
4
: manner provided by statute is also made a crime.
The duty to protect foreign governments against dangerous charac
ters entering under false passports is recognized by making the issu-
ance of passports by unauthorized persons a crime. The duty of
assisting the administration of justice in foreign countries and pre-
venting frauds upon it by persons in the United States, is recognized
through provisions requiring certain United States officials to re-
spond to letters rogatory from foreign governments requesting testi-
mony in cases in which that government is interested, by issuing
1- Treaties with Spain, 1795-1902, art. 5, Malloy, p,1642; Mexico,
1831-1853, art. 33, p. 1095; 1848-1853, art. 11, p. 1112. The govern-
ment of Mexico protested that the United States was not fulfilling
these treaty obligations but at a mixed commission arbitration under
treaty of 1868, Malloy, p. 1128, the Mexican claim was not allowed.
See Moore, Int. Art. 3;2430; Moore's Digest, 2;434. By the treaty of
1853, art. 2, p. 1122, the United States was released from this obli-
gation to Mexico. But in protocols from 1882 to 1896, reciprocal per-
mission was given to pursue marauding Indians across the boundaries
of the two countries. Correspondence has taken place in reference to
, the suppression of Indians on the Canadian frontier, but no treaty
was negotiated. See Moore's Digest, 2;434-442.
2- Act, May 16, 1882, 23 Stat. 22; Penal Code of 1910, Act, Mch. 21
1909, 35 Stat. 1088, in force Jan. 1,1910, sec. 156-162. Printed with
annotations, G.B. Tucker and C.W. Blocd, The Federal Penal Code of 1910
3- U.S. vs. .Arjona, 120 U.S. 479. Moore's Digest, 1;61;2, 450.
A similar view was taken in an English case, Emperor of Austria vs.
Day and Kossuth, 2 Giff. 428, (1861), in which an injunction was
issued to restrain counterfeiting of Hungarian Securities on the
ground that the law of nations, which is part of the law of England,
requires one nation to protect the prerogative privilege of a foreign
sovereign to issue money.
4- Rev. Stat. sec. 4278, 5353; Act, May 30, 1908, 35 Stat. 554,
Penal Code of 1910, sec. 232; Moore's Digest, 2;431.
5- Rev. Stat. 4078, Act of June 14, 1902, 30 Stat. 386.
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process to obtain such testimony from residents. The failure to re-
spond to such summons, on the part of residents of the country, is
1
made a penal offense.
A further recognition of this duty is found in the statute giv-
ing consular courts jurisdiction of acts by American citizens pro-
moting insurrection against the state in which they are located.
Such offenses may be punished by death provided the consul and his
2
associates agree and the United States minister gives his approval.
The American minister is also authorized to use military or naval
forces of the United States to prevent American citizens participating
3
in such insurrections. This extension of the duty to prevent injury
to foreign states by private persons, to acts committed in foreign
countries, is an exception to the rule. The exemption of United States
citizens from local jurisdiction in countries granting extraterritori-
al consular jurisdiction, however, imposes the duty of prevention
upon the United States in such cases. American citizens continue
under the juri sdictlon of the United States even though resident
abroad, so it continues responsible for their acts.
With the doctrine that federal courts have no common law criminal
jurisdiction, acts injurious to foreign governments can not be pre-
vented through the exaction of criminal penalties by federal courts,
except in cases covered by statutes. Although congress has the power
to completely cover the field of such penal legislation through its
power to punish offenses against the law of nations, the offenses
1- Rev. Stat. 4071-4083, 771-375; Moore's Digest, 2;104-113.
2- Rev. Stat. sec. 4102.
3- Act, Jan. 16, 1860, 12 Stat. 77; Rev. Stat. 4090.

-80-
actually covered are comparatively few. The president undoubtedly
has power to take preventive measures in matters covered by treaty
and duties required by international law in his general control of
foreign relations, but a large part of the duty of prevention in this
respect remains with the state governments. State courts may assume
a jurisdiction over any act injurious to foreign governments accord-
ing to the common law, and through their general police power, the
state governments may present attempts or plots with such aims in
1
view.
Controversy has arisen respecting the injury of water power loca-
tions in one country by depletion or diversion of the river in an
adjacent country. It has been held that such acts are cognizable in
when procedings are instituted
state courts/by citizens of another state of the union and probably
a similar rule would apply in reference to like injuries to foreign
states.
After the assassination of President McKinley, there was diplo-
matic agitation for the passage of uniform laws preventing anarchis-
tic plots and President Roosevelt in his message of Dec. 3, 1901,
3
recommended legislation by congress. No national statutes, except
4those excluding anarchists from immigration bear on the point but
state laws may prevent anarchistic agitation and also plots to commit
other varieties of crime abroad. In a letter of Secretary Bayard in
1- Moore's Digest, 2; 432.
2- Stillman vs. Man. Co., 3 Wood and M. 538; Foot vs. Edwards, 2
Blatch. 310; Miss, and Mo. R. R. vs. Ward, 2 Black 485; Wooster vs.
Man. Co., 31 Me. 246; In re Eldred, 46 Wis. 530; Thayer vs. Brooks, 17
Ohio, 489; Armendiaz vs. Stillman, 54 Tex. 623; See Moore's Digest,
2;451.
3- See Moore's Digest, 4;95-96: 2;432-434.
4- Act. Mch 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 12, 13. See Turner vs. Williams, 194
U.S. 279, (1904).
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1
1885, in reply to a communication from the British Government asking
whether participation in the Irish national League was not punishable
under the United' States laws, it was stated that no national statutes
penalized such offenses against foreign governments, but "if any per-
son in the state of Pennsylvania take measures to perpetrate a crime
in a foreign land, such an attempt, coupled with preparation to
effectuate it, though not cognizable in the federal courts, is cog-
nizable in the courts of the State of Pennsylvania. It is only neces
sary to obtain legal action in such prosecution, that an oath specify
' ing the offense be made before a state magistrate, and the state
prosecuting attorney having jurisdiction of the locality, notified
p
of the initiation of proceedings."
(2) Certain foreign public officers are entitled to special pro-
tection by international law consequently a special duty of preven-
tion is incumbent upon the government in relation to them. Diplo-
j
matic ministers are the most important of these privileged foreign
officers.
In 1784 the court of oyer and terminer of Philadelphia in Res
Publica vs. De Longchamps declared the person £f a public minister
"sacred and inviolable." "Whoever", said the court, "offers any
! violence to him, not only affronts the sovereign he represents but
also hurts the common safety and well being of nations, he is guilty
of a crime against the whole world." It added that the "comites"
and household of the minister are likewise inviolable. In cases
1- See Moore's Digest, 2;432.
2- The prevention of acts injurious to foreign states in time of
war while the United States is neutral is provided for in neutrality
statutes. See infra p. 136.
3- Res Publica vs. DeLongchamps , 1 Dall. Ill, (1784); Moore's
Digest, 4;622.
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involving public ministers the court held that the law of nations
should be applied, and in pursuance of this principle found De Long-
champs criminally liable for an assault upon the Secretary of the
French Legation. Much difficulty was experienced by the court in
reconciling its duties as a municipal court with those as a court of
international law. In the former capacity it must give a definite
sentence, in the latter it must give a sentence satisfactory to the
injured party, the king of France. It finally concluded that "the
defendent can not be imprisoned until his most Christian Majesty
shall declare that the reparation is satisfactory." Apparently a
de facto incarceration without formal sentence of imprisonment which
if given at all would have to bo "certain and definite" seemed the
only way out of the dilemma.
This view of the status of municipal courts in performing such
duties, based on Lord Mansfield's opinion in Triquet vs. Bath 1 and
2
the English treatment of the case of the Russian Ambassador in 1708,
is probably now obsolete. The states duty is to prevent injury to
diplomatic ministers by any suitable means. The criminal prosecution
and the kind of punishment accorded to persons assaulting ministers,
is thus not specified by international law. Such measures are law
supplementary to international law.
By a statute of 1790 the "offering of violence to the person
of a public minister, in violation of the law of nations" is made
subject to imprisonment for not over three years and fine at the
1-Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr 1478, (1764), Scott, 6.
2- The arrest of the Ambassador of the Czar of Russia in 1708 gave
rise to high feeling on the part of that potentate which was finally
assuaged by sending a handsomely illuminated apology prepared for the
occasion. As a result of this case a statute 7 Ann 12, (1708); Scott,
p. 4, was passed preventing another 3uch occurrence in the future.
3- Act Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 118, Rev. Stat. 4062-4065.
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discretion of the court. This act includes assaults upon members of
the minister's household and upon his residence.
1
Apparently it does
not include the sending of anonymous and threatening letters to a
p
minister. In 1793, in the case of U.S. vs. Ravara, tried in the
United States circuit court at Philadelphia, although the statute was
in force, the offender was indicted at common law for sending such
letters to the British minister. The court consisting of Justices
Jay and Peters, found him guilty. With the present view that federal
courts have no common law jurisdiction, such a prosecution would now
be impossible in federal courts.
The duties of prevention do not stop with the protection from
personal injury of the minister and his household. His jurisdictional
immunity must also be protected. The courts are forbidden by statute
to take jurisdiction of either criminal or civil cases against public
ministers or their servants, and persons executing process on such
privileged characters are declared "violators of the law of nations"
and subject to criminal punishment. This statute has been enforced
by the courts in a number of cases. 4
1- U.S. vs. Hand, 2 Wash. C.C. 435; See also on scope of act, U.S.
vs. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; Black Att. Gen. 9 op. 7, (1857); U.S. vs.
liddle, 2 Wash. C.C. 205, (1808); In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, (1889).
Similar statute in Great Britain, 7 Ann 12, printed Scott, 4; and
Cross vs. Talbot, 8 Mod. 288; Triquet vs. Bath, 3 Burr, 1478, (1764);
Heathfield vs. Chilton, 4 Burr. 2015, (1767); Parkinson vs. Potter,
L.R. 10 Q.B. 152, (1885); McCartney vs. GarButt, 24 Q.B.D. 36, (1890)
Scott 191-196; Moore's Digest, 4;622-628.
2- U.S. vs.' Ravara, 2 Dall . 297, (1794); Fed. Cas. 18,122. The de-
fendent in this case was a Genoese Consul but the court held that no
immunity from prosecution attached to this position. He was ultimate-
ly pardoned on condition that he give up his exequatur. Soe Moore's
Digest, 5;65. See also Bradford, Att. Gen., 1 op. 52, (1794); Lee Att
Gen., 1 op. 71; ( 1797) ; Moore's Digest, 4;629-630.
3- Act, Apr. 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 117, Rev. Stat. 4063-4064. The Supreiru
court is authorized to issue writs of mandamus to courts or public
officers of the United States in cases where ambassadors, public minis-
ters, consuls or vice-consuls are parties. Judicial Code, 1911, 36
Stat; 1087, sec. 234.
4- Ex Parte Cabrera, 1 Wash C.C. 232; U.S. vs. Benner, Baldwin 234;
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Foreign consuls, naval officers, and persons in military
3
forces have been held not to enjoy such immunities and are not in-
cluded in the terms of the statute mentioned. Such officers are
given no protection other than that accorded aliens, except in so far
as special treaties provide. They are however, recognized as being
exempt from personal liability to a limited extent for acts done un-
der authority of their government. They are therefore protected
from prosecution in state courts by an act giving federal courts
I
power to release from state courts on habeas corpus, subjects of for-
eign states in custody for acts done, "under any alleged right, title
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the com-
mission or order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color
thereof, the validity and effect whereof depends upon the Law of
nations. 1,4
Where consulates are declared inviolable by treaty and public
vessels are in port the government is under an obligation to prevent
violation of such places. The usual methods of keeping order by
police and if necessary armed fDrce, directed at executive discretion
5
serve to fulfill this duty.
Moore ' s Digest, 4;631-635.
1- In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, (1890).
2- Bradford Att. Gen., 1 op . 49 , ( 1794) ; Nelson Att. Gen. 4 op. 336,
(1844).
3- People vs. McLeod 25 Wend. 483; See also 26 Wend. 663 (Opp)
4- Act, Aug. 29, 1842, Rev. Stat. sec. 753. This act resulted from
the inability of national authority to liberate McLeod on trial for
murder in N.Y. The British Govt., and the political department of the
U.S. Govt, took the view that his act, done as a soldier and recog-
nized by theBritish Govt, was one for diplomatic reparation and per-
sonal liability could not attach. See Moore's Digest, 2;24-30.
5- The President may use the military and naval forces of the
government and call out the militia to repel invasion, suppress in-
surrection and execute the laws of the union. This includes the
execution of treaties. See act, Mch. 3, 1807; in re- military and
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(3) It has been officially held in the United States that resi-
dent aliens owe temporary allegiance to the government, must submit
to its laws,
1
are entitled to the judicial remedies for wrongs, open
p
to citizens, but that the United States government is not responsible
for injuries to them by acts of private trespassers. The alien must
get his remedy by the usual legal processes or not at all. This view
it will be seen, puts aliens on the same legal footing as citizens*
They have no immunities or advantages. In fact their rights are less
secure than those of citizens for they do not enjoy political privi-
4
leges and by the alien act in force from 1798 to 1801 they might be
expelled on order of the president. This view denies the doctrine of
international responsibility for the safety of resident aliens, yet
is the one generally expressed by the United States government. When
reparation has been made by the government it has been as a "gratuity
It has been denied that the government was under an obligation of in-
ternational law to prevent injuries to aliens or to make reparation.
naval forces, and act. May 2, 1792, Jan. 21,1903, Feb. 16,1914, in
re, the militia, under authority of constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl.l4j
1- Carlisle vs. U.S. 16 Wail. 47; Moore's Digest, 4; 9-17.
2- Cushing, Att. Gen. 7 op. 229, (1855); Taylor vs. Carpenter, 3
Story, 458; Breedlove vs. Nicollet, 7 Pet. 413; Moore's Digest, 4;7.
3- Nelson Att. Gen., 4 op. 332, (1844); The Resolution, Fed. Court
of Appeals, 2 Dall. 1, (1781); Lincoln Att. Gen., 1 op. 106, (1802);
Moore's Digest, 4;7: 6;787-791.
4- Act June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570, to be in force two years. Expul-
sion within three years of landing of excluded classes is permitted
in the present immigration laws, Act, Mch. 3,1903, 32 Stat. 1213,
sec. 20,21; Moore's Digest, 4;172. This however, is really a measure
to enforce the exclusion of undesirable classes and should be dis-
tinguished from acts providing for expulsion of aliens, common in
Europe, but represented in the United States by the single instance
i mentioned.
5- See Letter of Mr. Bayard, Sec. of State, 1886, For. Rel. 1886,
I
p. 158, Moore's Digest, 4;826-835. See Act, June 8,1896, Moore Digest,
4;850.
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Th is opinion to the contrary, it seem clear that responsibility
is recognized in practice as a rule of international law. The prin-
ciple is recognized by a number of state governments in laws making
counties responsible for property losses and damages caused by mob
2
violence. Even though the United States denies the theory in prin-
ciple, it has generally observed it in practice. We may therefore
consider what measures are taken to prevent injury to aliens.
By statute it is provided that persons violating safe conducts
•z
or passports of aliens shall be criminally liable in federal courts.
In numerous treaties rights of resident aliens are specified, extend-
ing to such matters as protection of life and property, right to own
land to make devises and bequests, and to have recourse to local
courts of justice. In some of them it is specified that subjects of
the contracting powers shall have the same rights as citizens when in
the United States, and most favored nation rights are frequently
guaranteed to subjects of the respective powers. Treaty rights of
4
this character are protected by the courts, applying treaties as law.
The courts have held that aliens within the territory are en-
titled to the same protection in their personal rights as citizens
5
and no more, and this has been the principle generally acted upon
in preventing injuries even when treaties do not specify such a privi-
lege. The constitutional guarantees operate to protect aliens resi-
dent in the country though they are not effective to prevent arbitrary
1- See Article by Julius Goebel Jr., The International Responsibili-
ty of states for injuries sustained by aliens on account of mob vio-
lence, insurrection and civil war, Am. Jour, of Int. Law, 8; 802, Ndv.
1914.
2- Illinois Rev. Stat., 1913, c.38, sec. 256a-256g-256w; p. 854, 857.
3- Act Apr. 30,1790, 1 Stat. 118, Rev. Stat. sec. 4063; Moore's
Digest, 4;623.
4- Hausenstein vs. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483.
5- Butler Att. Gen. 3 op. 254, (1837); People vs. Warren, 11 N.Y.
Cr. R. 433; Moore's Digest, 4;2.
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1
administrative methods in excluding aliens before arrival or ex-
2
pelling those illegally entering.
The ordinary exercise of the police power, prevention of injury
to persons, and punishment of offenders is in the hands of the state
governments. It is therefore upon them that the duty of preventing
injury to aliens largely devolves. The principle that treaties ar®
enforceable law enunciated by the constitution, is binding upon state
as well as federal courts and states have enforced the treaty rights
of aliens in cases coming before them, under the coercion of the
right of appeal to the federal supreme court should such rights be
neglected. A similar control may be exercised over the general pro-
tection of property and personal rights by such constitutional guaran
tees as those prohibiting state laws " impairing the obligation of
contracts" or taking life, liberty or property without "due process
of law". Thus the national government can in a measure prevent the
confiscation of contract debts of foreigners, a matter which has been
of international importance especially in Latin American countries,
3
although it is not clear that international law imposes such a duty.
But in the punishment and control of private individuals violating
rights of aliens, either guaranteed by treaty or by international law
no such method of federal control over the state governments exists.
The international responsibility falls upon the national government.
It has therefore sometimes happened that the national government has
made reparation for failure on the part of the states to perform this
1- U.S. vs. Williams, 194 U.S. 292; U.S. vs. JuToy, 198 U.S. 253,263
2- Zakonite vs. Wolf, 226, U.S. 212.
3- Constitution, art. 2, sec. 10, cl 1; Amendment 14, in reference
to states and Amendment 5, in reference to National Congress. The U.S
has generally refused to prosecute claims of its citizens based on
contract even where the contract was with the foreign government it-
self. See Moore's Digest 6; 705-738, 6;285-289.
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duty of prevention even though it had by law no means of controlling
the states or offering adequate protection itself.
During the decade from 1890 to 1900 a number of cases arose in
which Italians were murdered or injured by mobs and in which the
state authorities appear to have been lax in performing their duties
of prevention. Presidents Harrison and McKinley, strongly urged con-
gress to enact laws giving the federal courts jurisdiction of cases
involving injury to aliens, especially where treaty rights were in-
volved as was the case in the Italian outrages.''" It seems that there
is adequate constitutional basis for such legislation both in the im-
plied power of the national government to enforce treaties which it
may constitutionally conclude; and in the power to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations. W. W. Willoughby has said in
this connection, "There would seem to be no valid constitutional ob-
jection to an act of congress giving to the federal courts cognizance
of all offenses for which the United States may according to the law
of nations be held responsible to foreign powers."^
3. Infraction of Treaties,
(1) Treaties may be declaratory of international law in which
case the contracting states have no more rights and no more duties
than they would under international law. They may be amendatory of
international law such as general international conventions in which
case after ratification, their provisions are international law and
the contracting states are under new duties according to them. Or
1- Pres. Harrison's Message, Dec. 9,1891, For. Rel. 1891 ,vg ;Moore 1 s
Digest, 6;840; Pres. McKinley's Message, Dec. 5,1899, For. Rel. 1899,
xxii, Moore's Digest, 6;846; Dec. 3,1900, For. Rel., 1900, xxii.
Moore's Digest, 6;647.
2- W.W. Willoughby, The Am. Const. System., N.Y., 1904, p. 108. See
also U.S. vs. Arjona, 120 U.S., 479, (1887), on the subject, also E.S,
Corw1n
r National Supjaeiiiacx, =wv i cn .y
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they may create exceptions to the general rule of international law,
being in nature similar to contracts. In some such treaties the
national obligations are made greater then under international law as
in treaties guaranteeing special protection to aliens or special pro-
tection to territory such as Panama and Cuba. In other cases the
national duties are made less than they would be under international
law. The protocols with Mexico relating to Indian marauders and the
capitulations of Turkey and other non-Christian countries decrease th<
usual obligations of abstaining from exercising force and jurisdictior
in foreign territory, although they add new obligations incidental to
the exercise of these privileges*
Treaty stipulations are considered in this thesis in connection
with the rules of international law to which they relate, the general
view being taken that treaties when duly ratified are ex propria
vigore municipal law, and whichever one of these classes they fall
into, they will be enforced as such by United States courts or execu-
tive officials.
At this point the subject matter of treaties will not be con-
sidered, but rather the general method of treaty enforcement the
measures which the United States has taken to prevent the infraction
of treaties.
(2) The most important provision of this character is found in
the constitution, "this constitution and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treatie s made or
which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall
be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or law of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding." 1
! Constitution, art. 2. sec. 2. cl. 2,
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What agreements are treaties, in the meaning of this provision
is a question of municipal law. The constitution requires that two-
thirds of the senate concur with the president in making treaties,
1
it therefore seems that executive agreements of which a considerable
number have been concluded by the president alone would not be "the
supreme law of the land" in this sense. There is undoubtedly, a limit
to the scope of the treaty power from the constitutional division of
power between state and national government, but where the line is
to be drawn has not been defined. It certainly appears to extend be-
3
yond the legislative power of congress. Ratification and proclama-
tion also appear to be necessary before a treaty is valid in the sense
4
of the constitution. Even when these conditions are complied with
and from a technical standpoint the treaty is clearly within the
terms of the constitutional provision there are important limitations
to its full effect as municipal law in the sense of that term adopted
in this thesis.
In this connection the dual character of the obligation imposed
by treaties must be borne in mind. A treaty primarily creates obli-
gations between states. The recognized representative of the state
that is its government may alone be held responsible, for the infrac-
tion of treaties so far as the other contracting parties are concerned
This is the only function of treaties in many countries, including
Great Britain. It is for the political department of the government
1- Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, cl. 2.
2- See Moore's Digest, 5-210-218.
3- Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 276, (1617); Geofroy vs. Riggs,
133 U.S., 258; Hausenstein vs. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483. Contra Prevost
vs. Grenaux, 19 How.l; Moore's Digest, 5;166; 175-179.
4- See Moore's Digest, 5;202-210.
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to decide upon and enact appropriate measures for putting them into
effect. Private rights under municipal law are not affected until
1
such action is taken.
In the United States however, aside from this primary obligation
imposed upon the government, treaties, often impose obligations imme-
diately upon individuals. The constitution has declared, in order to
better insure the performance of the duty by the government, that
treaties are law and immediately effective in altering private rights
and liabilities and the courts must take cognizance of them in that
capacity. Thus in England if the government wants to escape liability
for infractions of treaties stipulating for a change in private right*
it must always pass statutes providing for their endorcement. In the
United States this burden is shifted from congress by the constitu-
tional provision, although in some casos additional legislation may
be necessary especially where an appropriation of money is necessary
especially where am appropriation of money is necessary to make the
treaty effective.
(3) This secondary function of treaties, however, is one governed
entirely by municipal law. Hence although the international obliga-
ption of treaties can not be altered except by mutual consent, the
3terms of the treaty itself, or as is generally admitted by an entire
4
change of the conditions upon which the treaty was founded, the ob-
ligations of individuals and officers of government under it are
1- Westlake, Is Int. Law part of the Law of England?, Law Cuar.
Rev .22 ;l4jHolland, Studies in International Law, p.190-193.
2- See Moore's Digest, 5;319-322; 363-364,
3- See Moore's Digest, 5;322-335.
4- See Moore's Digest, 335-356. This principle is generally spoken
of as the implied reservation contained in all treaties of "rebus sic
stantibus." "There will be no state in the position to conclude a
treaty for all time wherein lies a perpetual limitation of its own
Sovereignty." Heintich Treitschke, Politik, 2 vol. Leipsic, 1899,
2;550.
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always subject to the will of the sovereign. An act of congress
specifically abrogating a treaty 1 or a subsequent and conflicting
2
statute by that body will abrogate a treaty so far as municipal law
is concerned, although vested rights created under it will be pro-
tected by constitutional guarantees in the same manner as vested
3
rights under repealed statutes. The continuance of a treaty, al-
though a duty of international law, is a political question, subject
to the discretion of the sovereign and beyond the power of municipal
such
law to control. However, by requiring that any/statute be unequivo-
4
cal and incapable of reconciliation with the treaty by interpretation,
the courts of the United States can do much toward enforcing the duty
of the government not to abrogate treaties. Applying this principle,
United States courts have held, that war does not terminate treaties.
It suspends them in respect to private rights of enemy persons and
brings them into effect in respect to provisions specifically related
5
to rights during war.
1- Act July 7, 1798, 1 stat. 578, abrogating French treaty of 1778.
Moore's Digest, 5;356-363.
2- Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 560; Whitney vs. Roberston, 124 U.S.
190, (1888); The Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, (1889); Homer
vs. U.S., 143 U.S. 570; LaAbra Silver Mining Co., vs. U.S. 175 U.S.
423, 460, (1699); Moore's Digest, 5;364-370.
3- Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259,277, (1817); Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel vs. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464; Carneal vs.
Banks, 10 Wheat. 182; Moore's Digest, 5; 386-387.
4- In re Chin A. On, 18 Fed. Rep. 506.
5- Society for the Propagation of the Gospel vs. New Haven, 8 Wheat,
464,494, (1823); Carneal vs. Banks, 10 Wheat. 181. Great Britain took
a similar view in respect to a statute giving effect to a treaty whicl
in terms was "to continue in force so long as the said treaty between
his majesty and the United States of America should continue in force
and no longer." It was held that the War of 1812, did not terminate
the treaty, hence the statute remained valid. See 37 Geo. Ill, c.97,
(1797), in re treaty 1794, art. 9, Sutton vs. Sutton, 1 Russell and
Mylne, 663; Moore's Digest, 5; 373. The United States did not agree
to the Spanish claim that the war of 1898 abrogated all treaties be-
tween the two countries. See Moore's Digest, 5; 375-376.
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In addition to the power of the political department of govern-
ment to terminate treaties it also has exclusive control of many
treaty provisions which are by their nature, incapable of municipal
law enforcement. Treaty obligations to pay money, to cede territory,
to enact laws, to enter into constructive enterprises such as the
Panama Canal or to make a particular disposition of military and nava
forces are addressed to the political department of government. The
courts hold them political questions and will follow the political
department in interpreting them. 1 They can not be enforced by munici
pal law.
(4) The only treaty provisions which are law actually enforceabli
by regularly constituted municipal authorities, are those parts relat-
ing to the control of persons and inferior officers of government
within the jurisdi ction, * of the government. This enforcement may be
either judicial or executive.
Judicial enforcement is found in the power of courts to veto
legislation or constitutional provisions of states, in conflict with
2
treaties, to compel administrative officials to perform acts by
mandamus, or to refrain from action by injunction, and to apply trea-
ties directly as rules of decision in adjudicating private rights
such as privileges granted aliens, and foreign officers resident in
the country, prize rights of neutrals and enemies in time of war, etd.
By such measures as injunction, the imposition of criminal penalties
and civil liability in tort courts both state and federal may also
prevent the infraction of treaty rights of alien persons or foreign
1- Doe vs. Branden, 16 How. 635; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet. 314;
The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1; Bottiller vs. Dominguez, 130 U.S.
238. Moore's Digest, 5; 241-242.
2- Ware vs. Hylton, 3 Dall . 199, (1796); Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat,
259; Hausenstein vs. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483; Gordon vs. Kerr, 1 Wash.
C.C. 322; Moore's Digest, 5;371-572.
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states, by private persons within their jurisdiction.
Executive authorities may also take measures to enforce treaties
directly. It has been held that imprisonment of persons in pursuance
even
of treaty stipulations by executive authorities,/in the absence of
legislation, judicial process or declaration of martial law, is not
an unconstitutional exercise of power nor a deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. 1 It would thus seem that executive
measures, appropriate to the fulfillment of treaty obligations, may
be effectively used under no authority other than the treaty itself.
Legislative authority is necessary to make treaties effective in
many cases, especially in those requiring an expenditure of money.
It is generally considered a duty of congress to act where its aid is
3
required but in the case of^treaty with Mexico of 1883, providing
that necessary legislation should "take place within twelve months
from the date of exchange of ratifications," 4 congress failed to per-
form this duty. In many other cases the enforcement of treaties can
be made more effective by legislation action. Statutes and orders
imposing criminal penalties, creating administrative positions, di-
recting public officers, etc., have often been enacted and promulgatec
for this purpose.
Rules contained in treaties are similar to those contained in
international law in their relation to the municipal law of the United
1- Ex Parte Tescano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (U.S. Circuit Court, Cal.
1913. See also In.reDebs, 156 U.S. 564 as illustrating general execu-
tive power to safeguard broad general interest, and its application
tc treaty enforcement by E.S. Corwin, National Supremacy N.Y. 1913,
p. 293.
2- See Moore's Digest, 5; 221-223.
3- Cushing Att. Gen., 6 op. 296, (1654).
4- Treaty with Mexico, 1883, art. 8, Malloy, p. 1151. See Moore's
Digest, 5;222.
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States. In both cases the rules are primarily obligatory upon the
government, and in both cases, as a municipal measure to aid in the
enforcement of the governments obligations, it is provided that the
rules shall be part of municipal law and directly enforceable by
courts and executive officers in appropriate cases. In both cases,
also many of the rules are by their nature incapable of immediate
enforcement by municipal law, because the courts can not exercise
jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. In such cases they
are political questions, and the national duties under them may be
fulfilled through discretionary executive action or the enactment
and enforcement of supplementary laws.
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Chapter IV Obligations of Vindication,
Introductory
The duties of prevention relate to acts committed by private
individuals for which the government is responsible, and which it is
bound to prevent. The government is not responsible for acts of
aliens, but international law sometimes requires it to treat viola-
tors of international law even when they are aliens in a specified
manner. The obligations of states are not limited to the mere nega-
tive one of not doing harm to others but as members of the family of
nations they owe at least a moral duty to that society to take mea-
sures to promote its general welfare. They must vindicate their
sovereignty, when foreigners violate international law in their terri-
tory or foreign criminals attempt to find refuge there, by exercising
jurisdiction over such persons according to the requirements of in-
ternational law. And they must vindicate their position in the
family of nations by cooperating with other nations in constructive
activity for the general good.
Duties of this character are for the most part in a process of
becoming, rather than being already established law. In time of
peace general international law does not require such activity, yet
the progress of conventional law, in requiring duties of this charac-
ter, leads to the belief that some of them may be soon recognized as
obligations of the law of nations.
1* International Cooperation.
Such international conventions as those providing for an inter-
national bureau of weights and measures, 1 for the international pro-
1- International Bureau of Weights and Measures, 1875, Malloy,
p. 1924.
L
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tection of industrial property, 1 for the protection of submarine
2 3
cables, for the repression of the African Slave trade, for a Uni-
4
versal Postal Union, for tne protection of literary and artistic
copyrights, for promoting sanitation and preventing epidemic dis-
eases, are adhered to by large numbers of states including the
United States and impose duties upon states for the general good of
the civilized world. Similar duties are imposed by the Geneva, and
the Hague conventions, although their rules are largely declaratory
of international law and define obligations owed to single states
rather than ones required for the general good alone. In its most
recent interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine the United States ap-
pears to have recognized that it must assume certain responsibilities
in connection with countries of the Western Hemisphere. The adminis-
tration of Customs duties on several occasions in Latin American
countries, for the purpose of paying obligations owed by such coun-
tries to European nations is an illustration of the exercise of this
7duty; and the activity of the various Pan-American congresses in-
dicates further special duties connected with the affairs of the new
world.®
1- Convention for International Protection of Industrial Property,
1883, Malloy, p. 1935.
2- Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables, 1884, Malloy,
p. 1949.
3- General Act for the Repression of African Slave Trade, 1890,
Malloy, p. 1964.
4- Universal Postal Conventions, 1891, 1897. Concluded by the
president without consent of the senate under authority of Act of
June 8, 1872. See Moore's Digest, 5;220.
5- Convention on Literary and Artistic Copyrights, 1902, Malloy,
p. 2058.
6- International Sanitary Convention, 1903, Malloy, p. 2066.
7- See President Roosevelt's finnual Message, Dec. 6,1904, For. Rel
.
1904, xli; Moore's Digest, 6;596.
8- Act May, 24, 1888, Moore's Digeat, 6;599-604. Treaties of the
Central American Peace Conference, 1907, Malloy, p. 2391-2400. The
duty of preserving order in Cuba are recognized bv t.paaH as , nnh« , i QQ3
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These obligations are spoken of as duties of international co-
operation, 1 and the law regulating them as international administra-
2
tive law. There has been a great deal of municipal legislation for
enforcing these duties and judicial opinion interpreting them, but
as they are not yet duties imposed by international law aside from
convention, we will not attempt to consider the subject here.
2, Prevention of Crime.
There is however, one duty of a similar character which is so
habitually practiced and is so well established that it can almost be
I said to constitute a real duty of international law. That is the
duty to aid in the suppression of the more serious crimes. The power
of national courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction on the
high seas f or the punishment of pirates is well recognized by inter-
national law and it seems that a positive duty to exercise this
authority and suppress piracy is likewise fairly established. A
government that does not take adequate measures to suppress piracy
may expect other governments to intervene and punish pirates even
3
within its jurisdiction. The slave trade conventions have recognizee
a similar obligation to suppress this commerce. The municipal mea-
sures which the United States has taken to perform these duties have
4
been discussed.
Attempts have been made to conclude international conventions
requiring states to prevent the emigration of criminals from their
p. 352-4, Panama, 1903, art. 23, p. 1356.
1- See Moore's Digest, 2;466-438.
2- See P.S. Reinsch, International Unions and their administration,
Am. Jour. Int. Law, l;579-673. (1907): Int. Adm. Law and National Sover
eignty, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 3 ; 145 , ( 1909) : Public Int. Unions, Boston,
1911: Hershey, Essentials of Int. Pub. Law, p. 5, bibliography, p. 14.
3- See the Amelia Island case, President Monroe's message, Nov. 17,
1818, Moore T s Digest, 1;173: 2;406-408.
4- Rnprfl
,
p. 31
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territory and tc establish international police bureaus for the de-
tection of criminals but it can not be said that international law
as yet imposes obligations of this character. The duty of punish-
ing its own criminals and giving up criminals seeking asylum in its
territory to the state where the crime was committed is sometimes
p
considered a duty of international law and it certainly is a duty
very commonly observed. However, the assertion that states are posi-
tively required by international law to extradite criminals wanted
abroad appears to be erroneous. Extradition is not a duty of inter-
national law. In the absence of treaty, states are not under an
obligation to surrender criminals. The duty has however, been so
universally acknowledged by conventional law that a brief considera-
tion of the laws of the United States relating to its enforcement
may be appropriate.
3. Extradition,
That no legal obligation to extradite criminals exists in the
absence of treaty has been affirmed by courts and political officers
4
of the United States. There have, however, been some cases of ex-
tradition without treaty but the act has been described as one dic-
tated by courtesy rather than by legal obligation. The internation-
al duty recognized by the United States therefore, is that of obeying
the extradition treaties.
1- Such efforts have been made especially in reference to the
suppression of anarchists, see Moore's Digest, 4;95-9S: 2;432-434.
2- See Sir. E. Clarke, A treatise on the Law of Extradition, 4th ed,
1903, cl; Chancellor Kent, In Matter of Washburn, 4 Johns Ch. 105, 107,
(N.Y.); Hershey, op.cit., p. 263, note 69.
3- See Moore on Extradition, 1; 13-20: Moore's Digest, 4;245.
4- Commonwealth vs. Deacon, 10 S. and R. 125; U.S. vs. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407; Terlinden vs. Ames, 184 U.S. 270,289, (1902; Moore's
Digest, 4;245-246.
5- See case of Arguelles, Moore on Extradition, 1;33: Moore's
Digest, 4;249.
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(1) Provision for extradition of murderers and forgers was made
in the treaty with Great Britain of 1794 in force till 1807.
1
The
first general extradition provision was in the Webster-Ashbur ton
2
treaty of 1842 with Great Britain. Since that time treaties have
3been concluded with almost all important countries and they gener-
ally specify that persons indicted for the more serious crimes shall
be extradited. Express exclusion is ordinarily made of political
4
offenders.
Although there have been some state laws providing for extra-
5dition to foreign governments the better opinion seems to be that
the national government alone has the power to deliver up fugitives
7from foreign countries . National statutes since 1848 have provided
for the apprehension and preliminary trial by federal courts of per-
sons whose extradition is requested, although it has been held that
1- Treaty with Great Britain, 1794-1807, art. 27, Malloy, p. 605.
2- Treaty with Great Britain, 1842, art. 10, Malloy, p. 655.
3- Eighty-four treaties with fifty countries have been concluded.
The independent states with which there appear to be no treaties at
present are as follows: Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Para-
guay, Uruguay, China, Persia, Siam, Liberia, Abyssinia. There is no
extradition treaty with the German Empire, but treaties are in effect
with the North German Union and the following states of the empire,
Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hanover, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Meck-
lenburg-Streli tz
,
Oldenburg, Prussia, Schamberg-Lippe
,
Wurtemburg.
4- Ornelas vs. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, (1896); In re Ezeta, 62 Fed.
Rep. 972; Moore's Digest, 4;332-354.
5- Treaty with Mexico, 1861, art. 2; Law of New York, 1822, p. 134,
N.Y. Rev. Stat., 1827, declared unconstitutional in People vs. Curtis
50 N.Y. 321, (1872); Moore on Extradition, 1;53: Moore's Digest,
4;240.
6- Holmes vs. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540,579, (1840); Legare, Att. Gen,
3 op. 661, (1841); People vs. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321, (1872); U.S. vs.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414, (1886).
7- Act. Aug. 12, 1848; 9 Stat. 302, act. June 22, 1860, 12 Stat.
83, Rev. State, sec. 5270-5280.
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treaties being law, the courts can perform such functions in the ab-
sence of statute. 1 The courts have held that extradition need not
be given for offenses not specified in the treaty, but the meaning
of the offense named in a treaty will be determined by the law of the
2
country where it was committed.
(2) Constitutional guarantees demand that "due process of law"
be given to persons in the territory of the United States before ex-
tradition. This necessity is satisfied if evidence sufficient to
3
warrant commitment for trial in the United States or to indicate
4
probable guilt is forthcoming, even though the party is to be extra-
dited to foreign territory under military occupancy of the United
States, where the usual forms of trial, guaranteed to inhabitants of
the United States may not be had. Many countries refuse to extra-
dite their citizens and a number of treaties to which the United
States is a party specifically exempt them, but the United States
does not recognize this exemption in the absence of specific treaty
provision.
(3) The actual surrender of the accused is an executive act and
is performed by the president through the secretary of state, except
7in certain treaties with Mexico in which state authorities on the
1- A number of extradition treaties were concluded before the first
statute in 1848 and extraditions were made under them. See The British
Prisoners, 1 Wood and M. 66; (U.S. cc, 1845) U.S. vs. Watts, 14 Fed.
Rep. 130; U.S. vs. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 497; Moore's Digest, 4-270-273.
U.S. vs. Robbins, Bees Admr. 266; Matter of Metzger, 5 How 176, (1847]
See E. S. Corwin, National Supremacy. N.Y. 1913, p. 277 et. seq.
2- This is frequently required by the terms of the treaty. See Ben-
son vs. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 466, (1880); In re Farez, 7 Blatch.
345, Moore's Digest, 4;273-278.
3- Nelson Att. Gen., 4 op. 201, (1843); Moore's Digest, 4;388-391.
4- In re Ezeta, 67 Fed. Rep. 972.
5- Act June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 656, providing for extradition to
territory under military government, and.Neeley vs. Henkel. 180 U.S.
109,(1901), upholding the statute, Moore's Digest, 4;287-306.
6- Neeley vs. Henkel, 160 U.S. 1G9 , ( 1901 ) ;Moore ' s Digest, 4;287-306,
7- Trea ty with Mftxiao
f
1861. art. 2. Ma1lQV
f p. 11 26,
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boundary are given power to surrender accused persons within their
jurisdiction. The treaties themselves furnish sufficient authority
for the exercise of this power,''' but it can not be exercised until
the evidence has been heard and certification given by the proper
2judicial authority. It seems, that even after such certification,
the president's power is not merely administrative. He may in his
discretion refuse to surrender a person found liable by the courts.''
The ultimate fulfilment of the duty of extradition is therefore a
political rather than a legal one according to the law of the United
States. Municipal law can not compel the president to deliver crimi-
nals, although after action by the courts it is undoubtedly his duty
to do so, except in extraordinary cases.
4. Return of Deserting Seamen.
The return of deserting seamen to their vessels is a matter re-
sembling extradition. As in that case international law imposed no
4duty in the absence of treaty, but the United States has assumed the
5 6
obligation in a number of treaties, and statutes have provided that
deserting seamen may be seized on application of the consul of a
foreign government having an appropriate treaty with the United States
and on proof of desertion be delivered up to the consul. It has been
held that seamen consigned to vessels being built for a foreign goverrff
ment and still in dry dock are within the meaning of these treaties
1-Terlinden vs. Ames, 184 U . S. 270 ,289 ,( 1902) ;Moore ' s Digest, 4;397-399
2- Curtis Att, Gen., 6 op. 217, (1853) ; Nelson, Att. Gen. 4 op. 240(1843)
3- See Moore's Digest, 4;399-400.
4-Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424,431,467-469; Cushing Att. Geri
6 cp. 148, 209; Moore on Extradition, sec.4C8; Moore's Digest, 4;417-420.
5- This provision has been contained in fifty-two treaties with
thirty-five countries.
6- Rev. Stat., 5280, on proceedure, see Rev. Stat. sec. 4079-4081.

-103-
and statutes.
1
At the present time, international law imposes no duties of
vindication on states in time of peace, although it requires them to
observe treaties and international conventions, imposing new duties
of this character upon them. The rapid multiplication of these
treaties in recent times and the almost universal acceptance of the
principles of some of them, indicate that in certain fields, co-
operation and mutual aid have become recognized as essential to the
life of civilized nations, and while states may not yet be under a
legal obligation to accede to such treaties or the principles they
embody, international comity certainly imposes a moral obligation
which can not be long neglected. The rules of municipal law enforc-
ing these moral obligations of cooperation in humanitarian and in-
dustrial matters and mutual aid in the suppression of crime are
therefore closely related in international importance to like mea-
sures enforcing positive legal obligations of international law.
The accession to treaties of this kind is a purely political matter
and beyond the control of municipal law but the usual measures for
enforcing treaties in the United States apply once they are concluded
1- Tucker vs. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424.
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Chapter V. Obligati ons of Reparation .
Introductory
Reparation is a duty owed by a state in case of a failure to
observe any of its obligations under international law. If it com-
mits any forbidden acts itself, or fails to prevent its subjects from
doing so, it must make amends to the injured state or its subjects.
This applies to violations of the duties of states when neutral or
belligerent, as well as in time of peace. To enumerate the occasions
on which reparation is due would therefore, be to recapitulate prac-
tically the whole of this paper. It is not the purpose of this chap-
ter to discuss the occasions upon which the United States has given
reparation, but rather to consider the general laws by which the duty
to make reparation is enforced.
Like all obligations of international law, reparation is pri-
marily a duty of states. No matter who the perpetrator of tthe wrong,
whether a private person or a diplomatic officer, if it is a breach
of international law, the state will be held liable. Viewed from this
standpoint, reparation is beyond the control of municipal law. As an
obligation upon the sovereign power, municipal law can lend no effec-
tive sanction, although it can, by proper constitutional arrangements
insure a distinct recognition, both national and international, of
the authority which is to be considered the responsible agent of
sovereignty in this respect, and can furnish a machinery whereby the
demands, required by a just observance of the duty of reparation,
may be made known.
Furthermore, although the state is ultimately held responsible,
material reparation may often be had more expeditiously by direct
recourse to the private person, officer or department of govern-
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ment immediately at fault. Municipal law may enforce the duty of
such persons and departments to make reparation.
It is true that the municipal enforcement of the duty to make
indemnity encumbent upon the immediate perpetrators of the wrong, is
often used as a basis for denying the duty of "reparation" altogether
using the term to signify solely an indemnification by the government
of the state at fault. This view is believed to be untenable. If a
breach of international law has been committed the state through its
recognized government is responsible, no matter what advantages of
recourse to the immediate party at fault, its municipal law may give.
The duty of the government to make reparation, can only be escaped
by proof that the tort was not one of international law. If it is
admitted that international law requires a state to give reasonable
protection to aliens in its territory, then an injury to such aliens
by mob violence implies an obligation of reparation and indemnity by
the government no matter what remedies from the immediate perpetra-
tors, through courts of justice, municipal law may permit. Escape
from the obligation of the government, can only be based on a denial
of the statement that international law imposes such an obligation
of prevention.
But although the state can not escape the obligation to make
reparation for breaches of international law, through its government,
this does not prevent it providing other means by which the injured
party may obtain reparation, through municipal law. Such municipal
remedies may be more rapid and satisfactory to all parties concerned
than recourse to the government through diplomatic channels. If
1- See especially Secretary of State, Evarts and Secretary of State
Bayard, official correspondence on Chinese outrages, 1680-1885,
Moore's Digest, 6;820-635.
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satisfaction is obtained from the person or officer guilty the state
b
duty of reparation is fulfilled, and to its fulfillment in this man-
ner municipal law may lend a sanction. The question may therefore,
be treated under the two heads, (1) reparation by the national govern-
ment, (2) reparation by inferior governmental divisions, public offi-
cers and private persons.
1. Reparation by the National Government.
Under the constitution, exclusive control of foreign relations
is in the hands of the national government of the United States. In
this field it is sovereign. The municipal law of the United States
can not compel it to observe its duties of reparation. On numerous
occasions, the duty has been recognized, through the voting of in-
demnities by congress, the authorization of salutes to a foreign flag
or public apology, but it has been done as a matter of policy, comity
foreigh pressure or sense of international obligation, not from any
coercion of municipal law.
Although the duty of the national government to make reparation
can not be compelled by municipal law, the probability of the duty
being performed, will be greatly increased if municipal law (l)
places no obstacles in the way of such performance, and (2) estab-
lishes a machinery for the determination and settlement of claims for
reparation. Municipal law may thus be of great importance in the
fulfillment of this international duty.
(1) The obstacles if any which the constitutional system of the
United States places in the way of an adequate performance of the du-
ties of reparation will be considered according to the character of
those duties. Reparation may take the form of (a) Apology, or salute of
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a foreign flag, (b) cession of territory, (c) pecuniary indemnity,
(d) punishment or surrender of offenders, or (e) release of persons
held in custody in contravention of international law.
(a) Such formal modes of reparation as apology and salute of the
flag are entirely executive in nature. The president through his con-
trol of foreign relations exercises unrestrained discretion in these
matters
.
(b) Reparation by cession of territory generally results from
war. The United States demanded such indemni ty,, although it can
scarcely be called reparation, in the Mexican aid Spanish wars but it
has never made cessions for this reason itself. The power to cede
territory, is generally agreed to be inherent in the treaty power,
consequently if necessary reparation of this character could be made
by the president with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
2
senate.
(c) Pecuniary indemnity is the most common form of reparation,
and it clearly can not be made without the express consent of congress
Congress by the constitution has control of the purse and consequent-
ly no indemnity can be paid without an appropriation by it, although
lump appropriations for the general purpose of settling claims might
1- For reparation by apology see The Trent Affair. No formal apologj
was made, but Great Britain recognized the return of Mason and Slidell
and Secfcetary of State Seward's note as equivalent to the apology de-
manded. Moore's Digest, 7; 771. For reparation by Salute of Flag see
case of French Consul subpoened in San Francisco, Moore's Digest,
5; 80; case of The Florida seized in Brazilian territorial waters,
Moore's Digest, 7; 1091; Case of Spanish consulate attacked at New
Orleans, Moore's Digest, 6;813.
2- Lattimer vs. Poteet, 14 Pet. 14. There has been dicta to the
effect that the consent of a state is necessary before any of its ter-
ritory may be ceded. See Geofroy vs. Riggs, 133 U.S. 267; Insular
cases, 182 U.S. 345, though in this case the court admitted that
territory of a state might be ceded to buy peace after a disastrous
war, without such consent. See Butler, Treaty Making Power, 1;411-413;
2;238, 287-294: Moore's Digest, 5;171-175.
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be voted, to be expended at executive discretion. As the steps lead-
ing to reparation and the correspondence on the subject are conducted
by the president, a failure on the part of congress to appropriate
for a reparation
5
the validity of which had been admitted by the ex-
ecutive, might lead to serious trouble. As a matter of fact congress
appears to have followed the recommendations of the president in this
.
1
respect.
However the probability of the national government paying in-
demnities, depends somewhat upon its control of the actual perpetra-
tors of the wrong. The breach of international law, may have been
through an act of the national government itself or an agent acting
under express authority, in which case no such question would arise.
It may have been through the unauthorized act of an officer of the
national government abroad or within the territory of the United
are
States. As such officers if military or naval /under the constant con^
trol of the government through courts martial and military law and if
civil are under executive control and are frequently bonded, the
government would have no grounds for denying its responsibility from
this cause.
Where the offense has been committed by a state officer or a
private citizen within the territory of a state, it seems to be
settled that the constitution does not prevent the national govern-
ment prosecuting the offender in its own courts if his act violates
1- As examples of pecuniary indemnity voted by congress, see Case
of Spanish Consul, Act, Aug. 31, 1652, 10 Stat. 898; Mch. 3,1853,
10 Stat. 262, Moore's Digest, 6;814-818; Rock Springs Anti Chinese
Outrage, Oct. 19, 1688, 25 Stat. 565,566; Italian Lynchings, New
Orleans, 1691, Moore's Digest, 6; 840; Colorado, June 8, 1896, Moore's
Digest, 841; Hahnville, La., July 19, 1897, 30 Stat. 105,106; Tallula,
La., 1899, Moore's Digest, 6;846: Erwin Mass, Mch, 3, 1903, 33 Stat.
1032; English Seaman injured, New Orleans, June 8, 1696; Mexican Lynd>
ing, Yreka, Cal., July 17,1898, 30 Stat. 653; in Texas, March 3, 1901,
31 Stat. 1010.
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international law or treaty. It is also clear that no such juris-
2diction may be exercised unless statutes specifically provide for it.
Statutes have provided for the extension of the jurisdiction of feder*
al courts over persons violating diplomatic immunities, and over a
few specified offenses against foreign states, but no such provision
has been made where the offense is against the general rights of
aliens or consuls residing within the country. It is not surprising
therefore, that for offenses of this c haracter , the United States has
been very reluctant to admit a duty of reparation. Where it can not
punish offenders, or take measures to prevent a recurrence of out-
rages, the national government has felt that it is not legally re-
sponsible and where it has made indemnity has done so as a "gratuity"
rather than an obligation.^ If however, as appears to be the case,
1- W.W. Willoughby, The Am. Cpnst. System, N.Y., 1904, p. 108;
E.S. Corwin, National Supremacy, N.Y. 1913; U.S. vs. Arjona, 120 U.S.
479, (1887).
2- On the strictly statutory character of the jurisdiction of
federal courts except the supreme court see U.S. vs. Worral , 2 Dall.
384, (1798), and general terms of judiciary act of 1789, Rev. Stat.
687-750 granting less jurisdiction than included under constitutional
provisions. Somewhat contra see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,584, saying,
"Every government, is entrusted by the very terms of its being with
powers and duties to be exercised an£ discharged for the general wel-
fare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any proper assist-
ance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other."
The supreme court appears to have an inherent jurisdiction by the
constitution subject to the power of congress to limit it, but as
positive grants of jurisdiction by congress are held to negative all
other jurisdiction, its jurisdiction in reality extends no further
than provided by statute. See U.S. vs. Moore, 3 Cranch 159,170,172;
Durousseau vs. U.S. 6 Cranch 307,313; Ex Parte MdCardle, 7 Wall. 506,
513.
3- Supra, p. 76 et seq.
4- See Diplomatic correspondence and congressional action on in-
demnities for injury to Spanish consul, 1851, Chinese Outrages 1880-
1885, Italian Lynchings, 1891-1901, etc,, Moore's Digest, 6;811-849.
In the last of the Italian cases the act of congress, Mch. 3,1903,
33 Stat. 1032, appropriated $5,000 "out of humaneconsiderations with-
out reference to the question of liability therefor to the Italian
Government." Moore's Digest, 6; 849.
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international law imposes a duty of preventing injury to resident
aliens, no such plea will avail. The United States government is
the only authority within the territory of the United States known
to foreign states and will be held responsible for violations of in-
ternational law, whether it in fact can control the guilty persons
or not. It therefore seems that statutes should give the federal
courts jurisdiction over offenders of this character. 1
(d) Frequently the injured state has specifically demanded the
2punishment of offenders as reparation. Here also the constitutional
division of power between state and national governments has offered
an obstacle to the performance of this demand. In the case of army
3
and naval officers and civil officers of the United States govern-
ment, misconduct in office is made a crime against the United States
and offences by such officers are cognizable by federal courts. The
same is true of persons guilty of violating the immunities of foreign
diplomatic officers, the obligations of neutrality, and doing a few
other acts forbidden by international law such as counterfeiting for-
eign securities. No statutes have however, given the federal courts
criminal jurisdiction of persons violating rights of aliens guaran-
teed by treaty or international law and consequently unless the state
government, which can not feel the pressure of international response
bility, chooses to prosecute such offenders 4the duty will not be
1- See Messages, Pres. Harrison, Dec. 9, 1891; Pres .McKinley , Dec.
5, 1899, Dec. 3, 1900, Moore's Digest, 6 ; 840 ,846-847 , in which such
legislation is recommended.
2- See case of French Privateers, 1811, Moore's Digest, 6;809;
Chinese Outrages, Denver, Colo, 1880, Moore's Digest, 6,820; Italian
Lynching New Orleans, 1891, Moore's Digest, 6;838.
3- On court martial punishment of the commander of the United States
vessel Wachusett, in reparation for the act of seizing the confeder-
ate cruiser Florida in Brazillian territorial waters, see Moore's
Digest, 7;1090.
4- The Continental Congress recommended that states prosecute oifen-
ses against the Law of Nations . Res .Nnv. gg ,1,7fi1, ,.Tnu r >n-^^p.7 :181.FordlL
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performed. The constitution undoubtedly permits of such an extension
of federal jurisdiction and it would seem that the adequate enforce-
ment of international obligations demands it.
In the place of punishment of offenders against international
rights, states have sometimes demanded as a reparation, that they be
delivered up for punishment by its own tribunals. This was demanded
by the Russian Czar upon the arrest of his ambassador in London in
1708^ and by the King of France upon the assault of his secretary of
p
legation at Philadelphia in 17S4 . The demand was refused in both of
these cases and it seems that no such obligation of reparation exists
under international law. A state may extradite fugitives xrom justice
in its territory for offenses committed abroad , but the theory of
territorial sovereignty upon which international law is so largely
based, places it under no obligation to surrender persons for acts
committed within its own jurisdiction. To do so would be to acknowl-
edge an extraterritorial effect of the laws of the foreign country.
International law may require a state to punish offenders as a repara-
tion for international wrongs, but it does not require it to submit
them to the punishment of the injured state.
(e) On several occasions the release- of officers or persons held
under public authority has been the form of reparation demanded.
Where the person is held by the executive or judicial authority of
1- See statement of this case in Triquet vs. Bath. 3 Burr, 1478.
(K.B. 1764), Scott, 6i Holland, Studies in International Law, pl87
.
2- Res Publica vs. De Longchamps, 1 Dall.lll, (Pa. 1784)
.
3- In countries which adhere to the theory of jurisdiction by
nationality even extradition for offenses committed abroad is refused
in the case of their own subjects. See Italian refusal to extradite
its subjects even when no exemption was specified in treaty. Moore's
Digest, 4;290-297. In this case Italy punished the persons whose
extradition was asked in her own courts.
ed., 21;1137, and offered to pay for the prosecution of such offences
Res. Aug. 2 ,1779, IblCi. ft:232. Fnrri t ed . . 14 :914.
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th e national government, that authority can grant release, in the
former case by executive action as in the Trent affair of 1861
j
1 in
the latter by writ of habeas corpus which may be instituted by ex-
ecutive authority, or by a direct statutory prohibition of juris-
2
diction as in the case of foreign diplomatic officers.
Where the person is held by authority of a state court, again
an obstacle may be presented to the effective fulfilling of inter-
3
national duty as was illustrated in the case of McLeod, an English
| soldier, held by authority of the state of New York, for an alleged
murder, and whose release was demanded by Great Britain. In this
' case the national government was unable to effect release, and as
4
a consequence a statute was soon after passed providing that persons
held by state authority whose release was demanded on grounds of in-
ternational law, might be brought before the federal courts on habeas
corpus, in which case the national authorities might with satisfac-
tory evidence bring about a release. The statutory provisions, ex-
eluding cases against diplomatic ministers from the jurisdiction of
state courts altogether, removes this obstacle from the release of
such persons by national authority.
It seems that the constitution offers no obstacle to the ob-
servance of all national duties of reparation. The principle of
national supremacy in the fields constitutionally delegated to the
national government, including foreign relations, permits of legis-
lation by congress and the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts
1- On release of Mason and Slidell as a reparation for their Ille-
gal seizure from the British vessel, Trent, see Moore's Digest,
7;768-770.
2- Act. Apr. 30,1790, 1 Stat. 117, Rev. Stat. sec. 4063-4064.
3- People vs. McLeod, 25 Wend. 483, (N.Y.1841) in which an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus was refused by the state court.
See Moore's Digest, 2;24-25.
.„
4- Act. Augi,,,^, 1842, Rev, Stat. Moorp '° PiQnnt.,
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"necessary and proper" to fulfill all duties required by internation-
al law or treaty."^" However, additional legislation to make some of
this constitutional power effective seems to the necessary.
(2) The fulfillment of the duty of reparation may be secured
by the provision of an adequate machinery for prosecuting claims for
reparation. The final method for prosecuting any claim for repara-
tion is the resort to force by way of intervention, reprisal or war.
Observance of the "duty" of reparation, if it can be called a duty
under such coercion, is a matter of policy and certainly requires
no additional sanction from municipal law. We have to do, solely
with the duty of making reparation for acknowledged breaches of in-
ternational law.
The prosecution of claims for reparation may be by (a) judicial
means provided by municipal law, (b) diplomacy, or (c) arbitration.
2
(a) By an act of 1855 a court of claims was established at
3first as an advisory body but later as a court with power to compel
payment of money from general appropriations for that purpose.
Aliens are permitted to prosecute suits in the court of claims if
their government accords a like privilege to United States citizens
and most European governments have been included in this class.
^
1- See Pomeroy, J.N. , An introduction to the Constitutional law of
the United States, 9th ed. N.Y., 1886, p. 571. Gorwin, E.S., National
Supremacy, N.Y. 1913. passim.
2- Act Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612.
3- Act Mch. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765, Under this act the court was
still simply advisory, as the Secretary of the Treasury had a dis-
cretionary power to revise its decisions, consequently the supreme
court refused the appellate jurisdiction given to it. (Gopdon vs.
U.S., 2 Wall. 561) This difficulty was remedied by the act of Mch. 17,
1866, see also Tucker act, Mch 2, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, U.S. Rev. Stat.
10 59,1069, Judicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 142,180.
4- Act July 27,1868, 15 Stat. 243; Rev. Stat. 1068. Judiciary Code.
Privileges accorded subjects of Great Britain, (U.S. vs. C'Keefe 11
Wall. 178; Carlisle vs. U.S. 16 Wall. 147) Belgium, (DeGive vs. U.S.
7 Ct. CI 517); France, (Rothschild vs. U.S. 6 Ct. CI* 204; Dauphin v.l>.
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The jurisdiction of the court extends over claims founded on acts
of congress, executive regulations, contracts express or implied with
the United States, damage cases not sounding in tort and all claims
1
referred to it by either house of Congress. It is expressly stated
however, that the jurisdiction does not extend to claims "growing out
of or dependent upon treaty stipulations entered into with foreign
nations or with Indian Tribes."2 As the court's jurisdiction tos
limited to the express terms of statute it does not extend to claims
based on general international law. The court therefore could not
aid in enforcing the national duty of reparation, unless congress
had first acted, except in so far as the obligation to pay contract
debts may be considered a duty of international law.
(b) Diplomatic representation is the most frequent method of
presenting demands for reparation. These must be presented to the
Department of State and must come from a foreign government through
3
its diplomatic representative in the United States. The Department
of State will not listen to a claim presented by a foreign private
person or officer and congress will not consider any alien claims not
4
coming through the Department of State. The action of the Department
of State upon claims is entirely discretionary and its recommendation
U.S. 6 Ct. CI. 221); Italy, (Fichera vs. U.S. 9 Ct. CI. 254); Prussia,
(Brown vs. U.S. 5 Ct. CI. 571); Spain, (Molina vs. U.S., 6 Ct. CI. 571)
Switzerland, (Lobsiger vs. U.S. 5 Ct. CI. 687). See Roger Foster, A
Treatise on Federal Practice, Civil and Criminal, 5th ed., 3 vols.,
Chicago, 1913, 3;2309.
1- Act Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612; Rev. Stat. 1059. Judicial Code,
Act, Men 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 145, District courts now exer-
cise a concurrent jurisdiction in these matters, Ibid, sec. 24.
2- Act Mch. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765, sec. 9, Judicial Code, 1911, 36
Stat. 1687, sec. 153.
3- U.S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, Moore's Digest, 6;607-609.
4- Magoon's Reports 338; see also, 43 Cong., 1st Sess., Report No.
496, committee on war claims, May, 2, 1874; Moore's Digest, 6;608.
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to congress although generally followed has no controlling effect.
Congress having acted, it would seem that the payment of claims be-
comes a purely administrative act and the foreign claimant can have
recourse to the court of claims on the authority of this statute, or
to an action of mandamus to compel payment by the Secretary of the
Treasury or the Secretary of State.
(c) The conclusion of arbitration treaties and the determination
to submit any particular claim to arbitration are political questions
and beyond the power of municipal law to control. The United States
has concluded a large number of special as well as general arbitra-
tion treaties. 1 The former usually specify the proceedure to be ob-
served and the subjects to be submitted to the jurisdiction of the
2
arbitral court. The latter provide that all questions of a class
or all questions except those of a specified class shall be submitted
to arbitration, yet although treaties are by the constitution, law
of the land, cases do not come before arbitral tribunals automatic-
ally. The submission of any case is a political question, upon which
the executive power of the government has discretion.
A claim having been submitted to arbitration and an award given
the matter is subject to enforcement by municipal law. It has been
held that an arbitral decision is final and as binding on the courts
as an act of congress. It would therefore seem that the payment of
the award is purely administrative in character, and can be compelled
by mandamus. This however, is not true in cases in which the award
1- Supra, p. 19, note 3.
2- It has been held that decisions of an arbitral court beyond its
competence as defined by treaty are void. See Comegys vs. Vasse,
1 Pet. 193; Trevall vs. Bache, 14 Pet. 95; Judson vs. Corcoran, 17
How. 612; Moore's Digest, 7;30-33.
3- Comegys vs. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193,212. La Ninfa, 75 Fed. Rep. 513,
(1896).
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has been for the United States and its citizens claim payment. If
it develops that fraud was practiced, the United States government
can reopen the whole matter and refuse payment to its citizens.
1
The arbitral decision is res judicata as between the governments,
but not as between the government and its own subjects.
Although the submission of questions to arbitration even under
general treaties is a political question and beyond the control of
municipal law, the establishment of a mode of proceedure by means of
such treaties and of a permanent pannel of judges as is provided by
the Hague conventions undoubtedly affords an important sanction to
the equitable fulfilment of duties of reparation. The establishment
of a permanent court of arbitration with recognized jurisdiction,
as was attempted and notably favored by the United States' delegation
at the second Hague conference, would add an even more effective sanc-
tion of similar character.
2, Reparation by inferior governmental divisions,
public officers, and private persons.
As has been stated the national government of the United States
is primarily responsible for all breaches of international law by
itself or its citizens and reparation for such torts may always be
expected from it. This does not however, prevent the injured party
seeking reparation from inferior governmental organs, officers, or
individuals. We may therefore consider the municipal measures en-
forcing the duty of such persons to make reparation.
(1) The constitution permits the extension of the jurisdiction
to
of federal courts/controversies "between a state or the citizens
1- Frelinghuysen vs. Key, 110 U.S. 63; Boynton vs. Blaine, 139 U.S.
306; U.S. vs. LaAbra Silver Mining Co., 32 Ct. CI. 462, (1897);
LaAbra Silver Mining Co., vs. U.S., 175 U.S. 423, (1899). See Moore's
Digest, 7;65-68.
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thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects"^" but not to "suits
in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
o
States * * by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." The ex-
emption does not extend to suits prosecuted by foreign states. It
therefore seems that so far as the constitution is concerned, a for-
eign state could bring action for reparation against one of the
commonwealths of the union in federal courts although its subjects
acting individually could not. The Statutes however, have not pro-
vided for such a jurisdiction, consequently there have been no such
actions. Foreign states have always asserted that the government of
the United States is the only authority recognized by them as re-
sponsible and have refused to have direct recourse to state govern-
3
ments, even when the state has offered to make indemnity.
Most states have established courts of claims in which they
4
may be sued under limitations in their own courts, and a number
of them have provided by law for the responsibility of cities and
counties for property losses and lynchings.
1- Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 1.
2- Constitution, Amendment 11.
3- See case of French Privateers, 1811, in which the State of Geor-
gia offered to make indemnity for injury to French seamen in Savannah
Moore's Digest, 6; 609.
4- Illinois act Mch. 23, 1819, Laws 1819, p. 184; act. Jan. 3,1829,
Rev. Laws, 1832, p. 593, repealed Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 464, permitting
the auditor of Public Accounts to be sued ior the state. 111. Act.
May 29, 1877, laws, 1877, p. 64, creating commission of claims "to hea
and determine all unad judicated claims of all persons, against the
state of Illinois" and submit them to the auditor of public accounts
who is to lay them before the General assembly. 111. Act May 16,1903
laws 1903, p. 140, creating a court of claims with a similar authority.
See N.Y. Laws, 1870, C.321; 1876, c.444; 1883, c.205; 1897, c.36;
Mass. Rev. Laws, c.201. See Freund, E. , Cases on Adminifetrative Law,
St. Paul, 1911, p. 363-367.
5- As Examples see 111. Rev. Stat. 1913, c.38, sec. 256a-256g,p . 854
making a city or county liable for three-fourths damages for property
losses caused by a mob of over twelve persons, with the proviso that
such liability does not prevent recovery j?om individual perpetrators.
c.28, sec. 256w, p. 857, creating a. liability of $5000 upon counties
and cities for lynchings, recoverable by the survivors of the personlynched. " °
_
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These methods of recovery are open t o aliens or foreign sovereigns
under the usual provisions opening courts to such persons.
(2) Recourse against private persons or officers of government
may be had by either foreign individuals or sovereigns.
1
Such suits
2
may also be commenced in the name of a foreign state. Foreign
states or persons bringing such suits have the advantage of the us-
ual principles of law applicable to suits brought in, recovery of
3
claims or damages by citizens. The foreigner in such a case has
the additional advantage of an option in bringing his case in either
the state or federal courts. By the constitution the jurisdiction of
federal courts may be extended to controversies "between a state or
the citizens thereof and foreign states citizens or subjects" and
statutes have provided for the exercise of this jurisdiction as to
4
such suits against citizens.
1- King of Spain vs. Oliver, 2 Wash. C.C. 429.
2- The Saphire, 11 Wall 164 and Moore's Digest, 2; 85-87. English
cases, U.S. vs. Prioleau, 35 L.J. Gh. N.S. 7, (1365); U.S. vs. McRae
,
L.R. 8 Eq. 69, (1869); Moore's Digest, l;65-66.
3- Gushing, Att. Gen., 7 op. 229, (1855); Taylor vs. Carpenter,
3 Story 458; State vs. Chue Fan, 42 Fed. Rep. 865; Crashley vs. Press
Pub. Co. 179 N. Y. 27,(1904); Moore's Digest, 4;7-9.
4- Constitution art. 3, sec. 2, cl. 1. United States District
courts have jurisdiction of civil suits where the matter in controvers
is over $3,000 "between citizens of a state and foreign states, citi-
zens of subjects", (Judicial Code, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, sec. 24,cl.l)
and "of all suits brought by any alien for a tort only in violation
of the Law of Nations or of a treaty of the United States" (Ibid, sec
24, cl.17). All suits of which district courts have original juris-
diction, or in which the parties are of diverse citizenship and there
is danger of local predjudice, may be removed from state courts into
district courts by motion of the defendent. ( Ibid . sec . 28) . Most of
these provisions were in the Judiciary act of 1789, Rev. Stat. sec.
563, cl.16; sec. 629, cl.l. Removal of causes involving aliens to
circuit courts was provided in an act of Aug. 13, 1888, 25, Stat. 434 a
sec. 2, on which see New Orleans Co., vs. Rabasse, 10 So. 708, Breed-
love vs. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 413. The circuit courts were abolished by
the judicial code of 1911, sec. 289.
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The usual principles of liability of officers apply in suits
brought by aliens as well as by citizens. In principle Anglo-Ameri-
can law considers officers liable for wrongful acts in which case
they would be liable for torts violating international rights of
foreign states or persons."*" The tendency however, is to relieve
officers from such liability either by statute or judicial decision,
when they act in good faith, the state sometimes assuming the lia-
bility in such cases. The responsibility of private persons would
be governed by the law of torts and contracts of the state where the
action was brought, the same remedies generally being open to the
2
alien as to a citizen.
1- Little vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170, (1804).
2- See reference to this mode of indemnification in letter of
Secretary of State Bayard, For. Rel . 1S86, p. 158, in reference to
Chinese Outrages at Rock Springs, W*y., 1885, in which reference is
also made to the right of aliens to remove cases to federal courts.
Moore's Digest, 6; 831-832.
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PART II. OBLIGATIONS AS A NEUTRAL TOWARD BELLIGERENTS ,
Introductory .
The obligations of neutral states have been classified by Hol-
land"^ as obligations of (1) Abstention, (2) acquiescence and (3)
prevention. To these Lawrence adds two, the duties of (4) restora-
tion and (5) reparation.
(1) The obligations of abstention, peculiar to neutrality relate
to matters which the state itself must abstain from doing, and are
outside of the jurisdiction of municipal law. Whether a state by
performing its duties of abstention shall remain a neutral or whether
by refusing to perform them it intervenes and thus itself, becomes
a belligerent is a question which is always to be determined by the
political departments of government. Municipal law can not in any
way effect the power of the state to thus exercise its sovereignty.
It may be noted that certain acts of abstention are specifically re-
quired by the Hague conventions of 1907. Thus neutral states are
required to abstain irom partiality in dealing with belligerents, from
supplying belligerent powers with "warships, amunition, or war materl?
al of any kind", and from partiality in applying "conditions, restric
tions and prohibitions" upon the admission of belligerent war ships
3 4
or prizes into their territorial waters. By the constitution
treaties are declared to be part of the law of the land, consequently
these provisions might be spoken of as rules of municipal law. In
reality, as they are directory upon the state itself they can not be
1- T.E. Holland, Neutral Duties in Maritime War, Proceedings of
the British Academy, 2;2, quoted Moote's Digest, 7;863.
2- T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 4th ed.,
N.Y.
,
1910, p. 629.
3- Hague Conventions, 1907, V, art. 9, XIII, arts. 6, 9.
4- Constitution, art. VI, sec. 2.
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enforced by any regularly constituted state authority so scarcely
deserve that title. They are rules directory upon the political
organs of government, but are not enforceable rules of municipal law.
The duties of abstention discussed under the law of peace, likewise
apply to states in t ime of neutrality.
(2) The neutral state's obligations of acquiescence are entirely
passive. They require the state to submit without protest to inci-
dental inconveniences, and detractions from its ordinary rights under
international law, caused by the operation of acknowledged privileges
of belligerents. The most prominent of these inconveniences is the
loss to its subjects which results from the exercise of belligerent
rights in interfering with maritime commerce such as the right of
visit and search, seizure, and confiscation after adjudication for
breach of blockade, contraband trade, unneutral service and similar
acts. A neutral state must also acquiesce in occasional losses by
its citizens resident in belligerent countries, when such losses are
incidental to the conduct of hostilities. The duty of acquiescence
simply requires the acknowledgement by the neutral state that the
ordinary rights of its citizens under international law are modified
in their relations with a belligerent community or state. The form
which a breach of this duty would take would be the making of un-
warranted diplomatic protests or intervention. As in the case of
abstention both of these acts are prerogatives of sovereignty and
incapable of limitation by municipal law. The duties of acquiescence
connected with exemptions from territorial jurisdiction and servi-
tudes apply to states in neutrality as well as in peace.
(3) The Duty of prevention requires a state to prevent unneutral
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acts by its citizens and agencies of government and the unneutral use
of its territory. It is in this field that municipal law is most
essential for the preservation of neutral obligations.
(4) The duty which Lawrence has in mind when he speaks of
"restoration" is the duty which a neutral state is under to restore
prizes captured in its waters or illegally brought to its ports, to
the original owner. 1 It seems that the use of the term restoration
as describing this duty is unfortunate as it implies that the duty
is one owed to the power to whom the prize is restored. If this were
true, if the owner of the vessel captured in violation of neutrality
had a right to its restoration, he could make his claim if the vessel
were in the custody of a belligerent as well as a neutral prixe court.
This however, is not the case. It is a recognized principle that the
owner of the vessel can not claim restoration in a belligerent prize
court, on the ground that seizure was in violation of the neutrality
2
of a third state. The Prize is restored, not as a reparation to the
state from which it was taken, but as a vindication of its own neutral
rights by the neutral state. Like international cooperation and the
1- Lawrence, op.cit., p. 349.
2- "A capture made within neutral waters is, as between enemies
deemed, to all intents and purposes, rightful; it is only by the
neutral sovereign that its legal validity can be called in question;
and as to him only, is it to be considered void. "The Ann, 3 Wheat.
435, 447, (181B). See also, The Adela, 6 Wall. 266, (1867); The Sir
Wm. Peel, 5 Wall. 535; The Lilla, 2 Sprague
,
177; The Florida, 101 U.S
38, (1879). English cases, The Eliza Ann, 1 Dods. 244,(1813); The
Purissima Conception, 6 Rob. 45, (1805); The Diligentia, 1 Dods. 404,
412, (1814); The Etrusco, Lords, 1795, 3 Rob. 31; The Vrouw Anna
Catherina, 5 Rob. 144. See Scott Cases, pp. 684-691; Moore's Digest,
6;1000, 7; 511, 10.89.
3- If the property has been captured within the jurisdiction of the
neutral, the neutral "may indeed, inflict pecuniary, or other penal-
ties, on the parties for such violation; but it then does it profess-
edly in vindication of its own rights, and not by way of compensation
to the captured." La Amistad de Rues, 5 Wheat. 385. See also La Es-
trella, 4 Wheat. 298,(1819); The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283,496
Fenwick, op.cit. p. 90, says, "Where vessels have been fitted out and
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extradition of criminals, it is an obligation growing out of the
general interest of humanity which requires the greatest possible
restriction of the area of war. Unlike them, however, it is a duty,
required by international law, even in the absence of treaty stipu-
lations, and reparation may be demanded in case of failure to ob-
serve it."*" We will therefore include the duties which Lawrence con-
siders duties of "restoration" in the subject obligations of vindi-
cation. There are other obligations which will logically be included
in this subject, such as that to intern belligerent troops entering
neutral territory and to enforce observation of the twenty-four hour
stay and twenty-four hour interval rules by belligerent vessels tak-
ing asylum in its ports.
(5) The duty of reparation refers to the obligation which a
neutral state is under to make suitable amends to the injured bel-
ligerent for a failure to perform any of its other duties as a neutral.
The reparation may assume the forms of payment of damages, restora-
tion of property or public apology. The payment by Great Britain of
the Alabama claims award in 1871 is a classic example of the perform-
ance of this duty. There are no duties of reparation peculiar to
the law of neutrality. The provisions of United States' law enforc-
ing this duty in time of peace, apply equally well, for the enforce-
ment of obligations arising in time of neutrality.
armed or have increased their force, in violation of the neutrality
6f the United States, the courts of the United States will intervene
to effect a restitution of prizes captured by such vessels, not be-
cause the capture is illegal as between the captor and the former
owner, but because the neutral states has the right to vindicate its
own sovereignty by divesting possession of property acquired as the
result of a violation of its sovereignty."
1- Commodore Stewart's Case, 1 Ct. CI. 113, (1864), Scott, 910.
Supra, p. 161, note 1.
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We will then consider the municipal measures enforcing the ob-
ligations of the United States as a neutral under two heads, (l)
the obligations of prevention, (2) the obligations of vindication.
It is probably desirable to present in more detail the basis of
distinction between these two classes of duties. The duty of pre-
vention differs from the duty of vindication in that the former re-
lates to certain obligations a neutral state is under in reference
to its own subjects and territory, while the latter is concerned
with the treatment of foreign subjects and agencies of government.
International law does not define the means which a state must take
in performing its duties of prevention. It is of no international
importance whether it chooses to control its subjects and the use of
its territory by means of criminal penalties, requirements of bonds
or other guarantees, or the use of military force, so long as it
exercises "due diligence" or "the means at its disposal", the methods
are entirely a matter of internal policy.
t
On the other hand in per-
forming the duty of vindication the state is dealing with persons who
are not its own subjects. It is really acting as sn agent of the
society of nations to adjudicate a breach of international law*
Consequently that s cciety is interested in the method of treating
these violators of international duty and specifies, in international
law that illegal prizes shall be restored, belligerent troops shall
be interned, vessels illegally in ports shall be expelled or seques-
trated, etc.
In general therefore, the municipal rules enforcing duties of
prevention, consist of rules supplementary to international law,
while those enforcing duties of vindication, consist of rules of in-
ternational law which are also rules of municipal law.

-125-
It may be added that the same act may entail obligations of both
kinds. A neutral state may be required to prevent a specified in-
fraction of its neutrality. If it is unsuccessful in preventing
this act, it may be required to vindicate its neutrality in a par-
ticular manner. Thus a neutral state is under an obligation to pre-
vent hostilities in its territorial waters. Yet if a prize is there
taken in spite of its efforts, the duty of vindication requires it
to adjudicate this prize and restore it, to its situation before
capture.
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Ohapter I. Obligations of Prevention.
1. Treaty Provisions.
(1) The United States has recognized certain duties of pre-
vention as incumbent upon it by treaty. Many of the early treat-
ies of the United States contain an article stipulating for the
preservation of "perpetual peace and amity," between the two
1 ?
countries. In Henfield's case which aros e in 1794, such
provisions in the treaties with Netherlands^, Prussia4
,
and Great
Britain^, were made one of the bases for the government prosecu-
tion oi a person accused of accepting a commission from Prance
who was at war with these countries. General principles of
international law were also relied on in the case, but the main
1.- As examples of this kind of treaty may be mfintioned that with
Prance, in force from 1778 to 1798 which said "There shall be
a firm, inviola le, and universal peace and a true and sincere
friendship between" etc., Malloy, p.469. The s-^me phrase
.introduces the treaty with Sweden of 1783, pl725; with Prus-
sia, 1785-1796, pl477; with the Netherlands, 1782-1795,
.
pl234; with Cireat Britain, 1794, p591. Most of these
treaties have been abrogated or superseded and the more re-
cent treaties generally relate to particular subjects such
as commerce, extradition, consular privileges, etc., and do
not corAa'n the specific peace and amity clause. This,
however, is not universally true. The treaty with Spain
of 1902 begins with an article of the character formerly so
common, p. 1701.
2 - In re Henfield, ?ed. Gas. 6360, (1793).
3 - Treaty with the Netherlands, 1792-1795, art. 1, Malloy, pl234.
4 - Treaty witfc Prussia, 178 5 - 1796, , art. 1, Malloy, pl477
.
5 - Treaty with 'Jre it Britain, 1794-1807, art. 1, Malloy, p591.
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aupport for the indictment seemed to he that Henfield 1 a acts were
prohibited by these treaties which were law in the United States.
Though the court accepted this view at that time, it is clear
that criminal indictments could no longer be supported under
such general treaty provisions^, and as a matter of fact few
treaties now in force contain the perpetual peace and amity
clause, in the mandatory form it assumed in the early treaties.
By another common provision in early treaties the contract-
ing parties bound themselves when neutral to prevent their sub-
jects accepting privateering commissions or letters of marque to
serve against the other. 2 Often the stipulation was added that
offenders were to be punished as pirates 2 . Such provisions were
fre uently mentioned by the courts as the basis for assuming
jurisdiction over prizes brought into United States oorts, and
for restoring them to their original owners when it was proven
1 - U.S. vs. Worral, 2 Dall . 384, (1798); U.S. vs. Hudson,
7 Granch 32
,
(1812 ) .
2 - The acceptance of letters of marque to serve against the con-
tracting party is forbidden in the following treaties;
France, ^1778-1798, art. 21, Llalloy, p475; Bolivia, 1858, art.
25, pl21 ; Central America, 1825-1839, art. 24, pl67; Chili,
1832-1850, art. 22, p!78; Columbia, 1824-1836, art. 22, p299,
1846, art. 26, p310; Dominican Republic, 1867-1898, art. 25,
p411; Ecuador, 1829-1892, art. 25, p428; Guatamala, 1849-1874,
art .24, p868; Hayti, 1864-1905, art .31, p929 ; Netherlands,
1782-1S95, art. 19, pi239; Peru, 1870-1886, art. 28, pl423;
1887-1899, art. 26, pl429; Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 20, pl483;
1799-1810, art. 20, pl495; 1828, art. 12, p!499; Salvador,
1850-1870, art
.26, pl545; 1870-1893, art. 26, pl559; Spain,
1795-1902, art. 14, pl645; Sweden, 1783, art. 23, p!733, re-
newed, 1827, art. 17, pl754; venzuela, 1860-1870, art. 25,
p*853; Gre t Britain, 1794-1807, art. 21, p603.
3 - It is provided that offenders shall be treated as pirates in
the following of the above treateis, Columbia, cuador,
Guatamala, lietherlands , P eru, Prussia, Salvador, Spain, Swe-
den, Gre t Britain.
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that the captor was an American citizen operating under a foreign
letter of marque^". No criminal prosecutions have, however,- "been
instituted under strength of the treaty provisions alone, al-
though there would seem to be greater warrant for such action,
than under the general peace and amit-y provisions utilized in the
p
Henfield case. On the contrary the -court in "The Bello Oorrunes
commenting on the fact that the acceptor of a certain commission
to. cruise against Spain ought to be indictable as a pirate ac-
cording' to the treaty with that country
,
expressed the opinion
that under the "free institutions of this country" such action
would probably be impossible. The fact that this duty was un-
dertaken as a privilege accorded to the contracting party, in-
dicates that it was not regarded as a duty demanded by interna-
tional law. Privateering itse'lf is now prohibited by interna-
ticnal law and states are therefore under the general obligation
to prevent the acceptance of letters ^of marque by their subjects.
The matter is mentioned in few if . any particular treaties in
force, but is considered in general law making treaties and in
s*atut es •
Article 22 of the treaty with France of 1778 made it unlaw-
ful for foreign privateers other than those of Prance "to fit
their ships" in the ports of the United States, or to sell or
1.- Talbot vs. Jansen 3 Ball* 135; The Bello Co mines, 6 Wheat.
152 (1821)
2 - The Bello Gorrunes, 6 Wheat, 152, (1821)
3 - Treaty with Spain, 1795-1902, art. 14, Mallby, pl645.
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exohange prizes which they had captured or to purchase provisions
in excess of an amount necessary to supply them to the nearest
home port. Since an implied exception was made in the case of
France 1 it seems that the duties here mentioned were not at that
day conceived of as duties imposed by international law. Sim-
ilar provision, without the exception for the benefit of the con-
tracting parties, has been inserted in a number oi' other treaties^
The special privilege accorded to France in this respect was
the basis of much diplomatic difficulty in the early days of the
United States, and it was finally abrogated in 17982 by act of
congress. It is now clear that the duty to prevent the fitting
out of armed vessels is demanded by intemati nal law and no na-
tion can be accorded special privileges in this regard, compatibly
with the continued maintainance of neutrality. The United States
recognized this fact in the treaty of Washington, with Great
4Britain in 1871 • Article six of that treaty stated that a neu-
tral government is bound to exercise "due diligence" to prevent,
1 - Treaty with France, 1778-1798, art. 17, 18, Malloy, p475.
2 - The selling of prizes fitted out as privateers, and purchase
of victuals by warships except sufficient to reach the near-
est home port is prohibited to enemies of the contracting
party in the following treaties: France, 1778-1798, art.22,
Malloy, p475; 1800-1809, art. 25, po04; Dominican Republic,
1867-1898, art. 24, p411; Hayti, 1864-1905, art. 31, p929
;
Venzuela, 1860-1870, art. 24, pl853; Gre ^ Britain, 1794-1807,
art .24, p604.
3 - Act of July 7, 1798, 1 stat . 578.
4 - Treaty of Washington, with Gre .t Britain, 1871, Malloy, p703.
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(1) the fitting out within its jurisdiction of vessels intended
to oruise against foreign states and the i eparture of such ves-
sels, and (2) the use of its ports or waters as a "base of naval
operations" for the augmentation of military supplies or f or the
recruitment of men. Although this treaty was concluded with
the immediate purpose of furnishing a "basis for adjucating the
so called Alabama claims "both countries exoressly declared their
intention' to be bound for the future by these provisions. The
treaty is still in force and is law in the United States.
(2) The greater part of these duties formerly stipulated
for in treaties with single countries, have now been incorporated
in the Hague conventions and thus given more definite recognition
as principles of international law. Those dealing with neutral
duties, are however, by their terms, binding only when all of the
parties in the war are signatories^-. These conventions require
a neutral state to prevent by the use of force if necessary the
transportation of tropps across its territory, or the use of neu-
tral territory for erecting woreless stations or for recruiting
,
but it is stipulated that no obligation exists to prevent indi-
viduals crossing its frontiers for foreign service or the expor-
tation of arms by private persons • In reference to naval war,
the neutral must use the "means at its disposal" to prevent the
making of captures in territorial waters, the setting up of bel-
ligerent prize courts in its territory, or t e use of its ports
1. Hague Conventions, 1907, V, art .20; XIII, art. 28, Ma Hoy,
pp22 90, 2352.
£ - Ibid.,V, Arts. 2-5,10; XIII, art. 5.
3 - Ibid. ,7, arts. 6-S ; XIII, art. 7.
Tin.
Tooni
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as a "base of naval operations" 1
. The principle of the treaty
of Washington, requiring the neutral state to prevent the fitting
out or departure of armed vessels from its shores, is embodied
practically verbatim^. The neutral state is also required to
prevent belligerent war vessels and prizes, enjoying the right
"of asylum in its ports, from exceeding the privileges accorded
them by international law. Thus it must enforce the twenty
four hour stay and twenty-four hour interval rales and must pre-
vent the carrying out of repairs by war vessels other than those
"absolutely necessary to render them seaworthy", and the augmen-
tation of their fighting force or armament. Fue 1 may only he
given sufficient to re ch the nearest home port and only once in
three months in the same port to vessels of the same belligerent
power^5 . Failure to enforce these rules would constitute the
neutra
.
port a "base of naval operations".
As treaties are declared by the constitution to be part of
the law of the land, it would seem that executive officers and
courts are justified in assuming authority to carry out any of
these provisions, even in the absence of express statutory author-
4
ity. This view was upheld in the case of Ex parte Toscana .
This case does not relate to a duty of prevention but to the
1 - Hague Conventions, 1907, XIII, arts. 2,4,5,25,26.
2 - Ibid. , XI II, art. 8
3 - Ibid,, Xlllj arts. 13,14,16-21.
4 - Ex parte Toscana, 208 Fed.Rep. 938, (1913).
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the provision of the Hague convention of 1907 requiring a neutral
state to vindicate its sovereignty "by interning belligerent
troops crossing its frontier. It would seem that if executive
officers have power' to perform that duty udder authority of
the treaty alone, a similar exercise of authority in performing
duties of prevention would he upheld. Undoubtedly criminal
prosecutions could not he undertaken solely under authority of
the conventions but it is believed that this case is authority
for the view that executive action, temporarily restraining pro-
perty or persons, for the purpose of carrying out- any of the duties
of prevention required by treaty, would oe upheld as valid and
not in conflict with constitutional guarantees of "clue process
of law" etc.
R] ere are however , statutory means provided for the -no re
effective enforcement of most of the duties of prevention defined
in these treaties as well as those require-' by the general prin-
ciples f international law not specified in treaties or inter-
national agreements.
2. Statutory Provisions.
2
(1) In 1794 the first neutrality statute was enacted . It
1 - On lack of a common law criminal jurisdiction in federal
"
courts see U.S. vs. Torral, 2 Dall. 384, (1798) U.S. vs.
Hudson, 7 Granch 52, (1812). A federal criminal jurisdic-
tion based on treaties and international law was upnel a m
In re Henfield, F*<U Gas. 6360 (1793) and U.S. vs. :<avara,
2 Sail, 297, Fed. Gas. 16, 122, (1793).
2 - Act June 5, 1794, 1 stat . 581.
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defined certain actions on the part of citizens of the United
States in aid of one of the belligerents as subject to criminal
punishment, and gave administrative authority for the enforcement
of these provisions.
The enactment of this statute was the outgrowth of two
events, (1) the neutrality proclamation of the president and. (;.)
the unsuccessful attempt to obtain a criminal, conviction for a
breach of neutrality under treaties, these proclamations and the
common law. Washington's neutrality proclamation of April
22 1793'
L
| after reciting the state of war which existed and the
intention of the United States to remain neutral, said, "I have
given instructions to those officers to whom it belongs to cause
prosecution to be instituted against all persons who shall within
the cognizance of the courts of the United States, violate the
law of nations with respect to the powers at war or any of them."
This proclamation was followed by a more vigorous one of March
24, 1793
2
,
which s-oecified various offences against neutrality
1 - Proclamation, Apri* 22 , 1795, 11 stat. 753; Am. St. Pap. For
Bel. 1-140- Compilation of the Messages and Eapera of the
President's' 1789-1897, J.D.Richardson, ed., 10 vol. Wash-
ington, 1896-1899, 1:157. See also Rules adopted by the
cabinet as to the equipment of vessels in the ports f the
United States by belligerent powers, Aug. 3, 1793, Ricnardson |
Messages , 10:86.
2 - Proclamation, March 24, 1794, 11 stat. 753; Richardson's Mes-
"
sa^es 1-1--7. Neutrality proclamations of similar cnaracter
have been issued by the ^resident in succeeding wars in wmch
the United States has been neutral. Franco -Pruss laa war,
(Aug.22, Nov, 8, 1870, 16 stat. 1132; Richardson • * Messages,
issued calling attention to a state of insurrection
°r insur-
gency, when belligerency has not been recognized,
and to the
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which world be regarded as criminal and especially "required all
courts, magistrates and other officers * * to exert the power
in them severally vested to prevent and suppress such unlawful as-
semblages and proceedings and to "bring to condign punishment
those who may have been guilty thereof."
The contents of these proclamations indicates the belief that
breaches of neutrality by individuals could be punished without
specific statute and this view was upheld by the court in the
case of Gideon Henfiel^"1" • Henfield, who was accused of serving
on board a French vessel, was brought to trial in the summer of
1793 after Washington's first proclamation and before his second.
The United otates Circuit court of Pennsylvania comoosed of jus-
tices Wilson, Iredell, and Peters, cmrged the jury to find Hen-
field guilty of breaches of neutrality because he had violated
the law of nations which was part of the common law, because he
had violated certain treaties of peace and amity between the
United States and some of the belligerent powers, and because he
provisions of the neutrality laws applicable in such circum-
stances. Revolt of Spanish co lonies • fITov .27 ,1806 ; Sept.l,
1815, Richardson's Messages^ 1;404,561): Canadian Insurrection,
f Jan. 5;I'0v .21,1838; Sept .25 , 1841 , 11 stat. 784-786; Kicrard-
son's Messages, 3;481-482, 4;72): Cuban Pi libus ters , ( Aug .11
,
1849; April 25, 1851; May 31, 1855, 11 stat. 787; Richardson's
Messages, 5 ; 7 , 111 ,272 ) : Mexican Filibusters, (Oct. 22, 1851;
Jan. 18, 1854, rd chardson 1 s Messages, 5;112,271): Iiicaraguan
filibusters, (Dec. 8, 18 55; uct. 30, 1858, 11 stat. 7G9,798;
Kichardson's Messages, 5;388,496): i-enian Invasion of Canacla,
June 6, 1866; Mpy 24, 1870, 14 stat. 8.13; 16 stat. 1132; Rich-
ardson's Messages, 6; 433: 7; 85): Cuban nevo lution , (Oct. 12,
18 70; June 12, 1895; July 2 7, 1896, 16 stat. 1136; 29 stat.
870,881; Kichardson's .Messages, 7; 91, 9; 591, 694): Insur-
gency in Dominican Re-oublic , (Oct. 14,1905, 34 stat. 3183):
Mexican ^evolution, (Mch .. 2,12 ,1912 , 37 stat. 1732-1733).
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had endangered the safety and security of the United States.
In spite of this charge the jury refused to find Henfield guilty
largely on account of the popular republican sympathy for revo-
lutionary Prance.
In order to -orevent the recurrence of such an event the presi-
dent urged upon congress the passage of a neutrality act specify-
ing crimes against neutrality and fixing adequate penalties.
The result was the act of June 5, 1794
,
already mentioned. Since
that time neutrality acts of similar character have been constant-
p
ly in force in the United States .
For some time after the passage of this act there was doubt
whether such offenses were not indictable at common law, in the
federal courts, in the absence Df a specific act. It was only .
gradually that the doctrine that federal courts enjoy no common
law jurisdiction, developed. In the case of the United States
1 - Act June 5, 1794, 1 stat. 581.
2 - Ihe act of June 5, 1794,(1 stat. 381) was to last two years.
It was renewed I.Ich. 2, 1797 (1 stat. 497), amended, June 14,
179 7, (1 stat. 520) and made permanent April, 24, 1800. (2 stat
54). This was amended by the temporary act of Ilarch 3, 1817
(3. stat. 370) and the whole statute was revised in the per-
manent act of April 20, 1818,(3 stat. 447). A temporary
amendment was past I.Iarch 10, 1838, (5 stat. 212). The act of
1818 was repeated in the revised statutes of 1878 (sec. 5281-
5291) and with a few alterations in the penal Code of 1910,
35 stat. 1088, sec. 9-18, 303). Acts of April 22, 1898, (30
stat. 739), I.Iarch 14, 1912, (37 stat. 630) and March 4, 1915,
should be regarded as amendments to the neutrality statutes.
For excellent discussion of the neutrality laws, giving the
authoritative interpretation by the courts, see, O.G.Fenwick,
The Neutrality Laws of the United Stages, 'Yashington, 1913,
passim.
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vs. Ravara 1 which involved the sending of threatening letters to
a diplomatic minister, the United States Circuit court of Penn-
sylvania maintained its jurisdiction in a criminal case at com-
mon law. In the cases of the United States vs. Corral2 in
1798 and United States vs. Hudson3 in 1812, the latter in the
supreme court of the United States, the theory of a common law
jurisdiction in federal courts was denied and since then, this
view has in the main been adhered to. It thus appears that in
the present state of the law, in the absence of statute, offenses
against neutrality w uld not he criminally punishable,
(2) The crimes defined, by the neutrality statutes may be
roughly classified as (a) acce nting commissions, (b) enlisting
in the service of a belligerent, (c) setting on foot military
or. naval expeditions, and (d) using the territory of the United
States as a base of military or naval operations.
fa) "Accepting and exercising" commission within the United
States for service against a foreign state is a crime when per-
formed by United States citizens 4 . There has been on]., one pre
sedition under this orovision, that of Isaac Williams in 17975 .
1 - U.S. vs. Havarra, 2 Bail* 297, ed. Gas. 16, 122, (1793).
2 - U.S. vs. Worrall, 2 Dall, 584, (1798).
3 - U.S. vs. Hudson, 7 Granch 32, (1812).
4 - Rev. "tat. sec. 5281, penal Code of 1910, 35 stat . 1088, sec.
9
5 - U.S. vs. Isaac Williams, 2 Granch 82, note., Fed. Gas., 17,708,
(1797) See also Charge to Grand Jury, McLean, Fed. Gas.
18,265, (1838).
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(b) Enlisting in the service of a foreign state or political
body^ within the territory of the United States or "hiring or re-
taining" others to do such an act or to leave the country with
"intent" to do so is a crime for either citizens or aliens 1
,
but
it has been held that the section does not forbid leaving the
p
country with intent to enlist abroad, either individually or in
parti es^
•
(c) "Setting on Foot Ililitary expeditions "within the terri-
tory of the United States is made a crime 4 and has been held to
apply even though the expedition is directed against unrecognized
insurgents^. Ho tile "intent" must however, be proved * A
mere departure of bodies of men, even with arms may not consti-
tute a "military expedition" in the meaning of the statute 7 .
Several sections of the neutrality statutes were designed parti-
cularly to prevent the "fitting out and arming"8 and "augmenting
1 - Rev. Stat., sec. 5282, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 10.
2 - U.S. vs. Hertz, Fed. Cas. 15,357, (1855), U.S. vs. Kazinski,
Fed. Gas. 15,508, (1855).
3 - U.S. vs. ITunez, 82 Fed. Rep. 599; U.S. vs. O'Brien, 75 Fed.
Hep. 900. On this offense see also Lee, Att. Gen., 1 op. 63;
Gushing, Att. Gen., 7 op 377; In re Henfield, Fed. Gas.
6360, (1793).
4 - Rev. Stat,, sec. 5286, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 13.
5 - Wiborg vs. U.S., 163 U.S. 632; U.S. vs. 0' Sullivan, Fed. Gas.
15,974. Contrary 'i'he Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1. See also
letter of Secretary of State Bayard, July SI, 1855, For. Rel.,
1855, p776, and 11 op. 26 7.
6 - U.S. vs. 0' Sullivan, Fed. Gas. 15,975.
7 - U.S. vs. Hart, 74 Fed. Rep. 724. Other prosecutions under thi !
section see, U.S. vs. Hart, 78 Fed.Rep. 868; U.S. vs. Lumsden,
Fed. Gas. 15,641; U.S. vs. Murphy, 85 Fed.Rep. 609; U.S. vs.
Ybanez, 53 Fed. Rep. 536; U.S. vs. Hughes, 75 Fed. Rep. 267.
See also Charge to Grand Jury, McLean, Fed. Gas. 18,267, (1851
8 - Rev. Stat. sec. Lu,U«J>, Pui. i l Oud^^ 1010, nn n 11^0^ H
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the force" of privateers. These were important in the days of
the Napoleonic wars, and the Rev Its of the Spanish and Portuguese
oolonies in South America in the early nineteenth century, and
there were many prosecutions under them2 . With the revolution
in naval architecture which the use of steel has brought, and the
abolition of privateering in the Declaration of Paris of 1856,
privateering by individuals is no longer important, although there
were prosecutions under these provisions as late as 1891 f r
fitting out naval expeditions for use in Spanish American Bev©«
lutions . This same change, however, has made the construction
and sale of an armed vessel to a belligerent a violation of neu-
trality in itself 4 , There have been efforts to apply these pro-
visions to prevent the sale of armed vessels to belligerents*
the courts have, however, held that an •intent" to use the vessel
in hostilities must be shown, and "intent" implies more than a
1 - Rev. Stat. sec. 5285; Penal Code of 1910, sec. 12.
2 - Criminal Prosecutions, see, U.S. vs. Guinet , 2 Ball* 321,
(1795) Scott 695; U.S. vs. Smith, ?ed. Gas, 16,342a, (1806);
U.S. vs. Skinner, Pec. Gas. 16,309, (1818); U.S. vs. ~uincy,
6 Pet. 445, (1832), Scott 706; U.S. vs. .'rumbull, 48 Fed. Rep
99, (18912, Scott 731. See also Kelson, At.. Gen., 4 op. 356,
(1844). Forfeiture of vessels, see, Eetland vs. !Phe Gassius,
Fed. Gas. 7 743; Gelston vs. Hoyt , 5 Wheat. 246, (1818); The
Meteor, Fed. G as. 9498, (1866), reversed, Fed. Gas. 15,760,
Scott 711; The Mary IT. Hogan , 18 Fed. Rep. 529; U.S. vs. £14
Boxes of Arms, 20 Fed. Rep. 50; The City of Mexico, 28 Fed.
Rep. 148, (1886); The Garondolet, 37 Fed. Rep. 799, (1889);
The Gonserva, 38 Fed. Rep. 431; The Three Friends, 166 U.S.
I, (1897); She Itata, 56 Fed. Rep. 505; The Laurada, 85 Fed.
Rep. 760, (1896). Restoration of prizes captured by war ves-
sels, see infra p 161-162.
3 - U.S. vs. Trumbull, 48 Fed. Rep. 49, (1891), 3co4t 731.
4 - See Scott 720, note. A modern Steel warship constitutes a
"military expe ition" in itself and it cannot be treated as
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mere knowledge of the use to which it will "be put . There is no
provision making the bone fide sale of vessles to a belligerent
a cri e t although it was acts of this kind which the United
States complained of in the Alabama Claims controversy 2 .
other articles of contraband, the sale of which by private per-
sons is permissable. See Snow, cases, p 437-438; Editorial
Comment, J.B.Scott, Am. Jour. Int. Law., 9;177, Jan. 1915.
1 - The Meteor, Fed. Cas, 15760, reversing Fed. Cas. 9,498; The
Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat* 283; LaConception, 6 Wheat*
235; The Bello Corrunes , 6 Wheat* 152; U.S. vs. Cuincy, 6
Pet. 45; The Laurada , 98 ed. .iep. 983; Hoodie vs The Al-
fred, 5 Da 11. 307; 5 op. 92. The contrary view was offered
by Attorney General Legare, (3 op. 747) and by Justice Betts
,
in the Meteor, (Fed. Oas . 9,498) although his decision was
reversed on this point in the Circuit court, (Fed. Cas. 15,760)
The correctness of the interpretation which excludes the sale
of armed vessels from the prohibition of the section is in-
dicated by the fact that a bill to prevent the sale of armed
vessels to belligerents was presented in the House of Repre-
sentatives in 1817. It was lost in the Senate. (See Annals
of Congress, 14th Cong., 2nd sess . p 719). Also in 1866
when popular sympathy was aroused over the Fenian uprising
and it was felt that the neutrality laws were too strict a
bill was presented in the House to prevent the recurrence of
a decision similar to that of Justice Betts in the Meteor
which had recently been given. The bill consisted of a re-
vision o the neutrality acts ine luring the provision that
nothing be construed to prevent t e sale of armed vessels to
belligerents. This bill was also lest in the Senate. (See
Cong. Globe, 39th cong. 1st sess. p41 94-41 97, and House de-
port, No. 100, 39th cons;., 1st. sess.) On this general sub-
ject see Fenwick, op. cit. pp37, 48-49, 108-109.
£ - On the Alabama award see, Moore, Int. Arb., 1 ;495-682 ,4;4057-
4178; 5;4639-4685; Mo ore '3 Digest, 7; 1059-1076; Montague
Bernard, Historical account of the neutrality of G-re t Bri-
tain during the American Civil "Jar, Lond n, 1870. 'Jaleb
dishing, The Treaty of '.Vashingt on, I . .
,
1873; '3cott, 713-
72 <>.
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(d) Certain acts which would constitute the ports or ter
ritory of the United states a "base of naval or military
operations* have been rtEde criminal offenses. The Betting on
foot of military expeditions, the fitting out and arming of pri-
vateers or augmenting of their force have boen mentioned. A
joint resolu ion of April 22, 1898, 1 authorized the president to
prohibit the ex ortation of coal or military material. (Phis
was amended on ::arch 14, 1912 2 making such exportation a penal
Offense except under exemptions specified by the president. Thii
applies only after the president has made a proclamation that
"conditions of domestic violence"" exist in an "American Country"
and are being promoted by "munitions of war procured from the
United States." An act of March 4, 1915 authorized the presi-
dent to direct customs officers to detain vessels which are sus-
pected of carrying fuel, arms, men, or supplies, to foreign war-
ships hovering outside of the harbor and persons engaged in thus
1 - Act April 22, 1898, 30 stat. 739, This joint resolution was
a war measure, intended to conserve to the United States the
supplies of war material manufactured in the country anc" had
no connection with obligations of neutrality but it was used
as a basis for the neutrality proclamation of President
Roosevelt, on Oct. 14, 1905,(34 stat. 3183), forbidding the
exportation of arms to Dominican Republic where a revolution
was going on. See Fenwick, op. cit. p56.
2 - Aot. March 14, 1912, 37 stat. 630.
3 - Aot. March 4 , 1915
.
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using American territory as a base of naval operations are sub-
ject to criminal indictment. The provisions of this act were
suggested by a circular of the department of State of .September
19, 1914^, in which the detention of vessels engaged in such un-
neutral acts was authorized.
Fines ranging up to 310 ,000, imprisonment ranging up to ten
years, and forfeiture of unneut rally used vessels and other pro
-
gperty are provided for these various offenses •
(3) Besides the criminal provisions, statutes have pro-
vided other means for preventing infractions of neutrality.
District courts are given jurisdiction of vessels fitted out in
violation of neutral duties with authority to condemn them3 .
The president is authorized to employ the military and naval for-
ces of the country to enforce the provisions of the act after
ajudicial process shall have been ineffective and to require
1 - Circular of the Department of State, Sept. 19, 1914, Supp •
Am. Jour. Int. Law., 9; 122, Jan. 1915.
2 - Penalties, accepting foreign commission, fined not over
$2,000, imprisoned not over 3 years, (Penal Code of 1910, sec
9) ; Enlisting in foreign service, ol,000, 3 year.:, (P.C. sec
10) ; Setting on Foot Military expedition, $2,000, 3. yaars
,
(P.C. sec. 13); fitting out and arming vessel, .$10,000, 3
years or lo years if to cruise against United States citizens
and forfeiture of vessel, (P.C. sec. 11, 303); augmenting force
of vessel, §1,000, 1 year, (P.C. sec.12); Exportation of arms
to American country when orohibited by p roclamati on
, fl0 tG00
Z years, (Act.March 14, 1912, 37 stat. 630); Supplyirg. belli-
gerent vessels from United Statea. -x>rts t $10,000, 10 years,
(Act March 4, 1915) .
3 - Rev. Stat* sec. 5383, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 12.
4 - Rev. Stat. sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14. Only mil-
itary, not civil force may be used under this authority, see
Gelston vs. Eoyt, 3 Wheat* £46; Nelson, Att . Gen., 4 op. 336,
(1844). % is view somewhat modified, 21 op. 2 73.
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foreign vessels to depart, from the ports of the United States
when such stay would "be contrary to international law or treaty 1 .
United States ministers in countries where the United States main
tains consular courts, may issue writs to prevent American citi-
zens enlisting for service against any foreign country and are
authorized to use any military force of the United states avail-
able to carry this power into effect . Collectors of Customs
are required to detain vessels "manifestly built for military
purposes" leaving poarts of the United States when circumstances
render an unneutral use probable
,
or on order of the president
any vessel suspected of carrying arms or supplies to belligerent
war vessels hovering outside of the port •
1 - Rev. 3tat. sec. 5288, Penal Code of 1910, sec, 15. Fenwick
expresses the opinion that this section the same as the pre-
ceding, authorizes the president to act only when judicial
action;, is impossible, through lack of jurisdiction due to
the public character of the vessel or of sufficient evidence
to permit of successful prosecution. It seems however, as
though in terms the president is left discretion as to the
occasions upon which the authority may be properly exercised.
See Fenwick, op, cit, p95,
2 - Act June 1
,
1860, 12 s.at, 77, Rev. otat. 4090, Consular
courts are given jurisdiction over United States citizens
promoting "insurrection or rebellion against the government"
of the country where the court is located with power to de-
cree the death penalty provided the United States minister
approves. Rev. Stat* sec. 4102, supra p. 36,39,79.
3 - Rev. Stat. 5290, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 17. This -rovision
was suggested by Hamilton's "Instructions to the collectors
of Customs of the United States of Aug. 4, 1793. Am. St.
Papers For. Rel
, ,
1;40, The customs collector is liable for
detention of vessels without prooaole cause, see Hendricks
vs. Gonzalez, 6 7 Ted. Rep. 351.
4 - Act Harch 4, 1915.
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Armed vessels owned in whole or in part by citizens of the
United States, clearing out of ports of the United States may be
required to give bond that they will not be used by the owners
th emselves, to commit hostilities^". This provision was designed
to prevent the use of American owned privateers in war. There
would be no breach of the bond if vessels were sold to a belli-
gerent and used by him to commit hostilities.
Federal courts are given"authority to hold to security of the
peace and for good behavior in cases arising under the const itu-
rr
tion and laws of the United States This provision has been
utilized to aid in the enforcement of neutrality obligations of
prevention. In the case of United States vs. C,uitman^ f arising
in 1854, Quitman refused to answer certain questions of a Grand
Jury which was investigating alleged violations of neutrality in
connection with the Cuban revolution, i;1o r this refusal the court
held that under this statute bonds should be required of him to
observe t ::e neutrality laws.
3. Ex eoutive Action.
In addition to the authority given to administrative,
1 - Rev. 3tat. sec, 5289, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 16.
2 - Because of the modern practice of ccnvert ; ng merchantmen, al-
though privateering is technically abolished, the provision
is not obsolete. It seems probable however, that it would *>e
wise to extend its provisions to require bonding of vessels
againrt sale to a belligerent, as this is now prohibited by
international la".'. See .-'enwick, op. cit. pp 96,' 154.
3 - Rev. Stat. sec. 727 ^ Judicial Code, 1911, 36 s tit. 1087, sec. 27).
4 - U.S. vs. Quitman, Fed. Gas. 16,111, (1854).
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judicial and executive officers by statute, much authority ex-
ists inheritently in such officers to enforce neutrality obli-
gations. The opinion as been expressed that the president as
jhief executive may perform acts necessary to enforce tre ties
Ln the absence of statutory authority 1 . Such matters as pre-
venting abuse of the privilege of asylum by belligerent warships,
the passage of troops on neutral territory, and the unneutral
use of radio telegraph stations are prohibited ,b„ the Hague con-
ventions as well as general international lav; and may he enforce
by executive action. Executive orders have provided for the super
vision and censorship of radio-telegraph stations and the de-
tention of vessels suspected of carrying supplies to belligerent
war ships
,
on this basis. The shipping of submarines for sale
to a belligerent power has also been prevented by executive ac-
tion • The executive disapproval of loans to belligerents,
1 - Ex Parte ?oscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938,(1915); See also In re
Debs, i58 U.S. 564,(1895), on inherent power .of executive
and judicial officers to carry out the obligations and func-
tions of government.
2 - Executive Order, Aug. 5, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour. Int. Law, 9; 115,
Jan. 1915.
3 - Circular of Dept. of Stat., Sept. 19, 1914, Supp. Am. Jour.
• In t. Law., 9; 122, Jan. 1915.
4 - Letter by Secretary of State Bryan, Dec. 7, 1914, jgm. Jour.
Int. Law, 9; 177, (Jan. 1915). Also Editorial Comment, J.B.
Scott, Ibid, 9;177. See also circular of Dept of State with
reference to the status of armed merchant vessels, 1914,
permitting detention of suspected -:esse.ls; by port authorities.
Sup;o. Am • Jour. Int. Law. 9; 121, (Jan. 1915).
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al though not required by international law is another illustra-
tion of inherent executive authority in these matters 1
.
Courts have held that jurisdiction of vessels fitted out
in violation of neutrality, or prizes taken by them, is inherent
in the admiralty and prize jurisdiction, and may be exercised
in the absence of statute". A large range of discretionary
power to prevent unneutral use of territory or unneutral acts by
American citizens undoubtedly exists in revenue officers, mar-
shalls and other civil officers of the United states.
4. Commercial Embargoes.
Another class of acts v;hich relate somewhat to the enforce-
ment of duties of prevention are the embargo acts passed at dif-
ferent times, _'he acts of 1898 and 1914 requiring an embarge on
arms under certain conditions have t lready been mentioned. Of
somewhat different character are commercial embargoes
,
the most
important of which were those passed during Jefferson's administra
tion, while the United states was a neutral during the Napoleonic
wars, in Europe.
1 - See Editorial Comment, Am. Jour. Int. Law., 8;856 (1914)
2 - Glass vs. $he Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall . 6, (1794); Talbot vs.
Jansen, 3 Dall. 153,(1796); Jhe Estrella, 11 Wheat ,298, ( 1819 )
.
3 - Embargo acts, Llch. 26, 1794, 1 stat. 400; Apr. 2, 1794, 1 stat.
401; Apr. 18, 1794, 1 stat. 401; May 22, 1794, 1 stat. 396;
June 4, 1794, 1 stat. 372; Dec. 22, 1807, 2 stat. 451; Jan. 9,
1808, 2 stat. 453; Men . 12,1808, 2 stat. 473; Apr. 25, 1808,
2 stat. 499; Jan 9, 1809, 2 stat. 506, act of Dec. 22, 1807
repealed Llch . 1, 1809 and non-intercourse act, in reference
to France and England substituted. See i..oore Digest, 7;142-
144.
tI r
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Th e re is not and never Wafl a rule of international law which
requires a neutral state to prevent shipments of merchandise or of
arms to a belligerent or to any one else. This is specifically
stated in the Hague Conventions of 1907 • The self made "inter-
national law" in the extraordinary Berlin and Milan decrees of Na-
gpoleon and the British order in council" forbade neutral commerce
with practically all of Iforope and it might be inferred that the
American Embarge of 1807 to 1809 was in aid of these decrees*
It must be understood however, that these decrees and orders did no
assert that neutral states were under obligations to prevent their
subjects engaging in such commerce. They simply asserted that
the ordinary rule of self help, by w icn belligerents can seize
neutral vessels as prize, would be applicable to a much wider
range of circumstances than permitted by the ordinary rules of
blockade, contraband and unneutral service.
Mhe embargo and non intercourse acts are therefore to be re-
garded as rules of domestic policy, dictated by reasons en-
turely unrelated to international law. It was not to aid in
the enforcement of its duties as a neutral either under interna-
tional law or under the law asserted by Ha;ooleon's decrees or
the British orders in Council that they were enasted. Their
purpose was rather one of retaliation against these extensions of
1 - Hague conventions, 1 (. ; 07, v,art.7, I.Ialloy p2298; xiii, art. 7,
MaHoy p2359.
2 - For text of British Orders in Council and Napoleon' s decrees,
see Am. 3t . Pap., for, Rel . , 3;262;286; British and Foreign
State ^'a^ers, 8;401-513; De Martens, ilouveau Recueil, 1;
433-549.
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intematioral lav;. It is noteworthy that the enactment of the
embargo by the United States permitted I.apoleon to extend his
view of international law even further by his Bayonne decree 1
ordering t-he seizure of all United otates vessels at sea on the
ground that he was simply helping the United States enforce its
own law. This view was of course unwarranted. Ho domestic
law of the United States could add to the belligerent rights of
either party to the war.
5, Interoceanic Ganal .
The United -Hates has recognized special obligations of pre
vention as encumbent upon it in relation to the Panama^anal,
by treaty and has provided for their enforcement by executive
orders. in its treaties with New Granada, (now Columbia) of
1846
,
and with Nicaragua of 1867° the United States guaranteed
the neutrality of any canal that might be constructed in either
of these countries. m the lay ton-Bulwer treaty with Great
Britain of 18504 the two countries agreed to jointly guarantee
the neutrality of any interoceanic canal 'in the central American
region but it was provided that neith r she Id exercise exclusive
p.
control of such a canal. 'ihe ^ay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901^
1 - Bayonne Decree, Am. State Pap., Jor.Rel., 3;291.
2 - Treaty with Columbia, 1846, art. 35, Malloy, p312.
3 - Treaty with Nicaragua,, 1867, art. 15, Malloy, po285.
4 - Treaty with Great Britain, 1850, Malloy, p660.
5 - Treaty with Great Britain, 1901, Malloy, p782.
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superseded this treaty. Great -°ritai accorded the United States
the right to construct and maintain a canal and to orovide regu-
lations for managing it. The United States agreed to adopt sub-
stantially the rules of the Suez Canal convention to ensure its
neutralization. Specific regulations require the United otates
to prevent, in the canal or adjacent waters to a three mile limit,
""belligerent rights, hostile acts, the revictualing of
blokades, the exercise of/belligerent vessels, the embarkation
or disembrakat ion of troops or munitions of war except in case of
accidental hindrance of transit. It must compel vessels to com-
plete transit with the least possible delay and must enforce the
twenty four stay and twenty four hour interval rules. to per-
form these duties the United otates is authorized to use neces-
sary military force.
In its treaty of 1903 with the Republic of Panama the
united States guaranteed that country's independence and was
granted complete sovereign rights in perpetuity over a strip of
territory known as the Canal Zone, extending five miles either
side of the canal route exclusive of the cities of Panana and
Col-
on. *he United States guaranteed the perpetual neutrality of
the canal and agreed to use armed force and if necessary
erect
fortifications in the canal zone for that purpose.
The canal Has completed in 1914 and regulat ions for its
o peration and navigation were xomul-ated by
executive rder
•>uly 9, 1914
£
. Foil wing the outbreak of Euro e an war in
August 1914, the president promulgated supplementary
rales under
1 - Treaty with Panama, 1903, art. 1,18,23, llalloy, p!349.
2 - Rules and Regulations for the operation and navigation of the
Panama Canal, July 9, 1914.
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date of Nov. 13, 1914 1 designed to carry out treaty teq.ii ir ernent
3
for preventing unneutral acts in the canal • The regulations were
based dm the Hay Paunoefote and Panama treaties, the Sues canal
convention of Oct. 29, 1888^, the rule issued thereunder on Peb.
10, 1904^ following the outbreak of the tfusso-Japanese war, and
the general requirements of neutral as defined in the Hague con-
ventions.- These rules defined public armed vessels and auxil-
liary belligerent vessels, for both of whiolt classes it prescrib-
ed the rules required by the treaties mentioned* '-^ e enforcement
of these regulations were ensured by requiring vessels to give
written assurances to obey them before entering the oanai* In
addition to the treaty requirements the regulations forbade the
presence of more than six war vessels of onebelligerent or its
allies in the canal or adjacent waters at a time and the .passage
of air craft over the Ga&al Zone. A protocol was concluded with
the Kepublie of Panama in October 1914 , to ensure the cooperation
1 - Proclamation prescribing rules and regulations for use of the
Panama Canal by Belligerent vessels, 1
,
v
.
IS, 1914. Tot
text see Supp. Am, Jour, Int. Law., 9;1£6, Jan. 191b. See
also editorial comment in Am. Jo-r. Inti Law., 9; 167, Jan. 19U
£ - Convention of Constantinople, Oct. £8, 1888, Martens, Kouveau
' Reoueil, ser. H; 15,557; British and Foreign State. Papers
78; 18.
3 - Rules for the use of the Suez Canal by belligerent vessels,
Feb. 10, 1904, British and Foreign State Papers, 102;591.
4 - Hague conventions, 1907, xiii, llalloy, p£55£.
5 - Protocol with Panama, 1914, Supp . Am. Jour. Int. Law., 9;1£8,
Jan. 1915.
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of that republic in carrying out the neutrality requirements that
a war vessel be prevented recoaling in the same country within
a period of three months, or t. e purposes of this requirement,
the Republic of Panama and the Canal Zone were thus considered
the same country.
It will be seen that the duties of prevention undertaken in
these regulations are largely the same as those required of all
neutral territor. , The requirements are however, stricter in
some cases, as the rights of fueling, repairing, and replenish-
ing stores are more li ited, The regulation interprets the
twenty four hour stay rule as permitting a twenty four hour stay
in addition to the time occupied in transit of the canal.
The regulations seem to have adequately covered the duties
specifically undertaken by the United otates in reference to the
^anal.as well as the duties encumbent updm it for preserving the
neutrality of all its territory.
6» Acts by agencies of government.
Aside from the duties of prevention encumbent upon the
United States in reference to its civil population, international
law and treaty require it to prevent unneutral acts by public
Officers. On the outbreak of wars, special instructions have
been generally sent to di lomatic officers, often relating es-
pecially to duties Imposed upon such officers in belligerent
countries in case affairs of the other belligerent are entrusted
to them. On the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 an
executive order directed "all officials of the government, tfivil,
military and naval - - not only to observe the President's pro-
clamation of neutrality but also to abstain from either action
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or speech which can legitimately cause irritation to either of
the combattants 1 ."
The Navy regulations enjoin naval officers to observe strict
neutrality on all occasions 2 . These regulations can be enforced
by court martial, a procedure resorted to in the case of an un-
neutral act by a naval commander in 1844 during the war between
Montevideo and Buenos \yres .
The obligations of prevention, incumbent upon neutral
states have been recognized by the United States in treaties and
statutes, and the duties thus recognized seem to be in accord
with international law. The failure of statutes to recognize
the duty to prevent salesaf armed vessels to belligerents is
only an apparent exception as the United States has acceded to
this .principle in the Treaty of Washington and the Hague conven-
tions of 1907, which are according to the constitution part of
the law }f the land.
The means relied on for enforcing these duties are (1) the
deterrent effect of criminal punishment by fines and imprisonment,
(2) the forfeiture of property involved in violations of neu-
trality, (3) the requirement of bonds of good behavior in suspi-
cious cases, (4) the grant of jurisdiction to courts over cases
involving breaches of neutrality with implied power to enforce
1 - Executive Order, March 10, 1904, Por.Rel., 1904, pl85 , Moore's
Digest, 7;868. See also instructions to Diplomatic and con-
sular officers, Aug. 17, 1914, Supp .Am. Jour .Int .Law , 9; 118,
( Jan. 1915)
2 - Navy Regulations, 1915, sec. 1502, 1653-16.4, 1645, 1647.
3 - Moore's Digest, 1;178.
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their judgments, (5) direct executive action to enforce criminal
provisions, expel or detain foreign vessels, and otherwise pre-
vent illegal acts, with a resort to the army, navy, and militia
Of the United states if necessary, (6) control of public officer
and by
by executive act ion/ courts martial.
Wtiile specific provision is made by statute for the use of
these means in many cases, it seems probable that whs re such au-
thority is not given by statute, executive and judicial officers
can apply appropriate means, for enforcing the duties specified
by treaty or the Hague conventions. Treaties are part of the
lav; of the land and the executive and judiciary, be in;? under oath
to enforce the laws can, it would seem, use all available means
to enforce them.
In the field of international law defining neutral duties
the United states holds an honored position. Its early neu-
trality statutes enforcing obligations in this field laid down
a standard of conduct which was not required by international
law at that time but has since become recognize' as obligatory.
The neutrality act of 1794 was influential in creating new in-
ternational law. Canning said of American practice in this re-
spect, "If I wished for a guide in the system of neutrality, I
Should take that laid down by America in the days of the presi-
dency of Washington and the Secretaryship of Jefferson1 ." This
"
1 - Cited, Synfman Rhee , Neutrality as influenced by the United
States, Princeton, 1912, pl06. See also Cpini n of J. '".Pos-
ter, and. of Rhee, Ibid., ppl04-,Ul. IT.E.Hali, not inclined
to flatter the United. States, says of its practice in refer-
ence to neutrality obligations, "The policy of the United
States in 1795, constituted an epoch in the development of
the usages of neutrality, fhere c n be no doubt that it was ;
intended and believed to give e "feet to the obligations then
incumbent upon neutrals. But it represented b, far the most
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unique position is undoubtedly due in large measure to the situa-
tion of the United 3tates as the most important power of European
civilization remaining neutral in various European wars. It
indicates however, the effect which municipal lav; may have in
creating new international lav;.
advanced existing opinion as to what these obligations were,
and in some points it even went farther than authoritative
international custom has up to the p resent time advanced.
In the main however, it is identical with the standard of con
duct which is now admitted by the eoramftnity of nations."
Hall, A Treatise on international Law, 4th ed., London, 1895,
p616.
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Chapter II. Obligations of Vindication *
Introductory.
Duties of vindication are necessitated by the failure of bellig-
erent troops, warships or prize crews to observe their obligations
as belligerents toward neutrals, and some of them also imply a fail-
ure on the part of the neutral state to perform its duties of pre-
vention. Thus a neutral state is bound to prevent hostilities in its
land or water territory but if it fails in this, it must perform its
duty of vindication by interning troops, or restoring prizes captured
in the course of such hostilities.
Most of the obligations of this kind are specified in the Hague
conventions and consist of measures to be taken by the neutral state
in case of violations of its territory by land forces, hostilities
on its territorial waters by naval forces or violations of the right
of asylum by belligerent warships or their prizes.
There are a number of general requirements laid down for bellig-
erent warships which a neutral is at liberty to modify by law. Thus
a neutral state is permitted to vary the general rule demanding that
all belligerent vessels be equally permitted to enter its ports by
forbidding such entrance to vessels which have violated its neutral
-
1 .
ity. It may also vary the twenty four hour stay rule by municipal
2
regulations, and the general rule permitting no more than three bel-
3
ligerent warships in a port at one time. The conventions also give
a neutral power the right to give asylum to belligerent prizes on
condition that it sequestrate them, pending adjudication, but this
4
provision was not ratified by the United States.
?-~l5f?' XW + ar^£ •1%~HA$' 3, -Ibid, ,2lII art. 15.4.
-Ibid. , XIII , art .25. This permission was: variation from the general

-155-
International law in these cases imposes a belligerent duty but
no corresponding neutral duty of vindication. The belligerent duty
is for the benefit of the neutral and if the neutral indicates by
local law that it does not care to avail itself of this benefit inter-
national law is unconcerned. These subjects therefore do not form
obligations of vindication, they are rather exceptions to those
obligations
.
Eliminating these exceptions the duties of vindication recog-
nized by the united States by treaty, may be classified as (1) the
1
internment of belligerent troops violating neutral territory, (2)
2
the internment of belligerent warships violating the law of asylum,
(3) the expulsion of belligerent warships after a twenty-four hour
3
stay, subject to exceptions, (4) the detention of belligerent warships
4
in accordance with the twenty-four hour interval rule, (5) the re-
rule laid down in articles 21 and 22 which forbade the giving of
asylum to prizes except in cases of "unseaworthiness , stress of w Bath-
er, or want of fuel or provisions" and even then only temporarily.
The United States ratified the convention with a proviso, excluding
articles 23, thereby, recognizing it as a neutral duty to refuse to
permit prizes to be sequestrated in her ports. See Naval tfar College,
International Law Situations, 1908, p76. It is interesting to note
that the United States had specifically permitted the sequestration
of prizes in a number of its early treaties. See treaties with France,
1778-1789, art .17, p. 474; 1800-1809, art. 24, p. 504; Netherlands, 1782-
1795, art. 5, p. 1245; Sweden, 1783-1799 , Revived 1816, 1827, art .19,
p. 1732; Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 19, 21, p. 1493; Great Britain ,1794-1807
,
art .25, t>. 604. Treaties with Tripoli ,1805 , art .17 ,p .1792 snd with Al-
giers ,1795-1815 , art .10 p. 3; 1815-1830 , art .18 ,p .10, permitted United
States vessels to asylum and sell prizes in their ports and forbade
the sale of prizes taken by any of the Barbary states from the United
States in a similar manner. Asylum to merchant vessels and in most
cases warships and privateers also when necessitated through "str§33
of weather or pursuit of _pirrates or enemies" is provided for in
treaties with twenty-five countries, a few of which are still in force,
1-Hague Conv ent ions, 1907 , V. arts. 11,12, Malloy, p. 2300.
2-Ibid. XIII, arts. 21,24.
3- Ibid. XIII, arts. 12, 13.
4-Ibid. XIII, art. 8.

-156-
storation of prizes captured in neutral waters or brought into neu-
tral ports in violation of the law of asylum, and the interment of
1
the prize crew, These are positive duties imposed upon the neutral
state and failure to perform them will furnish grounds for diplo-
matic complaint and demand for reparation "by the injured belligerent.
The performance of these duties involve an assertion of juris-
diction over foreign prizes, warships or armed forces, agencies which
under ordinary circumstances are exempt from the jurisdiction of any
sovereign but their own. It is therefore of importance to investi-
gate the measures which the United States has taken for performing
its duties of vindication by the exercise of this extraordinary jur-
isdiction. The subject may be conveniently divided into the three
heads, (1) illegal prize, (2) illegal acts of belligerent warships,
(3) violations of land territory. The mere fact that these duties
are contained in the Hague conventions which are treaties and "the
law of the land" would furnish ground for the assertion of juris-
diction by judicial and executive officers, but in some cases juris-
diction has been specifically conferred by statute, and in others
it is necessary to consider the view which the courts and executive
authorities, have taken as cases have arisen. We will therefore con-
sider the supplementary laws enacted for carrying out these obliga-
tions, and the rules laid down by the executive and judicial officers
themselves in carrying them out.
1. Illegal Prizes.
The neutrality laws give United States district court a juris-
2diction over captures made in the territorial waters of the Country
1. -IbidTXIII, arts. 3, 21, 24.
2. -Hev. Stat. Sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14.

-157-
and infer that a jurisdiction exists over prizes taken by priva-
1
teers outfitted in the United States. This provision contained in
2
the original neutrality act of 1794 was enacted as a result of ./ash^
3
ington's address to congress of Dec. 31, 1793, in which he urged
upon congress the enactment of neutrality acts, and also provisions
ensuring a sufficient jurisdiction in the courts to carry out the
duties of restoring illegal prizes. It seems probable that United
States courts can assume jurisdiction over illegal prizes under theii
general admiralty and prize jurisdiction even in the absence of
4
statute, as was in fact done in the cases of Glass vs. The Betsey
5
and Talbot vs. Hansen, both of which came before the court before the
passage of the first neutrality act. The view wa3 emphatically stat-
6
ed in the case of the Ustrella, that the jurisdiction existed in-
dependently of statute. Furthermore so far as the writer has been
able to discover, there has never been a case before the court in
which the capture was made in the territorial waters of the United
States, and in which therefore the jurisdiction explicitly conferred
by statute would strictly apply. The cases have all been ones in
which the illegality of the prize was based on an outfitting of the
privateer, or augmenting of its forces in the United States, prior
to the capture. .Ye may therefore safely assert that the jurisdictior
1. -Eev. Stat, Sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14 gives the Pres-
ident power to utilize the military forces of the country to "detain
such .ship or vessel (violating the neutrality of the United States)
with her prize or prizes - - in order to restore the prize or prizes
in the cases in which restoration shall have been adjudged."
2. -Act. June 5, 1794, 1 stat . 381.
3. -See Am. St. Pap.
,
For. Rel., 1;21.
4. -Glass vs. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dall. 6, (1794).
5. -Talbot vs. Jansen, 3 Dall. 133, (1796).
6. -The ^strella, 4 Wheat. 298, (1819).
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exercised by United States courts while the country is neutral, over
belligerent prizes is not dependent on statute.
The nature of the prize jurisdiction, while the country is neu-
tral, has been discussed at length in a number of cases and with a
remarkable concurrence of opinion. The court has always insisted
that its jurisdiction does not extend over the question of prize or
1
not prize. That is a matter solely within the authority of the
prize courts of the belligerent country and their determination is
conclusive. The neutrals jurisdiction over prize of war can only
arise where (1) its own duty of vindicating its neutrality is invol-
ved, (2) where the capture was entirely without evidence of belliger-
ent authorization or for other reason was not within the belligerents
2
prize jurisdiction, or (3) where salvage or other maritime claims
1. -L' Invincible, 1 7/heat .238 ,261; LIcDonough vs. Dannery and the
Ship Mary Ford, 3 Dall.188; The Alerta, 9 C ranch, 359, (1815); The
Estrella, 4 //heat . 298.
2. -This situation occurs where the capture was so clearly unwar-
ranted that the belligerent prize court can not legitimately assert
a jurisdiction. There is of course room for difference of opinion
in any case, as to whether it could or could not, and the question
virtually resolves itself into this, Is the belligerent prize court's
assertion of its own jurisdiction to be considered conclusive. In
Glass vs. The Sloop 3etsey, (3 Dall.6, 1794) the supreme court up-
held, jurisdiction over a capture by a French privateer, apparently
on the sole ground that being neutrally owned the vessel was not
liable to condemnation in a French Prize court. It is doubtful
whether such a jurisdiction would now be maintained. In Rose vs.
Himely, {4 Cranch 241, 1808) the prize, owned by an American Hose, wd|3
seized on the high seas near Cuba for breach of municipal regulations
and after sale to Himely brought to Charleston. Here it was libeled
by the original owner, Hose, and while in the custody of the United
States District court, a French Prize court in Santa Domingo issued
a decree of condemnation, upon which Himely based his title. The
majority of the court though disagreeing in reasons agreed that the
SanCa Domingo court lacked jurisdiction and consequently Himely had
no title. Three justices denied its jurisdiction on the ground that
actual custody of the prize was necessary. Two justices, including
chief justice Llarshall, held that captures on the high seas for
breach of municipal regulations were contrary to international law
and so conferred no jurisdiction upon the prize court of the captur-
ing country. Justice Johnson dissented from the decision, holding
that the prize court's jurisdiction depended upon municipal and not
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1
of neutral subjects are involved. In all of these cases the prize
must have "been brought within the neutrals jurisdiction voluntarily.
A neutral state has no right to make seizures outside of its own
2
territory or to assume jurisdiction over vessels which are not with-
3
in the actual custody of its court.
international law and that its own assertion of jurisdiction must "be
regarded as conclusive by foreign courts, hence the Santa Domingo
court had jurisdiction and Himely' s title was good. The case does
not refer to prize jurisdiction in pursuance of belligerent rights,
but the principle that there are limits, beyond which a foreign prize
court's assertion of its own jurisdiction will not be regarded as
conclusive, although denied by justice Johnson, seems to have been
settled. Consequently there are cases in which the courts of a neu-
tral st8te may exercise jurisdiction over a prize which the belliger-
ent claims the right to adjudicate, and thereby itself determine upon
the belligerent's rights.
1. -This situation occurs when the determination of belligerent
prize rights arises incidentally to some ordinary maritime claim of
a neutral subject. In McDonough vs. Dannery and the Ship Mary Ford,
(3 Dall. 188, 1795 ) a French Squadron had captured the Mary Ford, a
British vessel and after attempting to sink her, left her derelict.
She was rescued by a United States vessel which brought her to Boston
and libeled her for salvage. Both French and British claimants put
in an appearance, the French claiming the balance after deduction of
salvage, as legal prize of war, and the British claiming this balance
as original owners of the vessel. The supreme court decreed one-
third salvage to the United States rescuers, and the balance to the
French captors, holding that title to an enemy vessel, changed hands
immediately on capture. Here the court really decided a question of
prize as between the two belligerents, but it was only done inciden-
tally to the adjudication of the neutral parties claim to salvage,
and could be regarded, as was said in discussing the case by Justice
Johnson in L' Invincible
, (1 Wheat .238 , 261 ) to have been a recognition
of the title of the last possessor rather than a determination of bel
ligerent rights. In the Invincible, the court again assumed juris-
diction, where neutral salvage rights were involved, and in DelCol
vs. Arnold, (3 Dall. 333), jurisdiction over a prize sequestrated in
Charleston was based on a maritime tort committed against a neutral
owned vessel by the belligerent claimant of this prize. The case was
questioned in L' Invincible , but justified on the ground that consent
had been given by the belligerent claimant to submit the proceeds of
his prize to the neutral jurisdiction.
2. -This statement was denied by Chief Justice Liarshall in Church
vs. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, (1804), Scott, 343; He upheld a seizure
by Brazil outside of territorial waters in pursuance of a local law.
The view stated was however maintained by Marshall in Hose vs. Himely
4 Cranch 281(1808); See also Hudson vs. Guestier, 6 Cranch 281,(1810)
The Appollon, 9 V/heat.362. In the case of the Itata submitted to ar-
bitration, the United States was held liable in damages for the seiz-
ure of a vessel in Chilean territorial waters. See Moore, Digest of
International Arbitrations, 3;3067-3071.
3. -Rose vs. Himely, 4 Cranch 241,(1808).
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The first situation mentioned is the one of immediate impor-
1
tance to the present subject. In the case of the Brig Alerta,
Justice Washington clearly defined the nature of this jurisdiction.
"The general rule is undeniable that the trial of captures made on
the high seas, jure belli, by a duly commissioned vessel of war,
whether from an enemy or a neutral belongs exclusively to the courts
of that nation to which the captor belongs. To this rule there are
exceptions which are as firmly established as the rule itself. If
the capture be made within the territorial limits of a neutral
country into which the prize is brought or by a privateer which had
been illegally equipped in such country the prize courts of such
neutral country not only possess the power, but it is their duty to
restore the property so illegally captured to the owner. This is
necessary to the vindication of their own neutrality."
The two cases are distinguished by Justice Washington, (1) where
the capture is made in the territorial waters of the United States,
and (2) where the capture is made by a vessel which was armed or had
its forces augmented in the United States in violation of neutrality.
(1) In the first case jurisdiction is specifically granted by
2 3
statute but has never been exercised. In the case of the Grange
Attorney General Randolph gave an official opinion that a vessel cap-
tured in Deleware bay which he regarded as territorial water, by a
belligerent should be restored to the United States, but as the ves-
sel was no longer infra praesidia no question of a federal courts
prize jurisdiction arose. In several ca:es where the United States
1. -The Alerta, 9 Cranch 359,364,(1815).
2. -Revised Statutes, Sec. 5287. Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14.
3. -The Grange, 1 op. 33, (1793) On request this vessel was returned
by the capturing belligerent power. Moore's Digest, 7; 1086.
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has been belligerent the neutral states right to prizes captured in
1
its territorial waters has been upheld but apparently the courts have
never had a direct opportunity to assert jurisdiction over such a
prize while the country was neutral.
(2) In the case of prizes captured by vessels which previously
had violated the United States neutrality laws, the exercise of jur-
2
isdiction by courts is implied in the neutrality statutes and has
been frequently exercised. During the wars immediately following
the French revolution American adventurers, moved by republican sym-
pathy for revolutionary France and possibly full as much by hopes of
gain, frequently fitted out privateers in American ports, obtained
French Letters of Marque and forthwith cruised against England with
whom France was at war. It often happened that prizes made by these
vessels would be brought into American ports in accordance with the
3
right claimed by France under the treaty of 1778; in which case a
representative of the original neutral or English owner, generally
the English counsel would file a libel for restitution. The court
4
from the first assumed prize jurisdiction in such cases and in sev-
1. -The Anne, 3 Wheat .435 , (1818 ) ; The Florida, 101 U .3 .37 , ( 1879 j
;
The Sir Wm.Peel,5 ?/all.517; The Adela, 6 M.1.266. In Stewart vs.
United States, 1 Ct. 01.113,(1864), the court asserted the United
States had a just claim against Portugal for permitting a prize to
be recaptured by Great Britain in her territorial waters during the
war of 1812, and that Portugal had a just claim against Great Britair
for performing this act. Indemnity had been obtained from Portugal
for some of these seizures by the treaty of 1851, See Malloy treaties
p. 1458, and also General Armstrong Arbitration, Moore, Int. Arb.,2;
1071. Commodore Stewart's claim having been ignored in this settle-
ment, it was held he had no claim against the United States. Supra.pl
2. -Hevised Statutes, sec. 5287, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14. Supra.
P« 157, note 1,
3. -Treaty with France ,1778-1798 , art .17 , 22 ,Malloy treaties ,p .474.
4. -Talbot vs. Jansen,3 Dall ,133, ( 1796 ) ; Moodie vs. The Alfred,
3
Dall. 307, (1796) ; Moodie vs. The Phoebe Ann 3 Dall .319 ,( 1796 ) ; Geyer
vs. Llichel and the Ship Den 0nzekeron,3 Dall. 285; Moodie vs. The
Betty Cartheart, Fed. Cas. 9, 742,3 Dall .288 , note ; Wilkinson vs. The
Betsey, Fed. Cas. 17,750,(1799); Moodie vs. The Brothers, Fed. Cas.
9,743,(1799); British Consul vs. The Ilancy, Fed. Cas. 1898, (1799 )
;
Moodie vs. The Amity, Fed. Cas. 9741.
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1
eral cases restored the vessel. A similar situation arose during
the revolutionary struggles of the South American republics against
Spain and Portugal. Again thoughts of pecuniary gain and republican
sympathy combined to lure American privateers into the fray, and fre-
quent cases appear in the reports with the Spanish or Portuguese
consul as libe lant. Again the United States courts asserted their
jurisdiction and as before they generally decreed restitution to the
2
original owner. The effrontery with which these privateers some
times put forth their claim is remarkable. On several occasions the
expeditions appear to have been nothing short of piracy, as captures
were made before any commission was obtained from the South American
Insurgents. Under such circumstances the owner of the privateer
3
would put forth a claim of expatriation or of a sale to the privateer
4
to a fictitious South American party, claims which were for the most
5
part ignored by the court.
1. -Restoration was decreed to a neutral Butch claimant in Talbot
vs. Jansen, 3 Dall .133 ,( 1796 ) , and to an English Claimant in Moodie
vs. The Betty Carthcart , Fed .Cas .9 , 742 ,3 Dall .288 , note , and British
Consul vs. The ITancy ,Fed .Cas .1898 J 1799 ) .
2 . -Restitution was denied in La Amistad de Rues, 15 Wheat ,385 ,( 1820 ) ;
the case was remanded for further evidence in The Divina Pastora, 4
Wheat .52 , (1814) and in the following cases restitution was decreed;
The Brig Alert a vs. Mbran, 9 C ranch, 359 , (1815 ) The Est rel la, 4 Wheat.
298,(1819); LaConcept ion , 6 7/heat 235,(1821) The Bello Corrunes, 6
Wheat 152,(1821); The Santissima Trinidad , 7 Wheat .285 ,( 1827 ) ; The
G-ran Para, 7 Wheat 471,(1822); The Arrogante Barcelona, 7 Wheat. 296,
(1822); The Santa Maria, 7 Wheat. 490; The Monte Allegre 7 Wheat.
520,(1822); The Kereyda, 8 7/heat .108, ( 1823) ; The Fanny, 9 7/heat. 659,
(1824)
.
3. -The Gran Para, 7 Wheat .471 , (1823 )
.
4. -LaNereyda, 8 7/heat .108
,
(1823) ; The I.Ionte Allegre, 7 Wheat .520 , (1822 )
.
5. -In some dicta in cases of this character, the court expressed
the opinion that a bone fide transfer of the prize to an innocent
third party destroyed the taint of illegality, (The Arrogante Bar-
celona, 7 ./heat. 496,1822) but where such a case arose restitution
of the prize was decreed, (The Fanny, 9 Wheat . 658 ,1825 ) . A bone fide
sale of the privateer after the illegal outfit in the united States
was held to remove the taint of illegality from subsequent captures,
but such sale must be clearly proved, (The Llonte Allegre, 7 7/heat. 320,
1822; Moodie vs. The Alfred, 3 Dall. 307 ,1796) . It \ms held that a
making of repairs without augmentation of force did not amount to a
breach of neutrality and consequently did not make prizes illegal,
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It appears that the law of the United States permits of courts
exercising jurisdiction over illegal prize and disposing of them in
a manner to fulfill the states neutral obligation of vindication.
It must be noted that the exercise of this jurisdiction implies cus-
tody of the prize. If the prize is in a foreign port the United
States courts have no jurisdiction although the case may be such that
the government of the United States is under an obligation to demand
1
its return.
2. Illegal acts by Belligerent War Ships.
The duty of vindication following an illegal act by a belliger-
ent warship may involve the exercise of jurisdictional) over the
officers and crew of the vessel or (2) over the vessel itself.
Formerly a distinction was drawn between cases involving public
warships and those involving . privateers. As privateering is now
technically abolished this distinction is no longer important, and
even before it3 abolition the courts declared that for most legal
ourposes privateers, bearing a commission of the sovereign, were in
S
the same status as public warships.
(LToodie vs. The Phoebe Ann, 3 Ball .319 ,1795 jGeyer vs.Michel and the
Ship Den 0nzekeren,3 Ball. 285). A sale in the United States of prizes
captured under a French commission being , impliedly permitted by the
French treaty of 1778, (art .17, 22, Malloy, p. 474 )was held to be no breacfii
of neutrality and hence did not mfeke the prize illegal ,( Lloodie vs.The
Ami tiy^Fed .Cas .9741 ) . The United States never admitted that France had
an absolute right of sequestrating and selling prizes in the United
States under this treaty, ( Moore 1 s Digest , 7 ;936 ) . Such salesare now
forbidden by international law, (Hague Conventions ,1907 XIII, art. 21,
Malloy, p.S361; Moore's Digest , 7 ;935-938 ) . In any case a bone fide
condemnation in a recognized prize court was held to transfer title
conclusively, in the prize, but the condemnation must be satisfactor-
ily evidenced, (LaHereyda,8 V/heat .108 ,1823) . Where none of these cir-
cumstances intervened, restitution to the original owner was decreed,
but claims for further damages by the injured owner of the prize were
denied , (LaAmistad de Rues, 5 //heat. 385). Supra p. 122, note 3.
1. -See Hague Conventions ,1907 ,XIII , art .3,Malloy ,p . 2359 , and United
States understanding of it, Senate Resolution of Apr .17 ,1908 ,Malloy
p. 236 6.
2. -L* Invincible,! //heat . 238 ,( 1816 )
.
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(1) It was held in an opinion of Attorney General Kelson in
1
1844 that, although belligerent public vessels themselves are not
subject to the jurisdiction of United States courts, their commander
and officers are and can be criminally prosecuted for breaches of the
neutrality statutes. He said "the very purpose of the act would be
defeated were it otherwise; and there is no principle of which I am
aware which exempts from responsibility for criminal acts within our
jurisdiction the commander or officers of ships of war of other na-
tions with whom we are at peace." While there seem to be no cases in
which prosecution of the officers of men of war has been undertaken,
the commanders of privateers holding commissions of foreign belliger-
ent states, have been prosecuted when it could be proved that they
were still American citizens as is necessary for prosecution under
2
the first section of the neutrality act. If a privateer is to be
regarded as subject to the same legal exemption as a man of war it
would seem that these cases are in accord with attorney general
Kelson's opinion. Prosecution has never been attempted of commanders
or privateers under sections of the neutrality acts which are not
3
directed against citizens alone, as for instance section five which
prohibits the augmentation of force of warships or privateers in the
territory of the United States by any person. A very similar case
arose in the orimimlprosecution of Alexander LIcLeod by the 3tate of
4
Eew York in 1841. He was a soldier acting under authority of Great
Britain, but nevertheless Sew York maintained its jurisdiction to
punish him criminally for a homicide committed in that capacity in
the State. Great Britain bitterly protested this action.
1. -I.elson,Att .Gen. ,4 op .336 , (1844)
.
2. -U.S. vs. Isaac 7/illiams, Fed .Cas .17 , 708 , 2 Cranch 82, note: In
re Henfield, Fed. C as. 6360, (1793).
3. -Revised Statutes ,5285 , Penal code of 1910, sec. 12.
4. -People V3. McLeod, (K.Y.) 25 -Vend. 483,1 Hill 375,(1841).
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At present international law seems to exempt the officers and
crew of public vessels from local jurisdiction s0 long as their acts
are in pursuance of official "business or take place entirely within
1
the vessel. This exemption however, does not extend to acts done
on land in violation of local laws and if the commander of a war
ship engaged in augmenting the force of his vessel by the purchase
of military materials or the recruitment of men in the territory of
the United States and outside of his vessel, it seems probable that
he would be liable to the criminal provisions of the neutrality act,
although in such a case, undoubtedly diplomatic protest would be re-
sorted to rather than criminal prosecution.
The criminal prosecution of the officers or warships is not
itself a duty of vindication. Internment of such officers in cer-
tain cases, is the action required of neutral states. It would seem
that executive authorities can exercise jurisdiction over foreign
naval forces, to perform the duties required by treaties. The intern
-
2
ment of land forces has been upheld in the courts and it is probable
that the same action as to naval forces is permitted by the law of
the United States.
(2) Whether United States courts can exercise jurisdiction over
foreign public vessels which have violated the neutrality of the
United States is a question of difficulty. It has been noted that
courts can exercise jurisdiction over the prizes captured by bellig-
erent privateers or cruisers in certain cases. The exercise of
jurisdiction over the privateer or war ship itself, is an entirely
different question. In the neutrality statutes forfeiture of pri-
vateers fitted out in the United States for unneutral purposes is
1 .-See Moore's Digest, £; sec. 256.
2.
-Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Hep .938, (1913)
.
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provided for, but this may be intended to refer to cases where the
vessel was apprehended before being commissioned by the foreign power
and so does not necessarily imply a grant of jurisdiction over for-
eign public vessels. It has however been interpreted to so apply.
2
In the case of the Cassius which was a French public vessel origin-
ally fitted out in the United States in violation of the neutrality
laws, the vessel was held for a long time pending litigation and
ultimately released on a technicality, France had protested the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over this vessel and finally abandoned it with
the intention of protesting the matter diplomatically. Secretary of
State Pickering in referring to this case upheld the courts juris-
3
diction, for he thought if forfeiture could not be had in such cases
the neutrality acts could be completely evaded by transferring il-
legally fitted out vessels to the foreign government at their first
port. The exemption of foreign warships from local jurisdiction was
4
denied by attorney general Bradford in an opinion of 1794 in which
he supported the execution of writs of habeas corpus on a British
public vessel in an American port, for the purpose of releasing
American citizens held on board. This action gave rise to a protest
by the British minister.
The better opinion however seems to be that expressed by Chief
5
Justice Marshall in the Schooner Exchange vs. LIcFaddon, in which case
the court refused jurisdiction of a French public vessel which had
entered port in stress of weather and which was claimed by a United
1. -Revised Statutes , sec .5283 , Penal Code of 1910, sec. 11.
2. -Zetland vs. The Cassius, 2 Dall.365. See also U.S. vs.Peters,
3 Dall .121 , which was an earlier case involving this vessel, in which
the courts jurisdiction was denied.
3. -Letter of See. of State Pinckney, Oct .1,1795, Am. St .Bap. , For. Rel.
,
1 ;634.
4. -Bradford Att . Gen.l op .47 , ( 1794 )
.
5. -The Schooner Exchange vs. McPaddon, 7 Cranch ,116 ,( 1812 )
.
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States citizen as having been illegally made prize by the French.
The court held that while the principle of territorial sovereignty
was absolute, comity and custom demanded that public vessels be ex-
cepted from the general rule, and the court would infer that the
government intended to observe the customary rule of comity unless
it had expressly declared the contrary. The exemption of foreign pub
lie vessels from jurisdiction was emphatically maintained by attorney
1
general Gushing in 1855 the theory of extraterritoriality being as-
serted. As has been noted Attorney general Kelson while maintaining
that the officers of public vessels were subject to the territorial
2
jurisdiction admitted that the vessels themselves were exempt. 'This
appears to be the rule and therefore although United States courts
can assume jurisdiction over illegal prizes they can not over foreign
public vessels even when they have violated a duty of international
3
law.
Although courts can not exercise jurisdiction over foreign
public vessels violating neutrality, it is clear that executive of-
ficers must do so, if the duties of vindication are to be carried out
If a court exercised jurisdiction it would have authority to declare
the vessel forfeited and thus change its ownership. Executive of-
ficers can exercise no such authority as this but they can expel or
detain a public vessel, render it incapable of putting to sea and
4
intern its crew when occasion demands. The power to expel public
vessels is specifically given in the neutrality laws to the president
and in the execution of this power he may use the land and naval
force and the militia of the country, if necessary. The power to
1. -The Sitka, 7 op .123 , (1855 ) Att .Gen.Cushing. See also, 8 op. 73.
2. -Nelson, Att. Gen. ,4 op .336 , (1844)
.
3. -For discussion of the exemption of public vessels from ter-
ritorial jurisdiction see Hall, ' International Law, p. 195.
4. -?>ev. Stat. 5288, Penal Code of 1910, sec. 15.
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detain vessels violating neutrality statutes is given to the pres-
1 2
ident and also to custom officers when circumstances render an un-
neutral use probable. This does not apply to belligerent war ves-
sels in general. It has been held that the presidents power can onlj
be used in aid of judicial process and only military, not civil,
3
officers can be employed. A customs officer detaining a vessel un-
4
der this provision does so at his own risk. On account of these
interpretations the statutory provisions seem insufficient to carry
out the countries duties of vindication. However, as duties speci-
fied in treaties and conventions can probably be exercised by the
5
president in the absence of express statutory authority, the omis-
sion is not serious.
3. Violations of Land Territory.
The principle duty of vindication required under this head is
the internment of belligerent troops entering the neutral territory.
Although not acted upon by New York in the case of People vs. McLeod
the general principle is recognized in the United States that military
forces are exempt from territorial jurisdiction. The doctrine was
stated in reference to troops nassing through territory under a lic-
7
ense, in dicta by chief justice Liarshall in The Bxchange vs. I.IcFaddoi
and in reference to the rights of troops engaged in hostilities in
8
several cases arising out of the civil war. This does not, however
1. -Eev. Stat. 5287. Penal Code of 1910, sec. 14.
2. -Rev. Stat. 5290. Penal Code of 1910. sec. 17.
3. -Gelston vs. Hoyt,3 '.Vheat.246; See also 4 op .336 , (1844) .some-
what modified in 21 op. 273.
4. -Hendricks vs. Gonzalez, 67 Fed. Re. 351.
5. -Ex Parte Toscano,208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913)
.
6. -People vs. McLeod , (K.Y
.
) 25 Wend. 483; 1 Hill 375,(1841).
7. -The Schooner Exchange vs. LIcFaddon,7 Cranch 116,(1812).
8. -Ileal Low vs. Johnson, 100 U.3 .158 ,170 , (1879 ) ;Coleman vs.
Tennessee, 97 U .S .509 , (1878 ) .
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prevent executive officers performing duties imposed upon the country
1
by treaty. In the case of Ex Parte Toscano which came before a
United States circuit court in 1913 the facts were as follows: Dur-
ing the civil war in Llexico a band of federalist troops defeated at
tfovco crossed the frontiers of the United States and voluntarily sur-
rendered to armed forces of the United States. Under order of the
President they were disarmed, kept for a time at ElPaso and then sent
to Ft. Rosecrans, California. Toscano, one of the interned soldiers
sought release on habeas corpus, on the ground that he was uncon-
stitutionally deprived of liberty without "due process of law". This
the court denied, holding that the exercise of the authority by the
2
president was fully justified by the Hague convention of 1907, which
had been ratified by both the United States and Mexico. "The treaty"
it said, "is full and complete and no legislation is necessary to its
enforcement." If congress has not provided special officers for
carrying it out the duty devolves upon the president as chief ex-
ecutive. The Hague treaty itself and the execution of its terms was
held to be sufficient to give the applicant his "due process of law"
and the writ was denied. Prom this case it seems that United States
law adequately provides for performing this duty of vindication.
The United States has provided for carrying out its duties of
vindication (1) by conferring jurisdiction, on the federal courts,
of illegal prizes with power to restore and liberate such prizes ac-
cording to international law and (2) by conferring authority on ex-
ecutive officers to expel, detain and intern war vessels and their
officers and crews and to intern belligerent troops crossing the
frontier. The degree to which the international duties of vindica-
1. -Ex Parte Toscano, 208 Fed. Rep. 938, (1913)
.
2. -Hague Conventions, 1907,V.art.ll,I.Ialloy,p.2298.
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tion are performed depend upon the rules of law acted upon
by courts
and executive officers in exercising their jurisdiction in these
matters. The rules followed "by courts are found in court decisions
and are based on the principle that courts of the United States
apply international law as part of the law of the United States,
while executive officers are bound by the principle that treaties
are the law of the land and so perform the duties of vindication
as therein specified, With these principles it seems that adequately
provision is made in the law of the United States for carrying out
the duties of vindication imposed by international law.
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PART III » OBLIGATIONS AS A BELLIGERENT TOWARD NEUTRALS
.
Introductory
The obligations of neutral to belligerent states have been
classified under the five heads, duties of (1) abstention, (2) ac-
quiesence, (3) prevention, (4) vindication, (5) reparation. In
order to show the relation of belligerent duties to neutral duties we
will consider belligerent duties under the same classification.
It must, however, be constantly borne in mind that the position
of a belligerent is very different from that of a neutral. A belli-
gerent is always active, while a neutral is passive. Consequently
while it is neutral duties that are prominent, it is belligerent
rights which are most noticed. Neutral duties are restrictions upon
the ordinary rights of an independent state while belligerent duties
are simply limits set to extraordinary rights.
(1) The belligerents duties of abstention are largely equivalent
in substance to a neutral states duties of prevention. What the
neutral is bound to prevent, the belligerent, in most cases, though
not always, is bound to abstain from. Thus a belligerent state is
bound to abstain from violations of neutral territory and injury to
neutral individuals. These duties so far as encumbent upon the state
as such are beyond the provice of minicipal law to control and so be-
yond the scope of our subject. When a belligerent neglects its
duties of abstention, as Germany did in the violation of Belgium
neutrality, it is an act of sovereignty for which the state is inter-
nationally responsible but which can not be controlled by municipal
law. Some duties of this character have been given recognition in
treaties and international agreements, but such stipulations are for
the most part directed to the political organs of government and con-
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stitute political questions which can not be enforced as minicipal
law* An exception, however, may be made in one case. The duty to
abstain from interference with neutral commerce, except as permitted
by international law, is enforced by municipal law through the ad-
judication of all neutral seizures in prize courts. This method of
enforcing duties of abstention will therefore be considered.
(2) The belligerents duties of acquiescence relate largely to
the neutral's duties of vindication. In performing these duties the
i
neutral state subjects belligerent troops, public vessels and prizes
to its jurisdiction in a manner which would be considered as an in-
dignity under ordinary circumstances. These conditions the belliger-
ent must acquiesce in. It must not complain when a neutral interns
its troops or ships of war and assumes prize jurisdiction over its
captures provided such acts are required by international law. Ac-
quiescence in such actions or its reverse, however, are acts of
sovereignty and beyond the control of municipal law.
(3) The belligerent's duties of prevention bear a relation to
the neutral's duties of vindication. Acts which the neutral is oblig'
ed to vindicate if committed, the belligerent is obliged to prevent.
As the belligerent in exercising rights peculiar to that status,
comes in contact with neutrals through its army and navy, its duties
of prevention require it to exercise control over those agencies of
government. It is through this control that municipal law can be
' most -effective in enforcing international obligations of belligerent
to neutral states. The municipal means for preventing infractions of
international law by such agencies of government will therefore con*
| cern us.
(4) A belligerent state has no duty of vindication. It is it-
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self the aggressive party in its relations with neutrals and conse-
to arise
quently no occasion is apt/for vindicating its sovereign rights as
against neutrals. Resembling the neutrals duty of vindication is
the belligerents right of self help, by which it is permitted to re-
quisition the property of neutrals under certain circumstances, to
draft resident aliens into its armies and subject them to numerous
inconveniences and losses in case of military necessity, to visit
and search, neutral merchant vessels, and confiscate them in vftll de-
fined cases. These acts resemble duties of vindication in that they
are acts involving foreign individuals and are specifically defined
by international law but they are in no sense duties. No one but the
belligerent is benefited by their performance and there will be no
violation of international law if they are not performed. It is a
belligerent right which is here in question and the accompanying duty
is that which is owed to the neutral state to abstain from exceeding
these privileges and to prevent an illegal exercise of them by its
land and naval forces. These subjects are considered under obliga-
tions of abstention and prevention.
(5) Reparation is a belligerent duty, but as noted in the case
of a neutral, it is not a duty peculiar to the status of belligerency
It is a duty universally required in cases of breaches of internation
al law. Because of the probability of illegal acts in the heat of
war, the question of reparation is particularly prominent in relation
to belligerent communities. As examples of reparation by the United
States, as a belligerent may be mentioned the case of the Florida in
which the United States made public apology for a capture in the
territorial waters of Brazil 1 and the Trent affair in which the Unite<
1 - Case of the Florida; See Moore* s Digest, 2;367: 7;1090.
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States restored two confederate officers taken from a British vessel
during the civil war.^ As the principles of municipal law relating
to the enforcement of this duty are applicable to reparation in all
cases, further discussion is taken up under that head, in the genera]
division of the law of peace.
The obligations of belligerents to neutrals which may be en-
forced by municipal law will therefore, be considered under the two
! heads, (1) obligations of abstention, and (2) obligations of preven-
tion. In the first case, international law itself defines the ob-
ligations which are binding upon the government. Courts in giving
j
| effect to such obligations, therefore apply international law. In
the second case, international law defines the conduct which land anc
naval forces must pursue in dealing with neutrals but it does not
prescribe the measures which the government must take for enforcing
this conduct. The means which may be taken for preventing infrac-
tions of international law by agencies of government, are left to
the discretion of the belligerent state. They are therefore rules
supplementary to internationl law.
1- Case of the Trent, see Moore* s Digest, 2;1001: 7:626, 768.
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Chapter I. Obligations of Abstention .
Introductory.
A number of obligations of abstention have been given
specific recognition in treaties and international agreements to
which the United States is a party and are therefore according to
the constitution part of the law of the land. In the Hague
conventions the United States has bound itself to abstain from
exercising war rights against neutrals until it has notified them
of the outbreak of war, 1 from committing hostilities in neutral
territory or in neutral waters,^ from using neutral harbors or
territory as bases of naval or military operations or for the undue
asylum of war vessels, ^ in special treaties as well as the Hague
conventions and the Declaration of London, which however is
unratified, it has agreed to abstain from injuring neutral
individuals in person or property except in accordance with
specified rules. 4 Although so far as these rules bind the state
they are sanctioned by considerations of policy rather than by
municipal law, yet a belligerent acts through its agencies of
government, largely its army and navy. The duties of abstention
1. Hague Conventions, 1907, III, art. 2, Malloy, p. 2266.
2. Ibid, 1907, V, art. 1; XIII, art. 1, Malloy, pp. 2297, 2358.
3. Ibid, 1907, XIII.
4. See treaties guaranteeing "free ships, free goods", infra p.
201 ; specifying rules of blockade, infra, p. 180 ; freedom of vessels
under neutral convoy, infra, p. 225 ; freedom of neutral trade,
infra, p. 197 ; specifications for the exercise of the right of
visit and search, infra, p. 225 ; and the immunity of resident
neutral persons from military service, infra, p. 215 .
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imposed upon it may be to a considerable extent guaranteed by the
control of these bodies through municipal law. Looked at from
this standpoint the duties in ouestion become duties of prevention.
What a belligerent community is bound to abstain from doing it is
bound to prevent its army and navy from doing. Such duties may be
controlled by municipal law and will be considered under obliga-
tions of prevention.
Municipal law may also serve to make the obligations
effective through the action of constitutional checks between
departments of government. Thus the courts may be given authority
to control the action of the executive in seizing neutral property.
This situation actually exists in the provisions of municipal law
requiring the adjudication of all maritime seizures by prize courts
before their confiscation. The judiciary here, by its power to
liberate prizes, acts as a check upon the abuse of authority by
the executive, and in so far as it actually applies rules of
international law in determining prize cases, enforces the
belligerent governments duty to abstain from illegally interfering
with neutral commerce.
It must not, however, be forgotten that the prize court
although it may apply international law is a court of the belliger-
ent state and is always bound by municipal law. It has no
authority as against the sovereign power in its state. It is only
over one branch of the government that its authority exists.
The fact that the belligerent state controls the prize
court, a condition which it was hoped would be remedied by the

-177-
establishment of an international prize court, inevitably puts the
neutral claimant at a disadvantage in litigating and were it not
for the pressure of his own government and the sanctions of
international opinion, he would not receive his rights, as is
indicated by the distinct difference in the enforcement of neutral
rights when most of the great powers are belligerent and when most
of them are neutral.
It is the belligerent states duty to make its prize court,
in the words of Lord Stowell, "a court of the law of nations"
Yet as it is a court of the belligerent state the law which it
enforces is by definition municipal law. Here therefore we have
a case where we should expect to find international law enforced
directly as a part of municipal law. We should expect to find the
rules applied by prize courts, rules of both international law and
municipal law. Both English and American prize courts have on
numerous occasions assured us that this is the situation which
actually exists, ^ yet with a few cases to the contrary we have
also been informed that even prize courts are bound to obey a
1« The recovery, 6 Rob. 348, (1807). See T. E. Holland, Studies
in International Law, p. 196.
2- Cases asserting that prize courts apply international law,
English— The Maria, 1 Rob. 350, ( 1899 ) ; The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348 , (1807 );
The Minerva, (1807 ); The Fox, Edw.Adm. 312,(1811), Le Louis, 2 Dods.
239,(1817), The Annapolis, 30 L.J.Pr. M. and Ad. 201. See also
Phillimore, International Law, 3; sec. 436. For discussion of these
cases see Holland, op.cit. 196. The first three of these cases
are authority for the view that prize courts must apply
international law even when contrary to municipal law. United
States cases— Talbot vs. Seamans, I Cranch 1, 37,(1801); The
Nereide, 9 Cranch 388; United States vs. The Active, Fed. Cas. 759;
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191; The Scotia, 14
Wall. 170, The Paqueta Habanna, 175 U.S. 677.
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positive mandate of its government even when in conflict with the
law of nations. Lord Stowell seized the dilemma by the horns,
"These two propositions" he said, "that the court is bound to
administer the law of nations and that it is bound to enforce the
king's orders in council are not at all inconsistent with each
other" because one could not "without extreme indecency", presume
that a conflict could exist In the United States Chief Justice
Marshall solved the dilemma by resort to the magic power of legal
interpretation. "It has also been observed that an act of
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains and consequently can
never be construed to violate neutral rights or to effect neutral
commerce further than is warranted by the law of nations as
understood in this country." 2
Neither Stowell 's confidence in the impossibility of a
conflict nor Marshall's reliance upon interpretation can obscure
the fact that conflicts between the law of nations and of the
nation have occurred and have been so direct that no interpretation
can avail. In such circumstances prize courts, the same as any
1» The Fox Edw. Adm. SIS, (1811).
2- Murray vs. The Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 118, (1804).
3- Strangely enough the very case in which Lord Stowell spoke
involved just such a conflict. The orders in Council upon the
basis of which he decreed condemnation of the neutral vessel before
him, have been universally denounced as contrary to international
law. See article entitled Disputes with America in Edinburg Rev.,
Feb. 1812, 19; 290, severely censuring Lord Stowell 's alteration of
opinion from 1798 to 1811, quoted Moores Digest, 7; 648-651.
Phillimore in his international law, 3; sec. 436, implies a similar
censure. "If he (Lord Stowell) had not so considered them (i.e.
considered the orders in council to be consistent with internation
al law) and nevertheless executed them, he would have incurred
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other courts must obey municipal law.l A failure to do so would
be a dereliction from duty on the high way to rebellion. The
duty therefore rests with the belligerent state to see that the
law applied by its prize courts is international law. We will
examine the principles of law thus applied in the United States,
in cases involving the rights of neutral individuals. They are
to be found largely in prize court decisions, but there have
also been statutes, treaties, and executive orders stating
principles of this branch of law which the courts are bound to
observe.
Neutral Property at Sea.
The doctrine is maintained in the United States that
title to property seized at sea does not vest until after
decision of the court. 2 The government, therefore, appears before
the prize court as an applicant for condemnation while the
neutral individual claims restitution, compensation, damages, or
if the vessel is a recapture, restoration.
the same guilt and deserved the same reprehension as the Judged
of a municipal court who executed by his sentence an edict of
the legislature which plainly violated the law written by the
creator upon the conscience of his creature." See Holland , op. c it
.
p. 198.
1- Regina vs. Keyne, l.R. 2 Ex. D.160; The Schooner Exchange
vs. McFaddon; 7 Cranch 116; Murray vs. The Charming Betsey, 2
Cranch. 64; Mortens on vs. Peters, 14 Scot.L.T.R. 227,(1906)
Bentwich, p. 12.
2- The Adventure, 8 Cranch 221,(1814); The Nassau, 4 Wall 634;
The Neustra Senora de Regla, 108 U.S. 92,103,(1882); The Tom, 29
ct. cl.68,97 (1894); Grundy. Att .Gen. ,3 , op. 377 , (1838 ) . See letter
of Sir W. Scott, (Lord Stowell ) and Sir J. Nicholl, to Mr. Jay,
1794, stating the general principles of prize law and the
necessity of adjudication. Am. St. Pap., 1; 494, Printed Moores
Digest, 7; 603-608.
,
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The bases upon which condemnation of neutral vessels and
property are justified under international law are (1) breach of
blockade, (2) carriage of contraband, (3) unneutral service,
(4) presumption of enemy character, (5) necessity or the right
of angary. The belligerent government will therefore claim
condemnation on one of these grounds, The neutral owner will
claim restitution if the belligerent does not make good his claim
for condemnation; he will claim compensation if in such a case
the vessel has been sold, destroyed or requisitioned; he will
claim damages if the vessel has been seized without probable
cause or has not been treated with proper care in bringing in;
or he will claim restoration if he is an original owner of a
captured prize.
1. Grounds. for Condemnation.
(1) Breach of Blockade . In a number of early treaties the
principles of blockade were laid down requiring effectiveness-1- and
sometimes individual notification2 of vessels. The Declaration of
1- Effectiveness has been required in nineteen treaties with
thirteen countries, of which the following are in force: Bolivia,
1858, art. 18, Malloy, p. 119; Columbia, 1846, art. 18,p. 308;
Italy, 1871, art. 13, p. 973; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived, 1816,1827,
art. 10, p. 1728.
2- Individual notification of vessels ignorant of blockade has
been required in twenty-one treaties with seventeen countries of
which the following are in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 26, p. 120;
Columbia, 1846, art. 20, p. 308; Italy, 1871, art. 13, p. 973.
Individual warning unless the vessel could have heard of the
blockage has been required in six treaties, with five countries of
which the following are in force: Sweden, 1827, art. 18, p. 1754;
Prussia, 1828, art. 13, p. 1500; Greece, 1837, art. 16, p. 853.
See also Moore's Digest, 7; 827.
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London of 1909, A lays down the rules of blockage at length.
This treaty, however, has not received general ratification
although the United States senate has approved it.
The United States has instituted blockades during the
Mexican, Civil and Spanish wars. On these occasions the law
to be applied in dealing with neutrals was defined in proclama-
tions declaring the blockades and instructions to naval commanders
The prize courts in applying the law have relied on these
treaties, proclamations and instructions in addition to
judicial precedents. and general principles of international law
on the subject. In proclamations and instructions the principles
that the blockade must be effective and declared in order to be
binding have been generally specified. Individual warning, how-
ever, has usually not been required. The whole practice on the
subject, stating these points was embodied in Stockton's Naval
war code in force as a general order of the Navy Department from
1900 to 1904. 2
1- .Declaration of London, Charles Treaties, 1913, pp. 869-272,
signed Feb., 26,1909, Ratification advised by senate ,Apr .24,1912.
2- Proclamations of Blockade: Aug. 19,1846, by Commodore
Stockton, (Moore's Digest, 7; 790, Br. and For. St.Pap. 34;1139);
Apr. 19, 27, 1861 by President Lincoln, (12 stat.1259); Apr. 30, 1861
by Commander Prendergast , (F.H.Upton, Law of Nations effecting
commerce during war, 3rd. ed., N. Y. 1863,p .487 ) ; Apr. 22, 1898 by
President MeXinley, (30 stat.1769). Naval Instructions relating
to blockade, May 14,1846, (Moore 's Digest ,7;828; Br. and For. St.
Pap.,34;1139 ); Dec .24,1846 , (Moore 's Digest ,7;790 ); May 8,1861
(Prize cases, 2 Black 676); Nov. 6,1861, May 14,1862, (Upton, op.
cit., p.490); Aug. 18, 1862, (Official Records, Union and Confederate
Navies, Ser.l,l;417,Moore's Digest ,7;700 ) ; June 20,1898, (Gen. Ord.
,
Navy Dept. ,1898, No. 492, For. Rel
.
,1898 ,p .780, Freeman Snow,
International Law, 2nd. ed., Washington, 1898
,
p. 174 ) , June 27,1900,
Stockton's Naval War Code , (Gen. Ord.
,
Navy Dept. ,1900, No. 551,
revoked Gen. Ord., Navy Dept., Feb. 4, 19 04, No. 160, Printed,Naval
War College, International Law Discussions, 1903, p. 112. )
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The courts have held that proof of three questions of
fact is necessary to justify condemnation, (1) existence of blockad*
,
(2) knowledge on the part of the violating vessel, (3) actual
or constructive violation. 1 To exist a blockade must he
2
effective, hut a single cruiser may he sufficient to make it
so; it need not he declared, defacto blockades have been
considered legitimate, ^ although they are denounced by the
Declaration of London,^ and it terminates only on notification or
occupation of the port.
6
Knowledge of the blockade will be presumed''' when the
vessel left port after notification to that government,® or had
an opportunity to learn of the blockade enroute.^ An individual
warning is only necessary when required by treaty1^ or where the
vessel sailed before notification and arrived in ignorance of the
blockade. 11
1-» The Nayade, Fed. Cas. 7, 046; The Betsey, 1 Rob. 29; The Nancy
1 Act. 59.
2- The Andromeda, 2 Wall. 48; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474.
3- The Olinde Rodriguez, 174 U. S. 510.
4- The Adula, 176 U. S. 351.
5- Declaration of London, 1909, art. 8.
6- The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Josephine, 3 Wall. 83; The
Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Adula, 176 U.S. 361.
7- Condemnations without special warning—The Circassian, 2 Wall.
135; The Hallie Jackson, Blatch.248; The Emperor, Blatch. 175; The
Prize Cases, 2 Black 635; The Revenge, 2 Sprague 107; The Hiawatha,
2 Black 677; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603; The Coronelius, 3 Wall. 214;
The Eerald, 3 Wall. 768; U.S. vs. HallSck, 154 U.S. 537; The Adula,
176 U.S. 361; The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231.
8- The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135.
9- U.S. vs. Halleck, 154 U.S. 537, (1864).
10- Fitzsimmons vs. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch 185,(1818).
11- The Nayade, Fed. Cas. 7046; Yeaton vs. Frey, 5 Cranch 335,
(1809).

-183-
In defining the acts constituting a violation of blockade
the courts in the civil war cases seem to have gone beyond the
bounds of international law.-*- Besides attempting to enter^ or
leave^ a blockaded port or hovering about in a suspicious manner^
1- This is partly accounted for by the fact that &n the court
considered the civil war blockade a municipal rather than an
international measure. For an interesting statement of this view,
written while the war was in progress see Upton, op.cit., p. 298-
307. He says, "No one surely whose intelligence is not clouded
by prejudice or obscured by selfish considerations can fail to
perceive the broad distinction between that blockade which is
proclaimed by a sovereign nation of a portion of its own ports,
for the purpose of quelling a domestic insurrection and compelling
the misguided insurgents to'unthread the rude eye of rebellion
and welcome home again discarded peace 1
,
and that which is ordered
and enforced by a sovereign government of the ports of its
foreign enemy, for the purpose of paralyzing his power and
compelling him to repair his wrongs, and submit to the terms of
equitable pacification." p. 301. This view is wholly indefensible
by modern international law. The law of blockade is for the
benefit of neutrals and it make no difference to them whether the
war is rebellion or international war—they have a right to the
same law in either case.
2- Fitzsimmons vs. Newport Ins. Co. 4 Cranch 185, 200; McCall
V8. Marine Ins. Co., 8 Cranch 59; The Diana, 7 Wall. 354; The
Nuestra Senora de Regla, 17 Wall. 29.
3- The Jeune Nelly, in U.S. vs. Guillam, 11 Wall. 47; The Tropic
Wind, Fed. Cas. 14, 186, 16,541a; The Hiawatha, Fed. Cas. 6451,
affirmed, 2 Black 677; The Lynchburg, Fed. Cas. 8,637a, 8638, 8639;
The Crenshaw, Fed. Cas. 3,384, affirmed, The Prize Case, 2 Black
635. Days of grace have generally been allowed in which vessels
in port may leave. In the civil war cases no cargo could be
loaded in this time, The Hiawatha, Fed. Cas., 6451, although a
limited permission to do so was given by the Navy Instructions of
May 8, 1861, see Prize Cases, 2 Black, 676. According to the
instructions of 1898 and Stockton's Naval War code cargo may be
loaded in this time.
4- The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231; The Coosa, 1 Newb. Adm. 393; The
Hiawatha, Blatch.l, Fed. Cas. 6451; The Empress, Blatch. 175;
The Josephine, 3 Wall. 83; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170; The
Teresita, 5 Wall. 180; The Newfoundland, 176 U.S. 97,(1900); The
Cornelius, 3 Wall. 214.
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the court applied the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockade,
condemning cargoes bound for blockaded ports by transhipment. 1
No limits to the zone of operations were required. Vessels with
an "intent" to break blockade were held liable from the beginning
of the voyage to the end of the return voyage 2 and even on a
subsequent voyage^. These rules were quite generally denounced
by European publicists, although in a number of cases which were
subsequently submitted to arbitration the American position was
sustained. 4 They are however in conflict with the Declaration of
London which forbids the application of "continuous voyage" to
blockade and requires that captures be limited to the zone of
operation of the blockading squadron.^
1- The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Springbok, 5 Wall. 1,(1866);
The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514; The Flying Scud, 6 Wall. 263; The
Thompson, 3 Wall. 155. In The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28 it was held
that a transhipment by land could not be regarded as a breach of
blockade
•
2- The Galen, 37 ct. cl. 89, (1901); The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603;
The Circassian 2 Wall. 135; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The
Cornelius, 3 Wall. 214; The Jenny, 5 Wall. 183; The adela, 6 Wall.
266.
3- The Mersey, Fed. Cas. 9,489 reversed Fed. Cas. 9,490; The
Major Barbour, Fed. Cas. 8,983; The Joseph H. Toone, Fed. Cas.
7,541. The principle of liability on a subsequent voyage was not
relied upon exclusively in these oases. For discussion see Upton,
op.cit. p. 288. Contra, see The Wren, 6 Wall. 155.
4- The case of the Springbok, 5 Wall. 1, (1866), in which a
cargo destined for transhipment to a blockade runner at Nassau
Hew Providence was condemned aroused the severest criticism. It
was denounced as a retrogression to the practice of paper blockade
so prominent in the Napoleonic wars. See Moore's Digest 7; 723-
739, in which opinions of Lord Russel, Twiss, Phillimore,
Bluntschli, Fiore, and others are given. For arbitral awards
under Art. 13, treaty of Washington of 1871, Ibid. 7; 725, Moore
Int. Arb., 4; 3928-3935.
5- Declaration of London, 1909, art. 17, 19.
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Forfeiture of vessel and cargo has been the usual penalty
for breach of "blockade, though in a few cases where the owner of
part of the cargo was ignorant of the intent of the vessel the
cargo was restored, ^ while in other cases, where, applying the
doctrine of continuous voyage, it was the cargo alone which had
a blockaded destination the vessel was released. 2
(2) Carriage of Contraband . Early treaties generally
contained lists of articles which could alone be declared contra-
band,^ and sometimes free lists were also included. 4 One of the
1- The Springbok, 5 Wall. 1, The Flying Scud, 6 Wall. 263.
2- The Springbok, 5 Wall. 1.
3- Contraband lists generally consisting of four classes of
articles, (l) arms and ammunition, (2) military clothe*s and
accoutrements, (3) horses and their furniture, (4) other instru-
ments especially for use in war have been included in twenty six
treaties with twenty countries of which the following are in force:
Bolivia, 1858, art. 17, Malloy, p. 119; Italy, 1871, art .15,p. 974;
Prussia, 1799-1810, revived 1828, art .13,p. 1491; Sweden, 1783-1798,
revived 1816, 1827, art. 9,p. 1728. Most of these treaties specify
that no other articles shall be subject to confiscation as contra-
band, although this is not true of those with Italy and Prussia.
In addition to these classes of articles, the treaty with Great
Britain of 1794-1807 , (art . 18,p. 601) included Navy stores, and
stated that "provisions and other articles not generally contra-
band may be regarded as such" and may be seized upon indemnifying
the owner for their value with an allowance for profit, and
damages caused by the detention. Treaties with Salvador , (1850-
1870„ art.l9,p.l543;1870-1893, art .19, p. 1557 ) add "provisions that
are imported into a besieged or blockaded place" to the contraband
list though it is difficult to see why such goods would not be
liable under the law of blockade, and a treaty with Two Sicilies
of 1855-1861, (art
.3, p. 1816 ) includes "troops whether infantry or
cavalry" under the name of contraband. The treaties with Prussia
Italy and Venezuela, (1836-1851, art. 18,p. 1836; 1860-1870, art. 13,
p.1850) exclude horses from the contraband list.
4- The treaties with France, 1778-1798, art .24, p. 496; Spain,
1795-1902, art. 16,p. 1646; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816,1826,
art
.8,p. 1728, among other things put textiles, gold, iron, copper,
coal, grain, provisions, Navy stores, and lumber on the free list.
That with Netherlands, 1782-1795, art .24,p. 1240, puts navy stores
and machines for manufacturing war material on the free list.
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most remarkable provisions is that in the Prussian treaties of
1785 and 1799 the latter of which was renewed in 1828 and is still
in force, ^ in which contraband is declared abolished as between
the two countries with the proviso that goods formerly deemed
contraband might be detained and requisitioned on payment of full
compensation to the neutral owner. The Declaration of London^
contains a codification of the law of contraband, embracing
lists of absolute contraband, conditional contraband and free goods.
These lists, however, have not been adhered to in subsequent wars.
Naval instructions beginning with those of the continental
congress of 1776 have been issued at the beginning of wars
specifying contraband lists and enjoining naval officers to respect
neutral rights. Few cases involving contraband here decided in
the revolutinary war, the war of 1812, the Mexican or the Spanish
wars. The Civil war cases alone are of importance. In these the
1- Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 13, p. 1481; 1799-1810,
revived 1828, art. 13,p. 1491. See U.S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U.S.
526 for interpretation of this provision. It has also been made
the basis of compensation in the recent (1915) case of the United
States vessel William P. Frye.
2- Declaration of London, 1909, Charles Treaties, 1913, p. 272.
3- Naval instructions April 3, 1776, (Journal of the Continental
Congress, W.C.Ford, ed., 4; 253, Journal of Congress, 1; 244,
G. W. Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution, N.Y.,
1913, 2 vols., 2; 695); Apr. 7, 1781, (Jour. Cong., Ford, ed., 19;
361); 1812, (2 7/heat. App., 80-81) Moore's Digest, 7; 516), May 14,
1846, (Br. and For. St. Pap.34;1139 ) , May 14, 1862, (Upton, op.cit.
p.490); Aug. 18,1862, (Official Rec. Union and Conf. Navies, Ser.
1,1; 417); June 20, 1898, (Navy Dept., Gen. Ord., 1898, No. 492,
For. Eel., 1898, p. 780); June 27, 1900, Stockton's Naval War Code,
June 27, 1900, Stockton's Naval War Code, (Naval War College,
International Law Discussions, 1903, p. 112.
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courts appear to have "been guided largely by British precedents
mostly those of Lord Stowell in the Napoleonic era.l
All cases have held that the concurrence of (1) a hostile
character in the goods themselves and (2) a hostile destination
are necessary for condemnation. The courts have drawn the
distinction between absolute and conditional contraband, holding
that the former may be condemned if destined to the enemy country^
while the latter is only liable if bound for the use of the
enemy army. 3 The doctrine of continuous voyage has been applied
to both absolute^ and conditional contraband. 5 It was this
question which occupied most attention in the civil war cases.
British vessels were in the habit of landing cargoes in the West
Indies or in Mexico near the Texan frontier for transhipment in
blockade runners or by land to the confederate states. ^ Such
1» On force of British prize court precedents in United States
courts see Marshall in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9
Cranch 191, 198, (1815), quoted Moore's Digest, 7; 598, "The United
States having at one time formed a component part of the British
Empire their prize law was our prize law, so far as it was adapted
to our circumstances and was not varied by the power which was
capable of changing it."
2- The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28,58, (1866).
3- The Commercen, 1 Wheat. 382, (1816).
4- The Dolphin, Fed. Cas. 868, (1863); The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514,
(1865).
5- The Pearl, 5 Wall. 574, (1866); The Peterhoff, 5Wall.28, (1866
)
6- For complete statement of the conditions of contraband trade,
during the civil war see the Stephen Hart, Blatch. 387, (1863),
Scott, 852, affirmed in the Hart, 3 Wall. 559. See also Moore's
Digest, 7; 698-739.
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vessels if captured on the first limb of the voyage, that is
while sailing "between two neutral ports were usually condemned.
^
The grounds of condemnation were not always clear. In most of
these cases, carriage of contraband and breach of blockade were
both suggested.
The penalty imposed for carriage of contraband was
ordinarily condemnation of the contraband cargo alone,** though
free goods of the owner of contraband were generally declared
"infected" and condemned, 3 Evidences of bad faith such as
destruction of papers, 4 giving of false destination^ and being
involved in blockade running^ were held to condemn the vessel also.
Ordinarily liability was held to cease with the deposit of contra-
band goods, but this was not true, the vessel being condemned
on her return voyage, if a false destination was given. 7
1- Instructions of the Secretary of the Navy, Aug. 18, 1862,
authorized seizure of vessels carrying contraband for the
insurgents "to their ports directly or indirectly by transhipment".
See Moore's Digest, 7; 700.
2- The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28, (1866), The Commercen, 1 TTheat.
382, (1816).
3- The Lucy, 37 Ct. CI. 97. (1901); The Bird, 38 Ct. CI. 228,
(1903); The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28.
4- The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514.
5- The Luoy, 37 Ct. CI. 97, (1901); The Joseph, 8 Cranch 451;
Carrington vs. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Pet. 494.
6- The Dolphin, Fed. Cas. 868; The Pearl, 5 Wall. 574; The Hart,
3 Wall. 559; The Gertrude, Fed. Cas. 5, 369; 5, 370.
7- The Lucy, 37 Ct. CI. 97, (1901); The Joseph, 8 Cranch 451;
Carrington vs. Merchants Ins. Co., 8 Pet. 494. In the Betsey and
Polly, 38 Ct. CI. 30, (1902), it was held that giving a false
destination does not condemn on return voyage when there is no
contraband on board and the real destination is unblockaded.
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(3) Unneutral service . The transportation of troops
and the carriage of dispatches which are the commonest offenses
included under the offense of unneutral service are sometimes
spoken of an analogues of contraband. In reality the offense
is distinctly different from that of carrying contraband. The
idea of destination inseparable from contraband trade is not
necessarily included. It is the service, ordinarily coupled
with an unneutral intent that creates the offense.^ The
similarity to contraband trade, however, is evident and in a
gtreaty of 1855 with Two Sicilies naval and military troops
were included in the contraband lists. A large number of treaties
in stipulating that free ships shall make free goods add that
enemy persons on neutral vessels shall "not be taken out of that
ship unless they are officers or soldiers and in the actual
service of the enemies",^ thus indicating that such persons are
liable and strongly implying that they may be taken out of a
vessel overtaken at sea, a position which was protested by Great
Britain in the Trent case. 4 The Declaration of London distin-
guishes two classes of unneutral service.^ Lesser offenses
1- On distinction of contraband trade and unneutral service see
Marquardson on the Trent case, quoted Moore's Digest, 7; 775.
2- Treaty with Two Sicilies, 1855-1861, art. 3, Malloy.p .1816.
3- Seizure of military persons on neutral vessels has been
provided in twenty seven treaties, with nineteen countries, of
which the following are in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 16, Malloy,
p. 119; Columbia, 1846, art. 15, p. 306; Italy, 1871, art. 16, p. 974;
Prussia, 1785-1796, revived 1828, art .12, to. 1481; Sweden, 1783-
1798, revived 1816. 1827, art. 7, p.1727/
4- See Moore's Digest, 7; 775.
5- Declaration of London, art. 45, 46.
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subject the vessel to the treatment of neutral contraband carriers,
while graver offenses amounting to a direct participation in
naval movements subject them to the treatment of enemy merchant
vessels
.
In the Chesapeake affair of 1807 1 and in other
cases preceding and causing the War of 1812 the United States
objected to the taking of military persons from its vessels when
neutral. In these cases the illegal impressment of neutral
persons was also involved. The Trent affair^ during the civil
war, which involved the seizure of confederate emissaries from a
British vessel, was settled diplomatically and unfavorably to
the right of such seizure. Here the vessel was not brought in
for prize adjudication, seizure being made on the sea but this
practice seems to have been contemplated in a large number of the
United States treaties of that time,^ although not by any treaties
with England. It also seems to be countenanced by the Declaration
of London.^ The seizure in the Trent case, however, was compli-
cated by the fact that the persons seized were diplomatic
emissaries accredited to a neutral government, rather than military
persons, consequently should have enjoyed diplomatic immunities.
No cases involving unneutral service appear to have
come up in United States prize courts. ^ English precedents,
1- See Moore's Digest, 2; 991, 1001.
2- See Moore f s Digest, 7; 768-779.
3- Supra, note 3, p. 189.
4- Declaration of London, art. 47.
5- Seizure of vessels engaged in unneutral service was authorized
by the Naval instructions of 1898, art. 16, For. Rel., 1898, p. 781,
and Stockton's Naval War Code, 1900-1904, art. 16, 20.
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however, which are usually of weight in United States prize
courts, 1 have held that vessels may he condemned not only on the
has is of employment by the enemy government hut also for knowingly
or fraudulently giving aid through carriage of troops, military
persons or dispatches. 2 Where knowledge or fraud is not proved
the vessel has usually been restored but on condition that it
pay the captors expenses, ^ the ground being taken that the
belligerent has a right of seizing, bringing in and investigating
neutral vessels, suspected of unneutral service, even where
condemnation is not warranted.
(4) Presumption of Enemy character . The general
rules applies that enemy property at sea is liable to confiscation.
The belligerent will therefore claim condemnation of vessels and
goods apparently neutral if their real ownership or the actual
right to their use is enemy. The enemy or neutral character of
property may be determined in a number of different ways as by
the nationality of the owner, the domicile of the owner, the
location of the goods, or the flag of the vessel. Where the
1- On regard for English prize court precedents in United
States courts see Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch
191, 198, (1815), Moore's Digest, 7; 599, Supra, note l f pl87.
2- Carriage of Troops and military persons—The Caroline, 4 Rob.
256, (1802) The Friendship, 6 Rob. 320, (1807); The Orozemba, 6
Rob. 430(1807); Carriage of Dispatches—The Atlanta, 6 Rob. 430,
(1807); The Constant ia, The Susan, The Hope, See Moore's Digest,
7; 759-762.
3- The Caroline, 6 Rob. 461, (1808); The Madison, Edw. Adm. 224,
(1810); The Rapid, Edw. Adm. 228, (1810); See Moore's Digest, 7;
762-763.
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character of the goods depends upon the character of the owner,
the question of who is the owner when goods are in transit arises.
By the Declaration of London, 1 the neutral or enemy
character of a vessel is determined by the "flag which she is
entitled to fly" and of goods on hoard an enemy vessel by the
"neutral or enemy character of the owner" the title ordinarily
remaining with the seller until the destination is reached.
These principles have been generally adhered to by
United States courts, but the character of goods or of their
owner has been interpreted in accordance with the Anglo-American
principle of territoriality as opposed to nationality. Thus
goods owned by an inhabitant of enemy territory irrespective of
his sympathy^ or nationality^ have been considered enemy goods.
Goods employed in the enemy service4 or the produce of enemy soil^
1- Declaration of London, 1909, art. 58-60.
2- Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall. 404; 419: The Benito
Estanger, 176 U.S. 568. See Moore's Digest, 7; 429-430.
3- Chester vs. The Experiment, Fed. Court of Appeals, 2 Dall.41,
(1787); U.S. vs. Gillies, Pet. C.C. 159; Murray vs. The Charming
Betsey, 2 Cranch 506, (1813); The Venus, 8 Cranch 253,(1814); The
Frances, 8 Cranch 335,(1814); The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheat. 46.
See Moore's Digest, 7; 424-429.
4- Darby vs. The Erstem, Fed. Court of Appeals, 2 Dall. 34,
(1782); The Hart, 3 Wall. 559; The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; See
Moore' 8 Digest, 7; 410-415.
5- Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch 19,(1816); The
Prize cases, 2 Black 635, (1862). See Moore's Digest, 7; 406-410.
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are also regarded as enemy goods whatever the character of the
owner.
The courts have held that title to property in transit
is with the vendor. Thus goods enroute from an enemy seller to a
neutral buyer, even when sold, are condemned as enemy property,
^
and goods in transit from a neutral seller to a belligerent buyer
are released as neutral property. 2 it has been hinted, however,
that if the contract of sale specified that the transfer should
take place on delivery to the master of the vessel, and considera-
tion had been given, a neutral buyer might make good his claim. °
In addition to these general principles, international
law recognizes certain circumstances which give a constructive
enemy character to goods which are really neutral, in which case
condemnation is permitted. This constructive enemy character has
at different times and by different countries, been asserted on
the following grounds: (a) transfers to neutral flag, (b) accept-
ance of enemy convoy, protection or license, (c) resistance to
carriage by neutral vessels of enemy goods
visit and search or fraud, (d) engaging in closed trade , ( e )/ (f)
shipping of neutral goods on enemy vessels.
(a) By the Declaration of London, 4 transfers of enemy
1- The Ship Frances and Cargo, 1 Gall. 445, affirmed 8 Craneh
350,(1813); The Frances, 9 Cranch 183, (1815); The San Jose Indiana,
2 Gall. 268, affirmed 1 Wheat. 308, (1814).
2- The Ship Ann Green, 1 Gall. 274, Scott, 620, (1812).
3- The San Jose Indiano, 2 Gall. 268, affirmed 1 Wheat. 208. See
Moore's Digest, 7; 404-406.
4- Declaration of London, 1909, art. 55-56.
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vessels to a neutral flag are in general valid if made before
the outbreak of hostilities, void if made after. Certain
provisions and presumptions however, are added. A more liberal
rule has heretofore been applied by United States courts. Thus
bona fide transfers of vessels and property, whether made before
or after the outbreak of war have been held valid. ^ This has
also been the British rule.^ The sale, however, is presumed
not bona fide if made in transit3 or under conditions such as
the retention of enemy control or the reservation of a right to
repurchase.^ The sale of enemy warships to a neutral has been
regarded as void even if bona fide.^
1- Cushing, Att.Gen., 6 op .638 , (1854 ) ; 7 op. 538,(1855). See
Moore's Digest, 7; 715-724.
2- The Baltica, 11 Moore P.O. 141,(1857); The Ariel, 11 Moore
P.C. 119, (1857). France and Russia have generally applied the
principle that sales made after the outbreak of war are void. See
French Regulations, July 26, 1778, noted Moore's Digest, 7; 417;
Russian Prize Regulations, March 27,1895, quoted Moore's Digest,
7; 424. Great Britain adopted this rule as a measure of retalia-
tion by order in council, Nov. 11, 1807, Br. and For. St. Pap.,
8;468; Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., 3;270. By Naval Instructions of
1870, France somewhat relaxed her practice, and admitted that the
presumption of illegality in sales made during war might be over-
thrown by sufficient evidence. See A.P.Rivier, Princips du Droit
des Gens, 2 vols., Paris, 1896, 2; 414.
3- The Ship Frances and Cargo, 1 Gall. 443, affirmed 8 Cranch
354, (1813); The Sally, 3 Wall. 451,460, (1865).
4- The Island Belle, Fed. Cas. 168, The Benito Estenger, 176
U.S. 568, (1899), Scott, 621.
5- The Georgia, 7 Wall. 32, (1868); The Sally, 3 Wall. 451,460,
(1865). See also the Texan Star, Moore, Int. Arb., 3; 2360 and an
editorial comment by J. B. Scott, Am. Jour. Int. Law, Jan. 1915.
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(b) While the sailing under neutral convoy exempts
merchant vessels not only from capture "but from visit and search;
the acceptance of enemy convoy, of enemy license, or the shipping
of goods in an enemy armed vessel has sometimes been held in
itself to render the neutral goods and vessels liable to condem-
nation as of constructive enemy character. ^ In the leading
p
United States case, however, The Nereide, the majority of the
court speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, held that neutral
goods laden on an armed enemy ship were exempt from capture and
this decision was followed in the Atalanta^ a few years later.
Justice Story dissented in the Nereide, holding that a distinc-
tion existed between the loading of neutral goods in unarmed and
armed belligerent vessels, and the latter case similar to
belligerent convoy, gave the neutral goods enemy character. Story's
opinion was followed by the court of claims in a number of French
Spoliation claim cases. * The condemnation of neutral and national
1- See Danish Instructions, Mch. 28, 1810, declaring all neutral
vessels good prize "which made use of British Convoy". Eighteen
United States vessels were seized under this clause and a
diplomatic controversy ensued which was settled by a convention
of March 28, 1830, Malloy, p. 377, in which Denmark made compensa-
tion. See Moore's Digest, 7;496-499.
2- The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, (1815).
3- The Atalanta, 3 Wheat. 409, (1818).
4- The Nancy, 27 Ct. CI. 99, (1827); The Brig Sea Nymph, 36
Ct. CI. 369, (1901). It was held in The Galen, 37 Ct. CI. 89,
(1901), that though acceptance of belligerent convoy rendered
the vessel liable, the liability did not inhere after voluntary
separation from it.
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vessels sailing under an enemy license or passport has been
decreed in a number of cases.
^
(c) The Declaration of London2 provides that "forcible
resistance to the legitimate exercise of the right of stoppage,
search and capture" involves in all cases the condemnation of
the vessel and of goods belonging to the master or owner. Similar
provision was made in the United States naval instructions of
1898 and in Stockton* s Naval war code, 3 The courts have in-
variably held the captors exempt from liability for making
seizures when any of these circumstances exist4 and in a number
of cases have condemned the vessel.^ In most of the early
treaties, of the United States, neutral vessels were required to
carry passports or sea letter and other papers. In some of them
it was also provided that a vessel not carrying such papers could
be detained and might "be declared legal prize" by a competent
court unless the absence of the papers could be satisfactorily
explained. The courts, however, have held that in such cases
1- The Julia, 8 Cranch 181; The Aurora, 8 Cranch 203; The Hiram,
8 Cranch 444; The Hiram, 1 Wheat. 440; The Ariadne, 2 Wheat. 143;
Patton vs. Nicholson, 3 Wheat. 204; The Langdon Cheves, 4 Wheat.
103. See Moore's Digest, 7; 395-398.
2- The Declaration of London, 1909, art. 63.
3- Naval instructions, June 20, 1898. For. Rel., 1898, p. 780;
Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 33.
4- Del Col vs. Arnold, 3 Dall. 333; The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat.
1, (1826).
5- The Bermuda, 3 Wall. 514.
6- Non-Carriage of passports was declared to subject the vessel to
condemnation in sixteen treaties with eleven countries of which
those with Bolivia, (1858, art. 22, Malloy, p. 121) and Columbia,
(1846, art. 22, p. 309) are still in force. In six treaties with
five countries of which that with Prussia (1799-1810, revived 1828
art. 14,p. 1491) is still in force, the carriage of passports was
required" but failure to do so was specifically declared not to
create a presumption against the vessel.

-197-
neutral vessels could not be condemned even in the absence of
passports, if other evidence indicated a bona fide neutral
character
(d) Belligerents have at times condemned neutral vessels
for engaging in a branch of enemy trade closed to them in time
2
of peace, for trading between enemy ports or even for trading
with the enemy at all.*5 In a large number of its treaties^ the
United States has agreed as a belligerent to recognize the right
of citizens of the other contracting party to free navigation
between neutral and enemy ports and between two enemy ports;
and in none of its wars has it condemned neutral vessels even
when not protected by treaty on the basis of engaging in closed
trade. 5 The condemnation of vessels of American citizens trading
with the enemy is based on and entirely different principle and
1- The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227; The Venus, 27 Ct. CI. 116. (1892).
2- See British Rule of 1756, Moore's Digest, 7; 383, also
similar rule of 1793, Order in Council, Nov. 6, 1793, Lawrence,
op. cit. p. 717, Historical Account of the growth of these rules,
1 Wheat. 530, App. ii.
3- See Napoleon's Berlin, (Nov. 21, 1806) and Milan, (Nov. 23,
1807, Dec. 17, 1807) decrees and British Orders in Council, (Jan.
7, 1807, Nov. 11, 1807, Mch. 15, 1915). Te$ts of all but the last,
Br. and For. St. Pap. 8; 401-513; DeMarten's Nouveau Recudil, 1;
433-549; Am. St. Pap., For. Rel.3; 262.
4- The freedom of neutral trade has been guaranteed in twenty
five treaties with eighteen countries of which the following are
in force, Bolivia, 1858, art. 15, 18, Malloy, p. 119; Columbia,
1846, art. 15, 18, p. 306; Italy, 1871, art. 16, p. 974; Prussia,
1785-1796, revived, 1828, art. 12, p. 1481; Sweden, 1783-1798,
revived 1816, 1827, art. 7, p. 1727.
5- Dicta in some civil war cases seems to indicate that such
trade creates an enemy character. See The Hart, 3 Wall. 560.
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is really not governed by international law at all. In
insurance cases* the United States courts have denied the
legitimacy of condemnations of vessels for engaging in closed
trade or the Rule of 1756s as it was called. The greater
1- The condemnation of property of citizens engaged in trade
with the enemy should be regarded as a matter of domestic policy,
rather than of international law. Such trade has always been
branded as illegal and creating a constructive enemy character by
the United States, see The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155, (1844); Rush, Att.
Gen., 1 op. 175(1814); The Alexander, 8 Cranch 169, (1814); The
Sally, 8 Cranch 382, (1814); The St. Lawrence, 8 Cranch 434,(1814);
The Thomas Gibbons, 8 Cranch 421,(1814); The Rugen, 1 Wheat. 63,
(1816); Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 498, 18 How. 110. See
President Lincoln's proclamation Aug. 16, 1861, prohibiting all
trade with the southern states, (12 stat. 1262). See Moore's
Digest, 7; 391-395. The United States courts have applied the
doctrine of continuous voyage to such trade, The Joseph, 8 Cranch
451,454,(1814); The Grotius, 8 Cranch 456, (1814). See Moore's
Digest, 7; 388-391. In the Mary, 9 Cranch 126,148, (1815), the
doctrine of continuous voyage acted to the advantage of a vessel
which left England for the United States after the repeal of the
British orders in Council and before news of the outbreak of the
war of 1812, and consequently would have been exempt from capture
under the president 's instructions of Aug. 28, 1812, had she come
home directly. Although she left an Irish port in which she had
been forced to take shelter, long after she had knowledge of the
war, the court held her voyage was continuous from the innocent
start in England so she could not be condemned for trading with
the enemy. See Moore's Digest, 7; 393.
2- Vasse vs. Ball, 2 Dall. 270, (Pa.), See Moore's Digest ,7;387.
3- The Rule of 1756 was inaugurated by Great Britain during a
time when practically all colonial trade was closed in time of *
peace, and it was to this practice that the doctrine of continuous
voyage was first applied. In the wars following the French
Revolution, United States merchants entered the French West Indian
Trade which was opened to them, and in order to escape the opera-
tion of the rule of 1756, now known as the rule of 1793, tran-
shipped at a port of the United States before going to Europe.
Lord Stowell, held the voyage continuous and condemned vessels
bound for Europe whose cargo had originally come from the French
West Indies. See Moore's Digest, 7; 383, 1 Wheat, 530, App. ii.
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extensions of the claims to limit neutral trade put forth in the
Napoleonic wars with increasing severity against neutrals were
scarcely admitted even by the belligerent nations as warranted
by international law, but were justified if at all as measures
of retaliation against enemies. To these restrictions by means
of paper blockades the United States was an incessant protestant.
The charge that its own practice during the civil war was of
similar character has already been mentioned in considering
blockade. ^ However, the usual practice of prize courts in the
United States is to refuse to condemn neutral vessels for
engaging in any trade, unless principles of blockade or contra-
band can be invoked, a practice which naval forces were required
to observe by Stockton's naval war code. 2
(e) When no question of blockade, contraband or un-
neutral service are involved, the general principle has been
recognized from early times that neutral vessels carrying neutral
cargo are exempt from seizure and condemnation. When enemy
goods are loaded in a neutral vessel, three principles have at
different times been adted on: (1) both goods and neutral vessel
are liable, (2) the enemy goods alone are liable, (3) neither
goods or vessel may be condemned. The first principle by which
a constructive enemy character is given to the neutral vessel
carrying goods, is known as the doctrine of infection. It was
1- Supra, p. 184.
2- Stockton's Ilaval War Code, 1900-1904. art. 19.
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sometimes applied in the early eighteenth century hut in
recent times it has "been universally repudiated and has never
"been applied in the United States, The second principle was
the one generally applied as international law by the United
States courts, except where treaties directed otherwise, up
to the time of the Spanish war. In spite of the renunciation
of the principle by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, and the
consistent stand of the political department of the government
in favor of "free ships free goods" since the foundation of
the republic, the courts continued to announce the condemnation
of enemy property on neutral vessels as law during the civil war,-*-
although all condemnations were supported by resort to
principles of contraband and blockade as well. With this doctrine
neutral vessels carrying enemy goods were liable to the
inconvenience of seizure and detention until the enemy goods
could be removed. As a partial compensation the neutral was
p
usually allowed freight on the enemy goods condemned. The
third principle is known as the doctrine of "free ships free
goods". Although it acts immediately for the benefit of enemy
private persons, its adoption has been brought about by the
pressure of neutral powers and it is rather as a concession to
1- Early cases, The Julia, 8 Cranch 181; The Uereide, 9 Cranch
388; The Antonia Johanna, 1 Wheat. 159, (1816); The Ariadne, 2
Wheat. 143; The Caledonian, 4 Wheat. 100. For Judicial opinion
during the Civil War see, the Hiawatha, Fed. Cas., 6451; The Hart,
3 Wall. 559, affirming the Stephen Hart, Blatch, 387.
2- The Antonia Johanna, 1 Wheat. 159, Hoover vs. U.S., 22 Ct. CI.
408, 460,(1887); The Ann Green, 1 Gall. 274.
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the neutral's interest in not having his vessels detained, than
for the benefit of belligerent powers, that the doctrine has
at length become incorporated into international law, 1 In
naval instructions of the Revolutionary War the principle was
and
provided for/the courts at that time applied it in accord with
these instructions. 2 In early treaties beginning with the
first treaty concluded by the United States, that with France
in 1778 "free ships free goods" found a place, 3 sometimes
though not always coupled with a stipulation for "enemy ships,
enemy goods". 4 The political department of the government has
supported this principle as a rule of international law since
the establishment of the government^ but it was not applied by
1- The Doctrine was first authoritatively advocated by the
Armed Neutrality of 1780, sponsored by Russia, see Moore's Digest,
7; 558-561.
2- Naval Instructions, Apr. 3, 1776; Apr. 7, 1781, Jour. Cong.,
Ford, ed., 4; 253, 19;361, Allen, op.cit., 2;695. See also,
Darby vs. the Brig Erstern, 2 Dall. 34; Ordinance Dec .4, 1781 , J. C . 7
;
3- "Free Ships, Free Goods" has been provided for in thirty
treaties with twenty-seven countries, of which the following are
now in force: Bolivia, 1858, art. 16, Malloy, p. 1195; Columbia,
1846, art. 15, p. 306; Italy, 1871, art. 16, p. 974; Peru, 1856,
art. 1, p. 1402; Prussia, 1785-1796, revived 1828, art. 12, p. 1481;
Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 7, o. 1727; Russia,
1854, art. 1, p. 1520.
4- Of the above treaties in force those with Sweden and Columbia,
contain the stipulation of "enemy ships, enemy goods". See infra,
note 44.
5- See Moore's Digest, 7;434-453, especially letter of instruc-
tions by Secretary of State Cass, to United States Minister in
France, June 27, 1859, which says, "with respect to the protection
of the vessel and the cargo by the flag which waves over them, the
United States look upon that principle as established and they
maintain that belligerent property on board neutral ships is
not liable to capture", p. 450. In spite of this the courts
affirmed the opposite view a few years later during the civil war.
See The Hiawatha, Fed. Cas., 6451, The Hart, 3 Wall. 559.
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the courts after the Revolutionary war until the war of 1898.
The principle was adopted "by most of the power through the
Declaration of Paris of 1856, but this was never acceded to
by the United States and during the civil war the courts
continued to voice the earlier principle. 1 In proclamations
and naval instruction of the Spanish war the principle was
adopted, and it was also incorporated into Stockton's Naval
2War code. It is now undoubtedly law in the United States as
well as a principle of international law.
(f ) Neutral goods on enemy vessels have also been
subjected to varying treatment. The three possible principles
are (1) both enemy vessel and neutral goods are liable, (2) the
vessel alone is liable, (3) neither the vessel nor the goods
may be condemned. The first principle, known as "enemy ships,
enemy goods", was frequently applied in the early eighteenth
century along with the doctrine of infection, at a time when
neutrals were so few and lacking in force that their voice
commanded no attention but in recent times it has not been
applied as a rule of international law, and was repudiated by the
Declaration of Paris of 1856. It has however, been frequently
stipulated in treaties, as an offset to the concession of "free
ships, free goods". The United States has embodied this
1- The Hiawatha, Fed. Cas., 6451, The Hart, 3 Wall. 559.
2- Telegraphic Instructions, Apr. 22, 1898, (Moore's Digest, 7;
453); Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, (30 stat. 1770); Stockton's
Naval War Code, 1900-1904, art. 19.
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principle in a number of treaties, two of which are still in
force but probably obsolete in this respect. The second
principle that which condemns the enemy vessel and saves the
neutral goods, coupled with the principle that enemy goods
in neutral vessels are liable, was laid down in the Consolato
del Mare,^ a body of sea law of the thirteenth century, and has
formed the recognized rule of international law since that time.
The principle was adopted in the Declaration of Paris in
combination with the principle of "free ships free goods".
Although the United States did not accede to this declaration,
1- "Enemy ships, enemy goods", has been provided for in eighteen
treaties with thirteen powers, always in combination with the
stipulation of "free ships, free goods" and generally with the
proviso that goods of the neutral laden on an enemy vessel in a
specified time, varying from two to eight months after the out-
break of war shall be exempt. Only two of these treaties, those
with Peru, 1870-1886, (art. 19, p. 1420) and Salvador, 1870-1895,
(art. 16, p. 1556) were concluded after the Declaration of Paris.
In these two cases existing treaties were merely revised and the
clause was probably retained through lack of attention and an
automatic copying of old forms, in fact in the Peruvian treaty of
1856, the principles of the Declaration of Paris had been
adhered to as permanent and immutable. At the revision of the
Peruvian treaty of 1870 in 1887 the clause was ommitted. Two of
these treaties, those with Sweden, (1783-1798, revived 1827, art.
14, p. 1730; ) and Columbia, then called New Granada, (1846, art,
16, p. 307) are still in force. A convention of 1909, with
Columbia, (art. 7, Charles, treaties, p. 237), provided that
negotiations for the revision of the latter with a view to
removing obsolete provisions should be entered into.
2- Text of the Prize Chapters of the Consolato del Mare, may be
found in TCheaton, History of the law of Nations, N.Y., 1845, p. 63;
Travers Twiss, The Black Book of the Admiralty, Rolls Series,
No. 55, 3; 539. In his introduction to this work, Twiss gives a
very full account of the origin and force of the Consolato.
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in six individual treaties"1 of about that time it was agreed
to recognize the two principles as "permanent and inviolable"
rules of international law, applicable to all powers who so
conceived them. The courts have consistently applied this
rule in cases not covered by treaty provisions with a different
requirement, but with the presumption that goods in an enemy
vessel are enemy. The final principle, that which contemplates
the exemption of both the enemy vessel and its neutral cargo,
when coupled with the existing principle of "free ships, free
goods", would logically lead to the total immunity of enemy
private property from seizure during war. This is a principle
historically advocated by the United States, but is not at
present a rule of international law. In its treaties with Prussia
of 1785 and with Italy of 1871, 3 the latter of which is still
in force, the principle was adopted as between the signatories.
As the United States has never been at war with a country with
1- Treaties with Bolivia, 1858, art. 16, Malloy, p. 119;
Dominican Republic 1867-1898, art. 15, p, 408; Hayti, 1860-1905,
art. 19, p. 926; Peru, 1856, art. 1, p. 1402; Russia, 1854, art. 1,
p. 1520; Two Sicilies, 1855-1861, art. 1, p. 1813. The two
principles of the Declaration of Paris were incorporated in a
treaty with Tripoli of 1805, art. 5, p. 1789.
2- The London Packet, 1 Mason, 14, The Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague,
150; The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U.S. 655,(1899), Scott, 637; The
Lynchburg, Blatch. 57. See also Declaration of London, 1909,
art. 59.
3- Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 23, p. 1484; Italy,
1871, art. 12, p. 973. In a treaty with Bolivia of 1858 the
contracting parties agreed to give asylum to privateers until they
should relinquish that practice, "in consideration of the general
relinquishment of the right to capture private property on the
high seas", (art. 9, p. 117).
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which such a treaty existed, the principle has never been
applied by the courts. In the two Hague conferences, the United
States delegation urged the adoption of this principle. In the
first conference a "voeu" was formally expressed that the
question be discussed at a succeeding conference.-^- At the second
conference in 1907, the matter was discussed at length and a
2
vote taken in which twenty-one powers including Germany, Austria,
Italy and the United States voted for; eleven including Great
Britain, France, Russia, and Japan voted against it, while one
abstained from voting.
(5) Necessity . The final rule, under which condemnation
of neutral property has been claimed is by the rights of preemption
3
and angary. It is asserted that in case of necessity the
belligerent may seize and use any neutral property provided it
is paid for. In a number of treaties preemption rather than
confiscation has been provided as the treatment of contraband,^1
but the present case relates to the seizure of goods not contra-
1- See Moore's Digest, 7; 471.
2- Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la paix, Actes et
Documents, 3 vols., The Hague, 1907, 3; 832.
3- The term angary applied to forced service of neutral vessels
and is now obsolete. See G. G. Wilson, Handbook of International
Law, St. Paul, 1910, p. 416. Preemption refers to the forced sale
of property. See Wilson, op. cit., p. 437.
4- Treaties with Great Britain 1794-1807, art. 18, p. 601; Prussia
1785-1796, art. 13, p. 1481; 1799-1810, revived, 1828, art. 13,
p. 1491. For interpretation of the Prussian treaty see U. S. vs.
Diekelraan, 92 U.S. 526. It has also been made the basis of
compensation in the recent case (1915) of the United States
vessel, William P. Frye.
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band or condemnable under any excuse other than necessity.
Several treaties among them the Spanish treaty of 1902, ^
provide that vessels and property of subjects of the contracting
parties, when neutral shall be exempt from seizure except in
case of necessity and then compensation shall be given, to be
arranged beforehand if possible.
Recognition of the right of requisitioning neutral
property in case of necessity is given in the Declaration of
London, The Hague Conventions, Lieber's instructions of 1863,
the naval instructions of 1898 and Stockton's Naval war code of
p
1900 to 1904. In all of these cases, however, full payment
for such requisitions is stated as an obligation.
2. Claims of the Neutral Owner.
Having considered the claims which the captor state
will offer as a basis for the condemnation of neutral prizes, the
claims of the neutral owner involved may be considered. These
claims may be grouped under the heads, (1) restitution,
(2) compensation, (3) damages, (4) restoration.
(1) Restitution of the actual property has been recognized
by the United States courts as the proper course in all cases
1- Treaty with Spain, 1902, art. 5, Malloy, p. 1703.
2- Declaration of London, art. 29, 49-54; Hague Conventions, 1907,
IV, annex, art. 52, V, art. 19; Instructions for the government
of the Armies of the United States in the Field, by Francis Lieber,
Apr. 24, 1863, Gen. Ord., War. Dept., No. 100, printed, Naval
War. College, International Law Discussions, 1903, art. 14, 38;
Naval Instructions, June 20, 1898, For. Rel., 1898, p. 780;
Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 3, 6, 14, 50.
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where the government does not make good its claim to condemnation.
It is the logical corallary of the principle that title to
property does not change until after decision rendered by the
prize court. If the court does not support the governments
claim for condemnation, the original owner's title has never "been
lost and he can claim the goods.
(2) Restitution, however, may he impossible. The
cargo may have been requisitioned or destroyed. If enemy goods
on board are condemned, a practice now repudiated the shipper
can not get freight from the consignee. In such cases the
courts have held compensation to be due the innocent neutral ^-
but this is subject to important limitations. The seizure may
have been justifiable because of suspicious circumstances,
although there is no condemnation. Here losses caused by delay
must be borne by the owner. Part of the cargo may have been
destroyed through accident or the lawful exercise of belligerent
rights by the captor. Here again the neutral suffers the loss
g
of freight and goods.
(3) However, restitution and compensation for actual
goods seized or destroyed may be no means cover the loss of the
neutral. Even if the ship and cargo are intact the delay may
have caused serious loss through fall of markets or breach of
contract. The right of the neutral to damages in such cases has
1- Declaration of London, 1909, art. 64; Hague Conventions, 1907,
V, art. 19; Stockton's Naval War Code, art. 6, 14. The Nuestra
Senora de Regla, 108, U.S. 92. (1882).
2- The Antonia Johanna, 1 Wheat. 159, (1816).
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been recognized in United States courts. Damages can not lie
against the government for more than the value of the prize
p
under adjudication, but they may be had from a naval officer
if the seizure was made without probable cause. 3 The burden
of proof however, is always upon the neutral claimant. 4 Except
in a very clear case recovery is impossible.
(4) The claim for restoration differs from those just
considered in that it is not brought by the party from whom
the vessel was immediately seized but from a former owner. It
arises in cases of recapture from the enemy, of a vessel or
goods originally belonging to a neutral or national individual.
^
The validity of the claim depends on whether or not title had
passed to the enemy captor before recapture. If it had, the
vessel is enemy property, if it had not it is neutral or national
property, and must be restored. The different views which have
1- The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, (1868); The Uuestra Senora de Hegla,
108, U. S. 92; Slocumb vs. Mayberry, 2 Wheat; The Appfflllon, 9
Wheat. 377; The Lively, 1 Gall. 315.
2- In the Siren, 7 Wall. 152,(1868), a neutral vessel was run
into and sunk by a captured prize. The court held the owner of
the sunken vessel could recover to the value of the prize if
subject to condemnation, but no more.
3- Del Col vs. Arnold, 3 Dall. 333, (1796 ) ; Little vs. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170,(1804); The Eleanor, 7 Wheat. 345; Jecker vs. Montgomery,
13 How. 498; The Thompson, 3 Wall. 1551 The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall.
170; The Anna Maria, 2 Wheat. 327; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546.
See Moore's Digest, 7; 583-597.
4- The Marianna Flore, 11 Wheat. 1,(1826); Murray vs. The
Charming Betsey, 2 Cranch 64; The Buena Ventura, vs. U.S. 175 U.S.
384; The Thompson, 3 Wall. 185; The Dashing Wave, 5 Wall. 170.
See Moore's Digest, 7; 598.
5- The right of restoration has been derived from the Roman Jus
Postliminii, although that applied to the rule whereby slaves
and property on land returned to their former status after
reconquest. See Hershey, op. cit., p. 439.
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been held on this subject assert that title to enemy property-
vests, (l) immediately on seizure, (2) after twenty four hours
quiet possession, (3) after bringing "infra praesidia", (4)
after condemnation by a prize court. All of these rules have
been at different times acted by by courts and embodied in
executive orders,-1- but the one at present established appears to
be the last. The original owners claim is good until the vessel
has been condemned in an enemy prize court. 6 A statute of 1800
1- Vesting of title immediately on seizure was held to be the
rule of international law during the Revolutionary War, (See the
Resolution, Fed. Court of Appeals, 1781, 2 Dall. 1,4, McDonough
vs. Dannery and the Ship Mary Ford, 3 Dall. 188, 1796) thus the
right of restoration was denied altogether except by way of
comity or express ordinance. An ordinance of congress , (Nov. 25,
1776, Journ. Cong., Ford, ed., 3;373) granted restoration of
recaptures made before twenty four hours possession but the court
held this could not apply where the enemy had sold the prize to
a neutral and in any case it applied only to United States
citizens, (The Resolution, Fed. Court of Appeals, 1781, 2 Dall.l,
4). The twenty four hour rule was also recognized in several early
treaties as to neutrals, where the captor was a privateer, although
restoration was permitted even after twenty four hours possession
and before condemnation when the captor was a public vessel. (See
treaties with Netherlands, 1782-1795; Malloy, p. 1243; Sweden,
1783-1798, revived 1827, p. 1830; Prussia, 1785-1796; 1799-1810,
arts. 17, 21, pp. 1482, 1492.)
2- Talbot vs. Seamans, 1 Cranch 1,(1801); Murray vs. The Charm-
ing Betsey, 2 Cranch 64, 121,(1804); The Star, 3 Wheat. 78, 86,
(1818). Restoration even after condemnation has been allowed where
the condemnation by the enemy prize court was clearly illegal.
See The Resolution, 2 Dall.l, (1781).
3- Act Mch. 3, 1800, 2 stat. 16, June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760;
June 27, 1813, 2 stat. 793; June 30, 1864, 13 stat. 306, 314; rev.
stat. sec. 4652.
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oontinued "by subsequent acts, required restoration to United
States citizens where the property had not been condemned
by competent authority, and to neutral subjects on a basis of
reciprocity. 1 The neutral can make good his claim only where
the law of his country would allow restoration to a citizen of
the United States, In any case a deduction of military salvage
for the recaptor^s is allowed before restoration.
The measures taken to enforce the duty of the United
States as a belligerent to abstain from illegally interfering
with neutral commerce are found in the rules laid down for the
courts in treaties, statutes, and executive orders and instructions
but primarily in the principles of law to which prize courts
have habitually adhered. These principles to which American
prize courts have professed obedience are (l) the principle that
title does not pass until decree of a prize court, (2) the law
applied by prize courts is the lav/ of nations, (3) statutes and
orders should be interpreted if possible so as not to conflict
with international law, (4) treaties, including law making
international conventions, are to be applied as part of the law
of the land. So long as these principles are adhered to by
discreet courts the national duties of this character will un-
doubtedly be fulfilled. Yet on account of the inevitable
tendency of even the most conscientious judges to be swayed by
1- The Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, See Moore's Digest, 7;
521-535.
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national partizanship the establishment of the international
prize court with a final jurisdiction in cases involving neutrals
would he a most important addition to these sanctions of
neutral rights. The United States has signed the international
prize court convention and the senate has recommended ratifica-
tion. The same is true of the Declaration of the London naval
conference designed to serve as a law to be applied by that
court. It has therefore done the most in its power to add
this sanction also for the enforcement of its duties as a
belligerent.
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Chapter II* Obligations of Prevention *
Int roductory .
A belligerent state while acting in that capacity is for the
most part represented by its army and navy. The part of inter-
national law defining the obligations of belligerents to neutrals,
therefore consists to a considerable extent of rules of conduct
for such agencies of government. The land and naval forces may
be controlled by municipal law. The obligations of prevention re-
quire a state to exercise this control and prevent infractions of
international law by its armed representatives.
With the theory of territorial state sovereignty, neutral
states have a right, in war as well as in peace, to exclusive con-
1
trol of their territory. As has been noted they are under an
obligation to vindicate this right by interning armed forces of a
belligerent violating their territory. The belligerent is under
an equal obligation to respect this right by preventing such vio-
j lations of neutral territory. I
Although with a strict application of the theory of territorial
' sovereignty the states interest in its citizen would vanish as
soon as he leaves its frontiers, the actual law recognizes that
I I
states have a limited right to protect their citizens on the high
seas and in foreign countries. Belligerents must respect this
[
right and prevent injury to such persons and illegal destruction
of their property. i7e may therefore classify the obligations here
considered into that of preventing (1) violations of neutral ter-
ritory, and (8) injury to neutral persons and property. Reserving
1. For exceptions to thi3 general statement see supra p. 44 et sea.
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this as a secondary classification we will divide the obligations
of prevention primarily into those relating to (l) acts by the lane
forces, and (2) acts by naval forces.
1. Acts by Land Forces.
I'he probability of land forces violating neutral territory
or injuring neutral individuals is much less than in the case of
naval forces, yet the United States has recognized by treaty, the
duty of preventing its land forces performing certain acts.
1
(l)3y the Hague conventions, a belligerent is forbidden violating
neutral territory, by moving troops or conveys of military material
across it, erecting wireless stations or other means of communica-
tion, or by recruiting corps of combattants thereon. It would
therefore appear to be incumbent upon the United States to prevent
its land forces performing any of these acts on neutral territory
in time of way.
Their appear to have been no cases of prosecution of array
officers for violating neutral territory in time of war but in an
2
opinion of the Judge Advocate general in 1908 it was stated that
the armed forces of the United States should not be permitted to
penetrate neutral territory in the process of enforcing the neutral-
ity laws. In the army regulations relating to garrison inspection
the inspectors are required to see that the commanding officer is
properly executing the laws relating to neutrality and the regul-
ations concerning international courtesy so far as applicable to
3
to his post.
1. Hague Conventions, 11)07 llalloy, p. 2297, V. Art. 1-3.
2. Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the Army
1912, G. R. Howland, ed. p. 106.
3. Army Regulations, 1913, sec. 889, p. 171-172.
-
---
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(2) The United States has recognized its duty to prevent the
injury of neutral persons through seizure of property on land in
1
the Hague Conventions. The general prohibitions relating to seiz-
ure of enemy property on land apply to neutrals in enemy territory
and special provisions are included, requiring compensation in case
railway material is requisitioned, 3y the principles of Anglo-
American law the status of property depends upon its territorial
location rather than the nationality of the owner, consequently
neutral property on enemy territory is subject to the same consid-
2
eration as enemy property in that situation. This question will
be more fully considered in dealing with the law of war. Suffice
it to say, here, that the Instructions for the government of the
3 4
armies state and the courts have reiterated that private property
cannot be seized on land except by requisition in case of necessity
unless an act of congress especially permits.
In a number of treaties the united States has agreed not to
draft resident subjects of the other contracting power for military
1. Eague Conventions, 1907, V. Art. 19, Llalloy, p. 229 7.
2. On the Enemy character of the produce of enemy soil see,
Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch 191, The Prize
Cases, 2 Black 635, 671. On the enemy character of proper-
ty of citizens or neutrals domiciled in enemy territory,
see, Chester vs. The Experiment, Fed. Court of Appeals, 2
Dall. 41, (1787); U.S. vs. Gillies, Pet. C.C. 159; The
Venus, 8 Cranch 253, (1814); The France, 8 Cranch 335,363,
(1814); The Uary and Susan, 1 Wheat, 46; Rogers vs. Amado
,
1 Newb. Adm. 400; The William Bagel ey, 5 Wall. 377; Gates
vs. Goodloe, 101 U.S. 612; Mrs. Alexanders Cotton, 2 Wall.
404, 419. On the general subject see Lloores Digest ,7 ;424-
434.
3. Instructions for the government of the armies of the United
States in the Field, Art. 38; Printed in The Military Laws
of the United States, 1911, p. 1079; Baval War College,
International Law Discussions 1903, p. 122.
4. Brown vs. U.S. 8 Cranch 110, (1814).
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1
service in case of war. flith the exception of treaties relating
2
to claims for injuries in specific cases, these treaties appear to
contain the only formal provisions imposing duties upon the United
States in reference to the injury of persons of neutral states in
land war fare. Whether or not a belligerent state is responsible
for injuries received by aliens resident in its territory, due to
the exercise of martial law, or the conduct of actual hostilities,
3
is not altogether clear in international law. Undoubtedly a state
is bound to prevent its armed forces unnecessarily and wantonly
4
injuring neutral residents, but it seems clear that it is under no
such duty when the actual prosecution of military movements create
5
a necessity. The neutral alien assumes the risk of his residence.
No statutes, regulations or official opinions of the military law
of the United States appear to bear on this point, if we except the
provisions relating to the usual exemption of enemy private pro-
6
perty contained in Liebers' instructions. Military commissions
undoubtedly have a jurisdiction to punish acts forbidden by the
treaties mentioned, but the protection of resident neutrals during
1. Treaties with Argentine Republic ,1853, art. 10 Malloy p. 23;
Congo, 1891, art. 3, p. 329; Costa Rica 1851, art. 9, p. 344; Dom-
inican Republic, 1867-1898, art .2, p. 404; France ,1778-1798 , art
.
14, p. 495; Hayti ,1864-1905 , art. 8, p. 923; Honduras ,18 64, art
.
9, p. 955; Italy, 1871, art .3, p. 970; Japan, 189 4, art .1, p. 1029;
Mexico ,1831-1881, art. 9, p. 1088; Paraguay , 1859 , art .11, p. 1367;
Servia,1881,Art
.4, p. 1703; Tonga, 1886 , art .9 ,p .1783; Two Sic-
ilies,1855-1861, art .5,p. 1816; Venezuela, 1860-1870. art. 2,
p. 1846.
2. Treaty of Washington, with Great Britain, 1871, art .12, Lialloy
p. 705. The commission provided, allowed Great Britain
vl, 929, 819 for injuries to British subjects during the Civil
War. See note lialloy ,p . 705. Treaty with France ,1880 ,ualloy,
p. 535. France was awarded $625 ,566.35 for injuries to her
subjects during the Civil War. Lialloy, p. 539.
3. Moore's Digest, 6; 883-926.
4. Moore's Digest, 6; 918-922.
5. Moore's Digest, 6; 883-894.
6. Lieber's Instructions, art. 38, Military Laws ,1911 ,p .1079
.
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war is largely left within the discretion of the president as
commander in chief of the army and subordinate military authorities
with delegated powers.
(3) As the actual enforcement of the state's duties of pre-
vention in relation to the army depend upon the method of control
1
exercised, some attention may be given to this point. The dis-
cipline of the army is to a large extent governed by formal rules
but these rules are to a considerable extent enforced by the dis-
cretionary authority of high military officers. In the field cov-
ered by constitutionally enacted congressional statutes, the army
is bound, beyond the authority of any executive or military officer
to transcend, but in matters relating purely to the conduct of war
it is doubtful whether congress has the power to control the army
2
by statute.
This does not however, mean that the army is unregulated by
law. It has a system of law of its own, known as military law,
administered by its own officers, and courts. The president as
commander in chief has complete discretion as to the movements of
the army except so far as limited by the constitution and acts of
3
congress within the competence of that body. Jhile the President 1
1. The statutory laws relating to the control of the army, an-
notated with references to court decisions and opinions of
attorneys general and judge advocates general may be found
in The .Military Laws of the United States, 1901, ed. by G.B.
Davis, with a -supplement to 1911, ed. by J.B.Porter. The
Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the
Army, published in 1912, also contains references to statute
cases and opinions of attorneys General bearing on the var-
ious points.
2. On the independence of the President see Military Laws, 1911,
p. 5 and notes. See Kendall vs. U.S. 12 Pet. 524, 610; -iarbury
vs. Lladison, 1 Cranch 137, 166.
3. Military Laws, 1911, p. 5, note 2.
s
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authority is discretionary and may be altered at will, as a matter
of fact it is exercised by means of more or less permanent regul-
ations and instructions issued as general orders. These regula-
1
tions have the force of law while operative and together with
statutes and constitutional provisions, their interpretations
found in judicial decisions and opinions of attorneys general and
judge advocates general, form the body of military law.
2
Military law is enforced by executive action, as in the power
of promotion, demotion and discharge exercisable by superior mil-
3
itary officers; by courts martial, whose jurisdiction is defined
by statute and extends only over statutory military offences most
4
of which are included in the Articles of War; and by military
5
commissions. Military commissions, administer military law by a
proceedure similar to courts martial but they are not limited to
the punishment of statutory offenses. They may take cognizance of
acts contrary to the unwritten law of war or to military regula-
tions .
The jurisdiction of both courts martial and military com-
6
missions is of an exclusively criminal character. They decree
punishments but do not award damages or reparation of any kind.
7
Their jurisdiction, however, is not territorial. It extends over
offenses committed in foreign countries.
1. U.S. vs. Barrows, Fed. Cas. 14,529; Dig. of Op. of Judge Ad. Gen.
1912, p. 681.
2. Llilitary Laws, 1911, p. 5. note 2.
3. Digest of Op. of Judge Ad .Gen
.
,1912 ,p .510-513.
4. Rev. Stat., sec .1342-1343; Military Laws, 1911, p. 962-1026. For
Historical account of development of articles of war;
Military laws, 1911, p. 962.
5. For History of development of Llilitary commissions see Dig.
of Op. of Judge Ad. Gen, 1912, p.1067. Use during Civil War,
ibid. p. 1071. Authority of , see Hev .Stat .1343, Military Laws
1911,p.744,note I.p745-Liebers Instructions , art .13, LlilitaryLaws, 1911. p. 1076; Dig.Op .Judge Ad. Gen. ,1912 p. 1067-1072. *
6. Dig.Op. Judge, Ad. Gen. 1912, pp. 510, 1072.
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x
The statutory provisions, known as The Articles of War, large-
2
ly prescribe duties of enlisted men and officers in relation to
their military superiors and the performance of their military
duties. Their aim is to enforce discipline in the army and they
contain little matter referring to the law of war. Courts martial
being limited in Jurisdiction to these offenses, can not take cog-
nizance of breaches of the unwritten law of war, including breaches
of the armies obligations to neutral states and persons. The en-
forcement of these matters is in the hands of military commissions
and their jurisdiction in time of war extends to offenses com-
mited by enlisted men, or officers, civilians, or enemies, con-
3
trary to military law or the law of war.
It is therefore by executive action and the adjudication of
military commissions that the duties of the army toward neutrals
are enforced. The provisions of the treaties mentioned, and the
general requirements of international law, as well as the rules
specified in army regulations and instructions may be enforced by
these authorities.
2. Acts of Naval Forces.
The llaval Forces of a belligerent are much more likely to in-
fringe the rights of neutral states than land forces. With them
therefore the duty of preventing such infractions has received more
attention in the municipal law of the United States.
1. Rev. Stat, sec .1342-1343
,
Llilitary Laws ,1911 ,p .962-1026.
2. An exception may be noted in the jurisdiction given to courts
martial over enemy spies, Rev .Stat .sec .1343, L'lilitarv Laws,
1911, p. 1026.
3. On the distinction between the jurisdiction of Military com-
missions and courts martial, see Lieber's Instructions,
art. 13, Military Laws, 1911, p. 1076.
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1
(1) By the Hague conventions the United States has recognized
the obligation to prevent its naval forces violating neutral ter-
ritory "by committing hostilities or setting up prize courts in
neutral waters, using neutral territory as a "base of operations or
violating the usual rules of asylum.
As in the case of the army the action of naval commanders is
largely regulated by executive control. There are however, statutes
dealing with the navy. The "Articles for the government of the
2
Navy of the United States" specify certain acts as crimes and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of courts martial. The only authority
3
capable of inflicting punishment in the navy are commanders, for
minor offenses and for more serious offenses, summary and general
4
courts martial. There are no courts in the liavy similar to mil-
itary commissions.
In addition to statutory provisions, the navy is governed by
bodies of rules known as navy regulations and naval instructions
which are promulgated by the president and have the force of law
5
until repealed.
ITo provisions of statute deal with violations of neutral ter-
1. Hague Conventions, 1907 XIII , art .1,4, 5,12, 15 7 23. In Thirty-
two treaties with twenty five countries the United States
has been given the right of asyluming its war vessels in
neutral ports, when necessary through "stress of weather,
pursuit of pirates or enemies." The following are now in
force, Bolivia, 1858, art .9, Llalloy, p. 117; Prussia, 1799-1810,
revived, 1828, art .18, 19, p. 1492; Sweden, 1783-1798 , revived
1816 ,1827 , art .21 ,p .1732. Such action does not constitute
a violation of neutral territory even in the absence of
treaty. Moore's Digest , 7 ;982-985.
2. Rev. Stat .sec. 1624; ivavy Regulations 1913,p. 15.
3. Rev. Stat ., sec .1624 art. 24.
4. Rev. Stat .sec. 1624, art .22,26 ,38.
5. Regulations for the government of the Navy of the United
States, Washington, 1913 ,under authority of Rev. stat.,sec.
1547.
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ritory "but regulations and instructions, since the Revolutionary
war have enjoined officers to respect neutral rights and especially
to refrain from hostilities in neutral territory. Thus "by the -Wavy
Regulations of 1913 commanders in Chief are to "scrupulously respect
the territorial authority of foreign civilized nations in amity with
2
the United States."
(2) The duty of preventing its naval forces injuring neutral
individuals, involves largely restraints which such forces are
hound to observe in exercising the belligerent right of seizing
neutral prizes on the high seas. The law applied by courts in en-
forcing the government's duty to abstain from illegally confiscat-
ing neutral prizes has been considered. Here we will consider the
methods by which naval forces are prevented from making such seiz-
ures, or otherwise injuring neutral persons.
It must be observed that the acts prohibited in performing
these duties of prevention and abstention are not exactly the
same. The belligerent must prevent a prima facie unjustifiable
seizure, but even when the seizure is justifiable the government
1. Daval Instructions , Apr. 3, 1776 , Apr. 7 ,1781 , ( Journ. Cong ,Ford , ed.
,
4; 253,19; 361 ) ; Aug. 28, 1812, ( 2 Iheat .App .80 ,Moo re 1 s Digest,
7; 545. Authority for the issuance of these orders was given
in the prize act of 1812, 2 stat .760, sec .8. They were upheld
in the -i-homas Gibbons, 8 Cranch 421 ,( 1814 ), but in the Mary and
3usan, 1 ./heat .46 , 57 ,( 1816 ) it was held that the captor must
be notified of the order before his right to prize money from
vessels, captured contrary to them, would be affected);
Hay 14, 1846, (Br. and For. St .Pap. ,34; 1139, Moore's Digest, 7;
828); Dec. 24, 1846, (Moore's Digest, 7; 790); Nov. 6, 1861; May
14,1862, (Upton, op. cit.p. 490) ; Aug. 18 ,1862(0f ficial Records,
Union and Confederate Navies, Ser. 1, 1 ; 417 ,Moore ' s Digest,
7;700); June 20
,
1898, (Gen. Ord. ,Navy Dept . ,1898, No .492, For.
Rel. ,1898, p. 780) ; Jan. 27 ,1900, (Gen.Ord. ,Navy Dept ., 1900 ,No .
551, revoked, ibid., Feb. 4, 1904 No .150 ) .liavy Regulations ,1913
sec. 1645,1647.
2. Navy Regulations, 1913 , sec. 1645. Navy commanders are allowed
some discretion under these rules. See note at head of
chapter 15, Navy Regulations ,1913, p .159r.
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may be bound to abstain from confiscating the prize. Thus it
frequently happens that a naval officer ?4 11 be held completely
justified in making a seizure even though the prize after adjudi-
1
cation is restored to the neutral owner.
It might be supposed that the means adopted to prevent illegal
seizure of neutral property at sea, would be a matter of purely
national concern and would not be specified by international law.
This is not"T;he case. The exercise of belligerent rights over
neutral commerce is so important and so subject to abuse, that
international law has to some extent specified the exact means which
a state must provide for carrying out this obligation. Thus, it
forbids captures by privateers, requires certain specified for-
malities of visit and search, and demands adjudication of the prize
by a court acting in the usual form of judicial bodies. The bel-
ligerent state is of course at liberty to enact supplementary laws
to better fulfill its duties under this head. Among such acts in
force in the United States may be mentioned the statutes abolish-
ing prize money, and those affixing criminal penalties for the
spoliation of prizes. Before the abolition of privateering the
requirements of bonds from privateers and the enforcement of lia-
bility against the owners of privateers were rules of this charact-
er. The abolition of privateering and the attempted abolition of
prize money at the Second Hague conference are illustrations of the
tendency of international law to enter more and more this field,
formerly left to the discretion of states.
The United otates has taken measures to prevent the illegal
seizure of prizes by restricting the classes of vessels which may
make seizures, by prescribing rules for visit and search of neutral
1. The Ilarianna Flora, 11 ,7heat. 1, (1826).
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vessels, and "by affixing penalties for making unjustifiable seiz-
ures. An improper treatment of prizes and their crews is also pre-
vented by municipal law. Definite rules for the conduct of prizes
have been prescribed. Criminal penalties enforceable by court
martial proceedings against persons in the navy violating these
rules, as well as liability to civil suit for damages, add sanctions
to their enforcement. Adjudication of prizes has also been pro-
vided for by the establishment of courts of prize jurisdiction.
These matters will be considered in greater detail in the following
sections dealing with the seizure of prizes, the care and treatment
of prizes and the adjudication of prizes.
3. The seizure of prizes.
The United States has authorized seizures during \mr by three
varieties of vessels, (l) privateers, (2) Converted merchantmen,
(3) vessels of the navy.
(1) The use of privateers or private armed vessels in war was
prohibited by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. The United States
1
has not acceded to this declaration, but refrained from using
2
privateers during the Civil War, and by proclamation at the out-
break of the Spanish war of 1898 disclaimed intention to use them
1. The United States did not accede to the Declaration of raris
because not having a navy it considered this type of naval
militia necessary, until the right to capture private pro-
perty at sea should be abolished altogether. This complete
exemption has been a tradition of American policy since
earliest times. In a treaty with Bolivia, of 1858, it was
reciprocally agreed, to give asylum to privateers, until the
two parties should relinquish their use, "in consideration
of the general relinquishment of the right of capture of
private property upon the high seas." art .9 ,Llalloy ,p .117
.
2. On proposals to issue letters of i.Iarque during the Civil War
and reasons for not doing so, see Moore's Digest, 7;556. An
Act of March 3,1863, 12 stat. 758, gave the president author-
ity to issue letters of Ilarque.

1 extensively
during that war. Privateers have not "been/used since 1856 and it
may safely be said that their use is now forbidden by international
law.
The United States made free use of privateers in the Revolu-
tionary war and the V/ar of 1812. On these occasions efforts were
made to prevent illegal seizures through rules of municipal law
expressed in treaties, statutes, naval instructions and court de-
cisions. Privateers were provided with commissions or letters of
-<Iarque accompanied by special instructions stating the scope and
2
limits of their right to seize property. These commissions could
3
be declared forfeited at the discretion of the President. By
4 5
Treaties and Statutes privateers were required to furnish bond or
1. Proclamation, Apr. £6 ,1898,30 stat .1770 ; Ho ore 1 s Digest , 7 ; 541
.
2. Privateers were authorized by a resolution of the continental
congress, ilarch 23,1776, On April 2, and 3, forms of commission
were adopted to be sent in blank to the colonies. About 1700 let-
ters of Marque were issued during the Revolutionary war. See Allen
liaval History of the American Revolution, 1;451; 2;701. During the
war of 1812, privateers were of great importance. In the civil war
the confederate states issued letters of Marque and an act of Men.
3, 1863, authorized their issuance by the federal government.
Regulations and instructions were drawn up on Mch.20,1863, but as a
matter of policy no commissions were issued. See Moores, Digest
7; 556. See Resolutions, of Congress, Moll. 23, 1776 instructions Apr.
3,776, Apr 17, 1781, ( Journ. Cong. , Ford, ed. ,4; 230 , 253 , 19 ; 361 ) ; In-
structions, Aug. 28, 1812, ( 27/heat . App.80) Moore's Digest , 7 ; 544 ) . On
necessity of carrying commissions see Upton, op .cit .p .177
.
3. Act June 26,1812,2 stat. 760, See Upton, Op. cit
. ,p 181,185; The
Thomas Gibbons, 8 C ranch, 421.
4. Treaties with Great Britain,1794-1607, art .19 ,Malloy p. 602;
France ,1800-1809 , art . 23 ,p . 504; Netherlands , 1782-1795 , art .14 ,p .1238
;
Prussia, 1785-1796, art .15,p. 1482; Sweden ,1783-1798 , revived treaty
of 1827, art
.16, p. 1730.
5. Act. July 9,1798, 1 stat. 578, June 26,1812, 2 stat 760.
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1
other security for good "behavior. An act of 1812 required pri-
vateers to keep a journal which was to he inspected by the com-
manders of naval vessels meeting the privateer at sea, prohibited
cruising without special instructions, and declared prize money
forfeited in case of illegal seizures. Courts have held the ow-
ners of privateers responsible for the conduct of the officers and
crew of the vessel to the full value of property injured or des-
2
troyed.
It should be noted however, that an illegal act done by a
privateer would not operate to invalidate the captures so far as
the United States government was concerned, The captor might
forfeit his prize money, bond and commission, but if the vessel
were declared good prize by the court, the neutral owner would have
3
no recourse. Thus a non commissioned vessel, or a vessel manned
4
by a neutral or even an enemy crew might make a capture, valid as
against the belligerent or neutral owner, although the officers,
crew and owners themselves might be subject to criminal punishment
or civil liability.
(2) The use of converted merchant vessels in ?/ar was provided
5
for in the .mail", subsidy act of 1891 and a number of vessels of
1. Act. June 26,1812,2 stat.760; Instructions to privateers , Aug. 28
,
1812, 2 Wheat. App .80 ,Uoore ' s Digest, 7; 544.
2. Del Col vs. Arnold, 3 Dall .333 , ( 179G ) . The liability of the
owners was held to extend only to acts committed by the officers
and crew in making captures in Davis vs. The Revenge, 3 Wash. 262.
For acts done not in pursuance of the commission the owner was held
not liable, see The Amiable Hancy, 1 Paine 111.
3. The Joseph, 1 G-all . 545
,
Upton.op .cit .178
.
4. The I^ary and Susan, 1 V/heat.46.
5.Act Llarch 3,1891,26 stat .830 , sec .9 . See also act July 17,1862,
12 stat. 600, sec. 8, for recognition of "armed vessels in the ser-
vice of the United States" distinct from either privateers or ves-
sels of the 2 ravy, and The Rita, 89 Fed. Rep. 7 63. Ho ore's Digest,
7;538-543.
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this character were used during the Spanish War. One of the Hague
1
conventions of 1907 contained regulations for the use of such ves-
sels but it was not signed or ratified by the united States. The
United States has always put converted merchantmen under the corn-
ed
mand of regular naval officers and sub je ct/ their crews to naval dis-
cipline. The measures taken to prevent violation of the rights of
neutral persons by regular naval forces are therefore applicable to
them.
(3) In a number of its early treaties the United States put
itself under the obligation to prevent warships exercising the right
2
of visit and search over vessels under neutral convoy, or the right
of search over vessels bearing a passport or sea letter of their
3
country when neutral. Specific requirements for conducting visit
4
and search were often included in these treaties and the right of
action for damages received by the neutral individual from a United
5
States warship or privateer was frequently granted. The treaty
requirement of bonds ,ensuring the good behaviour of privateers ,has
6
has already been mentioned.
1. Hague Conventions, 1907 , VII.
2. Respect for neutral convoy has been required in twenty four
treaties with nineteen countries of which the following are in force
Bolivia, 1858, art . 23 ,p . 309 ; Columbia ,1846 , art .23 ,p .309 ; Italy 1871,
art .19
,
p. 975; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived 1816 ,1827 ,art .12 ,p .1729
.
3. In most of the early treaties the carriage of sea letters was
provided for in terms similar to that of the French treaty of 1778-
1798 art . 24, 27 ,:ialloy ,p .477 ,478 . In some of them the carriage of
such^passport. wa3 mandatory, a failure to produce it if not explain-
ed would result in condemnation as constructive enemy property. Supra,
p. 196.
4. As examples of treaty provisions prescribigg method of conduct-
ing visit and search see treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art .15, p
.
1482; 1799-1810, art .15,t).1491; Sweden, 1783-1798, revived treaties,
1816, 1827, art .25, p. 1733.
5. Treaties with Prance ,1778-1798 .art .15 ,p .474; 1800-1809 , art .19
,
p. 504; Netherlands, 1782-1795, art .13, p. 1237; Prussia ,1785-1796
,
art
.15, p. 1482; Sweden, 1783-1798 , revived 1816 ,1827 , art .15
,
p. 1730.
6. Supra, note 4-, p. 223.
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Aceording to the Declaration of London vessels under neutral
1
convoy are exempt from visit and search. Illegal seizures are guard-
ed against by the provision entitling the owner to compensation if
his vessel was seized without sufficient reason and was subsequently
released.
In instructions issued to war vessels upon the outbreak of
2 3 4
wars and in general naval regulations and instructions methods of
conducting visit and search and other duties of naval vessels toward
neutral persons, required by treaty and international law have been
specifically enjoined.
The courts have held that the making of seizures without proba-
ble cause or proper authorization by lav/ even when done under
specific order of the President, as commander in chief of the navy,
5
renders the captor liable to damages. A seizure in violation of
international law, however, viien specifically authorized by municipal
6
law is permissable so far as the captor is concerned. The only
recourse in such cases is through diplomatic protest.
1. Declaration of London, 1909, art .61, 64.On the Status of the Decla-
ration of London in 1914, see Am. Jour. Int .Law. ,9;199 , Jan.1915.
2. Naval Instructions, Apr. 3, 1776 ,( Jour. Cong. , Ford ,ed. ,4;253) ; Apr.
7,1781, ( Jour. Cong., Ford.ed., 19 ; 361) ; Aug. 28, 1812 (2 Wheat .App.80,
Moore's Digest , 7 ; 544 ) ; 1813, Special Instructions , (Am. St .Pap. .Eav.Aff.
,
1;373, Moore's Digest , 7 ;516 ) ; May 14,1846 , (Br. and For. St .Pap . ,34;1139 ) ;
Dec. 24, 1846, (Moore's Digest , 7 ; 790 ) ; May 14,1862 , (Upton, op .cit . ,p .490 )
;
Aug. 18, 1862 ,( Sec . Jnion and ^onf .i.avies ,Ser .1 ,1 ;417 , Moore ' s Digest, 7;
700); June 20,1898 , (For .Eel 1898 ,p .780 )
.
3. Kavy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1634.
4. Stockton's Uaval tfar Code, 1900-1904, art .30,32,33.
5. Little vs. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 ,( 1804) , The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155;
The Dashing Jage , 5 7/all.l70; See also Moo res Digest , 7 ; 593-598.
6. La Maissonaire vs. Keating, 2 Gall. 334, See Upton, op .cit
.p .189
.
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4. The Care and Treatment of Prizes.
The prize having "been seized, five courses are open to the
captor. (1) Bringing in to home port for adjudication, (2) des-
truction, (3) Hansom, (4) sequestration in a neutral port or sale in
neutral territory, (5) release. The treatment which a neutral state
has a right to expect under international law and the measures which
the United States has taken to prevent its naval forces infringing
those rights will now be considered.
1
(1) A number of early treaties required the preservation of
prizes, intact until adjudication by a prize court, and the hospitable
treatment of the officers and crew.
2
The declaration of London, requires prizes to be brought to port
of
for adjudication and forbids the destruction/either vessel or cargo,
unless the prize would be liable to condemnation and an attempt to
bring it in fo,r adjudication "would involve danger to the ship of
war or to the success of the operation in which she is at the time
ship'
s
engaged." If the prize is destroyed, persons on board the/papers
must be saved and the captor is declared liable to pay compensation
if he cannot prove the existence of circumstances justifying des-
truction, irrespective of the validity of the capture. A decree of
restitution of the vessel or part of its cargo in such a case in-
volves compensation.
3
By the Articles for the government of the navy, punishment
1. As an example see treaty with Prance ,1800-1809 , art .20, 21 ....alloy, '
p. 503.
2. Declaration of London, 1909 , art .48-54.
3. Resolution, ITov .25,1775 , Jo urn. Cong.
,
Ford, ed.,3;373; act Apr. 23,
1800, 2 stat. 52; July 17,1862,12 stat.600; Rev. Stat, sec .1624,art
.
6,11,12. See other statutory provisions relating to the administra-
tion of prizes, act. March 3,1800, 1 stat. 16; June 26, 1812, 2 stat.
760; June 27, 1813, 2 stat. 793; Llarch 25, 1862, 12 stat. 375; March
3, 1863, 12 stat. 759; June 30, 1864, 13 stat. 306; Rev. stat. sec.
4615-4617.
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by death or other sentence of court martial is authorized to any one
destroying or injuring prizes or maltreating persons on board of
them, and in the instructions for the navy issued on the outbreak of
in
war, as well as /permanent instructions rules for the care of prizes
and their crew have generally been specified and their prompt bring-
1
ing in required.
The courts have declared that it is the captors duty to bring
2
prizes in for adjudication as soon as possible and to deliver papers
3
and necessary witnesses to the court. Failure to perform these
duties will result in damages to the neutral owner but it is only
for "gross misconduct without excuse or palliation" that they may
be had. "Much indulgence is extended to errors and even imDroprie-
4
ties of captors when no malignity or cruelty is justly chargeable."
(2) Special instructions to privateers and warships in the war
5
of 1812 particularly advised destruction of prizes and this action
6
was permitted by the instructions to Blockading vessels in 1898 and
7
in Stockton's Naval War Code. Although in the last two cases bring-
ing in was required unless there were "controlling reasons" for not
doing so, such as "unseaworthiness, the existence of infectious dis-
eases, lack of a prize crew," or imminent danger of recapture.
It Stockton's Naval War Code ,1900-1904, sec .46 ,47. Supra note 57.
2. -The Lively, 1 Gall. 318; The Nassau, 4 V/all.634; Moore's Digest,
7; 630.
3. -The Diana, 2 Gall. 95; The Bothnea and the Jarnstoff ,2 Gall. 88.
4. -See Upton, op. cit .p. 200, citing, The Lively and Cargo ,1 Gall. 29,
The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435; The George, 1 Mason 24. On liability of captor
for damages, see also, Slocum vs. Mayberry, 2 tfheat.l; The Appollon,
9 7/heat.362; The Neustra Senora de Regla, 108 U. S. 92, 103, (1882) , and
I-Ioore's Digest, 7; 630. Declaration of London, 1909 , art .52,53.
5. -Special instructions ,1813, Am. St .Pap. Navy Aff . 1 ; 373;Moore '
s
Digest ,7;516.
6. -Instructions to 31ockading vessels and Cruisers , June 20,1898,
For. Rel. 1698 ,p . 780 ,:.loore 1 s Digest
,
7;518.
7. -Stocktons i-aval '.Var Code, art. 50. Moore's Digest, 7; 526.
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These provisions of statute and executive order, indicate that
the destruction of prizes is permitted under certain circumstances
but the practice has been discouraged except during the war of 1812.
In discussions of the subject in the Haval War College in 1905 and
1907 the release of neutral prizes which could not be brought into
1
port was recommended
.
(3) Ransom or the release of the prize by the captor on signa-
ture of a ransom bill generally accompanied by a hostage to insure
payment is permitted by law in the United States. The prize money
2
act of 1862 provided for the division of ransom money in the same
3
manner as prize money and in the case of Goodrich vs. Gordon in the
1. -ITaval War College, International Law Discussions, 1905,p. 62-76;
1907,p. 75. In these discussions a distinction is drawn between the
destruction of neutral and enemy prizes, the former being forbidden.
See also T. E. Holland, Neutral Duties in Maritime War, Proceedings
British Academy, 2; 12, quoted Moore's Digest, 7;521. International
opinion generally condemns the destruction of neutral prizes and
British courts have upheld this view. See The Zee Star, 4 Rob. 71;
The Felicity, 2 Dods, 283; The Leucade
,
Spinas 221; W .I.Hall, Inter-
national Law, 4th ed., p. 763; T. J. Lawrence, International Law, p.
405; L. Oppenheim, International Law, 2; 469. Russian prize regula-
tions of March 27, 1895, and Sept .20 ,1900, (For. Rel.,1904, pp.735,
747,752, Moore's Digest, 7; 519) permitted destruction. A notable
controversy arose from the destruction of the British vessel Xnight
Commander under these regulations in the Russo-Japanese War. The
Russian prize court upheld this act. (Hurst and Bray, Russian and
Japanese Prize Cases, 2 vol, London, 1912, 1;54. S. Talcahashi, Inter-
national Law applied to the Russo-Japanese War N.Y.1908 p. 310; Moore's
Digest, 7; 521). Destaruction was permitted in exceptional cases, by
the Japanese Prize Regulations of March 15, 1904, art. 91 (Takahashi
op. cit. p. 788) and by the French laval Instructions of July 25,
1870, (Snow, cases, p. 577), and in certain cases of pressing necessity
in the rules adopted by the Institute de Droit International. (An-
nuair de l'institut de droit international, 6; 213, 221, 1882-1883,
Moore's Digest, 7; 526). The recent (1915) case of the William P.
Frye, an American vessel destroyed by a German cruiser was settled
under the Prussian treaty of 1799, renewed in 1828, (art. 13,Malloy
p. 1490) which requires compensation to be made for all contraband
goods destroyed. A similar settlement appears to be in view for the
more recent case of the Gulf light.
2. -Act. July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 600.
3. -Goodrich vs. Gordon, 15 Johns, 6, (1818) N.Y.
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suprerae court of Hew York, ransom bills were held to be good con-
tracts enforceable in court.
(4) The sequestration and sale of prizes in neutral ports is a
practice which the United States as a neutral permitted France in
1
the wars following the French Revolution. Since that time the United
2
States has opposed the practice although, according to treaties and
3
international law it has permitted the temporary asylum of belliger-
ent warships and their prizes.
4
In the Hague conventions of 1907, special provision was made
for the sequestration of prizes in neutral ports pending adjudica-
tion in the belligerents prize court, apparently with the hope of
somewhat limiting the necessity of destroying prizes at sea. The
United States did not ratify this section thus maintaining its op-
position to the principle of sequestration of prizes which the
5
American delegation spoke of as an "ancient abuse". The naval War
6
College in a discussion of the subject in 1908 recommended against
sequestration, nevertheless the United States has resorted to seques
t ration in wars in which she has been a belligerent and the courts
have not hesitated to uphold their jurisdiction over prizes in
1. -Moore's Digest, 7; 935-938.
2. -Treaties with France, 1778-1798, art .17,Hallo y p. 474; 1800-1809,
art .24, p. 504; Great Britain, 1794-1807 , art . 25 ,p . 604; Prussia , 1785-
1796, art .19 t p .1483 ;1799-1810 , revived ,1828 , p. 1493; Sweden , 1783-1799
,
revived 1816, 1827, art .17 ,19
,
p. 1732 ; Tripoli ,1805 , art .17 , p. 1792;
Algiers, 1795-1815 , art .10 ,p .3 ; 1815-1830 , art .18
,
p. 8; Netherlands,
1782-1795 , art .5 ,p .1245
.
3. -Att .Gen.Cushing,7 op. 122, ( 1855 ), Moore ' s Digest ,7 ;982-985. This
applies at least to war vessels and their prizes. The privilege was
often denied to privateers. See C-ushing 7 op. 122, (1855) , lore's Dig-
est 7; 546. For opinion during the Revolutionary war see Allen, Baval
History of the American Revolution, 1 ; 255-257 , 274: 2;537-538.
4. -Hague Conventions ,1907 , XIII . art. 23.
5. -Report of United States Delegation, see ITaval War College, Int-
ernational Law Situations, 1908, p. 76.
6. -lIaval V/ar College, International Law Situations, 1908, pp. 58-78.
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1 2
neutral ports, as well as over prizes which had been sold or des-
3
troyed. The sequestration of prizes in neutral ports seems to be
permitted to naval vessels by law of the United States, although not
looked upon with favor.
(5) Release of neutral prizes in preference to destruction was
4
recommended "by the naval war college in a discussion of 1907, but
be
this course would probably not/pursued except as a last resort.
The permission to accept ransom and sequestrate vessels in
neutral ports, together with the strict injunction to bring prizes
in for adjudication if possible, tend to prevent injury to neutral
owners. The permission to destroy prizes, however, would have an
opposite effect. The criminal penalties provided for illegal treat-
ment of prizes as well as the rule giving action for damages in such
cases are also measures directed toward performing the duties of
prevention encumbent upon the country.
5. The adjudication of prizes.
One of the most important measures taken by the United States
to prevent infractions of neutral rights by its naval forces, is the
1. -Jecker vs. Montgomery ,13 How. 512; The Arabella and the Madiera,
2 Gall. 368. Hudson vs. Guestier, 4 Cranch 293, Uaval 7/ar College,
International Law Situations, 1908, pp. 60-62.
2. -'.7illiams vs. Amroyd, 7 Cranch 423.
3. -The Edward Barnard, 31atch.l22; The Schooner Zavalla, Blatch,
173. See Laval .Var. Col., Int. Law. Sit. 1908, p. 63.
4. -Uaval «7ar College, International Law Di scussions
,
1907, p. 75.
Release, where the prize can not be brought in for adjudication, is
recommended by Lawrence, op. cit.,p.405; Hall, op.cit., p. 763.
British courts have favored this rule in dicta, see The Zee Star, 4
Rob. 71, The Felicity, 2 Dods. 38; The Leucade
,
Spinks 221, Bentwich
157, Iloore's Digest, 7;522. Release of neutral prizes in certain
cases was prescribed in the Japanese prize law of 1894, (art .20,22)
but destruction was permitted in similar cases by the law of 1904,
art. 91. See S. Takahashi , International Law applied to the Russo-
Japanese .Var, I7ew York, 1908, p. 333, -788, Moore's Digest, 7; 525.
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establishment of prize courts with jurisdiction over all seizures
by naval vessels. This means of prevention is regarded as so es-
sential that it has become a rule of international law. The estab-
lishment of prize courts and the adjudication of prizes is a duty
which international law requires of belligerent states.
1
(1) In a large number of its treaties the United States has
reciprocally agreed as a belligerent, to adjudicate prizes seized
from the other contracting party when neutral, in its prize court,
and furnish a written statement of the reason for condemnation, on
2 3
request. Statutes, instructions to naval forces and numerous dec-
4
isions of prize courts have also insisted on the necessity of a
legal adjudication of prizes before passage of title or complete
ousting of the right of the original neutral owner.
The United States has also recognized the duty of observing
certain limitations in the establishment of its prize courts. Al-
though Prance established prize courts in territory of the United
5
States in the wars following the French revolution, the United States
1 . -Ad judication of prizes has been required in twenty treaties with
fourteen countries, of which those with Bolivia, ( 1858 , art .24, Malloy,
p. 121), and Columbia, ( 1846 ,art .24,p .309 ) , are in force.
2. -Rev. Stat. sec. 4615-4617.
3. -Instructions , June 20, 1898, Art. 20-23, For. Hel. 1898, p. 781;
Moores Digest, 7; 514. Stockton's Laval War Code, 1900-1904, art. 46-
50.
4. -The Dos Hermanos, 2 V/heat
,
76; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat. 227; The
Adventure, 8 Cranch 221, (1814); Grundy Att . Gen., 3 op. 377 ,( 1838)
,
The Nassau, 4 Wall. 634; Moore's Digest, 7;623-631.
5. -See Fenwick, The neutrality Laws of the United States, p 18. At
the time of the Revolutionary war it was common to take prizes into
neutral ports where they were adjudicated by the local courts of
admirality, although it was even then regarded as an act approaching
a breach of neutral duty. The United States on several occasions
took prizes into French and Spanish uorts. See G.W.Allen, A Naval
History of the American Revolution, II.Y.
,
1913, 1;255,274: 2;537,538.
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never acknowledged its right to do so and in the Hague conventions
1
of 1907, it was provided that prize courts should not be set up on
neutral territory or on a vessel in neutral waters. The courts have
held that prize courts may be established anywhere in the countries
2
jurisdiction or in occupied enemy territory.
(2) The power to establish a prize court of appeal was given to
congress in the Articles of confederation and also the power to
"establish rules for deciding in all cases what captures on land or
water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or
naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or
appropriated." The court consisting of a committee of congress estab
3
lished under this authority by the continental congress had simply
appellate jurisdiction over state courts of admiralty, the establish-
ment of which with a prize jurisdiction was recommended to the col-
4
onial legislatures by a resolution of congress.
In the constitution the judicial power of the United States is
declared to extend over "all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction", By the judicial act of 1789 the jurisdiction of the
1. - Hague Conventions, 1907, XIII, art. 4, Halloy p. 2359.
2. - The Grapeshot, 9 .Vail. 129. The authority of the president as
commander in chief to establish prize courts in conquored territory
was upheld in the Grapeshot but denied in decker vs. Montgomery, 13
How. 498 which held that Congress alone could create courts with
a prize jurisdiction. See Moore's Digest, 7; 585.
3. - Articles of Confederation.art .9 ; Resolution of Nov. 25, 1775,
sec. 6, Jour. Cong.l;242 Ford. ed. 3;373. 3ee note on these courts
with references, Scott 10.
4. - Resolution of Hov.25, 1775, sec. 4-6, Jour. Cong.l; 242, Ford,
ed. 3;373. See Moore's Digest, 7;585. Before the passage of this
resolution, on Hov.l, 1775, The general court of I.Ias3achusett s had
established prize courts, the first ever erected by an independent
state in the western hemisphere. See acts and Hesolutions of Pro-
vince of Massachusetts Bay, Boston, 1886, 5;436.
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1
federal courts over prizes has been made exclusive, thereby barring
any possible jurisdiction in state courts and original jurisdiction
in -orize causes has been given exclusively to federal district
2
courts, thus limiting higher federal courts including the supreme
court to appelate jurisdiction in such cases. The prize jurisdiction
of district courts is complete, including all matters relating to
the disposition of vessels seized jure belli or by authority of
statutes such as embargo, non-intercourse and revenue acts. The
admiralty jurisdiction, both instance and prize exists constantly,
and no specific commission on the outbreak of -war is necessary for
3
the exercise of prize jurisdiction, thus when the country is neutral
the jurisdiction may be exercised over vessels violating neutrality,
and in times of peace over vessels of pirates and unrecognized in-
4
.
surgents committing depradations against commerce.*
(3) 3y the international prize court convention of the second
Eague conference, ratification of which with an amending proto col
1. - Act . Sept .24,1789 , 1 stat.76, sec. 9; rev .stat
.
,sec.711,cl.3,4;
Judical code, 1911, act ..larch 3,1911,36 stat .1087, sec. 256, cl. 4. The
admiralty jurisdiction of which prize jurisdiction is a part was
held to be exclusive in federal courts in The Hine vs. Trevor, 4 Wall
555; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 625.
2. - Act 3ept.24, 1789, 1 stat. 76, sec. 9; rev. stat., sec. 563, cl.
8; Judicial code of 1911, 36 stat. 1087, sec. 24, cl. 3. See -wetland vs.
The Cassius, 2 Dall.365, (1796).
3. - Prize jurisdiction may have been originally inherent in courts
of admiralty in England but it was quite early recognized as dis-
tinct from the instance jurisdiction and as exercisable only under
special commission, see Lindo vs. Hodney, 2 Doug. 614, (1781) ff.S.
Eoldsworth, A Eistory of English Law, 3 Vol., London. 1907, 1;330. By
the naval prize act of 1864, (27-28 Vict.c 25, sec. 4) a permanent
prize jurisdiction was given to the Eigh Court of Admiralty, which
was vested in the Eigh Court by the Judicature act of 1873, (36-37
Vict .c66, sec. 4,18) . By the Prize courts act of 1894, (57-58 Vict.
c39), commissions giving a prize jurisdiction to vice-admiralty
courts might be issued in time of peace to become effective by the
outbreak of war. See, The Earl of Ealsbury, ed., The Laws of England
27 vol., London 1912 23; 285, Pitt Cobbett , Cases and Opinions on
International J^aw, 3rd. ed., 2 vols., London, 1909, 2:190.
4. -Glass vs. The Betsey, 3 Dall.6, (1794) Supra P. 2g et seq.,160 et
seq
.
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was recommended by the senate on February 15, 1911, the United
States has consented to submit to the decision of the international
prize court, in certain prize cases arising in wars in which all of
2
the belligerents are parties to the convention. By the protocol
proposed by the United States in 1910 on account of the constitution-
al impossibility of an appellate authority above the supreme court,
it is provided that an original action for damages against the cap-
tors, may be brought in the international prize court. Technically
therefore in the case of the United States the international prize
court would not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
title to prizes, but the effect of the decision would be the same.
The International Prize Court has not been established up to date.
The convention provides that in deciding cases, the court is
to be governed by treaties if any bear on the controversy, by inter-
national law if settled or in the absence of either by "general
principles of justice and equity". On account of this somewhat
vague description of the law to be applied the London Baval Confer-
ence of 1909 was called to draw up a code of prize law. Owing to
the failure of the Declaration of London, proposed by this confer-
ence to secure general ratification no immediate prospect of the
3
establishment of the court is in view. The firm establishment of
such an international court would undoubtedly be a most potent agency
for preventing injury to neutral persons by belligerent naval forces.
(4) Prize Jurisdiction is ordinarily exclusive in the courts
1. -Eague Conventions, 1907, XII, Charles Treaties, 1913, p. 248.
2. -Charles Treaties, 1913, p. 262.
3. - On the status of the Declaration of London in 1914 see Editor-
ial Comment, Am. Jour. Int., Law. 9:199, Jan. 1915.
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1
of the country of the capturing belligerent power. It is essential-
ly a jurisdiction in rem, extending over seizures jure belli from
neutrals or enemies upon the high seas or int erritorial waters
2
within the admiralty jurisdiction. Actual possession of the vessel
in question however, is not necessary. The jurisdiction may be ex-
3 4 5
ercised over a vessel sequestrated in a neutral port, sold, ransomed
6
or sunk, and according to law a decision must be given in all of
these cases, before the seizure and disposition of the prize can be
regarded as legitimate. The ordinary case, is where the vessel has
been brought into port and has been put according to a provision of
statute into the custody of an officer of the court.
Seizures of foreign vessels made in pursuance of local regul-
ations such as the embargo and non-intercourse acts are legitimate
only when made in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
but subject to this limitation are treated in t he same manner
7
as prizes jure belli. The same is true of vessel violating the
neutrality of the United States. They also may only be seized in
8 9
territorial waters. The seizure of pirate vessels, vessels of
1. -L 1 Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238, 261; The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298; US.
vs. Peters, 3 Dall.121, (1795). In a number of treaties to which the
United States is a party, it is provided that prizes of either party
when belligerent shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of the other
when temporarily taken into its ports. Supra, p.230?or exceptions
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the captor power's courts over
prizes see Moore's Digest, 7;592. Supra p. 160 et seq.
2. -Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244 , Speed ,Att .Gen. ,11 op .445 , ( 1866 )
;
ITote on prize law, 1 Wheat App.II; 2 Wheat. App.I; 5 Wheat.App. p. 52.
3. -JeCker vs. Montgomery, 13 How. 498; The Advocate, Blatch,142; The
Arrabella and the Madiera, 2 Gall. 368.
4. -William vs. Amroyd, 7 Cranch 423, (1813).
5. -Maisso nai re vs. ^eating, 2 Gall. 324 ,337 ,( 1815 ) ;Miller vs. The
Resolution, 2Dall.l,15, (1781). See Moo re 1 s Digest
,
7;533.
6. -The Edward Barnard, 31atch,122; The Schooner Zavalla, Blatch,
173. See also Moore's Digest, 7;590.
8. -The Estrella, 4 Wheat. 298, (1819); The Alerta, 9 Cranch 359,(1815|)
7. -Rose V3. Himeley,4 Cranch 241 ,( 1808 ) ;Gelston vs.hoyt,3 Wheat. 246.
9. -The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. Rep. 408. (1885).
==========— ,
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1
unrecognized insurgents committing depredations on commerce and
2
vessels engaged in acts internationally condemned as the slave trade
is permitted on the high seas by countries at peace and in such cases
the United States courts exercise a prize jurisdiction. It should
he noted that statutes may confer a jurisdiction over seizures on
the high seas not recognized or permitted hy international law, and
3
the prize courts are bound to exercise it.
In order to confer a prize jurisdiction the seizure must be on
the high seas or in territorial waters within the admiralty juris-
diction. Seizures on land confer no prize jurisdiction in the
4
United States.
Although prize jurisdiction is essentially a jurisdiction in
rem the duty of the court being to settle the title to the vessel
itself and its cargo, yet it is not entirely so. Incidental to the
disposition of the prize, claims for damages, may arise and it may
be necessary to determine the rights of claimants for freight, liens,
insurance etc. All of these matters come within the jurisdiction of
5
prize courts of the United States.
(5) The functions of prize courts are (a) to determine upon the
1. -The Three Friends, 166 U.S.I, (1897); The Ambrosd Light, 25
Fed. Rep. 408. (1885)
.
2. -General act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade, 1890,
Malloy, p. 1964. In the Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 122, (1825) Chief
Justice i.iarshall, denied the legitimacy of seizures for slave trad-
ing beyond territorial jurisdiction in the absence of treaty.
3. -The Amy .Varwick, 2 Sprague 123; Hurray vs. The Charming Betsey,
2 Cranch 64; Talbot vs. Seaman, 1 C ranch 1; Moore's Digest, 2; 914.
In the absence of statute the jurisdiction of prize courts is deter-
mined by international law, The Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, Moore'
Digest, 7;599. In reference to British claims to prize jurisdiction
over extra territorial seizures of foreign vessels in suppressing hte
slave trade see supra p. 31.
4. -Brown vs. U.S'., 8 Cranch 110,(1814). In England prize courts
were given jurisdiction over booty seized by land forces by statute
in 1840, 3-4Vict.c65.sec.22; Banda and Kirwee Booty, L.R. 1 Adm.and
Ecc. , 109
,
(1866)
.
5. -Moore's Digest, 7; 593-603, Infra note 1. .p238.
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.egality of seizures, (b) to determine the title to prizes and (c)
;o dispose of the proceeds in case of condemnation.
By their authority to decide whether the seizure was justifiable
and in case it was without probable cause to decree damages against
the naval officers making it, price courts may aid in the prevention
of injury to neutral persons by such officers.
In determining the title to the prize, the court adjudicates
the respective claims of the belligerent government to condemnation
and the neutral o wner to restitution. It thus enforces the duty of
the government to abstain from illegal confiscation of neutral pro-
perty.
In disposing of the proceeds of condemned prizes the court may
further prevent infractions of neutral rights by naval forces. The
law applied by prize courts of the United States in decreeing dis-
tribution of the proceeds of prizes will be considered.
(6) Claimants to proceeds of prizes may be of two kinds, (1)
persons with equitable claims upon the vessel by contract or ordinary
principles of the law of admiralty, such as claims for freight, liens,
insurance, etc. The prize courts of the United States have in gen-
eral recognized the validity of such claims upon neutral prizes and
their jurisdiction over them, consequently in case of condemnation
of the vessel, such claims have been commonly allowed before any
1
part of the proceeds is decreed to the government. (2) Persons with
claims for meritorious service in capturing the vessel. These
claims may be of two kinds, (a) where the vessel is condemned to the
l.-The Societe, 9 Cranch 209, 212,(1815); The Antonia Johanna,
I
Wheat. 159, (1816); Schwartz vs. Insurance Co. of No. Am. 3 Wash.CC.
117. In the case of Enemy prizes the opposite rule appears to pre-
vail, that capture destroys all previous claims. See The Hampton,
5
.Vail 372; The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U.S. 655; The Prances, 8 Cranch
418,(1814); See Moore's Digest. 7; 600-603.

-239-
capturing state, and (b) whore a recaptured v essel is restored to
its original neutral or citizen owner. In the first case the claim
is for prize bounty or prize money, in the second for military sal-
vage •
(a) It is a principle firmly established in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, if not universal, that prizes legally condemned enure
1
primarily to the government.
l.-This principle which is signified by the phrase, "Bello parta
cedunt Reipublicae"' appears to have been recognized by the Greeks
and Romans. "Whatever is captured from the enemy, the law directs
to be public property, so that not only private persons are not the
owners of it, but even the general is not. The Questor takes it,
sells it and carries the money to the public account." Cited from
Dionysius of Kalicarnassus by Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis,
(1625), Whewell ed., 3 vols. Cambridge, 3;124. See also, A.S.Hershey
The History of International Relations during antiquity and the
:.!iddle Ages, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 5; 915, (1911); Coleman Philipson,
The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, 2 vols.,
London, 1911, 2; 237, 381. For opinion of Grotius on this subject,
see op .cit
.
,3;105. For recognition of this principle in England in
1342 A.D . see Rymer, Foedera, 20 vol., London, 1704-1735, 1;408;
Robert Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law, 3rd ed., 4
vols., London, 1885, 3; 601; T.B.Holland, Principles of Jurisprudence,
11th ed., K.Y., 1910, p. 212; Alexander vs. Duke of Wellington, 2
Russ. and I.Iylne 54, (1831); The Elsebe, 5 Rob. 173, ( 1804) ; Banda and
Kirwee Booty, L.R. 1 Adm. and Ecc. 109,(1866). Recognition of this
principle in the United States, U.S. vs. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch
103; The Siren, 13 Wall. 389; Porter vs. U.S. 607; Commodore Stewart's
case 1 ct cl. 113, Scott, 910; The liuestra Senora de Regla, 108 U.S.
92, 101, (1882); The Manilla Prize Cases, 188 U.S. 254. In the Pal-
myra, 12 vTheat
,
1, the court held that all proceeding for co ndemnatioi
upon captures should be in the name of the United States. Before the
abolition of prize money the courts frequently referred to the vest-
ing of prize in "captors" in an ambiguous manner which made it ap-
pear that title was transferred immediately from the original owner
to the naval force which made the capture. (The Mary and Susan, 1
Wheat. 416). The difficulty comes through the equivocal use of the
word "Captors" to mean either the capturing state or the individuals
of the capturing naval force. When the question has come up dir-
ectly the court has invariably held that oo ndemnation is always to
the government and the actual captors only have rights by reason of
explicit grant by the government. Thus an article in the French
treaty of 1800 (art. 4, Malloy, p. 497), providing for the restoration
of prizes not definitively condemned, but legally captured, was held
to violate no vested rights of the captors, (U.S. vs. the Schooner
Peggy, 1 Cranch 103, Lincoln Att. Gen. I op. Ill), and during the
Spanish war of 1898 the president released several captured vessels
before adjudication without compensation to the captors for their
loss of prize money, (Moore ' s Digest, 7;505 ;The Manila Prize Cases, 188
U.S .254. ) *
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1
In the revolutionary war by resolution of congress prizes were
given to the captors entirely if privateers and one-third to one-
2
half if public vessels. By an act of 1800 the viiole of the proceeds
of prizes captured by public vessels was decreed to the captor when
of inferior force to the prize and one half the proceeds when of
superior force. The act also provided for distribution among the
vessels within sight as joint captors, and among the officers and men
of the vessels. The whole of prize proceeds was given to privateers
3
and by an act of 1812 distribution was decreed to be according to
contract between owners and crew or in the absence of contract one
half to each. The previsions of the act of 1800 were oractically
4
repeated in acts passed during the civil war which applied to both
vessels of the navy and "not of the navy". Provision was also
made for the payment of prize bounty of $100 for each man on board an
enemy warship sunk or destroyed in battle if of inferior force to the
attacking United States vessel and $200 if of superior force. Ransom
money, salvage, and prize bounty were all to be distributed in the
same proportions as prize money. There have been numerous special
acts by congress giving prize money in particular cases where the
prize was sunk or recaptured and consequently no claim could be pro-
5
secuted under the general law.
1. - Resolution of Congress, Ho v. 25, 1775, Journal of Cong. 1;242
Ford. ed. 3;373. See Lloore's Digest, 7;£64. Henderson vs. Clarkson,
Supreme court of Pa., 2 Dall.174. (1792); Keane vs. the Brig Gloucestei
2 Dall.36, (1782), Fed. Court of Appeals.
2. -Act. Apr. 23, 1800, 2 stat . 52, sec. 5-7, see Upton, op .cit .p .484.
3. - Act June 26, 1812, 2 stat. 760, sec. 4; June 27, 1813, 2 stat.
793, See Upton, op. cit., u.485.
4. -Act I.Iarch 25, 1862, 12 stat. 375; July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 600;
June 30, 1864, 13 stat. 306, 314, rev. stat., sec 4630,4632, 4635,
4642, 4652, Upton, op. cit., p. 489.
5. -Special acts granting prize money, Victory on Lake Erie, 3 stat.
130; Case of Algerine vessels, 3 stat. 315; Crew of Brig Transfer,
3 stat. 480; Crew of the Black Snake, 4 stat. 23; Crew of the Bon Homme
Richard and the Alliance, 5 stat. 158; crew of the ,7asp,3 stat. 295.
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The courts have held that as the statutes make no provision
for prize money in case of capture by land forces or .-jointly by land
and naval forces, in such cases the entire proceeds enure to the
1
government. ..hile non-commissioned captors are legally entitled
to no prize money, "it has been the practice to recompensate gratu-
itous enterprise, courage and patriotism, by assigning the captors
a part and cometimes the whole of prize" according to attorney
2 3
general Wirt. By an act of March 3, 1899 all provisions granting
prize money and prize bounty were repealed, thus the entire proceeds
of prize .now enure to the government, and are according to the act
4
of 1862 to be used as a permanent naval pension fund.
5
(b) In early treaties with the iietherlands, Sweden and Prussia
it was reciprocally agreed that where either of the contracting par-
ties recaptured a vessel of the other before twenty four hours enemy
possession the vessel should be restored with one third salvage to
privateers and one thirtieth to public vessels. If the enemy had
had possession more than twenty four hours privateers were permitted
to return the entire proceeds while with public vessels the prize
6
should be restored with one-tenth salvage. A statute of 1800, sub-
stantially embodied in the revised statutes of 1878 decrees salvage
1. -The Siren, 13 Wall. 389; The liuestra Senora de Kegla, 108 U.S. 92,
101, (1882).
2. -Wirt, Att . Gen., 1 op. 463, (1821). See The Dos Hermanos, 2
Wheat. 77. Decisions involving prize money distribution in the
Spanish 7/ar, Dewey vs. U.S. 178 U.S. 510; The i.ianila Prize cases.
188 U.S. 254; The Mangrove Prize Lfoney, 188 U.S. 720.
3. -Act Harch 3, 1899, 30 stat . 1004, 1007.
4. -Act July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 600, sec. 11, rev. stat. sec.
5. -Treaties with Iietherlands
,
1782-1795, Ualloy.p 1243; Sweden,
1783-1798, revived 1816, 1827, art. 17, 18 p. 1730; Prussia, 1785-1786,
art .17,21; 1799-1810 , art .17 , 21 ,pp .1482 ,1492.
6. -Act I.Iarch 3, 1800, 2 stat. 16. The Act June 30, 1864, 13 stat.
306, 314; rev. stat. sec. 4652, leaves the determination of the amount
of salvage to the court.
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of one-eighth to the recaptors upon the restoration of vessels to the
original owner. The principle upon which restoration or condemnatioj
is decreed in cases of recaptured vessels has been considered un-
1
der obligations of abstention.
The methods adopted for enforcing the obligations of naval
forces, have been (1) punishment by court martial for violation of
articles for the government of the navy, (2) assessment of damages
by prize courts, (3) forfeiture of prize money. In addition to
these legal methods of control the conduct of naval forces can be
and is ordinarily controlled by executive action exercisable by the
president as commander in chief and subordinate naval officers with
delegated authority. The abolition of prize money las also been a
measure tending toward the protection of neutral rights. The
abolition of privateering with the stimulous which it gave toward
disregard for the rights of merchantmen, by offering chances for
personal gain, has called attention to the fact that prize money
created a similar situation in the navy itself. There can be no
doubt but that the quest of prize money acts as an incentive to the
2
making of unjustifiable seizures and when it was allowed, its for-
feiture in case of unwarranted seizures was used as a means of in-
forcing observance of neutral rights among naval vessels. 3y the
abolition of prize money and prize bounty the incentive toward il-
legal captures has been removed and the movement in the direction
started by the abolition of privatering, continued.
In the second Hague Conference of 1907, a proposal was made to
1. - Supra, p. 208-210.
2. -3ee Article by C
.
C. Binney, The latest chapter of the American
Law of Prize and capture, Am. Law. Reg., Sept. 1906, and Editorial
Comment, Am. Jour. Int. Law, 1907, 1;484.

1
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abolish prize money which was still given by all nations except the
United States and Japan. It was not accepted, even the United
matter
States voting against it on the ground that the/Was a subject proper
for local regulation and that it was not desirable to take emphasis
from the broader question of abolishing the right to capture private
property at sea which the United States was advocating. In the
present war, Great Britain has by order in council abolished prize
2
money and it seems probable that in course of time it will be acted
on internationally as was done in the case of privateering.
1. -Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Actes et Documents
,
3 vols., The Hague, 1907, 3;1148. English translation of this pro-
posal, J. Westlake, International Law, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1910,
2; 313. Discussion of the "voeu" which was proposed by the French
delegation, in the Acts and Documents, 3; 792,809 ,842,845 ,906 ,909.
2. -Order in Council, Aug. 28, 1914, abolished prize money and es-
tablished a prize fund to be divided among the whole navy at the end
of the war. See Ilorman Bentwich, International Law as applied by
Sngland in the tfar, Am. Jour. Int. Law., Jan. 1915.
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PART IV. 03LIGATI0ITS A3 A BELLIGERENT TO'.VA.u.- ENEMIES .
Introductory*
In their dealing-s with neutral states, the rights of belligerent
states are much in excess of the ordinary rights of states at peace.
This is even more true in their dealings with enemies. The recogniz-
ed rights of a belligerent against its enemy, are so great that it
sometimes seems impossible to define their limit s at all. Yet the
establishment of these limits is the purpose of the law of war. As
soon as we recognize the existence of such limits to legal rights,
we recognize the legal obligations not to exceed them. It is there-
fore possible to speak of the obligations of a belligerent to its
enemy.
The obligations of states have been classified under the five
heads, (1) abstention, (2) acquiescence, (3) prevention ,( 4) vindica-
tion, (5) reparation.
(1) Obligations of abstention can be made effective, for the
most part, only by act of the sovereign authority of the state. In
so far as this is true, municipal law can have no effect in their
enforcement. As in the case of obligations of belligerents toward
neutrals, the practice of prize courts, does furnish a check upon
the infraction of some of these duties. By legally adjudicating
enemy property captured at sea according to the rules of international
law, prize courts interpose between their own government and the
enemy owner of the prize, thus compelling observation of the bellig-
erent duty to abstain from confiscation of enemy property declared
immune by international law. In this case therefore, municipal law
may aid in the enforcement of the belligerent's obligations of ab-
stention.
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(2) Acquiescence seems to "be contradictory to the very nature of
war. lion-acquiescence , the effort to overcome, appears to he the
very essence of the relationship "between helligerents . This is true
so far as the "belligerent state itself is concerned, hut the duty of
acquiescence is recognized as obligatory upon the non-combat t ant
inhabitants of occupied territory. This duty obviously cannot be
enforced by the belligerent state claiming de jure sovereignty of the
territory, but by the occupying belligerent who has de facto sover-
eignty. The law of the United States does however, recognize the
en
duty, in that, it /forces ordinary commercial acts of individuals, not
of direct aid to the enemy, which were performed in pursuance of this
duty of acquiescence, even when contrary to the law of the United
1
States. This duty however; relates to the general subject of the
succession of states and the rights of inhabitants of transferred
territory which is considered in 'the chapters dealing with obligations
2
in time of peace
.
(3) The obligations of prevention require a state to prevent
certain acts by its officers of government and the inhabitants of its
territory which would amount to infractions of international law. It
is by enforcing these duties that municipal law can be most effective
in enforcing international obligations. The belligerent state comes
in contact with its enemy largely through its army and navy. Through
municipal regulations preventing infractions of international law by
such agencies t this obligation of international law may be made ef-
fective .
1. -Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall.l (1868).
2. ^3upra. p.65-6&T
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(4) Vindication, likewise, is foreign to the law of war. Inter-
national law does not put a belligerent under an obligation to vin-
dicate illegal acts by its enemy. It does however, give him a right
to retaliate to a limited extent. Retaliation is a right to vindicate
not a duty . The belligerent is however, under an obligation not to
carry retaliation beyond a certain limit. The limit is not fixed or
enforceable by any authority. The legitimacy of any particular meas-
ure of retaliation is left to the discretion of the sovereign. Mun-
2
icipal law cannot control it.
(5) Reparation should also, theoretically be a duty of belliger-
ents. Individuals of either belligerent state ought to be able to
recover compensation for injuries due to illegal acts of the enemy
state. In practice such a condition is impossible. The victor will
gain full reparation in the treaty of peace, but there is no legal
recourse for the loser. The treaty of peace definitely settles the
matter, and its terms are fixed according to policy and the result
of the conflict. There have however, been treaties requiring each
party to indemnify the other for the care of its prisoners of war,
specifically stating that this indemnity shall be considered entirely
apart from general indemnities demanded by the conqueror. The Hague
3
Conventions also require compensation for breaches of the law of war.
1. -The right of retaliation is recognized in Lieber's Instructions,
art. 27,28.
2. -It should be said, however, that there has been authority in
British Prize court decisions for the view that courts may refuse to
recognize retaliatory measures of their own government so far as they
injuriously affect neutrals. 3ee The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348, (1807);
The Llinerva, dw. Adm. 312, (1807); Phillimore, Int. Law, 3;sec.436;
Holland, Studies in Int. Law, p. 197-198.
3. -Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 24, Llalloy, p. 1484; 1799-
1810, revived 1828, art. 24, p. 1494; Mexico, 1848, art. 22, p. 1118;
Hague Conventions, 1907, IV. art. 3.
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3o far as such treaties are enforceable by municipal law, and so far
as enemy individuals are assisted by municipal law in obtaining
indemnity for injuries, the general rules of the subject of repar-
ation considered under the law of peace will apply.
We shall therefore, consider the duties of b elligerents toward
their enemies under the t wo heads, (1) obligations of abstention,
and (2) obligations of prevention. In the enforcement of the former
class of duties, municipal lav; enforces international law directly.
The rules of municipal law bearing on this point are therefore rules
of international law at the same time. In the second case, the
means employed for controlling the conduct of persons and officers
is a matter left to the discretion of the governments. International
law does not say how individuals shall be controlled, only what they
must be prevented from doing. The municipal law in this class will
therefore consist largely of rules supplementary to international
law.
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Chapter 1» Obligations of Abstention.
Introductory.
A belligerent state is bound to abstain from certain acts
toward its enemy. Thus it must abstain from committing hostilities
until formal warning of war, from the confiscation of public or
private debts, from committing acts of hostility against enemy
persons domiciled in its territory, from resorting to forbidden
methods of warfare, from the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war;
from the unneccessary injury of non-oombattants, from injuring the
sick and wounded and those carrying for them, and from injuring
1
scientific, religious and artistic institutions. These duties,
however, are obligatory upon the sovereignty of the state. They
are beyond the province of municipal law to control, so far as
2
they are duties of abstention. Thus courts have held that the
commencement of war is a political act and they can not question
the legitimacy of belligerent measures when the political depart-
ment of government has recognized the existence of the status.
Thus the Hague convention relating to the opening of hostilities
must be regared as directory solely upon the political depart-
have 3
ment of government. The courts also/held that the sovereign may
confiscate debts and if it does so unequivocally the courts can
offer no recourse to the mulcted enemy person. This statment
however, is subject to limitation. Unequivocal confiscations of
the sovereign are undoubtedly valid in municipal law. Confiscations
by particular agencies of government may not be.
1
-Hague conventions, 1907 , iii, iv, vi ,Malloy Treaties, pp 2259,
2269,2304.
2-The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635.
3- Brown vs. U.S., 8 Cranch 110 , (1814) ;Ware vs.Hylton,5 Dall.199,
fl796).
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Thus during the revolutionary war the confiscations by the in-
dividual commonwealths were declared void where they conflicted
1
with treaty provisions. The enforcement of the duty as against
inferior agencies of government, however, should be classified
under duties of prevention rather than of abstention. By a large
2
number of treaties the United States has recognized its duty to
protect enemy persons domiciled in its territory and to permit
a
them/certain time to wind up their affairs and leave. These treatie
also are addressed primarly to the political department of the
government. A sovereign act imprisoning domiciled enemies could
not be controlled by municipal law. AS in the case of confiscation
however, municipal law can enforce such treaties by preventing
their infraction by inferior agencies of government. By its ad-
hesion to the Hague and Geneva conventions the United States has
recognized its duty to abstain from forbidden methods of warfare,
from the inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, from unnecessary
injury to non-combattants and from injury to red cross agencies
and to the sick and wounded in their care. So far as they are
duties of abstention, these matters are addressed to the political
department of government, but they may be indirectly enforced by
1-ffare vs. Mylton, 3 Dall. 199 , f 1796 }. See treaty with Great
Britain, 1783, art .4-6 ,Malloy
,
p 588. The United States has
concluded 20 treaties with 15 countries, 6 of which are now
in force(1915) forbidding confiscation of public or private
debts due enemy persons, during war.
2-Pr otection to resident enemy persons has been guaranteed in
twenty-seven treaties with twenty-three countries of which
the following are now, f 1915) in force: Argentine Republic,
1853, art. 12, Halloy,p 24; Bolivia, 1858 , art. 11, p 122;
Columoia, 1846, art. 27,p310; Costa Rico , 1851 , art . 11
,
p34„
j
Honduras, 1846, art . 11
,
p956 ; Italy , 1871, art . 21
,
p975 ;Mexioo
,
1848,art.22,plll7; Paraguay, 1859 , art .13, p368 ;Prussia, 1799-
1810, revived 1828, art. 23, p 1494;Sweden, 1783-1798 , revived
1816, 1827, art. 22, p 1732.
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the control, through municipal law, of the armed forces of the
government, and will he considered under obligations of pre-
vention.
In the enforcement of prize law, however, the obligation of
the belligerent state to observe certain restraints in the eapture
of enemy property at sea is enforced through municipal law direct-
ly against the government. The principle observed by the United
States prize courts and other rules of municipal law bearing on
this point will therefore concern us at this point. In at least
one case, also, judicial methods have been provided for the pro-
tection of enemy private property on land. This case merits brief
consideration.
1, Enemy Private Property at Sea.
The general right of capturing enemy property at sea is recog-
nized by international law but there are specified cases in which
the belligerent must abstain from such captures. The enforcement
of this duty is provided for by the rule recognized in the United
States, whereby all prizes, enemy as well as neutral, are submitted
to prize courts before final appropriation. The general principles
of prize court jurisdiction and procedure have been discussed
1
under the law of neutrality and it should again be emphasized that
the whole institution of prize courts is primarily intended for the
benefit of neutrals. Enemies benefit from them only incidentally.
The rules applied in distinguishing enemy and neutral property
and vessels has also been discussed as has the attitude of the
United States onthe question of total immunity of enemy private
2.
property from seizure during war,
1 ~ Supra p. 231,et seq.
2- Supra p. 191,204.
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In the case of neutral vessels and goods, immunity from cap-
ture is the general rule. Capture can only be justified in certain
exceptional cases, as breach of blockade, carriage of contraband,
unneutral service, constructive enemy character, or necessity. With
enemy property and vessels the case is reversed. Here the rule is
liability to capture. Cases of immunity are exceptional. Under the
1
two treaties which the United States has concluded, insuring the
total immunity of enemy private property during war, this would not
be true, and if this principle were adopted as a general rule, a
condition which the United States has advocated since the foundation
of the Republic and notably at the second Hague conference, enemy
private property and merchant vessels at sea would be in practically
the same condition as neutral vessels and property are today. This
condition however, does not exist and by international law cases in
which enemy property at sea is immune are exceptions to the general
rule of liability.
The cases in which enemy property at sea is immune from
capture are defined in the Declaration of Paris and the Hague con-
ventions and may be classified as (l) vessels in port on the outbreak
of war, (2) vessels leaving their last port before the outbreak of
war, (3) postal correspondence, (4) coast fishing vessels, (5) enemy
property under the neutral flag, (6) "vessels charged with religious,
scientific or philanthropic mission." (7) hospital ships bearing the
red cross flag when they are commissioned and authorized by the bel-
ligerent government. In the last two cases public as well as private
owned vessels are immune from capture?*
1. -Treaties with Prussia, 1785-1799 , art .23,Malloy p.l484;Italy 1871,
art. 12, p. 973.
2. -3ee Hague Conventions, 1907, X, arts. 1-3, VI, XI.
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The immunities granted in these cases were provided for in
1
Stockton's Naval «Var code of 1900 to 1904. In the proclamation and
2
instructions on the outbreak of the Spanish war days of grace on
departure with immunity until they reach a home port were granted to
enemy vessels and the immunity of vessels hound for the United States
which left their last port before the outbreak of war was also pre-
3
scribed, the rule being applied in several cases. In the case of
4
the Paqueta Habanna arising during the Spanish war the court held
that coast fishing vessels of the enemy were not liable to capture,
before the enunciation of this doctrine by any international con-
vention.
The Immunity of Enemy property under the neutral flag is a
doctrine which has been supported by the political department of
the government since its foundation, but not given legal recognition
until the war of 1898, when the president's proclamation required
5
adhesion to the rules of the Declaration of Paris in this respect.
In many of the early treaties the doctrine of "free ships free goods'
6
had been specified as binding between the contracting parties.
1. -Stockton's Kaval V/ar Code, 1900-1904, arts .13-15,21-22.
2
. -Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat.1770; Instructions , June 20,
1898, art. 7, For. Eel. 1898, 780.
3. - The Buena Ventura, 175 U.s!384, was released under the pro-
clamation. The Panama, 176, U.5 535, although in the terms of the
exemption was condemned as an armed vessel forming part of the enemy
auxilliary navy, a case provided for in the proclamation. The Pedro,
175 U.S. 354, although her ultimate destination was the United States
,
was condemned because her immediate voyage was to an enemy port. The
doctrine of continuous voyage was here denied, where it would have
operated to the advantage of an enemy vessel. Four justices dissent-
ed from this opinion but it was followed by the court in the case of
the Guido , 175 U.S. 382. See Moore's Digest, 7; 453-9.
4. -The Paqueta Habantfa, 175 U.S. 677, (1900).
5. -Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat. 1770.
6. -This principle has been embodied in thirty treaties, with
twenty sewn count ries . Seven are no?;, (1915) in force. Supra p. 201,
note 3.
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Although there have not been a great many cases before the
prize courts in which these immunities have been applied, in the few
cases that have come up the court has followed the rules laid down in
treaties and executive orders. The general principle requiring the
adjudication of all prizes operates as a guarantee to the enforcement
of this duty of abstention.
ffere the international prize court established as provided by
the Hague conventions of 1907, cases involving these immunities would
1
all be subject to its jurisdiction. By its signature of this con-
vention and its consent to its ratification, the United States signi-
fied its willingness to add this further sanction to the enforcement
of these duties.
2. Enemy Private property on land.
According to international law enemy private property on land
2
is exempt from capture. Consequently, the government is under an
obligation to abstain from such captures. Exceptions to this rule
are recognized in the case of necessity, which justifies military
requisitions. The expense of administering territory under military
government may also be reimbursed by money contributions of the in-
habitants, which thus resemble taxes. In both of these cases, the
enforcement of the rule is in the hands of military authorities, and
1. -The International prize court is given jurisdiction over enemy
property when the case involves enemy cargo in a neutral ship and
when a claim is based on an allegation that the seizure has been ef-
fected in violation of the provisions of a convention or of an
enactment of the belligerent captor. Hague conventions, 1907, XII,
art. 3. See Charles Treaties, 1913, p. 250.
2. -United States courts have stated this principle, see Brown vs.
U.S., 8 Cranch 110, (1814); U.S. vs. 1756 shares of capital stock,
5 Blatch. 231; U.S. vs. Klein, 13 Wall. 128,137; Lamar vs. Brown,
92 U.S. 194, Moore's Digest, 7; 288-289.
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are discussed in considering the obligations of prevention in re-
1
lation to the land forces.
Crdijiarily the sanction of military law, controlling the armed
forces, alone guarantees this obligation of abstention. There is
no possibility of recourse to judicial authority as is provided in
the case of naval captures. Prize courts have repeatedly asserted
2
that their jurisdiction does not extend to land captures. The
reason for this difference is to be found in the fact that in naval
war, questions of neutral rights are apt to be involved; whereas this
is not so true in land captures. Property on enemy territory is priori
facie enemy property. The enemy's privilege of a judicial adjudica-
tion of his property, captured at sea arises from the probability of
its association with neutral property.
It is not, however, impossible that all property seized on land
should be subject to legal adjudication before confiscation. The
British prize courts have in fact been given jurisdiction of such
3
seizures. In the United States the abandoned and captured property
4
act of 1863 furnished a somewhat similar remedy during the civil war.
By this act, a sum equal to the value of captured property was to
be deposited in the treasury, and persons claiming ownership were
permitted to prosecute claims for such property in the court of claimfe
1. -Infra. p. 261.
2. -Brown vs. U.S', 8 Cranch. 110, (1814); Kirk vs. Lynde,106 U.S.
315,317; Cakes vs. U.S. ,174 U.S .778 ,786 , (1899 )
.
3. ^Statute 1840, 3-4 Vict c 65, sec. 22, The Banda and El.rw^e Booty
L.K.l Adm. and Eec. 109 (1866) Pitt Gobbett cases and opinions on
international law, 2 vols. London, 1913, 2; 201.
4. -Act llarch 12, 1863, 12 stat . 820; lloore's Digest, 7;295-300.
Cases under this act, see Young vs. U.S' 97 U.S. 39, (1877); Briggs
vs. U.S., 143 U.S. 346, (1892); Vsnce vs. U.S., 30 Ct . CI. ,252.
British subjects enjoy the benefits of this act, U.S. vs. O'Keefe, 11
//all. 178; Carlisle vs. U.S. 16 Wall. 147.
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Property intended for use in waging war such as arras, ordinance
ships, steamboats, forage, military supplies, etc., were excluded
and persons who had given "aid or comfort" to the rebellion were
denied this privilege.
Such privileges as this have not been granted in other wars.
This act probably was due to the fact that being a civil war, many
inhabitants of the seat of war were loyal to the federal cause. The
act was to reimburse such persons, rather than enemies. As a matter
1
of fact, by an set of 1864 it was specifically declared that the
jurisdiction of the court of claims would not extend to general claim
i
"against the United States growing out of the destruction or appro-
priation of or damage to property by the army or navy" during the
civil war.
In general therefore the United States does not provide for the
enforcement by means of judicial adjudication of its duty to abstain
from capturing enemy private property on land. The duty is enforced
indirectly by measures for preventing illegal seizures by armed
forces
.
l.-Act July 4, 1864, IS stat. 381.
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Chapter II » Obligations of Prevention .
Introductory.
It is for the most part through the enforcement of the duty of
prevention, as against its armed representatives, that the state
fulfills its duties of abstention; and it is largely through the
municipal sanctions thus enforced that the law of war is observed at
all. The belligerent's duties toward neutrals tend to be observed
because of the sanctions of international law. Ileutrals can bring
threats of force and demands for reparation which the belligerent
usually finds it convenient to heed. But in the law of war the enemy
is already using all the force he can. The treaty of peace defin-
itively concludes any further demand for reparation. What therefore
is the force which causes obedience to the law of war? There is
none, except that of self interest. Reciprocity benefits both bel-
ligerents. 3ach knows that a breach of law on its part will bring
about a retaliatory breach by the other. If this process were contin-
ued, war rights would soon pass all limits, the law of war would be
nill, savagery would prevail. It is only in so far as the principle
of reciprocal benefit acts that the law is obeyed. The state must
take extreme care that its armed representatives do not unwittingly
break the law of war, for the minute the first breach is made, a
progressive march of retaliation and counter-retaliation will have
begun which although contrary to the self interest of both, neither
can stop. We will therefore discuss the laws of the United States
designed to prevent infractions of the law of war by its (1) land
forces and (2) naval forces. As a third division we will consider
the laws of like effect in reference to (3) the civil population.
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1. Acts by Land Forces.
HHitary law, military government, and martial law are three
terms relating to the legal position of land forces in time of war
1
which should be distinguished. I.lartial law is the law in force in
portions of the home territory of a belligerent near the seat of war
or in a state of insurrection. It is a matter regulated entirely by
constitutional law and as its effect is primarily domestic it has no
connection with international law, except in case neutrals are injure!
by the suspension of constitutionsl guarantees, in which case inter-
national questions would arise, but ones extraneous to the present
topic
.
Military government exists when an army is in secure occupation
of a portion of enemy territory. The law applied under military
2
government, (to which the term martial law is also sometimes applied)
bears a relation to martial law, but in reality the condition is
somewhat different. In the latter case the persons affected are for
the most part citizens; in the former they are foreigners. The
law of military government, therefore, is a matter governed by inter-
national law. The occupying belligerent owes obligations to the
1. -On these distinctions see Ex Parte Milligan, 4 V/all.2; tf.E.
Birkheimer, Ililitary Government and Martial Law, 2nd. ed. London,
1904; p.21,372> G.B.Davis, A Treatise on Military Law, N . Y. .1912 ,p6
.
2. -See Lieber's Instructions, art .1-10. By applying the "theory
of de facto governments, that sovereignty passes immediately upon
effectual occupation of the territory, the law of military govern-
ment fulfills our definition of martial law, for the occupied ter-
ritory has become home territory. vVith this conception the law of
military government would be a sub ject*f co nstitutional rather than of
international law. Because of the practical difference and because
of the fact that military government is regarded as a temporary and
not permanent transfer of sovereignty, it seems well to preserve the
distinction
.
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inhabitants and they owe obligations to it, both of which are deter-
mined by international law. «7e are therefore concerned here with the
law of military government which the United States requires of its
armies.
Military law is the law regulating the conduct of the army. It
consists of the rules defining the powers and liabilities of military
officers and enlisted men and the means of enforcing them. It de-
fines the constitution of military tribunals, such as courts martial
military commissions and commissions of inquiry, their jurisdiction
and their proceedure; as well as the rules of executive subordinatior
and enforcement of discipline. In the United States, military law
is found in statutes, army regulations, and instructions, opinions
1
of courts, attorneys general and judge advocates general. Military
law is not a part of international law. The relationships it defines
are entirely domestic. Yet it is of great importance for our present
subject, for it is through the sanctions of military law that the
army is compelled to obey the law of war. Much of it consists of
laws supplementary to international law.
There has long been a discussion whether war is a relation be-
tween states or between armies. The latter view was eloquently
2
espoused by Rousseau and apparently influenced the early statesmen
1. -The Statutory laws relating to the control of the army, annotated
with references to court decisions, and official opinions may be
found in "The Military laws of the United States" ,1901 , ed. G.B.
Davis, with supplement to 1911, ed. J.B.Porter. The "Digest of
Opinions of the Judge Advocates General of the Army" published in
1912, C.R. Rowland, ed., also contains references to statutes, cases
and opinions of Attorneys General bearing on the various points.
See also annual publication of Army Regulations and General Orders
of the i'ar Department
.
2. -J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Translation by Tozer,
London, 1909, p. 106. See discussion on this question, J. 7/estlake,
Principles of International Law, Cambridge, 1894, p 258; G. M.
Ferrante, Private Property in Maritime V/ar, Pol. Sci. Quar., 20;
706, (1895).
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of the United States. At any rate the policy they established, now
a national tradition, that private property ought to "be immune from
capture in war, is in harmony with it. The present regime of uni-
versal conscription armies, seems to nullify the theory in Eurppe
at least. In our view Rousseau's dicta is untenable. The relation-
ship is one between two communities or states, not between two armies
or two navies. Facts are sufficient justification for the assertion.
It is however, clear that though both are enemies a distinction
exists between combattants and non-combattants . We may therefore,
consider successively the duties of the army to (1) combattants and tc
(2) non-combattants.
(1) The duties of armed forces toward enemy combattants include
such matters as the employment of only legitimate means of warfare,
care of the sick and wounded, treatment of prisoners of war and
spies, observance of flags of truce, armistices, etc.
A number of early treaties prescribed humane treatment for
1
prisoners of war. All of the subjects mentioned are regulated in
detail in the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1907 relating to the
laws of war on land and in the Geneva Convention of 1864 establishing
the red cross flag and prescribing rules for the care of the sick
and wounded. By its ratification of these treaties the United States
has made them law for its armies. The same matters are covered by
Francis Liebers celebrated instructions for the government of the
armies of the United States in the field, written during the civil
war. On April 24, 1863 these instructions were officially promul-
1.
-Treaties, Algiers, 1816-1830, art. 17, p 15, Prussia, 1785-1796,
art. 24, p. 1484; 1799-1810, revived 1828, art. 24, p. 1494; Mexico,
1848, art. 22, p. 1118; Morocco, 1787-1836, art. 16, p. 1209, Tripoli,
1805-1911, art. 16, p. 1791.
t
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gated as a general order of the war department and are therefore
binding law for the army. The instructions give detailed regula-
tions defining the limits permitted by necessity and by retaliation,
the treatment of prisoners of war and spies, use of flags of truce,
exchange of prisoners, and prohibited measures such as assassination.
The enforcement of these laws is largely in the hands of mil-
itary commissions. Courts martial being of statutory jurisdiction,
can not tske cognizance of many of these cases, as violation of the
laws of war are not listed in the offenses specified in the articles
1
of war. By statute courts martial are, however, given jurisdiction
2
over the trial of spies, and over officers or soldiers injuring
persons bringing provisions or other necessaries to the army while
in "foreign parts." This jurisdiction extends to camp followers,
retainers and militia in the service of the government as well as
3
the regular army and volunteers, violating the articles of war. The
decreeing of criminal penalties to violators, is the means employed
by both courts martial and military commissions for enforcing the
4
law. It must not be lost sight of, however, that the control of
the army is largely executive rather than legal. It is to the dis-
cretion of commanding officers that enforcement of the law of war,
5
whether unwritten, in treaties, or in orders, is left.
1. -On authority and jurisdiction of Courts Martial and Military
Commissions see Hev. Stat, sec .1342-1343; Military Laws ,1911 ,p . 744,
note 1, p. 745; Dig. Op. Judge. Ad. Gen., 1912, p 1067; Lieber's
Instructions, art. 13.
2. -Rev. otat. sec. 1343.
3. -Articles of .Var, rev. stat
.
, sec. 1342, art .56 ,63,64. Courts
Martial may punish members of these classes for felonies in time of
war, fart. 58) and soldiers for being found over a mile from camp
without leave, (art. 34).
4. -Dig.Op. Judge Ad. Gen., 1912, pp 510-511, 1071-1072.
5. -3y the Articles of .7ar an officer must keep good order and "to
the utmost of his power, redress all abuses and disorders which may
be committed by an officer or soldier under his command , ( art .54) and
officers guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman may
be dismissed, (art. 61).
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(2) Eon-Combattants vary in legal rights somewhat according to
circumstances. Thus non combattants domiciled in the belligerent's
own state, in territory under military government and in the actual
zone of hostilities enjoy different immunities. The army does not
effect the first class. Their treatment will be considered under the
duties of the civil population.
In the second case the United States has recognized the princi-
ple that such persons are immune from injury and their property from
confiscation so long as they observe their duty of acquiescence to th
j
occupying government. The duties of the army in this connection are
prescribed in the Hague conventions and in Lieber's instructions.
Special instructions to army officers are also usually issued pro-
viding rules for military government. It is a remarkable fact that
during general Scott's occupation of parts of Mexico in 1846, he
enforced the general rule of paying for requisitions and levying only
contributions in lieu of taxes to pay for the civil administration
of the territory, until he had received special instructions from
.vashington to adopt a harsher practice. It was thought that Mexico
was continuing the war because the civil population was not feeling
its hardship, consequently the instructions ordered him to support
his army by uncompensated seizures. Very reluctantly he undertook
this policy, which is contrary to modern international law and in
his opinion at that time was inexpedient. Here was a case where the
discretion of the general on the field was more efficient in enforc-
1
ing the law of war than that of authorities higher up.
The conduct toward non-combattants in the actual zone of hostil-
ities is also provided for in the Hague conventions. A number of
early treaties provided for the immunity of non-combattants in person
1.
-Moore's Digest, 7; 28 2- 285.
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1
and the payment for all requisitions. The Hague conventions besides
covering these points forbids unnecessary injuries to non-combattants
the bombardment of undefended towns, and pillage. Similar matters
are covered in Liebers instructions. Special statutes and instruct-
ions, however, especially during the civil war have required a far
2
harsher treatment. The treaties and instructions covering these
points are law and enforceable through the exercise of penal juris-
diction by military commissions and through executive coercion.
The preservation of the rights of non-combattants may also be enforce^
through laws providing for their indemnification for requisitions,
after the war. This is provided for in the provisions of the Hague
conventions and Liebers instructions which require the giving of
3
cash or receipt §, good after the war, for all requisitions. In the
4
civil war by the captured and abandoned property act the United
States provided for the indemnification of non-combattants. A sum
equal in value to all requisitions was to be deposited in the treas-
ury and all persons were compensated from this fund if they could
prove that they had taken no active part in the rebellion.
1. -Treaties witfr Prussia, 1785-1796, art. 23, pl414; 1799-1810,
revived 1828, art. 23, pl444; Mexico, 1848, art. 22, plll7; Italy,
1871, art. 21, p975.
2. - Confiscation act July 17, 1862, 12 stat. 589. On confiecation
of cotton and slaves during the civil war see Lloore's Digest 7;
300-366. For orders during Mexican War see Moore's Digest 7; 282-285.
3. - Hague Conventions, 1907, v, art. 53; Liebers Instructions,
art. 38.
4. - Act March 12, 1863, 12 stat. 820. See Moore's Digest 7; 295-
300.
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2. Acts by Naval Forces.
The law governing the conduct of the naval authorities is
contained in statutes, regulations, instructions, and the opinions
1
of coiirts. Naval courts mattial with jurisdiction over offenses
against the statutory articles for the government of the navy are
provided, hut the enforcement of the law of naval warfare is
largely intrusted to the discretion of commanding officers.
(1) The duties of the navy toward enemy combat t ants are
specified in the Hague convention of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions
as applied to naval war far adopted at the same time. In 1868 a
treaty was signed extending the provisions of the Geneva convention
to naval war. It was not generally ratified although the United
States did so in 1882. In 1898 the United 3tates issued a circular
stating that these additional articles would serve as a modus vivendi
during the war with Spain and in consequence the Navy Department is»
sued a General order requiring the observance of these regtQ.atipns
in the treatment of "the Solace" which had been fitted out as an
2
ambulance ship. Besides incorporating the principles of the Geneva
convention, the Hague convenetion of 1907, limits the use of submarine
contact mines, and the Bombardment of undefended coast towns. In
Stockton's Naval war code in force from 1900 to 1904 and in instruct-
3
ions issued at the beginning of wars the limits of hostile acts
1. - Articles for the government of the Navy, Rev. Stajb. sec. 1624;
Regulations for the government of the Navy of the United States,
1913, containing also permanent instructions.
2. - Additional articles to Geneva Convention, 1868, Modus Vivendi,
1898, Genreal order of Navy Dept., and Correspondence, Malloy,
Treaties, pl907-1924.
3/- Instructions to Blockading vessels and Cruisers, June 20,
1898, Gen. Ord. 492, For. Rel. 1898, p780.
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against enemy pu"blic forces have been prescribed. In the flavy regu-
lations of 1913 it is provided that "when the United States is at
war, the commander in chief shall require all under his command to
observe the rules of humane war fare and the principles of interna-
1
tional law." It will thus be seen that, as in the case of the
army, the enforcement of the duties of naval war are largely left
to the executive control of naval officers.
(2) The duties of the navy toward enemy non-combattants relate
largely to the exercise of the right of capturing private property
at sea, but certain restrictions upon possible injury to persons are
also required. Uaval forces are forbidden bombarding undefended
coast towns, indiscriminately laying submarine contact mines
or unnecessarily cutting cables between belligerent and neutral
2
territory, in the Eague conventions of 1907. These provisions are
designed for the protection both of enemy non-combattants and of
neutrals. The same obligations with the exception of that relating
to mines were prescribed in Stockton's Naval war code and it was
especially stated that "non-combattants are to be spared in person
and property during hostilities as much as the necessities of war
3
and the conduct of non-combattants will permit."
The enforcement of these duties, like those required in dealing
with enemy armed forces, is left to the authority of naval officers,
subject to the control of the navy department through instructions
and executive action.
In general the duty in reference to the seizure of enemy pro-
perty at sea is enforced by the same measures as those relating to
1. -Kavy Regulations, 1913, sec. 1635.
2. -Eague Conventions, 1907, IX,VIII, IV, art. 54.
3. -Stockton' s ITaval War Code, art. 3, 4, 5.
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the seizure of neutral prizes. The law of prize grew up for the
benefit of neutrals but because of the frequent difficulty of deter-
mining between neutral and enemy property at sea, enemy individuals
are benefited by the same rules.
As pointed out in considering the law of neutrality, the seizure
of prizes by public naval forces alone, their care, treatment, bring-
ing in and adjudication are provided for in treaties, and instruction
of the navy department. These provisions are made effective by such-
measures as the abolition of privateering, the abolition of prize
money, the holding of vessels liable in damages for seizures withoxit
probable cause, and by the establishment of prize courts with adequat
jurisdiction. Although enemy prizes benefit, in the main, by pro-
visions applicable to neutrals this is not always true. Enemy pro-
perty is prima facie condemnable therefore, it is seldom that damages
can be obtained for a seizure even where the vessel proves to be
1
immune. Also, because of this prima facie liability, the destructioi
of enemy prizes is not by the Declaration of London, made subject to
such grave presumptions of illegality, and the treatment to be accord-
ed the officers and crew of enemy vessels is different from that in
2
the case of neutrals.
The general principle that prizes must be brought in and that
title does not pass until legal adjudication applies to enemy private
vessels as well as neutral. The law applied by prize courts in adjud-
icating enemy prizes, has been considered in treating the belligerent'
obligations of abstention toward neutrals and enemies.
1. -The Paqueta Habanna, 175 U.S»677, (1900): and 189 U.S. 453,
(1903)
.
2. -The Declaration of London, 1909, art. 48-54, on destruction of
neutral prizes.
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3. Acts by the Civil Population.
International law requires a belligerent state to prevent its
citizens from performing certain acts against the person and property
of enemy individuals. In a large number of treaties the United States
has recognized the principle that enemy individuals in its territory
are immune from injury or confiscation of property. During both
the Mexican and Spanish wars special instructions specifically called
2
attention to such treaties. The usual criminal laws of the states
serve to prevent the spoliation of such aliens the same as in time
of peace. The treaties would also avail to gain freedom for the
alien in ease of detention by executive authority unless such deten-
tion were specifically authorized by act of congress or unless mar-
tial law had been declared in the territory in question. .Where such
cases exist, undoubtedly the courts could not intervene to release
detained enemy persons. In the alien enemies act of 1798 the deten-
tion or removal of such persons is provided for but express pro-
3
vision is made for the observance of treaty exemptions. During the
civil war, numerous detentions of this kind werd made, and although
1. -The United States has concluded twenty-seven treaties with
twenty-three countries on this subject. Ten are now in force. As
examples see treaty with Mexico, 1831-1881 , art . 26 , p. 1093; 1848, art.
22, p. 1117, Spain, 1795-1902, art .13, p. 1645; Generally a time is
specified, varying from six months to a year in which merchants may
wind up their affairs and leave the country unmolested. Supra, p.241
2. -Circular of Treasury Department to customs collectors, June 11,
1846, Br. and For. St. Pap. ,34; 1138
,
calling attention to the treaty
of 1831, giving Mexican merchants the right to leave the country,
and letter of Asst. Sec. of State, J.B.I.Ioore, Moore's Digest ,7 ;255,
calling attention to the provisions of the Spanish treaty of 1795.
Spain claimed that the treaty was abrogated by the war, a claim which
the United States denied. Such provisions as this would obviously be
meaningless if the treaty were abrogated by war. Several of these
provisions are followed by the statement that they shall not be abro-
gated by war; See Treaty with Prussia mentioned supra. p. 249, mote 2,
3. - Act July 6, 1798 1 Stat. 577. Rev. Stat. Sec. 4067-4070.
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the courts held after the war that they were not in all cases jus-
tifiable according to the constitution, as a matter of fact while
war was in progress, judicial process was of no benefit to the
1
prisoners. In this case there were, of course, no treaties provid-
ing immunity.
United otates law recognizes the principle that all commercial
intercourse between enemies stops at the outbreak of war and the
courts will not enforce obligations due to enemies on contracts or
2
commercial transactions made after the outbreak of war. The principl
is however, by no means of universal application. Private contracts
valid before the war, are valid after it, unless as in the case of
3
insurance contracts, time is an element. In such cases war suspends
but does not abrogate contracts. Furthermore contracts made in good
faith, which have no relation to the war, may be enforceable even
when made during war. Such a contract has been upheld where both
4
parties were domiciled in the same territory, and a devise by a
united otates citizen to an alien enemy, resident in the enemy count
5
was upheld
.
The confiscation of debts or other enemy property on land in the
6.
absence of express act of the sovereign has also been forbidden by
1. -Exparte .'illigan, 4 v/all 2.
2. -Jcholef ield vs. ISichelberger , 7 pet. 586; The Kapid, 8 Cranch
155, (1814); President's proclamation Aug. 16, 1861, 12 stat.1262.
3. -IT. Y.Life Ins. Co. vs. Statham, 93 U.S. 24, (1876).
4. -Kershaw vs. Kelsey, 100 Mass. 561. (1868).
5. -Fairfax 1 Devisee vs. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603, (1813). On
this general subject see Moore's Digest, 7;237-254.
6. -Georgia vs. Brailsford, 3 Dall.l; .Vare vs. Hylton, 3 Dall.199;
itanbery, Att
. Gen., 12 op. 72, (1866); Planters Bank vs. Union Bank,
16 IVall.483; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, (1877); Brown vs.
U.S. 8 Cranch 110, (1814).
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the courts. During the revolutionary war the courts held state con-
fiscation acts invalid, as conflicting with the British treaty of
peace. The fact that a citizen had paid his debt into the state
treasury was held to he no bar to the British creditors right of
1
action. Confiscation acts by congress would undoubtedly be regarded
as valid even when opposed by treaties, as acts of congress are
ordinarily held to supersede earlier treaties. Whether the passage
of such an act at all, is within the constitutional competence of
congress is a question not considered here. If the guarantee of
enemies against confiscation of debts were included in the constitu-
tion, undoubtedly the privilege could be enforced even against con-
gress by the power of the courts to declare laws unconstitutional.
In the absence of a treaty, constitutional provision or federal
statute, it is questionable whether state statutes confiscating enemy
debts could be prevented by the courts.
The confiscation of enemy private property on land when in the
zone of hostilities or in territory under military government is
justified on principles of necessity under the restrictions required
in levying requisitions and contributions by the army. Where the
property is in the belligerent states own territory, not under martia:
law the plea of necessity can not be offered. In such cases the
courts have held that the property may not be confiscated unless an
act of the sovereign specifically requires. The outbreak of war does
not itself confiscate enemy property, although the court held that
confiscation by the sovereign was compatible with international law,
2
a view no longer true.
1. -7/are vs. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, (1796).
2. -Brown vs. U.S. 8 Cranch 110, (1814); Cargo of Ship Emulous, 1
Gall. 562; U.S. vs. 1756 shares of Capital Stock, 5 Blatch. 231.
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Enemy merchant vessels in the belligerents jurisdiction on the
outbreak: of war are subject to the same rule. By the Hague conven-
tion they may not be confiscated Unless by their build they show
that they "are intended for conversion into war ships." The same
convention however, permits such vessels to be detained or requistion
ed with compensation where they can not leave in a short time because
of "force Majeure" but permission to leave in a specified time is
1
declared "desirable". The United states followed this rule in its
2
naval instructions of the Spanish war. The subject has been dis-
cussed at greater length in considering duties of abstention. Suf-
fice it to say here that the law of the United States attempts to
prevent the confiscation of such vessels as well as other enemy pri-
vate property in its jurisdiction on the outbreak of war.
1. -Hague Conventions, 1907, VI, This convention has not been sign-
ed or ratified by the United States.
2. -Inst ructions, June 20, 1898, art. 7, For. Bel. 1898, p. 780;
Proclamation, Apr. 26, 1898, 30 stat . 1770.
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CONCLUSIOK.
The views enumerated in the foregoing pages are based on the
theory that all rules of conduct, for a breach of which states as
such are held liable are rules of international law. Viewed from thi
standpoint, the rules of international law can be divided into two
general classes; (1) those prescribing lines of conduct for the
sovereign power in states, (2) those prescribing lines of conduct
for persons and governmental agencies subject to the control of the
sovereign power.
In a sense all rules of international law fall in the first
class. The responsibility for the observance of international law
and consequently the duty of enforcing it, rests with sovereigns.
Yet if we consider the rules themselves, and regard the conduct pre-
scribed rather than the responsibility imposed, a large part of them
belong in the second class and are capable of enforcanentby municipal
1
law.
It is hoped that the foregoing pages have indicated what these
rules are and the manner in which they are enforced by the municipal
law of the United States.
The rules of international law which are regarded as binding
upon the sovereign alone, are known as "political questions", and em-
brace such matters as the recognition of new states, and newly ac-
quired territory, intervention, termination of treaties and declara-
tions of war. In respect to these matters, international law has laid
1 .-"This usage, thus becomes not merely a rule for the guidance of
the state, but for the guidance, enjoyment and observance of the in-
dividual member of the body politic, and the very claim of the rule
in question, makes it of necessity a measure of municipal right and
duty." J. 3. Scott, The Legal nature of International Law, Am. Jour.
Int. Law, 1 ; 857, (1907)
.
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down rules of varying del initeness . It attempts to determine when
new states, new governments, belligerent, and insurgent communities
must be recognised, when intervention is proper, under what condition^
treaties may be terminated, etc. According to the older writers, it
detailed the circumstances under which a just war might be waged.
Observance of these rules, if indeed they are rules of international
law at all, is left to the discretion of the political departments
of the government. In the United States the president and congress
act in such circumstances according to their views of national pol-
icy. They may ordinarily follow the practice of nations in making
these decisions, but it is certain that municipal law can not compel
them to do so. The questions are political in character. Municipal
law adjusts itself in accordance with such political acts, but does
not control them. The judicial and administrative organs of govern-
ment in these matters will look to the political organs for guidance,
exclusively. They will not look beyond them, to international law.
The second group of rules of international law, lays down pre-
scriptions of conduct for private persons and public officers. In
our opinion most of the rules deserving the name of law belong in t
this class. 3uch rules may be effectively enforced, may be rules of
law in the Austininian sense, through concurrent enforcement by the
municipal law of all civilized countries. Yet they continue to de-
serve the name international because it is on account of the pres-
sure of international public opinion that they are thus concurrently
enforced by states. States are held internationally responsible
1 .-Fitz james otephen remarks that international law is not law so
far as it international and is not international so far as it is law
(History of the Criminal Law of England, 2;35). .Vith the Austinian
conception of lav; this dilemma is inevitable if we accept the liter-
al meaning of the term international law, as a law between states.
By admitting as rules of international law, those in which a vicar-
ious liability is imposed upon states for acts of individuals, we
)
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for their observance. _Iany rules of this character are enforced
through the law of the United States. The obligation to enforce them
has been recognized and made effective by means of treaties, statutes
executive orders and judicial decisions.
(1) Treaties.
Much of international law has been included in treaties to which
the United States is a party. Especially is this true in reference
to the laws of war and neutrality which have been to a considerable
extent, codified in the Hague and other international conventions.
It must, however, be emphasized that although declared law by the
constitution, treaties may embrace political questions. The con-
believe it is possible to vindicate the t§rm. 7/ith such rules the
incidence of the liabilit y and of the sanction are distinct. The
rules are international because by general international practice,
states are held liable. Yet the rules may relate to the conduct of
individuals and be capable of sanction by state authority. In so far
as they are thus sanctioned by concurrent adoption into the municipal
law of states they would conform to Austin's definition of law. It
seems to the writer that different writers on the legal nature of in-
ternational law, have written to cross purposes from failure to
reach an agreement as to whether the character of the rule, especially
the responsibility it implies, or the character of the sanction is
the criterion of international law. It is too clear to demand refut-
ation that if no rules are international law, except those enforce-
able against states, international law can not be a part of municipal
law. .Ve agree that "while the principles which international law em-
body are the product of international usage and agreement, their leg-
al force as rules controlling the administration of justice between
litigants is derived from the sanction of the state whose justice the
courts administer and by those laws the courts themselves are created!
( Willoughby ,Am. Jour .Int . Law,2;357). This however, simply states that
effective sanction can be given to rules only through state author-
ities, and if this sanction is given the rules are municipal law. If
we take the character of the rule rather than of its sanction as our
criterion of international law, Willoughby's statement does not pre-
vent the rule being at the same time a rule of international law. See
J.B.Scott and iff. W. V/illoughby, The Legal llature of International Law,
Am. Jour. Int. Law, 1 ; 831 ,2 ; 357 ,and an effort to reconcile these two
articles. Note, Harvard Law Review, 22; 66. See also John V/estlake,Is
International Law a part of the law of England? Law Quar. ^ev.,22;14.
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stitutional provision and the practice of courts and executive of-
ficers in giving direct effort to treaties so far as they apjoly to
'individuals, imparts a municipal sanction to the rules of inter-
national law. thus defined.
(2) Statutes .
Holland calls attention to the fact that in England, an "express
recognition of international lav; in an act of parliament is extremely
1 2
rare," and notes only five cases in which the term is used express-
ly. In the United States statutes the use of the term appears to
have been more frequent. "The law of nations" which is generally
used in preference to the more recent term"int ernational law" is of
3
frequent occurence. The most important statutes hearing on our
1 .-T .S.Holland ,Studies in International Law,Oxford ,1898 ,p .193.
• 2.
-The term "Law of Cations" is used in the act relating to the
privileges of ambassadors, 1709., (7 Anne cl2) the prize jurisdiction
of the court of admiralty*, 1815 (55 Geo. III. c 160, sec. 58), The Naval
Prize Act, 1864 (27-28 Vict.c25), and "Internat ional . Law" in the Ter-
ritorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878,(41-42 Vict .c73,sec.7) and the
3ea Fisheries act ,1883, (46-47 Vict .c22 ,sec.7) . Holland also notes
the use of certain terms peculiar to international law as "Neutral
Ship", "Proclamation of Neut rality"
,
"Belligerent" in a few statutes.
Holland, op .cit . ,p .194 .
3.
-The term "Law of Nations" has been used in the following cases,
possibly others: Resolution of Congress, May 22, 1779, states that
the United States will cause the "Law of Nations to be most strictly
observed", ( Journ. -Cong. 5 ;161 ,Ford. 3d. 14; 635); Aug. 2, 1779, the
United States will pay expenses for all prosecutions in states for
such"transactions as may be against the law of nations", (Journ. Cong.
5;232, Ford ,ed. ,14;914) ; Nov. 23, 1781, recommends that state legis-
latures provide for the punishment of offenses relating to violation
of safe conducts, broaches of neutrality, assaults upon public min-
isters,' infractions of treaties, and "the preceding being only those
offenses against the law of nations which are most obvious and public
faith and safety. requiring that punishment should be coextensive with
all crimes, Kesolved, that it be further recommended to the several
states to erect tribunals in each state, or to vest ones already
existing with power to decide on offences against the law of nations
not contained in the foregoing enumeration," (Journ. Cong. , 7 ;181 ,For .
ed. , 21 ;1137 ) ; Dec. 4, 1781, Courts to determine prize cases, by "the
law of nations, according to the general usages of Europe," (Journ.
Cong. 7;189, Ford, ed
.
, 21 ;1158 ) ; Constitution, 1789, Congress given
power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the
high s'eas and offences against the Law of Nations," (Art .1 ,sec .8 ,cl.l >)
Act Sept .24,1789 , District courts given jurisdiction of suits brought
by aliens for "torts in violation of "the law of nations or of treaty*,'
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subject may be roughly divided into (l) those defining the juris-
diction of courts, (2) those creating and defining the functions of
public officers, (3) those designed to prevent infractions of duty
by public officers, and (4) those of like effect in reference to
private persons.
(1) The jurisdiction of courts in relation to ambassadors, con-
suls, and aliens; over offenses against foreign states, and over
prizes of war have been prescribed both by the constitution and
statutes, often in terms making specific reference to international
law.
(2) Statutes creating and prescribing the functions of such
officers as ambassadors, ministers and consuls are of distinct im-
portance in the observance of international law, as also are those
giving executive naval and military officers authority to perform
such
duties required by international law/as expelling foreign vessels of
war which have violated neutral rights and extraditing criminals wher
required by treaty.
In these two cases, statutes frequently contain rules of inter-
national law itself. Vftien a statute requires a court to refuse
and the supreme court given exclusive jurisdiction of suits against
public ministers" as a court of law can have, consistently with the
law of nations", (1 stat .76 ,sec .9 ,13; rev.stat. sec .563, cl. 16 ,687
;
Judicial code of 1911, act March 3, 1911, 36 stat .1087 , sec . 24,cl.l7,
233), Act Apr. 30, 1790, prescribes criminal penalties for assaulting
or serving out process against public ministers, in "violation of the
law of nations", (1 stat .117 , sec .25,28 ; rev. stat. sec .4062 ,4064 )
,
Act June 5, 1794, authorizes president to expel foreign vessels in
cases in which "by the law of nations" they ought not to remain,
1 3tat .384, sec. 8, act . Apr. 20, 1818, 3 stat .447 , sec . 9 ; rev .stat . sec
.
5288; Penal Code of 1910, act March 4, 1909, 35 stat. 1088, sec .15)
Act -iarch 3, 1819, prescribes punishment for committing piracy" as de
fined by the law of nations", (3 stat .513, sec. 5; rev. stat., sec.
5368; Penal Code of 1910, sec. 290), act Aug. 29, ..1842, permits fed-
eral courts to release on Habeas Corpus from state courts, persons
claiming any right "the validity and effect 'of whi.cn depends upon -
the Law of Nations" ,(5 stat. 539, rev. stat. sec.753 ). The terms
"Law of Nations" and "International Law" occur frequently in such
executive orders as army, navy, consular and diplomatic regulations
and instructions. °
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jurisdiction of suits against foreign ministers, the rule is one
both of municipal and international law.
(3) Statutes frequently provide for enforcing the duties of
officers, ^aval and military officers and enlisted men are made
subject to military law and to civil liability for damages in cer-
tain cases. Requirements of bond and amenability to criminal pen-
alties for specified breaches of duty are specified in the case of
diplomatic officers and consuls.
(4) In the same manner private persons are made subject to
criminal prosecution for violating neutrality, for assaulting foreigr
ministers, for committing offenses against foreign states such as
counterfeiting foreign securities or for committing piracy.
Rules in these two classes are not, for the most part, rules of
international law but rules supplementary to international law. In-
ternational law does not prescribe the means to be employed by the
state in compelling persons under its jurisdiction to observe the
rules it lays down, but if they are not properly observed it holds
the state responsible. The enactment and enforcement of such rules
are therefore, of great importance in giving legal sanction to inter-
national law. Especially are such statutes necessary in the United
States in view of the fact that federal courts have no criminal
jurisdiction except in so far as has been conferred by statute.
Statutes defining boundaries, recognizing states, declaring war,
making appropriations to pay indemnities, etc., although of great
international importance are to be regarded as determinations by
congress of political questions. They do not furnish permanent rules
for the enforcement of international obligations although they may
recognize specific international duties.
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( 3) i^xecutive Orders.
Executive orders have been, for the most part, similar in
character to statutes, of the third class. They are supplementary
to statutes generally giving administrative rules in greater detail
for the guidance of public officers. Instructions and regulations
for diplomatic, consular, naval and army officers are illustrations
of rules of this character.
(4) Judicial Decisions .
In the practice of its judiciary the United States has given
most marked recognition and sanction to the rules of international
law. American courts from the earliest time have given voice to the
doctrine that international law is law in the United States and must
be applied by the courts in appropriate cases. The philosophy, bas-
ing law on natural rights, so prominent among the founders of the
.Republic, found expression throughout the constitutional system of
the United States. There was it is true, confusion of thought as to
the sources of natural law. The voice of the people, as expressed
in written constitutions, limiting the powers of government, was
considered the final criterion by many. The courts however, have
tended to recognize natural rights, based on precepts of morality or
reason, of legal force even when not so expressed. Thus while en-
forcing the authority of constitutions as against legislatures by
declaring statutes contrary to them void, they have sometimes ex-
pressed the opinion that certain fields of legislation are barred by
1
a higher law, not expressly stated in the constitution.
1.
-Goshen vs. dtonington, 4 Conn. Kep. 209,225; ,/ilkinson vs. Le-
land
, 2 Pet. 627; Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 C»anch 43; Ham vs. McClaws,
1 Bay 98 (S. Car. 1789) Bowman vs. iiiddleton, 1 Bay 254 (3. Car. 1792)
Regents of University vs. Williams, 9 Gill, and J. 365; .Mayor of
Baltimore vs. State, 15 M&. 376; Benson vs. Mayor of New York, 10
Barb. 244; Hobin vs. Hardaway, Jeff. Hep. 109, 113, (Va.); .; age vs.
Pendleton, ,/ythe
,
Hep
. , 211 , (va.1793); Quincy, iter).
,
200,474, App.520,
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The theory by which international law is applied by courts
bears a very close relation to this philosophy. In the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, international law was often consider-
1
ed a branch of natural law. If natural law was a higher law to whict
courts must give effect, so was international law, although in the
United States judicial opinion seems never to have gone the length
of holding that it must be applied even v/hen in derogation of express
2
• statute •
Mass. 1761-1772) ; Scott vs. 3anford,19 How. 393, 556; Domes vs.Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244,282. The superior authority of natural law was denied
in Calder vs. Bull, 3 D.all.386. English authority for a similar
doctrine see, Day vs. Savadge , Ho bar* ,85 , 87 ; Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1;
City of London vs. //ood, 12 Mod. 669, 687; Bonham's Case, 8 i-.ep.114 a,
4 Rep. 234; Rawles vs.Mason, Rich.Bro.wnlow, Rep. 197, 652. See Doctor
and Student ,writ ten about 1540, London, 1746 ,p .14; Blackstone upholds
the superior authority of natural law, (Commentaries, 1;41) but ad-
mits later that such laws can not render an act of parliament void
so far as municipal law is. concerned. (ibid.l;91). James 7/ilson,
Vorks
,
J.B.Andrews ,ed. ,2 vols. .Chicago ,1896, p. 415; 1 .i.I.Cooley ,a
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations , 7th ed. /Boston, 1903 p. 164;
J.B.Thayer, Cases on Constitutional Law, 2 vol. .Cambridge ,1895 ,1;1;
A. L. Lowell, Assays in Government, Bo st on ,1889
,
p. 169 ; A .C .McLaughlir
,
The Courts the Constitution, and parties, Chicago, 1912 p. 63-99;
Brinton Coxe, An essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legis-
lation, Philadelphia, 1893, ppl72, 180,227,234. C .G- .Haines , The Con-
flict over Judicial Power in the United States to 1870, Columbia
University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, (1909), 35;
16-36; C.G.Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy ,liew
York, 1914, pp. 18-24, C .H .Mclllwain.The High Court of Parliament ,1J.Y.
1910,pp. 9 7-108.
1. -Pufendorf, (1632-1694) ,Burlamaqui
,
(1694-1748)
,
and the modern
writer Lo rimer derived international law exclusively from natural
law. Blackstone, takes a similar view, Commentaries, 1;43,4;36. For
other writers in the "natural law school" of international law see
Bonfi Is ,op .cit
.
,p.64; A.S.Hershey, History of International law since
the Peace of .Vestphalia, Am. Jour. Int .Law, 6;30, (1912) . For American
writers asserting this view, see James .Yilson , Works
,
1;28,34; iff. J.
DuanP^ The Law of Nations investigated in a popular manner addressed
to the farmers of the Unitdd States, Philadelphia, 1809 ,pp .7-8. Dis-
cussion of "The Influence of the law of nature upon international lav?
in the United States", Jesse Reeves , Am. Jour. Int .Law, 3;547 , (1909 )
.
2. -The obligation of courts to apply international law was derived
from the theory of natural law in a number of cases of the latter
18th century. See Rutgers vs. "Jaddington, Mayor court of R.Y.,1784,
Thayers
,
cases, 1;63; Res Publica vs. DeLangchamsp ,1 Dall .111 , (Pa.
1784); in re Henfield, Fed. Cas.6360; //are vs.Hylton, 3 Dall. 194.
British Prize courts sometimes asserted that they must apply inter-
national law even when conflicting with statutes and executive orders.
The Recovery, 6 Rob. 348; The Maria, 1 Rob. 350; LeLouis,2 Dods.239;
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Chief Justice Liarshall always maintained that the courts apply
national law alone, hut hy the regard which he showed for internation-
1
al comity, and by the stand he took that international law is incor-
porated into the law of the United States and must he applied unless
expressly changed hy legislation, he showed the influence of the
2
theory of a higher law. Through the history of the United States
The Annapolis ,30 L.J.Pr.M.and Ad. 201 ;Phillimore , International Law,
3; sec. 436. "In the Minerva (circa 1807) Sir J.Mackintosh, then Re-
corder of Bombay, and acting under a Commission of Prize, spoice of
its being the duty of the judge to disregard the instructions, sup-
posing them illegal, and to consult only that universal law to which
all civilized Princes and States acknowledge themselves to be subject'.'
Holland .Studies
,
p. 197, cited Life Sir. J. Mackintosh, 1;317.
Hee also supra p. 177.
1. -Schooner Exchange vs. McPaddon,7 Granch 116.
2. -Talbot vs. Seaman, 1 Granch 1,37; Murray vs. The Charming Betsey,
2 Cranch 64,118; The ilereide , 9 Cranch 388,423; The Antelope, 10 V/heat
66,120. The reception of international law into the law of the United
States has been based on three theories, or four if we include the one
just mentioned which really asserts the authority of a "higher law"
superior to municipal law. These are:(l), International law was part
of the common law and was accepted with it. "The first craft that
carried an English settler to the new world was freighted with the
common law, of which the law of nations was and is a part." J.B.Scott,
Am. Jour, Int .Law, 1; 857 , (1907 ) ; "It is indubitable, that the customary
law of European nations is a part of the common law, and by adoption,
that of the United States," A. Hamilton, Letters of Camillus.Uo. 20,
Works, Lodge, ed.,9 vols.,ju.Y. 1885, 5;89. (2) International law was
impliedly received by the terms of the constitution . The Federal Con-
stitution provides that congress shall have power to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations and to make rules concerning cap-
tures on land and water. Further more it is declared that treaties
made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme
law of the land. The effect of these clauses which recognize the ex-
istence of a body of international laws and the granting to congress
of the power to punish offenses against them, the courts have repeat-
edly held is to adopt these laws into our municipal law en bloc, ex-
cept where congress or the treaty making power has expressly changed
them." W. / . Willoughby, Am. Jour. Int .Law, 2; 365. (3) International
law itself and the privilege of membership in the family of nations,
puts the courts of the United States under an obligation to apply in-
ternational law in appropriate cases. "The statesmen and jurists of
the United States do not regard international law as having become
binding on their country through the intervention of any legislature.
They do not believe it to be of the nature of immemorial usage, 'of
which the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. 1 They look upon
its rules as a main part of the conditions on which a state is orig-
inally received into the family of civilized nations. - - - If they
put it in another way it would probably be that the state which dis-
claims the authority of international law places herself outside the
circle of civilized nations." Sir. H .S .Maine .International Law.li.Y.,
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the courts have in theory maintained this view which was never more
emphatically pronounced than in 1900 by the supreme court in the case
1
of Paqueta Eabana. They have also, habitually supported the rule
applied in such cases by citations from authorities characteristic
of int ernational law. The works of publicists, of which those of
Vattel, Bynkershoek .Grotius , V/heaton and Kent are probably the most
been 2
frequent have/ freely cited. Treaties have been frequently adverted
to, as well as statutes and court decisions of foreign countries of
3
which those of Great Britain are by far the most numerous. EistoricajL
accounts of international practice has also sometimes been cited as
4
evidence of the rule of international law on the subject in question
The fields in which international law has been actually applied
in this manner may be classified as (1) cases relating to jurisdic-
( 2
)
cases arising upon the succession to sovereignty,
tiorVand (3) prize and maritime cases,. By defining the limits of
national jurisdiction, according to international law, by refusing
jurisdiction of extraterritorial offenses, and suits against foreign
sovereigns, by refusing to give extraterritorial effect to laws and
by assuming jurisdiction over prizes of war, courts have enforced
The same is true where courts have applied existing law and re-
duties of international lav;./ spected tested rights in newly ac-
quired territory. In determining prize cases, the courts
1887,p. 37. To similar effect, Phillimore
,
op .cit .1 ; 78 ;3ecretary of
State Jefferson to Genet. French I.Iinister, 1793, Am. 3t . Pap. For.
Rel. 1;150; Assist. Secretary of State Rives to Mr, -IcGarr, For. Rel.
1888, pt . 1, pp. 490, 492; I.Ioore's Digest, 1;1-11; See also cases cit-
ed. Eote 1 supra p. 7, and statutes. Hote. Supra.
p
1. -The Paqueta Eabana, 175 U.3 .694, (1907 )
.
2. -Other publicists frequently quoted have been Pufendorf , Ruther-
ford, .'/icquefort, .7olf, Halleck, Calvo
,
Perels,Eall.
3. -On the Authority of British prize precedents in United States
courts see Chief Justice Liarshall in Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar vs.
Boyle, 9 Granch 191,(1815). During the civil war Lord Stowell's
prize decisions were relied on almost entirely.
4. -In the Paqueta Eabana, 175 U.S. 694, Justice Gray makes exten-
sive citations from all of the kinds of sources mentioned.
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have in general made a faithful effort to apply international law as
their theory demanded, although exception should he made in some of
the civil war cases. So long as international law has to he applied
by national tribunals it can not hut he warped by its proximity to
considerations of policy and the inevitable partizanship of officers
who owe a primary duty to one of the litigant states.
The division of power between the state and national governments
have at times resulted in an inability to perform obligations re-
quired by international law. The states not having international
relations and not feeling the pressure of international public
opinion cannot be relied on to enforce duties of international law.
It would seem however, that under the constitution the national
government may exercise all povrers necessary to make treaties and
obligations of international law, effective. The difficulty is in
the failure of congress to act, rather than a constitutional im-
possibility.
The United States has provided in its municipal law for the
enforcement of numerous rules of international lav/. How completely
the- field is covered, we will not venture to assert. To define
exactly what obligations are actual international law at any par-
ticular time is almost impossible. The field of international law
is constantly growing. LIatter3 yesterday considered entirely in-
ternal today entail international responsibility and are regulated
by international law. The government must therefore, be constantly
on the lookout for new international- duties , which require supple-
mentary legislation to be made effective. The failure to provide
such necessary municipal measures does not relieve the state from
international responsibility if a breach of international law
occurs
.
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The municipal enforcement of international law is a matter of
great importance from the standpoint "both of international law and
natio al policy. There are no administrative or judicial author-
ities with coercive power except those of states. The growth of
international unions and administrative organs has been rapid in the
last few years but such bodies still rely on states^for effective-
ness. Power is essential to effective sanction and power is still
controlled by states exclusively. Rules of international law, can
not, therefore, be effective unless enforced by state authorities as
2
municipal law.
national policy likewise, dictates the provision of municipal
measures for enforcing international obligations. Since the Alabama
claims arbitration it has been clear that lack of such laws will not
relieve the state from responsibility. Liability to indemnity, re-
prisal or war can only be avoided by a strict observance of inter-
national duty, and this observance can in many cases be assured only
by adequate provisions of municipal lav/.
1. -Robert Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State, Am. Jour. Int.
Law, 1 ;105-128 , 297 T320 , emphasizes the importance of physical power
in the sanction of law. rules of
2. -Though not incorporated into municipal law, /international law
may be law in the 3ense of being rules of great authority generally
observed. They would occupy the position, which Llaine assigns to
the Brehon laws of ancient Ireland. "The Law of Distress, was clear-
ly enough conceived by the Brehon lawyers, but it depended ior the
practical obedience which it obtained on the aid of public opinion
and of popular respect for a professional caste. Its object was to
force disputants to submit to what was rather an arbitration than
an action, before a Brehon selected by themselves or at most before
some recognized tribunal advised by a Brehon." Sir E.S. Llaine, Early
History of Instirutio ns
,
Ef.Y. 1875, p. 286. See also ibid ,pp .52-252.
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